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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of European integration through a 
focus on the politics surrounding transnational high-speed rail infrastructure. Although it has 
been argued that a discourse on the creation of a ‘Europe of Flows’ has become dominant in 
policy development, the spatial conflicts that this type of infrastructure involves and the wide 
array of political actors concerned cast doubts on the smooth development of such a space. 
The thesis aim is pursued through a critical approach that considers policy problems as 
socially constructed, seeks to reveal the power struggles in policy-making, and places space 
at the centre of the study of politics. Thus, an analytical framework that combines discourse 
analysis, social and political theories of power and a spatially-nuanced approach informed by 
human geography debates on scale and relationality was adopted and applied to the case of a 
cross-border and EU-relevant high-speed rail line in the Spanish Basque Country. 
The case study first demonstrates the existence of a hegemonic discourse on transport 
infrastructure development, which accommodated a variety of concerns according to 
different scalar frames and was produced and reproduced in state, private sector and 
mainstream media discursive arenas. Proponents of an alternative construction based on the 
notion of proximity unsuccessfully struggled to challenge the former from other, minor 
arenas. Although those actors practicing the hegemonic discourse supported the high-speed 
rail line, the continuing prevalence of nation-state actors and power arenas largely prevented 
the timely development of a truly trans-European link, in spite of the efforts of both EU 
institutions and several transnational networks of association. Overall, the thesis illustrates 
how transnational high-speed rail infrastructure policy-making shapes, rather than a 
frictionless ‘Europe of Flows’, a hybrid European space that results from complex struggles 
for discursive hegemony and effective influence in the policy process. 
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Note on the use of Spanish and Basque terms and 
quotations 
For the sake of clarity, terms and quotations in Spanish and Basque have generally been 
translated by the author. However, when the meaning of terms could not be accurately 
conveyed in English (e.g. vertebración or gaztetxe) the original form has been kept in italics 
and, when necessary, an explanation of its meaning has been provided. This is also the case 
of the names of organizations (e.g. Asamblea contra el TAV) and of key policy documents 
(e.g. Estudio Informativo). References in languages other than English have not been 
translated. 
In terms of place names, the English term was only used when referring to regions or 
nation-states (e.g. Spain and Catalonia); in the other cases, the official name was employed. 
When both the Spanish and the Basque terms were official, the one deemed most common or 
easiest to identify was preferred (e.g. San Sebastián instead of Donostia). Place names in 
Spanish or Basque have not been italicized. 
 
1 Introduction 
 ‘We shorten distances; we bring people closer together.’ 
When I entered the main train station of the northern Spanish city of San Sebastián, 20 km 
from the French border, the information stand set up by the Spanish infrastructure manager 
ADIF on a new high-speed rail line was still closed and these last words of its promotional 
video1 had not yet been played that morning. A few months earlier I had decided to focus my 
research on this precise line, which links the cities of Vitoria, Bilbao and San Sebastián in 
the Basque Country region and belongs to one of the Trans-European Transport Network 
corridors promoted by the European Union. That weekday of September 2011 was the last of 
my four days of initial fieldwork, and I had planned to depart early and briefly visit the 
Goierri on my way to Vitoria, where I would spend the day checking documents at the 
Basque Government offices. A mountainous and industrial subregion with a strong 
nationalist tradition, the Goierri had witnessed significant contestation to the project. 
‘According to what is expected, the journey between Vitoria and Bilbao will take around 28 minutes, 
between Vitoria and San Sebastián 34 minutes, and between Bilbao and San Sebastián 38 minutes.’ 
After around 45 minutes, I got off the train in Ordizia, a town of 10,000 inhabitants where 
the construction of one of the branches of the studied line had started in 2008. The town was 
barely awaking and the morning mist prevented discerning the valley and locating the 
Txindoki, the emblematic mountain that overlooks the town from over 1,300 metres high. 
The market square, characteristically covered by a concrete structure, was empty and, 
passing by a banner on ‘amnesty and freedom’ for the imprisoned members of the Basque 
terrorist group ETA, I walked out of the small historical centre towards the site of the works. 
On the right bank of the river Oria, which links the string of towns of the lower Goierri, sat 
the main factory of CAF, a railway equipment manufacturer that has produced rolling stock 
for networks across the globe, from California to New Zealand (CAF, 2013). 
‘The important orographic difficulties of the land have resulted in almost two thirds of the route being 
installed on special structures, such as tunnels or viaducts.’ 
On the other side of the river, where the high-speed rail line would be built, a steep slope 
climbed behind the residential buildings along the road. In the surroundings of Ordizia, the 
line would in fact only emerge overground for less than 200 m in one of the narrow valleys 
perpendicular to the Oria. According to promotional materials produced by the government, 
                                                     
 
1 Available at ADIF (2010). 
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in the Goierri 90% of the line would run through tunnels. I left the main road and walked 
some 200 m into the valley until the entrance of the construction site. Still, the works on the 
tunnels were nowhere in sight. 
‘The implementation of this infrastructure will favour both the internal connections in the Basque Country 
and the relations with other regions, France and the rest of Europe.’ 
There, looking at the succession of hills that faded into the distance and among which a 
small viaduct was apparently being built, it was not difficult to think of high-speed rail as 
comparable in this case to air travel: a fast, long-distance transport mode so foreign to the 
spaces it bypasses that its only presence is a distant, passing noise. The main difference, 
obviously, is that the former is evidently grounded – it does not run above the land, but 
across it. It therefore involves a politics over space between actors with different stakes in it. 
The apparent absence of the high-speed rail line in the Goierri, rather than being simply 
explained by its disconnectedness from the subregion’s dynamics, could in fact be the 
outcome of a very material conflict between local and distant interests over space. 
 
Some authors have argued that there is a hegemonic project to create a single, uniform 
European space, a ‘monotopia’ underpinned by a vision of frictionless mobility through 
inter-city networks (Jensen and Richardson, 2004). As a result of this, a remote border valley 
that could be framed as an important ecological habitat or the site of a traditional farming 
community may become constructed as a barrier to cross-border network integration (Jensen 
and Richardson, 2004, p. 75). The tensions between a networked space of flows and the local 
spaces traversed by it has in fact been conceptualized through the contrast between flows and 
places (Hajer, 2000; Albrechts and Coppens, 2003), based on Castells’ (2010) duality of the 
‘space of flows’ and the ‘space of places’. The Spanish Basque Country, a border region 
with important topographical difficulties, could well be considered one of these places that 
pose friction to the seamless circulation of persons and goods that an integrated European 
space requires. However, a superficial examination of the problem points at a more nuanced 
situation. 
There was certainly a significant conflict concerning the impacts of the infrastructure on 
the area. Contestation had emerged locally and to a large extent, too, in those spaces not 
served and immediately impacted by the line. However, the problem seemed to have more 
facets than the duality of flows and places suggests. By linking the main Basque cities in less 
than 40 minutes, the line would provide a fast and comfortable means of transport between 
them, potentially contributing to modal shift from road to rail and thus reducing congestion 
on the regions’ roads. In fact, the Spanish infrastructure manager was emphasizing the intra-
regional, rather than trans-border, character of the line (‘Vitoria-Bilbao-San Sebastián high-
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speed rail line’) in its information stands at these cities’ train stations. In addition, actors 
from the by-passed localities may not necessarily have opposed such a project: industries in 
the Goierri might have seen in the rail line an opportunity to reduce their transport costs if it 
could carry freight traffic, as the government claimed, and if they had access to the network. 
Although at the bottom of a narrow valley in Ordizia the local and the trans-local could 
hardly seem more disconnected, European integration appeared to be just one of the several 
dimensions involved in the conflict over space that the high-speed rail line involved. The 
project would help to eliminate the friction posed to trans-European relations by a border, 
mountainous space, but it might also be seen as an opportunity to re-shape inter-urban 
relations in the region. The line’s disconnection with and impact on the locality may have 
contributed to its placement into the surrounding hills, yet local actors might also welcome 
the potential access to new markets that it could provide. The question, then, does not seem 
to be reducible to a duality based on scales (the European vs. the local). A wide variety of 
actors, with their different interests, views on the policy issue, and conceptualizations of 
space converge around a particular land use issue and, according to their ability to influence 
the policy process, lead to a single policy outcome. A trans-European high-speed rail line 
was certainly being implemented, but to what extent did it also present nation-state or 
regionally-specific features? Is it simply a European, frictionless space that is emerging, or 
does it present hybrid characteristics according to the diversity of interests involved? Are the 
varied perspectives held by different actors on the project compatible and, if not, what are 
the insurmountable differences between opposing actors? Have EU actors driven the policy 
process, or have other state and non-state actors been influential in shaping its outcome? In 
other words, how is European integration taking place on the ground? 
 
 
1.1 Framing the problem  
The development of transport infrastructure, through the re-shaping of spatial relations that it 
involves, has played a key role in the economic and political integration of territories. In 
Europe, the Roman road network, essential in maintaining political control and facilitating 
trade across the Empire, is a classic case in this respect, but examples abound throughout 
history (see Johnson and Turner, 1997, pp. 1–6). For instance, the improvement of the inland 
transport system in 18th-century England contributed to the industrial development of the 
country by, among other implications, widening the market for goods through the reduction 
of transport costs (Szostak, 1991). Additionally, the development of the German rail system 
in the 19th century promoted economic integration across the German states and, together 
with the Zollverein (a customs union established in 1834) laid the foundations of the political 
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unification of 1871 (Henderson, 1975, p. 52). European economic integration, according to 
its advocates, equally involves the development of a single space through the implementation 
of infrastructure that transcends nation-state borders.2 High-speed rail, because of the 
reduction of travel times between distant points that it entails (among other factors), is 
indeed central to this endeavour. This development, in turn, requires the establishment of 
policy-making spaces beyond those that have traditionally regulated rail infrastructure 
development in Europe. 
 
1.1.1 European integration and transnational high-speed rail: towards a 
‘splintered’ European space 
The importance of infrastructure in shaping a European space that transcends the borders of 
nation-states is not circumscribed to the last three decades. Recent historical research has 
investigated the contribution of infrastructure to the spatial and political integration of 
Europe since the 19th century (Anastasiadou, 2011; Badenoch and Fickers, 2010; van der 
Vleuten and Kaijser, 2006). More specifically, the post-war European integration process has 
involved from its outset a formal attempt to create a single European space through transport 
initiatives that would facilitate the effective establishment of a common market. The 
development of such a market was already central to the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing 
the European Economic Community (EEC), which also included a first outline of a common 
transport policy.3 However, for the following decades European transport policy 
developments were scarce (Stevens, 2004, pp. 47–56) and in fact by the mid-20th century rail 
systems in Europe had been placed under the control of nation-state governments and their 
rail companies (Ross, 1998, p. 67). The European dimension in transport policy, including 
infrastructure, has only gained significance recently, against the background of the impetus 
given in the 1980s to the creation of the EU Single Market. Its establishment entailed, as 
indicated by the 1986 Single European Act, the promotion of the free movement of goods, 
                                                     
 
2 The term ‘nation-state’ is used throughout the thesis to refer to the modern, conventional notion of 
the sovereign state that is being challenged by socio-economic, cultural and political developments 
(see also footnote 7). Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the contentious nature of the term 
‘nation’ and its derivatives, including the concept of nation-state, in particular in the light of the 
growth of transnationalism or increased interconnectivity across nation-state borders (e.g. Kearney, 
1995; Smith and Guarnizo, 1998) and the emergence of stateless nationalisms (Keating, 2004). In this 
respect, in this thesis no assumption is made regarding the actual existence of nations and their 
association with specific territories. Additionally, the term ‘central state’ has been occasionally 
employed to emphasize the contrast with other state formations within the nation-state.    
3 Stevens (2004, p. 171) has noted that negotiations leading to this Treaty had considered the 
development of a European transport infrastructure network, yet reference to it was finally omitted 
from the final text of the Treaty. 
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persons, services and capital, for which smooth transport across nation-state borders was 
fundamental. 
This period was accompanied by significant transport infrastructure policy 
developments at the EU level, in an intensification of what Nugent (2010) has termed the 
‘deepening’ of the European integration process. As Stevens (2004, pp. 173–177) has 
pointed out, these responded not only to the establishment of the Single Market initiative but 
also to other political (e.g. compensation to the less developed regions), practical (e.g. 
increase in intra-European trade) and institutional (e.g. the activity of the European 
Commission) developments. The most important initiative with regard to transport 
infrastructure was the Trans-European Networks (TENs) for transport, telecommunications 
and energy. The inclusion of a Title on TENs in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which created 
the European Union, provided the legal basis for the development of guidelines in the field 
of TENs, the implementation of measures to ensure the interoperability of the networks, and 
the provision of financial support for projects of European interest. Among the TENs, the 
Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) focused on transport infrastructure and 
included roads, rail (including high-speed rail), inland waterways and ports, seaports, 
airports and a combined transport network. European-level work on high-speed rail 
infrastructure occurred in parallel to the development of TEN-T policy and even provided, 
according to a working group set up by the Commission (High-Level Group “The European 
High-Speed Train Network,” 1995, p. 16), significant impetus to it. 
Within EU transport infrastructure policy, high-speed rail (HSR) is in fact a particular 
case.4 First, it was regarded as especially relevant to the European project. Ross (1998, p. 71) 
has argued that high-speed rail had been considered a triple catalyst in economic terms: as a 
way of helping the rail industry to recover from its decline, as a means of providing new 
impetus to the common transport policy, and as a promoter of growth and development 
through the creation of demand, new markets and employment. In an earlier paper, Ross 
(1994) had indeed examined the high expectations placed on this mode of transport as a 
vehicle to foster European integration, which he understood as the reduction of inter-regional 
differences, the facilitation of the aforementioned ‘four freedoms’ of the Single Market, and 
the harmonization of the nation-state rail systems. The importance of high-speed rail within 
EU transport infrastructure policy has also been emphasized and critically examined by 
Vickerman (1997) and others (Spiekermann and Wegener, 1996; Vickerman et al., 1999). 
                                                     
 
4 Since the emphasis here is on high-speed rail of European relevance, the definition of a high-speed 
rail line adopted in this thesis is that of the EU Directive 96/48/EC on the interoperability of the trans-
European HSR system (Council of the EU, 1996): a especially built line designed for speeds of at 
least 250 km/h, or a especially upgraded line equipped for speeds of 200 km/h or lower in the case of 
topographical, relief or town planning constraints.  
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Secondly, since it links a reduced number of distant nodes – in particular in its trans-
European dimension – it is arguably the land transport mode that involves, in the words of 
Graham and Marvin (2001), a greater ‘splintering’ of space. This phenomenon not only has 
negative environmental impacts on the areas it bypasses (e.g. through noise or land 
fragmentation), but may also reduce their overall accessibility as their access to the new 
network is limited (‘corridor effects’) and traffic is drawn from the conventional rail network 
(‘shadow effects’) (Vickerman, 1994, p. 17, 1997, p. 35). The accessibility changes that 
trans-European HSR development entail are in fact uneven within regions; the highest 
absolute increases in accessibility are in the nodes of the network, in particular in the central 
regions of Europe (Vickerman et al., 1999). Instead of a ‘shrinking continent’ (Spiekermann 
and Wegener, 1994), the European space shaped by high-speed rail resembles more the 
crumpled handkerchief famously described by Serres: 
‘If you take a handkerchief and spread it out in order to iron it, you can see in it certain fixed distances and 
proximities. If you sketch a circle in one area, you can mark out nearby points and measure far-off 
distances. Then take the same handkerchief and crumple it, by putting it in your pocket. Two distant points 
suddenly are close, even superimposed. If, further, you tear it in certain places, two points that were close 
can become very distant’ (Serres and Latour, 1995, p. 60).5 
The development of EU policy on a trans-European HSR network is thus closely related to 
both the European project and to the production of a differentiated space that privileges the 
linkage of distant points at the expense of short-distance relations. The radical difference 
between the spatiality of this type of infrastructure and the bounded territoriality of the 
nation-state that has traditionally dominated rail planning and development points at the 
relevance of studying the politics leading to the implementation of a transnational HSR line.6 
 
1.1.2 The democratic nature of transnational infrastructure politics in the 
context of European integration: relevance and normative implications 
of the research study 
Transnational high-speed rail development cuts to the heart of debates on European 
integration. The deepening of the European integration process involves an erosion of the 
                                                     
 
5 This topological notion, as the conversation between Serres and Latour shows, applies to not only 
space but also time. 
6 The term ‘transnational’ is employed for the type of infrastructure studied in this research in order to 
emphasize its relevance beyond nation-state borders (see also footnote 3) while avoiding its exclusive 
identification with the European dimension and TEN-T policy, which is referred to with the term 
‘trans-European’.  
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sovereignty or capacity to exercise authority without external restraints of the nation-state 
(Nugent, 2010, p. 428). The notion of the nation-state is based on the conceptual template of 
the modern inter-state system that emerged from the Peace of Westphalia, which is 
composed of sovereign states with a monopoly of legitimate violence within their boundaries 
(Caporaso, 1996, p. 34). It consolidated when the development of nationalism since the end 
of the 18th century (Anderson, 2006) led to the establishment of an essential link between the 
state and the nation that the people had become, which provided the source of legitimation to 
the nation-state (Habermas, 1996; Taylor, 2003). Fundamentally, the relationship between 
sovereignty, state, and nation was premised on territoriality: sovereignty entailed the 
monopoly of authority over separated, mutually exclusive and fixed territories (Ruggie, 
1993), which in turn constituted the ‘containers’ of nations (Taylor, 2003). As Taylor noted, 
‘the domination of political practice in the world by territoriality is a consequence of this 
territorial link between sovereign territory and national homeland’ (2003, p. 101).7  
The question of transcending the nation-state without losing its conventionally assigned 
legitimacy is therefore central to European integration, as the tensions between 
intergovernmental and supranational approaches to this process indicate (Nugent, 2010, pp. 
428–429), in particular with regard to the development of transport policy (Ross, 1998, p. 
xii; Stevens, 2004, pp. 221–241). This is especially the case of rail infrastructure policy, due 
to the centrality of the nation-state in regulating rail systems in Europe. In areas of shared 
competences, this dilemma has been addressed since the Treaty of Maastricht by basing the 
distribution of authority between EU institutions and nation-states on the federal principle of 
subsidiarity (Føllesdal, 1998; Scott et al., 1994; van Kersbergen and Verbeek, 1994). 
According to it, decisions are to be taken as close as possible to the citizen and EU action 
must be limited to those instances where the objectives cannot be effectively achieved at 
lower levels of government.8 The principle of subsidiarity is central to transnational high-
speed rail as it is the basis on which the realization of TEN-T rests (Stephenson, 2010a, p. 
715). Indeed, academic attention has focused on the appropriate balance of power between 
the different policy-making levels in order to deliver a transnational transport network 
(Sichelschmidt, 1999; Turró, 1999; Vickerman, 1995). The bias towards lower levels of 
government that the principle of subsidiarity presents reflects a concern for enhancing the 
                                                     
 
7 The notion of the nation-state is pervasive and has in fact been traditionally considered the natural 
site for modern politics by the social sciences (Agnew, 1994; Taylor, 1996). However, over the last 
three decades it has been challenged by a diverse body of work on the spatiality of the state (Brenner 
et al., 2003). 
8 In fact, as Scott et al. (1994) noted, subsidiarity as formulated in the Treaty is not only a procedural 
device that determines the division of responsibilities between the EU and nation-states, but also a 
substantive principle referring to broad notions of democratic control, thus potentially enabling a 
greater role for lower levels of government. 
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EU’s legitimacy and mitigate its so-called ‘democratic deficit’ (Scott et al., 1994):9 whereas 
higher levels of government are expected to increase the efficiency of policy, lower levels 
are considered to enhance its legitimacy. 
According to this perspective, an increasing role of EU institutions and other non-
nation-state actors in the development of transnational rail links would raise questions about 
the democratic nature of policy-making. Authors from a variety of disciplines have in fact 
pointed out the challenges that globalization poses to the understanding of democracy as 
framed by territorial units (e.g. Anderson, 2002a; Low, 1997; Shapiro and Hacker-Cordón, 
1999). However, as these works suggest, globalization does not necessarily mean a decline 
of democracy, although there is certainly a concern about the limited nature of nation-state 
democracy in this context. A democratic politics more in line with current conditions may be 
achieved by embracing non-territoriality or transnationality: Anderson (2002b, p. 6), for 
instance, has claimed that ‘border-crossing transnationalism’ may provide settings for more 
participatory forms of democracy and increase the currently limited democratic quality of 
politics. Indeed, Agnew’s (2005, 2009) argument that sovereignty is not inherently territorial 
suggests that politics and democracy in particular do not necessarily require to be organized 
territorially, that is through separate and geographically bounded state spaces. Several 
authors have in fact claimed for alternative democratic politics that are less territorially-
based (Anderson, 2002b; Low, 1997). 
Nevertheless, considering the tensions between European integration and the traditional 
dominance of the nation-state in rail infrastructure planning and development, it is important 
to clarify which type of politics is accompanying the implementation of such a trans-border 
and spatially networked transport infrastructure as is transnational high-speed rail: the extent 
to which this politics is based on the traditional, bounded spaces of liberal representative 
democracy or on alternative, possibly networked or defined by different boundaries, political 
spaces; and the degree of influence of elected politicians, officials, experts, and private 
sector and civil society organizations. The study of European integration through the politics 
involved in a very spatial issue would not only help identify the difficulties and challenges 
this process entails, but also point at its possible democratic limitations.10 
 
 
                                                     
 
9 The EU has been traditionally seen as having a ‘democratic deficit’ due to the lack of legitimacy and 
accountability of its institutions (see Weiler et al., 1995, for what they term a “standard version” of 
this deficit). However, the existence of this deficit is not universally accepted and the concept has in 
fact led to significant academic debate involving prominent figures in the study of the EU (e.g. 
Føllesdal and Hix, 2006; Majone, 1998; Moravcsik, 2002). 
10 This broader question will be returned to in the concluding chapter of the thesis (Section 9.3.2). 
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1.2 Framing the research 
Transnational high-speed rail infrastructure development has been approached from a wide 
variety of disciplines and perspectives. Significant contributions have naturally come from 
the European studies field (e.g. Ross, 1998; Stevens, 2004), but also from public policy (e.g. 
Hajer, 2000; Lemberg, 1995). The challenges of transcending conventional political borders 
have been addressed from transport studies and spatial planning perspectives (e.g. Nijkamp 
and Vleugel, 1995; Priemus and Zonneveld, 2003), whilst contributions from spatial analysis 
and applied economics have evaluated the desirability of this type of infrastructure (e.g. de 
Rus and Nombela, 2007; Spiekermann and Wegener, 2006). This section introduces this 
heterogeneous body of work and defines the particular approach adopted in this research. 
 
1.2.1 Existing scholarship: an emphasis on EU policy and technical 
assessments 
Although academic work on transnational HSR infrastructure has indeed been enormously 
varied, it has generally presented either one or both of these characteristics: an emphasis on 
EU policy and a largely technical assessment of the problems related to its implementation 
or of its justification. 
Concerning the first characteristic, academic work on transnational transport 
infrastructure, including high-speed rail, has largely – and understandably – focused on the 
development of EU policy, in particular the Trans-European Transport Network initiative. A 
number of studies have applied theories of European integration to understand the 
emergence and development of EU policy on transport and trans-European transport 
infrastructure networks (Dyrhauge, 2013; Stephenson, 2003, 2010b; Stevens, 2004). A 
second and partially overlapping body of work has addressed the EU transport infrastructure 
policy process. Thus, Peters (2005) has examined the development of policy on a European 
HSR network in a broad sense, even including ‘history-making’ decisions related to the 
deepening of the integration process, while Stephenson (2009, 2010a, 2012) has focused on 
different stages of the TEN-T policy process. Thirdly, more critical work has addressed the 
rationales underlying TEN-T policy, analyzing the existence and main characteristics of a 
hegemonic policy discourse (Hajer, 2000; Jensen and Richardson, 2004), its internal 
contradictions (Peters, 2003a), the production of knowledge that legitimizes it (Richardson, 
2006) and the limitations for environmental policy integration (Richardson, 1997). 
There is, however, a limited number of works that have addressed transnational HSR 
infrastructure policy-making beyond an exclusive focus on EU policy. These have examined 
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specific cases, notably the Channel Tunnel (Holliday et al., 1991; Ross, 1995) and the 
Øresund link and other cross-border links involving Denmark (Lemberg, 1995; Linnros and 
Hallin, 2001; Ross, 1995),11 but also others such as a new line in the Randstad-Flemish 
Diamond corridor (Romein et al., 2003). These case studies consider EU policy-making as 
one of several factors affecting transnational HSR development and thus they direct attention 
to other issues, such as the nation-state dimension of cross-border projects (Ross, 1995), 
multi-scalar infrastructure planning (Romein et al., 2003), public-private sector relations 
(Holliday et al., 1991), and the influence of actors in the policy process (Lemberg, 1995). 
With regard to the second characteristic, contributions from a variety of disciplines have 
studied the development of trans-border infrastructure starting from the premise that the 
development of transnational infrastructure networks is required to respond to the needs of 
an integrating Europe. A first group of academics from political economy (Johnson and 
Turner, 1997, 2007) and transport planning (Banister et al., 1995; Nijkamp and Vleugel, 
1995; Turró, 1999) have considered the barriers to such an enterprise and generally provided 
recommendations to overcome them. A similar yet less transport-based approach came from 
the spatial planning field, which has investigated the adoption of governance arrangements 
appropriate for the integrated development of trans-border corridors (Priemus and 
Zonneveld, 2003; Witte et al., 2013; Zanon, 2011). Although varied in their perspectives, the 
common concern of these works is the need to overcome the enduring importance of nation-
state borders and the need to develop a coordinated transnational approach. 
More critical work has of course been produced that evaluated the desirability of 
transnational transport infrastructure and HSR networks, yet, apart from the aforementioned 
contributions on the rationales underlying TEN-T policy, it has consisted of technical 
analyses on the spatial and economic implications of this type of infrastructure. A number of 
authors have sought to ascertain the potential contribution to balanced development – in 
accessibility and regional development terms – of the trans-European rail network 
(Spiekermann and Wegener, 2006; Wegener et al., 2005) and, more generally, the Trans-
European Transport Network (Gutiérrez, 2001; Gutiérrez et al., 1996; Vickerman et al., 
1999). These studies reveal a complex pattern whereby these networks in fact tend to widen 
the spatial disparities throughout the European space.12 Although not explicitly considering 
the trans-European dimension, some academics have focused more narrowly on evaluating 
                                                     
 
11 The Channel Tunnel, the Øresund link and the Great Belt link connecting East Denmark with 
continental Europe constituted in fact the three case studies used by Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) to illustrate 
their analysis of risk and accountability in megaprojects. 
12 A much wider stream of work has assessed the various impacts, including the environmental ones, 
of high-speed rail as a transport mode – see the reviews by Givoni (2006), Campos and de Rus (2009) 
and Albalate and Bel (2012) for useful summaries.  
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the economic profitability, which excludes indirect effects such as the environmental and 
regional development impacts, of new high-speed rail lines (de Rus and Nombela, 2007). 
Their analyses of specific lines belonging to the TEN-T network (Sevilla-Madrid and 
Madrid-Barcelona) suggest that their development was not economically justified (de Rus 
and Inglada, 1997; de Rus and Román, 2006). 
 
1.2.2 A critical perspective: research aim and questions 
The literature reviewed above has firstly devoted limited attention to the policy process 
surrounding the development of transnational HSR infrastructure, where the EU level of 
policy-making is only one of the several levels involved. Secondly, apart from a few 
significant exceptions, existing scholarship has tended to explain and evaluate the 
development of this type of infrastructure without essentially questioning its very rationale. 
Much of this work has sought to develop an understanding of policy processes (Holliday et 
al., 1991; Stephenson, 2003; Stevens, 2004) and the difficulties which the development of 
this type of infrastructure faces (Johnson and Turner, 1997; Nijkamp and Vleugel, 1995; 
Ross, 1995). Although some of these authors have been cautious about the capacity of TEN-
T networks to fulfil the expectations placed on them by their promoters (Spiekermann and 
Wegener, 2006; Stevens, 2004, p. 191; Ross, 1994; Vickerman, 1997), they have not 
challenged the need to respond to the requirements of an economically integrating Europe. 
In this respect, these works do not generally present the characteristics of what has been 
termed critical social theory (Agger, 2006) and critical geography (Hubbard et al., 2002, pp. 
62–73; Blomley, 2006). Critical enquiry, in this conception, is not limited to the inquisitive 
approach inherent to any academic undertaking, but involves a more fundamental concern 
with patterns of oppression and injustice in society and a belief in progressive social change. 
This approach involves the exposure of processes that produce and reproduce inequalities 
between actors and an emphasis on representation as a site both of domination through 
discursive/ideological hegemony and of resistance.13 
Nevertheless, some of the authors and approaches reviewed above do present critical 
features. This is particularly the case with the body of work on the rationales that underlie 
TEN-T policy. Through the unpacking of the discursive constructions that structure the 
dominant way of seeing transport infrastructure and its relationship with economic, social 
                                                     
 
13 These are two of the five common themes that Blomley (2006) has identified in critical 
geographical work. The other three are a commitment to theory and a rejection of empiricism, a 
confidence in the power of scholarship to undo domination through the provision of transformative 
insights, and a determination to engage in progressive praxis. 
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and environmental development, Hajer (2000), Jensen and Richardson (2004) and others 
have endeavoured to unveil their assumptions and weaknesses, the knowledge that 
legitimizes them – and that in turn discredits other forms of knowledge – and the practices 
through which they are produced and reproduced. Both Hajer (2000) and Jensen and 
Richardson (2004, pp. 237–256) have tentatively explored the possibilities of developing 
alternatives to the hegemonic discourse, thus revealing how the discursive field not only 
enables domination but also provides opportunities for resistance.14 Apart from discourse, 
other authors have sought to expose power inequalities in the development of transnational 
HSR infrastructure. Lemberg’s (1995) contribution constitutes perhaps the clearest analysis 
of the influence of actors in this process, although other scholars have also provided a 
detailed account of this issue concerning a high-speed rail station in Brussels (Albrechts and 
Coppens, 2003). Both studies, apart from noting the importance of economic elites in the 
policy process, in fact highlight the need to consider decision-making as political rather than 
technical, involving conflicting interests that result in winners and losers. 
By building on studies of transnational transport infrastructure that go beyond an 
exclusive EU focus and those which adopt a critical approach, the aim of this research is to 
contribute to the understanding of European integration through a focus on the politics 
surrounding high-speed rail infrastructure of European relevance. Thus, it addresses three 
distinct aspects. First, it seeks to uncover the rationales underpinning the behaviour of actors 
and how these strive to gain support for their own views. In particular, it intends to clarify 
Hajer’s (2000) notion of a ‘Europe of Flows’ discourse supposedly shared by actors at 
different levels of government, but also the alternative constructions of the transport problem 
that challenge it. Secondly, the research seeks to reveal the power struggles that take place in 
transnational HSR politics, identifying who prevails in this process and at the expense of 
whom. This is important given the increasing relevance of the EU in transnational transport 
infrastructure development, but also to clarify democratically relevant aspects such as the 
role of private sector actors, central in Lemberg’s (1995) case, and of elected and non-
elected state institutions at various levels. 
The study of both discourse and the exercise of power in transnational HSR policy-
making suggests the centrality of a third issue: space. Representations of space (e.g. the 
consideration of Europe as a frictionless space or as a patchwork of places) may be 
constitutive of the content of discourse and thus determine the practices – including policy 
development – that reproduce it. In addition, space may have an importance in discourse 
production. The construction of the transport problem is arguably likely to vary with the 
                                                     
 
14 See also Linnros and Hallin (2001) on the discursive struggle around the Øresund link. 
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spaces that frame the everyday personal and professional lives of actors (e.g. a peripheral 
rural area or the EU district in Brussels). Yet the explicit consideration of space is not only 
likely to shed light on the content and production of discourse; it also seems to be important 
in explaining the influence of actors in the development of transnational HSR infrastructure. 
The clearest case is the spatial remit of actors; in other words, the spatial frames (e.g. the 
nation-state territory or a municipality) that mediate their capacity to act. This is further 
complicated by the differences in spatial terms between a networked, spatially differentiated 
mode of transport and the traditionally territorially bounded form of planning and developing 
transport infrastructure. Are new political spaces emerging that better respond to the 
spatiality of transnational high-speed rail? 
According to these three foci, the research aim is pursued through the following 
research questions: 
 
1. What are the rationales mobilized around transnational high-speed rail policy-
making, to what extent are they compatible or mutually exclusive, and how are they 
produced, reproduced and transformed? 
2. What is the influence of actors in the development of transnational high-speed rail 
infrastructure, how do they exert it, and at the expense of whom? 
3. How is space present in transnational high-speed rail policy-making and how does 
it determine the production of the aforementioned rationales and the influence of 
actors in the policy process? 
 
 
1.3 Overall approach 
Answering the research questions introduced earlier involved taking two further steps prior 
to the empirical work. The first one was the development of an appropriate analytical 
framework that provided a sound and precise theoretical and analytical basis for this task. 
This is particularly relevant due to the varied research approaches of the existing literature. 
The second step was the adoption of a research strategy and methods that permitted applying 
the analytical framework to empirical data. Although detailed information on them is 
provided in Chapters 3 and 4, this section provides the necessary introduction for an 
adequate understanding of the research project. The completion of these two steps permitted 
to operationalize the research questions through the definition of a series of secondary 
research questions, which are presented at the end of the section. 
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1.3.1 An analytical framework based on discourse, power and space 
A framework for analysis was built according to three dimensions that responded to each of 
the research questions: discourse, power and space. Drawing from distinct but 
complementary theoretical approaches, it seeks to provide a sound basis for the analysis of 
transnational transport infrastructure policy-making from a social constructionist, critical and 
spatially-nuanced approach. The hybrid nature of the framework is meant to address in a 
coherent and integrated way the three aspects that were deemed central to the policy process. 
On the one hand, the development of transnational HSR infrastructure is obviously 
determined by the influence that actors have in the policy process. The work of social and 
political theorists of power such as Lukes (2005), Allen (2003) and, in particular, Clegg 
(1989) was employed to propose a conceptualization of power as exercised through different 
modes and dependent on the mean and resources available to actors. However, their 
behaviour, as discourse theory and analysis has argued (e.g. Howarth, 2000; Jørgensen and 
Phillips, 2002), is influenced by their construction of the social and material world through 
language and social practices. The adoption of Hajer’s (1995) discourse analytical approach, 
which complements Foucault’s theory of discourse with insights from social psychology, 
would allow, first, to map the existing discourses, with the simple narratives or story-lines 
through which they are articulated and the coalitions formed around these, and, second, to 
explain the dynamics and struggles through which these discursive constructions are 
produced, reproduced and contested. Finally, contributions from human geography on scale 
and relationality (e.g. Amin, 2002; Cox, 1998) were drawn upon to develop a 
conceptualization of space in policy-making that was subsequently applied to the other two 
dimensions. Both discourse production, reproduction and transformation and the exercise of 
power were assumed to be mediated by space, taking place across it (Allen, 2003) and 
through particular discursive (Linnros and Hallin, 2001) and power arenas. 
The framework was developed to frame the empirical analysis of this research, but it is 
also meant to have a wider applicability in a research field characterized by either partial or 
weak theorization. Discursive analysis of TEN-T policy is probably the field where the use 
of theory has been most advanced, although approaches have varied slightly. Hajer (2000), 
Linnros and Hallin (2001) and Peters (2003a) have applied the same analytical framework as 
the one selected for this research (Hajer, 1995), although Peters’ use of the concept of story-
line seems to slightly differ from Hajer’s.15 A more eclectic framework was developed by 
Jensen and Richardson (2004, pp. 41–66), who drew from Hajer and Foucault but also from 
                                                     
 
15 See Section 2.1.2. 
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other authors (e.g. Flyvbjerg, 1998). Research on the influence of actors in the policy 
process, however, has been fundamentally empirical and insufficiently theorized. To the 
author’s knowledge, Lemberg’s (1995) study is the one that most explicitly has addressed 
this issue, although his conceptualization of power is not elaborated and in any case is 
largely taken into account in quantitative, rather than qualitative, terms. Finally, the explicit 
consideration of space in transnational infrastructure policy-making has been uneven and 
mainly from the spatial planning field. As noted above, a number of authors have been 
concerned with the mismatch between the spatiality of transport corridors and the existing 
governance arrangements (e.g. Priemus and Zonneveld, 2003), yet the most significant 
attempt to integrate space in a theoretical and (discourse) analytical framework was carried 
out by Jensen and Richardson (2004). In any case, no integrated framework has been 
developed for the analysis of transnational infrastructure policy-making. 
 
1.3.2 A single case study of an unusual case of transnational high-speed rail 
infrastructure 
Providing a precise answer to each of the three research questions within a topic that 
involves both a wide number of actors, due to its spatial scope, and a lengthy process, due to 
the nature of major transport infrastructure development, prompted the adoption of single-
case study research as the research strategy. Case study research is particularly suitable when 
responding to explanatory research questions, such as those proposed in this research, on a 
contemporary issue over which the researcher has little control (Yin, 2009, p. 13). The focus 
on a single case allows to concentrate resources in obtaining an in-depth understanding of a 
complex and context-specific phenomenon. Case study research has been criticized for 
providing a poor basis for generalization, since a case may not be representative of the wider 
set of possible cases. Nevertheless, case study research is not intended for this type of 
generalization – as Yin (2009, p. 38) notes, a case is not a ‘sampling unit’. Rather, by 
providing insights that other methods cannot, this research strategy may still contribute to 
scientific and theoretical development (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2009, pp. 38–39). 
Indeed, the selection of a representative case, as Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 229) has claimed, is 
not necessarily the most appropriate strategy to obtain the greatest amount of information on 
a particular topic. The selection of an unusual case to illustrate the wider issue under study 
may in fact maximize the potential learning from it. Thus, in the study of the tensions and 
challenges in the development of transnational HSR infrastructure, cases that involve a 
particularly EU-relevant section, mobilize a higher number of actors at different levels, and 
present particular challenges due to local resistances or high investment costs seem likely to 
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provide an information-rich understanding of the issue. The case selected was, accordingly, 
the policy process on the section of a cross-border link of the TEN-T network (the Vitoria-
Irun HSR line) located within the Spanish Basque Country,16 a region with a high degree of 
autonomy within an already significantly devolved nation-state, active regional actors, both 
for and against the line, and important topographical difficulties.  
The in-depth nature of case study research and the need to triangulate data to provide 
solid evidence prompted the selection of a wide range of sources of evidence, which were 
differently employed according to each research question and its corresponding section of 
the analytical framework. The sources consisted of fundamentally three types of documents 
(documents produced by state and non-state actors, newspaper articles and parliamentary 
proceedings) and 36 focused, semi-structured interviews with actors who either had been 
involved in the case or, in a limited number of cases, could provide a useful overview on it. 
Depending on their relevance to each research question, these data sources were classified as 
primary or secondary. Thus, the primary sources were official documents and newspaper 
articles for constructing a basic narrative of the case study; parliamentary proceedings and 
interviews for carrying out the discourse analysis; and interviews for ascertaining causal 
relationships in the exercise of power. The presence and influence of the spatial dimension in 
the policy process was determined from the sources used for the discourse and power 
analyses.17 
 
To summarize, the answer to the three research questions was addressed through the 
development of a hybrid, three-dimensional analytical framework and the selection of a 
single-case study research strategy. These two steps made possible the definition, on the 
basis of the three broad research questions, of a set of secondary research questions to guide 
this research’s empirical analysis: 
 
1. What discourses and story-lines have been mobilized in the development of the 
Vitoria-Irun HSR line? To what extent have they blurred discrepancies between 
actors? How have they been produced, reproduced and contested? 
2. What has been the degree of power exercised by actors in the development of the 
Vitoria-Irun HSR line? Through which modes of power, means and resources have 
they been able to do so? Which actors have not exerted such an influence and why? 
                                                     
 
16 See Figure 2 in Section 4.1.2. 
17 More details of the research methods adopted are provided in Section 4.2 and Appendices A, B and 
C. 
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3. What has been the importance of space in determining the production of discourse 
and the exercise of power in the Vitoria-Irun HSR line policy process? What has 
been the role of the discursive and power arenas through which both processes take 
place? To what extent has policy-making on this high-speed rail line been 
characterized by relations or by scale? 
 
 
1.4 Outline of the thesis 
This chapter has introduced how, in order to address the wider issue of European integration 
through a focus on transnational high-speed rail policy-making, this research has adopted a 
perspective that seeks to provide critical and spatial insights into this process, has developed 
an analytical framework to address the issue in a theoretically sound and rigorous manner, 
and has applied this framework through the use of a single-case study research strategy. 
These steps are elaborated in detail in the first part of the thesis (Chapters 2 to 4), which 
contextualizes and frames the second, empirical part (Chapters 5 to 8), followed in turn by a 
concluding chapter.18 
Thus, the existing literature on this topic is reviewed in the following chapter, which is 
structured according to the three main issues that the research approach identified as key to 
the topic: the rationales articulated around the development of this type of infrastructure, the 
influence of actors in the policy process, and the relevance of space in policy-making. 
Chapter 3 subsequently presents the three-dimensional analytical framework proposed for 
the study of this issue, whereby transnational HSR policy-making is understood as consisting 
of discursive and power struggles and as being mediated by space. The last chapter of this 
first part of the thesis details the case study research strategy adopted and the research 
methods used. 
The following four chapters comprise the empirical results of the thesis. Chapter 5 
provides a description of the studied case, a chronological narrative of the Vitoria-Irun HSR 
line policy process from 1986 to 2006 based fundamentally on documentary evidence that 
provides the context for the three following chapters of the thesis. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 
present the analysis of the case on the basis of the three-dimensional analytical framework. 
Each of them addresses one of the research questions and is structured according to the 
                                                     
 
18 This ‘linear-analytical structure’ (Yin, 2009, p. 176) has indeed been the standard approach present, 
with some variation mainly in the degree of theoretical elaboration, in existing case study research on 
transnational HSR development. 
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concepts and categories defined in the analytical framework. Thus, they show the results of 
applying different analytical lenses to the same phenomenon described in Chapter 5, that is 
the policy process of a transnational HSR line. 
The findings of these three chapters are subsequently synthesized in the final chapter, 
which provides an answer to each of the three research questions and highlights the 
contribution of the thesis to the existing scholarship on the issue. In addition, it provides a 
postscript on the recent time period not covered in the case study (from 2006 to 2014), 
highlighting its possible implications for the research findings. The chapter concludes by 
reflecting on the value of the adopted analytical approach and on possible further directions 
of research. 
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2 Transnational high-speed rail infrastructure 
development in the European Union 
Analytically, the development of transnational high-speed rail infrastructure can be 
approached from two perspectives. The first one is concerned with exploring the rationales 
mobilized around this development, both those supporting it and contesting it.19 On the one 
hand, high-speed rail can be seen as central to the creation of a single European space, as it 
facilitates the transportation of persons and goods across borders. On the other hand, the 
contentious nature of infrastructure development, coupled with the trans-border character 
and concentrated accessibility of transnational high-speed rail, suggests that other rationales 
may oppose this idea. The second perspective focuses on the actual process leading to the 
construction of such an infrastructure, in particular on the roles of the different actors 
involved in it. During most of the second half of the 20th century, the nation-state played the 
main role concerning the ownership, planning, and management of the railway systems in its 
territory. But recent developments such as the liberalization of the transport sector and the 
increasing importance of EU institutions hint at a more fragmented policy environment 
where different state and non-state actors interact to shape transport infrastructure 
development. 
Both perspectives are of central relevance to the process of European integration as the 
tensions inherent in achieving convergence in both rationales and decision-making reveal the 
challenges that the European project faces. Whilst pro-EU actors, among others, may 
promote the development of a transnational HSR line, others, including the governments of 
areas not served by the network, community groups, and environmental organizations, may 
resist it and even openly contest it. Even when there is a broad agreement about the direction 
of policy, difficulties may in any case arise due to lack of coordination, different priorities, 
disagreement over financial contributions, etc. Therefore, a key challenge of the European 
project is bridging the distance between the integration it requires and the fragmentation of 
rationales and actors in the policy process. 
These two fields of enquiry are related to another, perhaps less evident but equally 
relevant to European integration. As explained in the introductory chapter, the spatial 
dimension of transnational HSR development is particularly significant. The differentiated 
European space it contributes to shape by increasing the connectivity between distant points 
at the expense of proximate ones suggests, first, that a variety of rationales with different 
                                                     
 
19 Rationale is conceptualized in this thesis as the argumentation that actors mobilize publicly to 
justify and legitimize their stance on a policy issue. 
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spatial features may be mobilized around the project. Certain actors may consider the 
promotion of trans-European relations as fundamental to economic development, whereas 
others may argue for the prioritization of short-distance transport to improve local, everyday 
accessibility. Moreover, the spatiality of transnational HSR infrastructure also points at the 
conflict between the trans-border spatial relations that it facilitates and the bounded political 
spaces that have conventionally framed the development of rail transport infrastructure. In 
fact, as Section 1.1.2 has argued, particular attention to the spatiality of policy-making in the 
EU may usefully inform debates on the democratic nature of this process. 
This chapter therefore focuses on these three fields by reviewing the relevant existing 
literature and recent research, which largely addresses transport infrastructure policy-making 
and EU transport policy but also includes contributions from spatial planning and political 
geography. The chapter first examines the rationales around the development of 
transnational HSR infrastructure, focusing on the possibilities for convergence between 
disparate ideas and interests. Subsequently, it addresses the role of the different actors 
involved in the policy process, in particular within the context of a changing policy-making 
environment in Europe where non-nation-state actors gain relevance. Finally, the chapter 
examines the literature on the spatiality of the policy process, focusing on the changing 
spatiality of the state and on the conflicts that the spatial implications of transnational HSR 
development may prompt. It concludes, on the basis of the previous discussion, by 
identifying the knowledge gaps in the literature and the resulting three research questions 
that have guided this research endeavour. 
 
 
2.1 Rationales around transnational high-speed rail infrastructure 
In light of the different rationales that may be mobilized around the idea of the development 
of transnational high-speed rail infrastructure, the challenge for the supporters of further 
European integration is to achieve a shared rationale that would facilitate this development. 
However, two caveats must be mentioned at this stage. Firstly, it is important to highlight 
that these rationales are not static; they evolve and their prevalence may change over time. 
This point is particularly pertinent since EU developments in transport infrastructure policy 
span for over two decades. Also, considering rationales in themselves, detached from the 
policy process, is problematic, as they are mobilized by a diverse range of actors in specific 
policy contexts. Nevertheless, this section does not focus on these temporal and policy-
making dynamics; its aim is to provide an overview of the existing rationales around 
transnational HSR development and evaluate the extent to which they are likely to converge. 
Thus, the section first reviews the rationales linked with the European project, it then 
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addresses the possible existence of a dominant policy discourse on transnational transport 
infrastructure, and finally it evaluates, on the basis of existing literature, the potential for 
rationale convergence across the European territory. 
 
2.1.1 The influential yet contested EU rationale  
The rationales for developing a high-speed rail project of European relevance can be diverse 
and do not necessarily need to be related to a ‘European-wide interest’20. However, due to 
the trans-European dimension of the transport infrastructure considered in this research, it is 
appropriate to address the specifically European justifications for it. Even if in this case a 
variety of EU goals can be sought (Ross, 1998, p. 182), a common, overarching argument is 
that the development of efficient transport networks is essential to enable and maximize the 
benefits of the EU Single Market, which was notably stated in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty 
(Article 170 in the current Treaty on the functioning of the European Union) and developed 
in the Commission’s White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, Employment (CEC, 1993). 
Moreover, this argument assumes the possibility of successfully integrating economic 
growth with environmental protection. This assumption became explicit in the early 2000s 
with the Gothenburg Sustainable Development Strategy (European Council, 2001) and the 
White Paper on a European Transport Policy for 2010 (CEC, 2001). This White Paper, 
while maintaining the aforementioned argument, placed emphasis both on promoting modal 
shift, in order to respond to road transport growth and contribute to a more sustainable 
transport system, and on eliminating bottlenecks, to reduce the congestion that increases 
pollution and compromises the economic competitiveness of Europe. In this respect, the 
assumption resonates with the policy discourse of ecological modernization (Hajer, 1995), 
which, in spite of recognizing the structural nature of the ecological crisis, nonetheless 
assumes that it can be overcome within the existing institutions of society. This general 
argument on transnational transport infrastructure development is frequently articulated 
under a transport rationale and a political economy rationale.  
The transport rationale refers to the potential role of high-speed rail in responding to the 
transport repercussions of an integrating European economy and society. The integration 
process and in particular the development of an internal market entail, in the first place, a 
foreseeable increase in transport demand due to the facilitation of movement across nation-
                                                     
 
20 Indeed, the extraordinary development of high-speed rail in Europe cannot simply be attributed to 
‘EU reasons’. High-speed rail experiences at nation-state level, the association of this mode with 
technological innovation, and emblematic projects such as the Channel Tunnel have contributed to 
some degree to this development (Ross, 1994). 
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state borders21. Indeed, due to this but also to social, economic and technological 
developments, there has been a dramatic increase in mobility in Europe since the 1970s 
(Banister et al., 2000). Over the 1995-2006 period transport performance22 grew at average 
yearly rates of 2.8% for goods and 1.7% for passengers, reinforcing the use of those 
transport modes with a seemingly higher environmental impact (i.e. road and air transport) 
(Eurostat, 2009). These developments have led not only to negative environmental impacts, 
but also to a reduced efficiency of the network due to congestion. In this respect, high-speed 
rail has the potential both to cater for the increase of transport demand across borders and to 
contribute to modal shift from road and air transport. Firstly, high-speed rail increases 
capacity directly due to the high frequency and size of its trains, and indirectly as they free 
capacity on the conventional network for both freight and regional passenger services 
(Givoni, 2006). But also, high-speed rail is likely to contribute to modal shift due to this 
increased capacity and the possibility to compete with road and air transport in travel 
distances that, based on time thresholds of around one to three hours of travel, range roughly 
between 200 and 800 km (Albalate and Bel, 2012; Vickerman, 1997). 
This transport rationale has been usually addressed through a wider political economy 
rationale, that is through the relationship between transport and the economic development 
of the EU. The construction of trans-border infrastructures has been seen as key in 
maximizing the potential of the EU Single Market whilst contributing to a balanced 
development within it. The Single Market requires the removal of internal barriers in order to 
function efficiently, achieve economies of scale, and enhance the competitiveness of 
European businesses in the global arena. Integrated transnational transport networks seem 
therefore key in facilitating its smooth functioning, an argument shared and mobilized not 
only by EU state actors (CEC, 1993) but also by European business interests (ERT, 1984). 
Significantly, this rationale is usually accompanied by the assumption that investment in 
transport infrastructure is also essential to reduce development disparities within the EU by 
increasing general levels of accessibility across its territory (Jensen and Richardson, 2004, 
pp. 76–81; Vickerman et al., 1999). Both dimensions have been central in the EU policy 
discourse since the inclusion of a specific Title on Trans-European Networks in the 
Maastricht Treaty. The relevance of high-speed rail with respect to them is likely to be 
higher concerning passenger transport, as it is particularly suited for this type of traffic. 
                                                     
 
21 The EU Single Market requires the establishment of ‘an area without internal frontiers in which the 
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured’ (Article 26 of the Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union). 
22 Transport performance is measured in tonne-kilometres in the case of goods transport and in 
passenger-kilometres in the case of passenger transport. 
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However, as cross-border freight transport is also important for an integrated European 
economy, high-speed rail development can also potentially contribute to its growth in two 
respects: indirectly, by freeing capacity on conventional rail lines to be used by freight 
services; and directly, by carrying both passenger and freight traffic on its lines in case they 
are designed with the appropriate specifications. However, as Germany’s HSR mixed-traffic 
system shows, the resulting increased industrial connectivity entails higher construction and 
operation costs (Albalate and Bel, 2012). 
Apart from this main political economic rationale, an important although arguably less 
explicit one responds to a Keynesian approach to public policy, whereby the periodic crises 
of capitalism would be overcome through state intervention. Under this conception, 
particularly marked in the European Commission transport initiatives of the early 1990s 
(Ross, 1998, p. 192; Sichelschmidt, 1999, p. 172), apart from contributing to the 
competitiveness of the European economy in the long term, major public infrastructure 
works would encourage economic growth and create employment in the short and medium 
term. 
However, the rationales for the development of transnational HSR infrastructure have 
been critically examined by a diverse body of research which formulates important doubts 
about them. Existing work can be divided between, first, evaluations of the policy objectives 
in themselves and, second, assessments of the extent to which they are accomplishable. 
Firstly, several scholars have pointed out the contradictions between policy objectives in EU 
transport policy, in particular between the economic competitiveness, balanced development, 
and environmental objectives (ESPON, 2004; Jensen and Richardson, 2004; Peters, 2003a). 
In general terms, it has been widely argued that the economic growth and competitiveness 
dimension of TEN-T policy has been prevalent over the balanced development and 
environmental ones (Jensen and Richardson, 2004; Peters, 2003a; Spiekermann and 
Wegener, 1996; Vickerman et al., 1999). The second body of work suggests that the 
potential of high-speed rail to contribute to these objectives is in any case unclear at best. 
Firstly, although there may be an increase in the competitiveness of the EU as a whole, the 
reduction of regional inequalities through transnational transport infrastructure is 
questionable on two grounds: the non-homogeneous increase in accessibility that the 
development of a trans-European HSR network entails (Spiekermann and Wegener, 2006, 
1996); and the contested assumption that higher accessibility and transport infrastructure 
investment promotes economic convergence between regions in Europe (Puga, 2002; 
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Spiekermann and Wegener, 2006; Tomaney and Marques, 2013).23 Secondly, the 
environmental benefits of high-speed rail are not clear either. Despite certain environmental 
advantages with respect in particular to air transport operations (Janic, 2003)24, high-speed 
rail has a significant impact on local air pollution, noise pollution, and land consumption, 
and in any case its advantages are dependent on whether high-speed rail development 
generates new transport demand or not (Givoni, 2006). 
These questions are particularly significant due to the high costs involved in the 
construction, maintenance and operation of this type of infrastructure. If those wider positive 
impacts of high-speed rail cannot be demonstrated, a high-speed rail line needs a significant 
level of demand to be economically profitable and compensate these high costs (de Rus and 
Nash, 2007; Givoni, 2006). This poses questions on the justification of high-speed rail 
development in relatively low-density European areas (de Rus and Nash, 2007), as cost-
benefit analyses of two high-speed rail lines in Spain have shown (de Rus and Inglada, 1997; 
de Rus and Román, 2006). In spite of these qualifications, the political momentum in the 
development of HSR networks has been remarkable. This has been noted, in some cases with 
frustration, by a number of the previously cited authors (de Rus and Nash, 2007; Tomaney 
and Marques, 2013; Vickerman, 1997). In fact, several scholars have pointed out the 
potential of the Trans-European Transport Network rationale to conceal these contradictions 
and uncertainties and to be shared among across the EU multi-level policy-making 
environment. 
 
2.1.2 The role of ideas in gathering support for policy: a ‘Europe of Flows’ 
discourse 
In fact, certain contributions to the EU transport policy literature suggest that the 
development of transnational transport networks cannot be explained simply by reference to 
material interests, but also to the influence of the idea in itself. This influence seems to stem 
                                                     
 
23 Criticisms of this assumption point out, first, that the influence of EU transport infrastructure 
investment and other transport policies in promoting regional development is significantly lower than 
that of socio-economic and technical macro-trends (Spiekermann and Wegener, 2006) and, second, 
that inter-regional transport investments are likely to reinforce the economic development of core 
regions and main nodes in the network (Puga, 2002; Vickerman et al., 1999). A contrasting view 
highlights the potential contribution of public investment in infrastructure in boosting productivity and 
economic growth (Aschauer, 1989; Munnell, 1992). 
24 High-speed rail’s environmental advantages in terms of energy consumption and greenhouse gas 
emissions are less clear with respect to road transport (van Essen et al., 2003) and conventional rail 
(van Wee et al., 2003). Additionally, the construction of a new high-speed rail line entails significant 
carbon dioxide emissions (Westin and Kågeson, 2012). 
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firstly from the close relationship between TENs and the EU project. Johnson and Turner 
(1997, p. 16) have argued that Trans-European Networks represented the (back then) latest 
‘big European idea’, able to keep or even revive the momentum for European integration. 
Focusing on the Commission’s rationale for promoting the TEN-T programme, Stephenson 
notes that '[t]he Commission thus promoted TENs as highly visible, symbolic, guarantors of 
economic growth, arguing they underpinned the basic functioning of the market' (2010b, p. 
1048). Most perceptively, Stevens (2004) has pointed out that despite the uncertainties 
surrounding the TENs programme, it has worked as a material and appealing initiative, seen 
as central to the EU’s economic goals whilst allegedly contributing to the balanced 
development of its territory: 
'It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the TENs programme was more political than economic in its 
motivation, a set of grands projets to fire the imagination. [...] Ignoring any inconvenient doubts about their 
economic rationale, trans-European networks had the benefit of being tangible and attractive wherever the 
dream of fast, convenient and comfortable travel could be held out, and they could be presented as integral 
to the realization of the Community's new economic goals' (2004, p. 191, original emphasis). 
Yet the suggestive influence of the idea of transnational transport infrastructure need not 
only be related to the European dimension; the particular characteristics of transport 
infrastructure seem relevant too. Lemberg (1995) for instance, in his case study on the 
Øresund, Great Belt and Fehmarn Belt bridges, argues that large infrastructure projects may 
be considered as national prestige projects and desired by politicians regardless of their 
economic viability. More significantly, transport infrastructure policy-making has often been 
based on the assumption of linear causal relationships between transport infrastructure and 
development – a myth of ‘structuring effects’, according to Offner (1993). In both its 
European and inherent dimensions, the materiality of transport infrastructure seems to play a 
role in its constitution as a symbol of a policy objective (such as economic integration or 
economic development), which helps to conceal the complexities of achieving such an 
objective. 
Some contributions from the policy analysis and spatial policy fields have explored the 
role of ideas on transnational transport infrastructure policy-making through a discourse 
analytical approach. Jensen and Richardson have developed extensive work on the policy 
discourses articulated in the development of a European spatial planning agenda and on the 
relationship between power and knowledge (e.g. Jensen and Richardson, 2004; Richardson, 
1999; Richardson and Jensen, 2000, 2003). They have argued that a policy discourse has 
emerged that seeks to produce a certain European space associated with a certain rationality 
(Jensen and Richardson, 2004). They named this space ‘monotopia’: ‘an organised, ordered 
and totalised space of zero-friction and seamless logistic flows’ (Jensen and Richardson, 
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2004, p. 3). This discourse has the concept of ‘frictionless mobility’ at its centre, yet it also 
encompasses other aspects of spatial development: the polycentric development of its urban 
nodes; the subsidiary role of the environment; and the re-thinking of territorial identity issues 
that a monotopic Europe involves. In spite of the appeal of their argument, it is doubtful 
whether the European space is being shaped in such a coherent and pervasive manner. 
Although the reasons for this are developed in the next subsection, at this point it is sufficient 
to note that the authors’ spatial planning approach may not sufficiently consider the 
differences between – and importance of – EU sectoral policies, which cast doubt on the 
feasibility of developing a coherent spatial project for the EU. 
A more transport-focused account has been given by Hajer (2000). In a brief paper he 
has proposed the existence of a transnational policy discourse (which he calls ‘Europe of 
Flows’), shared by policy-makers at different levels of government, that influences spatial 
development policy in Europe. The features of this discourse largely coincide with the 
rationale explained earlier in the chapter: among others, it is committed to market integration 
and considers global competition as a strategic challenge for Europe; it conceives the 
objectives of the EU as both enhancing competitiveness whilst promoting cohesion; it 
perceives infrastructure as key to achieve these goals; it is committed to ecological 
modernization; and it foresees increasing international demand despite the current marginal 
portion of international traffic. According to Hajer, the Trans-European Networks, and 
therefore the trans-European HSR network, should be understood as ‘a set of particular 
discursive practices within which a particular policy discourse is reproduced and 
transformed’ (2000, p. 138). 
The emphasis in Hajer’s approach lies on the power of such a policy discourse and on 
the fact that its influence is not limited to EU-level actors. In order to explain the production 
and reproduction – and therefore the influence – of the discourse, he employs the middle-
ground concepts of discourse coalitions and story-lines (see Hajer, 1995).25 In this respect, he 
proposes the story-line ‘from patchwork to network’, where ‘network’ can be interpreted as a 
metaphor of European integration (Hajer, 2000). As he correctly notes, the network 
metaphor masks the discrepancies between elements included in it, for instance the tensions 
between the objectives of cohesion and market integration. Despite the potential of this 
approach for understanding discourse production in transnational infrastructure policy-
making, the scope of Hajer’s paper is limited. Its focus is restricted to the content of 
discourse and does not include the institutional practices through which the discourse is 
created, reproduced, and transformed; it does not address the temporal dimension; and, 
                                                     
 
25 Both concepts will be further discussed in Section 3.1.3. 
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fundamentally, the analysis is tentative and open to be refined by further research. Peters 
(2003a) has applied Hajer’s discourse analytical framework to the analysis of EU transport 
infrastructure policy; however, the contribution to this discussion is of little significance 
since her use of the concept of story-lines emphasizes the conflicts between them and not 
their capacity to blur such tensions in order to achieve political leverage.26 Furthermore, as 
this literature addresses transport infrastructure generally, it remains unclear whether the 
‘Europe of Flows’ discourse would show variations in the case of high-speed rail. 
  
2.1.3 Alternative and dominant rationales: towards rationale convergence? 
Both Hajer (2000) and Jensen and Richardson (2004) claimed that such a dominant discourse 
across different policy-making levels in Europe excludes alternative rationales and 
discourses. The extent to which the limit between dominant and alternative rationales may be 
negotiated and permeated has scarcely been empirically investigated in this field, yet Linnros 
and Hallin (2001) provide an insightful first analysis. They carried out a discourse analysis 
of the environmental conflict concerning the Øresund link between Denmark and Sweden, 
focusing on three of the several alternative discourses to the hegemonic one. In this case, 
these counter-discourses, which fundamentally emphasized the environmental impacts of the 
link, were not able to challenge the dominance of a hegemonic discourse advocating the 
integration of the cross-border region through transport infrastructure. Importantly, although 
the contestation movement managed to introduce environmental issues in the public debate, 
these were incorporated into the hegemonic discourse and excluded from the political arena 
through their framing as scientific-expert matters. Ultimately, antagonism between both set 
of discourses prevailed: ‘An inner logic of the project was formed that made new or old 
critical views impossible to include if they did not adhere to the project’s main logic’ 
(Linnros and Hallin, 2001, p. 401). 
Nevertheless, beyond discursive antagonism, divisions may appear within the dominant 
discourse that can potentially undermine its political leverage. Despite the necessary 
flexibility of a policy discourse in order to integrate the interests and ideas of a broad range 
of actors across several policy-making levels, it is presumable that even those who are likely 
to support a transnational HSR line may frame the issue differently and even have divergent 
interests. It therefore seems necessary to delve deeper into the rationales that the supporters 
                                                     
 
26 Peters’ (2003a) use of the concept of story-line seems indeed different from Hajer’s. Whereas she 
considered ‘cohesion’ and ‘missing-links’ as contrasting story-lines, Hajer argued that it was the 
aforementioned ‘network’ metaphor what blurred the discrepancies between the objectives of 
cohesion and market integration. 
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of the ‘Europe of Flows’ discourse rely upon. Setting aside the differences that may be found 
at any policy-making level (e.g. between market-led or state-led approaches), I focus below 
on the specificities of the other two main relevant levels apart from the European: the 
national and the subnational.  
Firstly, the national scale is especially significant due to the nation-state roots of rail 
development in Europe and in particular the prominent role of this state in every aspect of 
the railways systems since the end of World War II (Ross, 1998). Indeed, Stevens (2004) and 
Ross (1994, 1998) have argued that the protection of state-owned national rail systems has 
been a major factor in preventing a European approach to rail development. Generally, it 
would be expected that the nation-state political arena would show its own dynamics, which 
do not necessarily match European ones. Stevens (2004, pp. 32–34), for instance, provides a 
brief review of the geographical, historical, and cultural factors that have contributed to 
shape nation-state transport policies across Europe. In terms of transport infrastructure 
networks, the differences between European and national approaches first refer to material 
interests, such as the extent to which a certain line contributes to European and national 
priorities. Transnational infrastructure is more likely to be supported by nation-states when it 
benefits directly their territory (e.g. by linking major urban areas in one nation-state) or 
supposedly provide development opportunities (e.g. by improving access to other markets). 
Cross-border links are prone to pose particular challenges, not only because of the 
presumably low priority of nationally peripheral lines, but also due to possible divergent 
attitudes of the nation-states involved (e.g. Ross, 1995). Nevertheless, another factor that 
may indicate different attitudes to HSR infrastructure development refers to the implicit 
spatial ideas that policy-makers have of their nation-state territory (Marshall, 2013).  
Secondly, it is also likely that subnational actors will articulate different positions with 
regard to developing transnational HSR infrastructure. In particular, as the impacts of high-
speed rail are especially marked in urban areas, where the stops are usually located, regional 
and local actors may see it as an opportunity to enhance the competitive advantage of cities 
within supranational scales of capital circulation, as part of what Brenner (2004) has termed 
‘urban locational policies’. This is in line with the entrepreneurial turn to urban governance 
that has taken place in advanced capitalist countries since the 1970s, whereby localities seek 
to improve their competitive position within the spatial divisions of labour, of consumption, 
and of key command and control functions, and in securing government’s resources (Harvey, 
1989). The arrival of high-speed rail also provides opportunities for local urban regeneration 
or development, as the oft-cited case of Lille shows (Newman and Thornley, 1995). 
Although in principle this stance seems to conform with the characteristics of the ‘Europe of 
Flows’ discourse, the mere sum of subnational interests could result in an increased 
frequency of high-speed rail stops which, although exploiting new markets, would 
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undermine the speed on the line and its long-distance functionality (Vickerman, 1997, pp. 
33–34). Conversely, there is potential for subnational resistance to high-speed rail 
development if it is considered not beneficial to the region, in particular if it is not served by 
the line once this has been defined.  
Ultimately, this diversity of rationales suggests that even if an overarching discourse on 
transnational infrastructure planning exists, policy outcomes may still vary according to the 
particular perspectives of the actors involved in the process. For instance, Lemberg’s (1995) 
paper on the policy process on several transport links between the Scandinavian peninsula 
and continental Europe shows how the transport mode and the type of these links were in the 
end determined by the power struggles that took place between actors apparently sharing the 
same discourse. According to him, business lobbyists managed to persuade a political 
majority in favour of bored rail tunnels to support combined motorway/rail bridges.  
 
This discussion casts doubts on the extent to which an effective convergence of rationales 
can be expected in the development of transnational HSR infrastructure. Although a policy 
discourse on a ‘Europe of Flows’ may be able to conceal the diverse inconsistencies and 
uncertainties of its rationales and at the same time gather support from a wide range of 
actors, the variety of rationales across the policy-making environment suggests that transport 
infrastructure policy in Europe might not necessarily result in such a European space. If there 
is a shared discourse on the development of transnational infrastructure, as Hajer (2000) 
suggests, it remains to be seen the extent to which different interests and ideas are 
accommodated within such a discourse and are able to steer transport infrastructure policy in 
a certain direction. It is necessary to complement and shed light on this discussion with a 
review of the processes that lead to the development of high-speed rail infrastructure in 
Europe. Thus, the following section addresses the role of actors in the policy process, with a 
particular focus on EU and non-state actors. 
 
 
2.2 The role of actors in the policy process 
The study of policy-making concerning transnational high-speed rail infrastructure has often 
focused on EU policy, drawing from either European integration theory (Stephenson, 2003, 
2010b, 2012; Stevens, 2004) or social and political sciences (Jensen and Richardson, 2004; 
Peters, 2003a). This EU focus is probably the reason that transnational transport projects 
have often been seen from a TEN-T implementation perspective (e.g. Stephenson, 2010a), 
whereas this programme may be better considered as yet another policy that influences high-
speed rail infrastructure development. Comparatively less academic attention has been paid 
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to the policy process surrounding specific projects of European relevance (although see, for 
instance, Holliday et al., 1991; Lemberg, 1995; Ross, 1995), an approach that considers the 
EU as one of the levels of a complex policy-making environment. Building on both bodies of 
work and on general literature on the topic (Johnson and Turner, 1997; Ross, 1994, 1998), 
this section seeks to develop an understanding of the policy process leading to a 
transnational HSR line. It first reviews the key aspects surrounding transnational HSR 
development to then focus on the role of state and non-state actors in this process. 
 
2.2.1 Transnational high-speed rail development: key features 
Infrastructure development costs, cross-border differences, or the links between rail systems 
and the European nation-state are certainly key factors in determining the policy process 
leading to the development of a transnational HSR line. Therefore, before addressing the role 
of actors in this process, these characteristics are reviewed in more detail. 
In terms of high-speed rail infrastructure in itself, the main aspect to be highlighted is 
the very high cost it involves, with a significant proportion of sunk costs.27 This cost refers to 
the building of the infrastructure and, to a lesser extent, to the maintenance and operation of 
the infrastructure and rolling stock (Campos and de Rus, 2009; Ross, 1994, p. 201). In fact, 
commentators usually point out that financing is the single most important challenge for 
high-speed rail development (Johnson and Turner, 1997; Ross, 1994). As a result of this, as 
it is mentioned earlier, high-speed rail requires a high level of demand in order to be 
profitable in purely economic terms (de Rus and Nash, 2007; Givoni, 2006). A second aspect 
is the long-term nature of its investment, the implications of which are several: certainly the 
build-up of revenue over an extended period of time (Johnson and Turner, 1997, p. 152), but 
also the uncertainties related to possible variations that the project may suffer over time, the 
unreliability of traffic forecasts and therefore the imprecision of economic valuations (Ross, 
1998, p. 196). Indeed, Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) have shown that large infrastructure projects 
such as high-speed rail links very frequently overestimate demand and suffer cost overruns. 
Both the high cost and the length of the development period suggest that a key stage of the 
policy process is implementation. 
In addition to this, the development of transnational HSR infrastructure poses 
significant challenges by the very fact of traversing nation-state borders. First of all, 
administrative and political differences between nation-states mean that cooperation between 
                                                     
 
27 Sunk costs are defined as those production costs that do not vary with output, even if this is zero 
(Clark and Wrigley, 1995, p. 207). 
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national actors is central in ensuring a smooth implementation. Ross (1995) has provided a 
detailed account of the dynamics of this cooperation – or lack thereof – in a comparison of 
the Channel Tunnel and the Øresund link policy processes. But also, different nation-state 
rail systems present disparities in technical aspects such as track and loading gauges, power 
supplies, signalling systems and safety control (Ross, 1994, pp. 204–205). Although this lack 
of harmonization cannot be tackled on a project basis, it nevertheless remains an additional 
difficulty to transnational HSR development. As the Christophersen group, responsible for 
identifying a limited number of priority projects for the TENs, noted, the lack of 
administrative, regulatory and technical harmonization poses a significant threat to project 
development (Ross, 1998, p. 194). All in all, these financial, long-term, and transnational 
factors involve a high level of risk, an issue that, as it is noted below, is particularly relevant 
in terms of private financing. 
A final consideration, which introduces the remainder of this section, refers to the 
traditionally dominant role of the nation-state in high-speed rail policy-making. Although the 
development of railways in Europe was mainly driven by private actors, by the mid-20th 
century rail systems in Europe had become owned, managed and operated by the state (Ross, 
1998, pp. 64–68). Consequently, the planning and development of infrastructure has largely 
been carried out following a nation-state perspective, which indeed still constitutes the scale 
of reference in current academic studies on infrastructure planning (e.g. Marshall, 2013). 
However, European integration and a variety of phenomena including the liberalization of 
the transport sector, public sector budget constraints, and demands for more democratic 
procedures have begun to challenge this status. Infrastructure planning may be becoming 
more a ‘multi-scalar’ and ‘multi-actor’ process (Romein et al., 2003), with a diminishing role 
of the nation-state and a tendency towards governance instead of government. 
 
2.2.2 The increasing relevance of non-nation-state actors 
The first group of state actors that needs to be addressed is obviously the EU. As mentioned 
in the introductory chapter, the ‘deepening’ of the European integration process has involved 
the increasing capacity of the EU in determining the development of transnational HSR 
infrastructure. The pivotal EU policy initiative in this regard has undoubtedly been the 
Trans-European Networks (TENs) in the areas of transport, telecommunications, and energy 
infrastructures. First included in the Maastricht Treaty, which came into force in 1993, it 
seeks to promote their development by (a) developing a series of guidelines covering the 
objectives, priorities and broad lines of action, (b) implementing measures to ensure the 
interoperability of the networks, and (c) supporting ‘projects of common interest’ promoted 
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as well by the member states. The TEN-T guidelines provide the criteria for the 
identification of the projects of common interest. Among these projects, they identify a 
number of key priority projects to be completed within a specific timetable, on which EU 
financial and coordination support would be concentrated. However, it is important to note 
that the guidelines entail no obligation on member states to complete the projects, and in fact 
EU action on TEN-T is conditional on the support of member states. 
But the role of EU institutions is not circumscribed only to the development of policy; 
they also contribute to the financing of TEN-T infrastructure by mainly providing grants, 
loans and guarantees. The TEN-T budget line offers a variety of financial instruments 
irrespective of the projects’ geographical location, including grants for studies or works, loan 
guarantees, and interest rate rebates on loans. As the TEN-T programme progressed, 
financial support has tended to concentrate more on those sections of higher European added 
value. The cross-border sections of priority projects are particularly favoured as they may be 
awarded TEN-T financial aid for works of a maximum of 30 per cent of the eligible cost (EP 
and Council, 2007). Apart from the TEN-T budget line, the European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund provide significant grants for projects in relatively 
underdeveloped areas of the EU. In addition to these direct funding mechanisms, the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) offers loans and guarantees to facilitate investment in 
TEN-T. The total EU contribution for TEN-T has grown steadily since 1996 (48 per cent 
from the 2000-2006 period to the 2007-2013), representing in this last period 27 per cent of 
the overall investment in the network (CEC, 2012a). In this period, this contribution has been 
of over 52 billion Euros in grants (8.0 from the TEN-T budget line and 44.2 from the 
Cohesion Fund and ERDF) and 53 billion Euros in EIB loans and guarantees (CEC, 2012a). 
In addition to this financial support, the European Commission also undertakes 
coordination initiatives to facilitate the implementation of the TEN-T. In 2006 the 
Commission created the Trans-European Transport Network Executive Agency, an 
independent body yet closely linked with the Directorate-General Mobility and Transport, 
which is responsible to ensure the technical and financial implementation and management 
of the TEN-T programme (CEC, 2013a). Additionally, in 2005 the Commission appointed 
European Coordinators to aid the implementation of those priority projects that present 
significant difficulties and are considerably delayed (CEC, 2013b). All of these projects 
involve several member states and most of them are rail projects. The European 
Coordinators – currently nine for 11 projects – are tasked with evaluating the projects, 
making recommendations on their effective implementation, and contributing to their 
development. 
Academic attention has mostly focused on the influence of the EU on infrastructure 
development; however, in a context of growing relevance of subnational state actors 
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(Brenner, 2004; Keating, 2000a), it is necessary to consider whether their role is becoming 
more important in this policy field. Literature on the EU policy-making level from a multi-
level governance perspective argues that subnational actors operate not only in nation-state 
arenas but also in the European one (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Marks et al., 1996), yet this 
is not necessarily translated into actual influence (Jordan, 2001, p. 201). With respect to HSR 
and transport infrastructure planning, empirical evidence on the role of subnational actors is 
scarce. Particular cases of transnational links (Lemberg, 1995; Romein et al., 2003; Ross, 
1995) point at the dominant role of the nation-state political arena, although some of these 
studies note that in such complex and long-term projects subnational concerns can hinder the 
policy process if not taken into account at an early stage (Ross, 1995). There is nevertheless 
some evidence that shows the potential of subnational state actors to substantially influence 
high-speed rail development, especially in those nation-states with a federal, devolved, or 
decentralized structure. For instance, Ross (1995) pointed out the integration of regional and 
local authorities in France in the Channel Tunnel policy process – in contrast to the British 
case – and Marshall (2013, p. 152) notes that the Catalan government negotiated with the 
Spanish one changes in the route of the high-speed rail line through the region, eventually 
managing to increase the number of stops on it. 
In general, authors tend to agree that the nation-state still plays a predominant role in 
HSR infrastructure planning and implementation. The TEN-T programme has a non-binding 
nature and the distribution of responsibility to implement it is not fixed (Ross, 1998, p. 202). 
EU financial support is meant to act as a catalyst as the majority of the funding must 
generally come from member states and, as Stephenson (2010a) notes, the Commission’s 
role is restricted to promoter, coordinator, and monitoring and evaluation body. Moreover, 
the influence of the nation-state is not limited to infrastructure planning as such but, at least 
at the beginning of the TEN-T programme, also extends to the very development of EU 
policy. Stevens (2004, pp. 180–181) points out that nation-state ministers were able to build 
their concerns into the text of the Treaty of Maastricht, which leave them significant control 
over the TEN-T programme. In terms of the TENs guidelines, as a result of negotiations 
between member states and EU institutions, the first ones were comprehensive enough to 
allow any significant item of infrastructure to be eligible for financial support (Stevens, 
2004, p. 188). But also, the prioritization of projects responded to a nation-state rather than a 
European perspective (Stevens, 2004, p. 183). This continuing influence of the nation-state 
may be a key hindrance in promoting a supranational approach to rail transport, in particular 
since member states seem to retain a nation-state perspective on that topic (Johnson and 
Turner, 1997, p. 173; Romein et al., 2003). In turn, subnational actors do not seem to have a 
significant influence in transnational HSR policy-making, but their role seems to be under-
researched. 
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2.2.3 Non-state actors: the role of the private sector and civil society 
Throughout much of the second half of the 20th century, the role of the private sector in rail 
development has been limited. However, its increasing relevance as a result of the move 
towards the liberalization of railways in Europe, which includes the decoupling of structures 
and operations, indicates that this situation may be changing. The influence of the industry 
lobby, in particular the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), on the development 
of EU transport infrastructure policy has been documented by a number of scholars (Peters, 
2003a; te Brömmelstroet and Nowak, 2008; van Apeldoorn, 2003). Industry lobbying was 
also present with regard to high-speed rail, with the Community of European Railways 
(CER) standing out as an early advocate of a trans-European network, whose plan for such a 
network was included by the Commission in its proposals (Ross, 1998, p. 74; Stevens, 2004, 
p. 176). The influence of these lobbies is felt not only on transport policies such as the TENs 
initiative, but also on of specific projects. Lemberg (1995) has shown that the lobbying of 
certain groups, in particular business organizations (which included the ERT, Scandinavian 
Link – a private consortium with close links to the latter – , and the Danish motor lobby) and 
trade unions, has effectively influenced the choice of the mode of transport and type of 
construction of several transnational links. This impact is significant since, as he noted, it 
modified the solutions originally proposed by a majority of political representatives. 
Although the influence of private actors in agenda-setting and policy formulation has 
been addressed occasionally in critical approaches to transport policy, generally attention has 
focused on the role the private sector can play in transport infrastructure policy 
implementation. The high level of investment that high-speed rail infrastructure requires and 
the reduced capacity of the public sector to assume it has prompted the state to seek the 
involvement of private capital. In particular, public-private partnerships appear to be crucial 
for the successful implementation of transnational infrastructure (Johnson and Turner, 1997, 
p. 157; Ross, 1994, p. 202, 1998, p. 194). Within these partnerships, the public sector would 
contribute to risk-sharing and to monitor that development conforms with public service 
considerations (Johnson and Turner, 1997, p. 157). However, experiences on enticing private 
capital in Europe have been scarce and problematic, as the cases of Italy (Albalate and Bel, 
2012, pp. 342–343) and the Netherlands (Koppenjan, 2005) show. The ground-breaking 
example of the Channel Tunnel, entirely financed by the private sector, suffered serious 
financial problems and uneasy relations between the Eurotunnel group and the French and 
British governments, their railway companies, and the lending institutions (Ross, 1998, pp. 
203–205). Indeed, the specific characteristics of this type of investment referred to above, in 
particular the high level of financial and public-policy related risk it involves (Ross, 1998, 
pp. 195–198), hinders private participation. 
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Although it has a less direct role in high-speed rail policy-making, it is necessary to 
address too the influence that civil society may have, in the form of a diverse range of 
organizations. These include notably environmental organizations but also locally-based 
groups, political parties, and trade unions, among others. Overall, except in those limited 
instances when they are explicitly included in the policy process (see the débat public 
experience in France, in Marshall, 2013, pp. 135–138), their influence is usually felt when 
hindering and potentially delaying the policy process. Flyvbjerg et al. (2003, p. 5) have 
argued that civil society is kept at a distance of large infrastructure projects’ decision-making 
due to either ignorance of practices of good governance, transparency and participation or a 
political interest in avoiding problems to their development. In any case this may result in 
major political issues at a late stage of the policy process (Romein et al., 2003; Ross, 1995). 
A notorious example is that of the Val di Susa, on the route of the planned Turin-Lyon HSR 
line and site of an active and long-lasting contestation movement composed by a wide 
variety of actors, including environmental groups, local mayors and citizen’s committees 
(della Porta and Piazza, 2008). After an intensification of the mobilization in 2005 that 
included clashes with the police, works were temporary suspended and a new phase of 
technical studies and negotiations commenced. 
 
In short, this section has shown that transnational HSR policy-making seems to be still 
dominated by the nation-state, despite the increasing power of EU institutions, in particular 
by providing financial and political support, as a result of European integration. Private 
involvement, although frequently addressed in terms of implementation, may potentially be 
influential in earlier stages of the policy process, as the development of TEN-T policy 
suggests. However, gaps remain in the literature that, if filled, may inform and qualify these 
appreciations. Firstly, it must be noted that insufficient research has been done on the last 
decade, when there are signs of a stronger role of EU institutions. But also, in terms of the 
actual research focus, this has tended to lie on EU policy while attention to specific projects, 
which would incorporate both EU and other policies, has been scarce. The little academic 
attention devoted to the role of subnational actors, in particular in those nation-states with a 
devolved or federal structure, is particularly striking. Moreover, research on transnational 
transport infrastructure policy-making tends to be significantly under-theorized, in stark 
contrast with the theoretical attention received by TEN-T policy-making. All in all, the 
complexity of the policy-making environment shown in this and the previous section is 
further enhanced by the relevance of space in both shaping the rationales mobilized and 
determining the influence of actors in the policy process. The following section explores in 
detail the treatment of this issue in the literature. 
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2.3 Space in transnational high-speed rail policy-making 
The particular spatiality of transnational high-speed rail suggests that attention to the 
complexities of transnational high-speed rail politics is not complete if the spatial dimension 
is not addressed. On the one hand, the flows that high-speed rail infrastructure supports and 
facilitates transcend traditional political boundaries or, in other words, traverse spaces 
territorialized by a variety of state space arrangements that do not necessarily match them. 
On the other, these flows, which link distant large urban agglomerations whilst by-passing 
vast areas in between, contribute to produce a significantly differentiated or ‘splintered’ 
(Graham and Marvin, 2001) space. These two phenomena draw attention to, first, the 
spatiality that state and non-state power adopts in order to support or contest such 
transnational flows and, second, the role that the particular spatiality of this type of 
infrastructure may play in shaping the attitudes of political actors concerning its 
development. Accordingly, this third section addresses the spatiality of transnational HSR 
policy-making by focusing on these two issues. 
 
2.3.1 Regulating transnational flows: territoriality vs. relationality 
Transnational HSR development involves the facilitation of goods and mainly passenger 
transport across nation-state borders, thus contributing to the economic integration of the 
EU. On the other hand, as the previous section shows, the nation-state seems to retain the 
main role in determining this development. This highlights a fundamental issue with regard 
to transnational HSR politics: the tension between the functional relations that transcend 
political borders and the spatiality of the state responsible for regulating them. 
Indeed, scholars have long noted the role of the state in regulating social and economic 
relations in forms that include transport infrastructure development (Lefebvre, 2003; Mann, 
2003). Lefebvre claimed that ‘only the state is capable of taking charge of the management 
of space “on a grand scale” – highways, air traffic routes – because only the state has at its 
disposal the appropriate resources, techniques, and “conceptual” capacity’ (2003, p. 90). 
Although the railways’ historical development shows that the private sector is also able to 
undertake significant infrastructure development, the importance of the state not only in 
providing resources, especially in those cases that may not be profitable from an economic 
perspective, but also in regulating the sector seems undeniable. He further argued that 
‘the state engenders social relations in space; it reaches still further as it unfurls; it produces a support, its 
own space, which is itself complex. This space regulates and organizes a disintegrating national space at the 
heart of a consolidating global space (l'espace mondial). The space produced by the state must be termed 
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political due to its specific features and goals. The state provides the relations (that is, the social relations of 
production) with a calibrated spatial support; [...]. The state tends to control flows and stocks by ensuring 
their coordination’ (Lefebvre, 2003, p. 85, original emphasis). 
Therefore, the state regulates social and economic relations and, fundamentally, it does so by 
means of space. The state, by adopting certain scalar configurations, contributes to the 
territorialization of capital and to the achievement of a ‘scalar fix’ for socioeconomic 
relations (Brenner, 1998; Smith, 2003). Yet these configurations of state space are not pre-
given; they are constructed through sociopolitical processes (Delaney and Leitner, 1997; 
Marston, 2000) and, as such, they are historically specific and always subject to evolution. 
Although he recognizes the variety of factors that influence state space formation, Brenner 
(1998) emphasizes the importance of the phases of capital accumulation in determining the 
scalar structure of the state. Thus, during the Fordist-Keynesian phase between 
approximately the 1950s and the early 1970s, the national space was the primary scale in the 
territorialization of capital and the mediation of its uneven geographical development 
(Brenner, 1998). This is consistent with the prominent role that the nation-state had with 
respect to railways during much of the second half of the 20th century, when it largely 
monopolized the development, management and operation of the rail systems in its territory. 
From the 1970s onwards, the state restructuring that the current, post-Fordist 
accumulation regime involves has destabilized inherited nation-state geographies and 
prompted the emergence of new and more complex scalar configurations (Jessop, 2002). A 
first one is naturally the European Union and the intensified ‘deepening’ of European 
integration since the late 1980s, which led to increased EU powers concerning transnational 
infrastructure development, among other relevant policy issues such as the promotion of 
balanced development throughout the EU. Yet a second scalar geography is arguably the 
subnational one. HSR transport’s impact on space is not homogenous; its influence is 
spatially highly differentiated and the increase in accessibility that it involves is felt 
particularly on large urban areas. Its spatiality may have a European reach, but it is 
heterogeneously articulated through nodes and the links between them. In this sense it 
contributes to the constitution of an ‘archipelago economy’ (Veltz, 2005), where production 
and consumption is concentrated within the main metropolitan nodes of a transnational inter-
urban network. If, as Brenner has noted with regard to state intervention within transnational 
circuits of capital, ‘it is no longer capital that is to be molded into the (territorially integrated) 
geography of state space, but state space that is to be molded into the (territorially 
differentiated) geography of capital’ (2004, p. 16, emphasis removed), a higher role for the 
subnational state might be expected with regard to high-speed rail. 
Yet state re-scaling under current conditions of capital accumulation does not involve 
only the increasing importance of supranational (de Melo and Panagariya, 1996; Fawcett and 
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Hurrell, 1995) and subnational (Brenner, 2004; Keating, 1997) state spaces, but also the 
configuration of trans-border cooperation spaces that seek to respond more appropriately to 
functional relations across nation-state borders. These include notably cross-border regions 
(Blatter, 2004; García-Álvarez and Trillo-Santamaría, 2013; Perkmann, 2003) but also a 
variety of ‘non-standard’ geographies of cooperation (Deas and Lord, 2006), both often 
financially supported by the EU through the ERDF. The creation of the European legal 
instrument of the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation in 2006 further provided a 
structure and legal certainty for this type of cooperation. In terms of transport infrastructure 
and high-speed rail, bilateral institutional arrangements are usually established to aid the 
implementation of cross-border sections. European Economic Interest Groups, typically 
constituted by the relevant nation-state infrastructure managers, have been set up to develop 
studies for cross-border sections, thus complementing technically the Intergovernmental 
Commissions (CEC, 2012b). More significantly for the purposes of this research, a number 
of EU-funded projects have adopted the spatial frame of a transnational transport or 
development corridor in order to address in a coordinated manner the challenges that these 
spaces present, mostly through a transport sectoral approach (e.g. Joint Spatial Planning 
Department Berlin-Brandenburg, 2012; Region Blekinge, 2013) yet in some instances in a 
spatially integrated manner (City of Mannheim, 2010). The partners in these projects are 
normally nation-state, regional and local public authorities and agencies, business 
organizations, and research and development institutions. 
There are obviously considerable differences in the configuration of these state spaces, 
with variations in aspects such as their functional scope, motivation, institutional structure, 
and stability. A useful approach to understand the complex spatiality of the state when it 
seeks to address socioeconomic relations has been provided by Blatter (2004), who 
distinguishes between territorial governance and functional governance. Territorial 
governance is characterized by the bundling of a high number of tasks within a limited 
number of jurisdictions, a clear definition of its boundaries, and stability with respect to time 
and space. In contrast, functional governance, in seeking to respond to functional relations, 
shows a narrower functional scope than territorial governance, a variable geometry of scale 
(multiple/fuzzy scales) and a flexible institutional stability with respect to time and space, 
among other factors. 
In spite of these recent developments, the empirical research reviewed in the previous 
section suggests that, in the case of high-speed rail policy-making, the nation-state seems to 
prevail over other state spaces, be it orthodox EU and subnational institutions or more 
complex arrangements. Spatially, this is most clearly manifested by academics from the 
spatial planning field on the mismatch between the transnational spatial relations facilitated 
and required by European integration and the existing, nation-state-based governance 
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arrangements that regulate them (Romein et al., 2003; Zanon, 2011). These authors argue 
that adaptation to these relations should not simply involve the establishment of scalar 
governance arrangements that match their spatiality, but the adoption of complex multi-level 
and multi-actor systems of governance. 
 
2.3.2 Attitudes to transnational high-speed rail development: a spatial 
understanding 
The particular spatiality of transnational high-speed rail not only involves a tension between 
territoriality – understood as the organisation and exercise of power over bounded blocs of 
space – and the flows of persons and goods across the borders of these blocs. Due to the 
highly spatially selective nature of this type of infrastructure, it may prompt among political 
actors strong and distinct reactions, including naturally contestation to its development. 
Although the conflicts that may accompany transnational HSR infrastructure do not 
necessarily present a local vs. trans-local dimension,28 place is frequently a significant factor 
in the contestation to it. Indeed, transport infrastructure projects have the potential for 
conflicts between local and trans-local interests, in particular when they involve high-speed 
rail lines due to their high spatial selectivity. The recent debate on a high-speed rail line 
linking London with the Midlands and the north of England illustrates this (e.g. BBC, 2013). 
The situation is intensified when the line transcends nation-state borders. Classic examples 
are cross-border mountainous areas: environmentally sensitive and once nationally 
peripheral, they may become repositioned within a wider European space and framed as 
‘missing links’ of a trans-European transport network (Jensen and Richardson, 2004, p. 75). 
The conventional view of infrastructure development as involving a conflict between the 
local and the trans-local – or between the regional and the trans-regional, and so on and so 
forth – implies the existence of a wider interest, against which the particular interests 
concerned may be fulfilled only when they do not contravene the former. This is the 
perspective adopted by those scholars who assume the necessity of developing transnational 
infrastructure to meet the needs of an integrating Europe and thus examine the challenges to 
its implementation, including the lack of a trans-European perspective (Johnson and Turner, 
1997; Nijkamp and Vleugel, 1995; Turró, 1999). Hence the common consideration of local 
contestation as NIMBY (‘not in my back yard’) protests, discredited as conservative and 
resistant to social change (see della Porta and Piazza, 2007). The framing of infrastructure 
                                                     
 
28 See for instance della Porta and Piazza’s (2007) research on the global framing of local protests to 
large-scale infrastructure projects. 
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conflicts as local vs. trans-local therefore assumes a multi-scalar hierarchy whereby long-
distance spatial relations are given priority over shorter ones.  
A more critical view of the conflict that transnational HSR development involves has 
been articulated spatially through the use of the suggestive metaphor of the space of flows 
vs. the space of places. This dialectical opposition was initially proposed by Castells’ (2010) 
to refer to the contradiction between the dominant spatial logic of the network society and 
the superseded spatial organization of the majority of the people’s lives. However, it 
captured the imagination of scholars of transnational transport infrastructure, who employed 
it to refer to the conflicts created by its development. As previously mentioned, Hajer (2000) 
has argued that a policy discourse on a ‘Europe of Flows’ dominates spatial development 
policy in Europe, and has in addition suggested that alternative discourses might be built on 
the basis of the particular qualities of places, as opposed to the horizontal uniformity of a 
‘Europe of flows’. Jensen and Richardson (2004) have framed this issue in similar terms and 
pointed out the need of alternatives more sensitive to place in order to counter the single 
hegemonic space of ‘monotopia’. Furthermore, Albrechts and Coppens (2003) have applied 
this distinction to the study of transnational infrastructure corridor planning. Their analysis 
of the planning process of the Brussels high speed train station highlights the tensions 
between the space of flows (produced by a financial and managerial elite) and the space of 
places (practiced by the local population). Underlying these contributions is the conflict 
between two types of spaces: those constituted by the relations between distant points; and 
those formed by spatial contiguity and self-containment. 
However, these approaches arguably overemphasize the disconnection between the two 
and understate the relevance of place in “anchoring” flows.29 Certain place-based actors may 
see new opportunities in a space reshaped by transnational HSR development. Without 
referring in particular to this type of infrastructure, this is clearly expressed in strategic 
spatial planning exercises that show how urban regions are positioned within wider networks 
(Healey, 1998, 2004), but trans-border relations may also provide opportunities for larger 
regions. In this respect, Prytherch (2010) provides an insightful investigation on the complex 
spatial imaginary through which Catalan regionalist actors have promoted the development 
of a ‘Mediterranean Arc’, a macroregion constituted through not only boundaries but also a 
dense network of spatial relations. These contributions suggest that understanding the 
response of political actors to the differentiated space produced by transnational HSR 
development requires the adoption of a spatially sophisticated approach which transcends a 
                                                     
 
29 Castells (2010, p. 443) has indeed noted that one of the three layers that constitute the space of 
flows is composed by its nodes and hubs. 
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conceptualization based on scales or on flows vs. places. A conceptualization of space that 
problematizes scale and the bounded nature of place and considers instead the relations that 
take place across it may provide a more useful avenue for understanding the behaviour of 
actors in transnational HSR politics. 
 
In short, the development of transnational HSR infrastructure produces a splintering of space 
that involves both a mismatch with traditional political spaces and a tension between actors 
associated to different spatialities. The importance of addressing these two phenomena here, 
however, does not lie in the existence of clear evidence on them. Since the traditional scalar 
frame of the nation-state seems to prevail in determining policy outcomes, attention to the 
relevance of space in the actors’ stance on this type of infrastructure has sought to 
understand it rather than to find further empirical evidence of it. What the discussion in this 
section intends to show is a general lack of a sophisticated and consistent understanding of 
the spatiality of transnational HSR policy-making. The spatiality of the state is primarily 
approached through a scalar lens, although some contributions present a more complex 
perspective (Blatter, 2004; Romein et al., 2003). In turn, a hierarchical view of scale or the 
use of the duality ‘flows vs. places’ seems inadequate to sufficiently understand actors’ 
attitudes on the development of transnational high-speed rail. A nuanced spatialized analysis 
of the policy process would uncover the assumptions of these imaginaries and provide a 
detailed explanation of the relationships between actors and space. This perspective is 
largely absent in the literature on transnational transport infrastructure and HSR policy-
making and, due to the highly differentiated spatiality of this mode of transport, it is 
particularly relevant. 
 
 
2.4 Conclusion and research questions 
This chapter has examined the literature on the dynamics of transnational HSR policy-
making in Europe with a focus on the diversity of mobilized rationales, the roles of the 
variety of actors potentially involved, and the spatiality of this process. Overall, it sought to 
clarify the tensions that the development of this type of infrastructure entails. However, the 
existing literature is not conclusive on any of these dimensions. 
Firstly, the argument that a hegemonic discourse shared across different policy-making 
levels is driving transport infrastructure policy in the EU, although theoretically suggestive, 
is not sufficiently demonstrated by empirical research. Although there may be an 
overarching consensus among political and economic elites on the need to develop 
transnational HSR infrastructure, it is likely that differences in interests and ideas will allow 
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for a certain degree of flexibility within that discourse. Instead of a ‘monotopia’, different 
‘Europes of Flows’ may therefore be imagined, promoted, and developed. The actual 
‘Europe’ to emerge through transport infrastructure development depends in turn on the 
second issue examined, namely the role of the different actors in the policy process. 
Academic work clearly points at the dominance of the nation-state, yet on the one hand this 
work has largely focused on EU policy rather than on EU-relevant transport infrastructure 
policy-making and, on the other, it has arguably paid insufficient attention to the roles of EU 
actors over the last decade and of subnational actors. Finally, scholarly work on transnational 
HSR policy-making has generally rested on a simplified spatial imaginary that is unsuited to 
correctly address its complex spatiality. Although existing research suggests that the 
spatiality of statehood remains territorially bounded through the dominant role of the nation-
state, it generally lacks an understanding of space that transcends a simple scalar imaginary. 
Moreover, the importance of space in shaping the rationales of political actors has been 
commonly framed through a vocabulary of scales or flows vs. places, which obscures its 
comprehension.  
Thus, firstly, this research is expected to ascertain whether rationale convergence in 
high-speed rail policy-making is occurring, illuminating at the same time the related tensions 
within it. Secondly, the thesis intends to provide a detailed account of the power struggles in 
the policy process and the respective role of actors within them. Finally, it seeks to develop a 
sophisticated understanding of the spatiality of transnational HSR politics by focusing on the 
role of space in determining the rationales mobilized by actors and their influence in the 
policy process. These three tasks have been pursued through the articulation of the following 
research questions: 
 
1. What are the rationales mobilized around transnational high-speed rail policy-
making, to what extent are they compatible or mutually exclusive, and how are they 
produced, reproduced and transformed? 
2. What is the influence of actors in the development of transnational high-speed rail 
infrastructure, how do they exert it, and at the expense of whom? 
3. How is space present in transnational high-speed rail policy-making and how does it 
determine the production of the aforementioned rationales and the influence of 
actors in the policy process?  
 
In the first place, the clarification of these questions is important for a better understanding 
of transnational HSR policy-making in Europe. It can thus contribute to empirical research 
on EU transport policy (e.g. Johnson and Turner, 1997; Ross, 1998; Stevens, 2004) and 
transnational transport infrastructure development (e.g. Lemberg, 1995; Romein et al., 2003; 
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Ross, 1995). Moreover, the response to these questions also seeks to promote a critical 
approach in this field, in the line of previous work on discourse analysis (Hajer, 2000; Jensen 
and Richardson, 2004) and on power struggles (Lemberg, 1995). Finally, it intends to place 
space at the centre of the study of transport infrastructure politics, in line with the ‘spatial 
turn’ that has taken place in the social sciences for over the last two decades (Warf and 
Arias, 2009). Ultimately, the aim is to contribute to the critical examination of European 
integration through a focus on a very spatial issue, i.e. transnational HSR infrastructure 
politics. Notwithstanding the EU’s unique achievements in regional economic, social, and 
political integration, it is essential to critically examine this process in order to contribute to 
its progressive development. Therefore, rather than an empirical analysis of the difficulties in 
developing a European orientation in policy-making – the dominant approach in research on 
transnational HSR policy – this thesis seeks to carry out a theoretically informed critique of 
policy-making in the EU that questions assumptions, unmasks power relationships, and 
identifies the winners and losers of this process. The following chapter develops the 
theoretical and analytical framework in order to carry out this endeavour.  
 
 
  
3 Understanding transnational infrastructure policy-
making: an analytical framework 
As the previous chapter has shown, the examination of transnational high-speed rail policy-
making has been framed according to three themes or fields of enquiry that are considered 
central to this process and, more generally, to European integration. These are the tensions 
between the wide variety of rationales potentially mobilized regarding high-speed rail 
development, the capacity of the diverse actors involved to drive and steer the process in a 
certain direction, and the spatiality of transnational HSR policy-making. In order to develop 
an analytical framework to answer the three research questions derived from these themes, 
they will be addressed separately by focusing on three dimensions: discourse, power, and 
space. 
The first research question relates to the dynamics of convergence and divergence of 
rationales in the development of transnational HSR infrastructure. In principle, a 
convergence of rationales is doubtful given the diversity of interests that seem to be involved 
in the process. However, a number of authors have made a preliminary exploration of the 
capacity of discourse to accommodate seemingly different interests and ideas and achieve 
dominance in the policy process (Hajer, 2000; Linnros and Hallin, 2001; Peters, 2003a). This 
research seeks to build on these contributions and adopt a discursive approach to the analysis 
of the processes through which certain representations of reality become hegemonic and 
others marginalized. In this view, the behaviour of actors does not simply respond rationally 
to their own interests since these are themselves constituted through discourse and social 
interaction. Analysis therefore does not focus on ascertaining the extent to which differences 
in attitudes prevent the development of a truly trans-European infrastructure, but on how 
these attitudes are in fact shaped in the struggles to achieve dominance in the discursive 
field. 
The next research question refers to who is driving the development of transnational 
HSR infrastructure and how. Empirical attention to this process has been infrequent but, in 
particular, it has rarely been sufficiently informed by theory. An exception is Lemberg’s 
(1995) study of the decision-making process concerning three transnational transport 
infrastructure links. Drawing on the results of his research, he developed a ‘power structure’ 
diagram that shows relations of different intensity between eight hierarchically arranged 
layers of power and a representation of the law-making process that illustrates the role of the 
different actors in it. However, the concept of power is not defined and the relations between 
actors, represented by arrows, are only characterized by the intensity and direction of 
influence. In this regard, this research seeks to provide a more solid theoretical foundation by 
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focusing on power, a central concept in the social sciences (Haugaard and Clegg, 2009) 
which has been explicitly addressed in political science (see for instance the ‘community 
power debate’, introduced below). This focus needs to detail not only the definition of 
power, but also what is understood as agency (‘who’) and the ways it is exercised (‘how’). 
Finally, the third question that this research seeks to answer concerns the spatiality of 
policy-making. As explained in the previous chapter, literature on transnational transport 
planning has been sensitive both to the mismatch between the nation-state and the regulation 
of trans-border functional flows and to the conflicts prompted by the particular spatiality of 
transnational HSR infrastructure. However, it generally retains a simple spatial imagination 
that obscures a satisfactory understanding of the policy process. This thesis aims to 
complement this literature by explicitly addressing space and placing it as one of the 
cornerstones of the analytical framework. In this respect, it seeks to problematize the 
spatiality of policy-making by drawing on recent human geography debates on scale and 
relationality. This problematization will be subsequently used to spatialize the previous 
discourse and power analytical approaches. Since both state and non-state actors are 
considered in the analysis of policy-making, this approach is concerned not only with the 
spatiality of the state (Brenner et al., 2003) but also with that of non-state actors (Harrison, 
2013); in short, with the spatiality of discourse and power. 
Combining these three approaches in a single analytical framework poses significant 
challenges due to their different disciplinary backgrounds and the fact that they do not 
necessarily share the same ontological and epistemological positioning. Discourse analysis 
considers reality as socially constructed and is associated with an interpretative 
epistemological approach, whereby the researcher, focusing on the meaning that actors give 
to their actions, seeks to develop an understanding of social phenomena that is of limited 
generalizability (Marsh and Furlong, 2002). The approach to power, in turn, is 
fundamentally concerned with ascertaining the causal relationships that led to a certain 
outcome and developing an explanation – rather than an understanding in the interpretative 
sense – of phenomena. The differences, nevertheless, are arguably a matter of emphasis 
since both approaches seek to produce an explanation of events, although a discourse 
approach does so according to the interpretation of the meanings that actors attach to the 
world.1 In any case, the discourse, power, and spatial approaches are addressed 
independently in separate sections, although the last of these carefully draws the links with 
                                                     
 
1 Understanding how actors interpret social and physical phenomena may in fact be necessary for 
developing adequate explanatory accounts. In fact, Sum and Jessop (2013) have recently proposed 
what they term a ‘cultural political economy’, which combines an attention to meaning-making with 
political economic approaches.  
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the first two. At the end of the chapter they are brought together in a single diagram that 
illustrates the analytical framework employed in this research. It is then suggested that the 
combined consideration of the spatialized discourse and power analytical approaches permits 
the development of a social constructionist, theoretically informed, and spatially nuanced 
understanding of transnational infrastructure policy-making. 
 
 
3.1 Policy-making as discursive struggle 
The previous chapter used the term ‘rationale’ to loosely conceptualize the justification 
publicly espoused by actors of their stance towards a particular policy issue. This included 
interests in the first place, such as the expected benefits for a state actor’s territory or a 
business organization’s members. Secondly, the term ‘rationale’ also encompassed ideas 
such as symbolic associations and assumptions about causality. In fact, a number of authors 
from the transport policy field have suggested that ideas play an important role in 
transnational transport infrastructure policy-making, an aspect that Hajer (2000), Peters 
(2003a), and Linnros and Hallin (2001) have addressed in more detail through a discourse 
analytical approach. Building on their work, this section defines a framework for the analysis 
of these rationales’ dynamics by adopting a discursive approach to policy studies. It firstly 
discusses the role of discourse in policy-making, then introduces discourse analysis and its 
different approaches, and finally explains the framework adopted in this research. 
 
3.1.1 Discourse in policy studies 
For the majority of the second half of the 20th century, social sciences have been dominated 
by a positivist and empiricist understanding of political behaviour (Fischer, 2003, pp. 21–
22).2 Actors, according to this view, behave rationally in order to achieve their self-interested 
objectives (e.g. Laver, 1997; Riker and Ordeshook, 1973). As Fischer (2003, p. 22) has 
noted, even those neopositivist perspectives that have sought to integrate ideas in their 
approaches, considering them as guides for behaviour, have retained the basic assumption of 
self-interested, rational behaviour. This understanding has been challenged since the 1980s 
by ‘cognitive’ approaches that emphasize the role of ideas in the policy process, in particular 
in the definition of political problems (Fischer, 2003, p. 23; Surel, 2000). According to 
                                                     
 
2 Positivism and empiricism here broadly refer to approaches that seek to produce ‘objective’ and 
empirically rigorous causal explanations of political action (Fischer, 2003, pp. 21–22, see also pp. 
118–119). 
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Fischer (2003, p. 22), ideas are not only able to shape the actors’ interests but also to entirely 
change the ways they see the social and material world. The difficulty lies in assessing the 
respective importance of ideas and interests, not least because of the diversity of cognitive 
processes classified under the term (John, 1998, p. 144; cited in Fischer, 2003, p. 24). 
In parallel to this increased attention to ideas, there has been a reassessment of the role 
of language in policy-making. In line with the ‘linguistic turn’ in twentieth-century 
philosophy (e.g. Rorty, 1992), language is seen as not simply reflecting social and physical 
reality, but as constituting it (Fischer and Forester, 1993, p. 1; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, 
pp. 8–9). Language, in other words, inescapably shapes our view of the world.3 Important in 
this notion is that language is not reducible to the individual; rather, it must be understood 
within the practices it is employed (Fischer, 2003, p. 41; Hajer, 2006, p. 70). The 
implications of this view of language for policy-making are profound. If the representations 
of reality through language are necessarily selective, they are linked with issues such as 
agenda-setting and relations of power (Fischer and Forester, 1993, p. 1) and their definition 
is therefore politically significant. Moreover, since language must be understood as 
embedded in social practices, attention to policy processes is important in understanding 
continuity and change in these representations. This relevance of language has led to an 
significant body of work that emphasizes the role of argumentation in policy analysis and 
planning (Fischer and Forester, 1993; Fischer and Gottweis, 2012) and calls for an 
interpretative and deliberative policy analysis approach more attuned to contemporary 
democratic conditions (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). 
Both ideas and language are at the centre of discursive approaches to politics. These are 
concerned with how relatively stable representations of reality structure behaviour and 
become embedded in social and political practices. In spite of the variety of 
conceptualizations of the term, discourse commonly refers to a specific set of ideas and 
concepts that give meaning to social and physical phenomena and are produced and 
reproduced through social practices (Fischer, 2003, p. 90; Hajer, 1995, p. 44; Howarth, 2000, 
p. 9). Following the conception of language explained above, discourse must not be 
understood as just speech or argumentation, but as constituting reality and being embedded 
in the context it is practiced (Fischer, 2003, p. 41; Hajer, 1995, p. 44). Ideas are then 
understood as integrated in discourse, rather than simply as one of the many variables 
                                                     
 
3 This does not necessarily mean there is no reality beyond language, but that access to it is always 
through the latter. As Laclau and Mouffe have famously argued: ‘The fact that every object is 
constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to 
thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. [...] What is denied is not that such objects exist 
externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects 
outside any discursive condition of emergence’ (1985, p. 108, original emphasis). 
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influencing policy-making (Fischer, 2003, p. 41). As Fischer has explained, ‘the discourse 
approach sees the medium of language as constituting the very meaning upon which ideas 
are constructed’ (2003, p. 41). Interests, in this perspective, are shaped intersubjectively by 
discourse (Fischer, 2003, p. 46; Hajer, 1995, p. 59). 
By selectively conceptualizing the social and physical world, discourses delimit the 
range of issues to be considered in policy-making and specify the forms of knowledge that 
are acceptable as legitimate (Fischer, 2003, p. 73).4 Therefore, the achievement of 
dominance in the discursive field is a key dimension of political processes. As Fairclough 
has noted, ‘the articulation and rearticulating of orders of discourse is correspondingly one 
stake in hegemonic struggle’ (1992, p. 93; cited in Fischer, 2003, p. 79). Drawing from 
Gramsci’s (1971) writings, hegemony has in fact been addressed by discourse theory by 
understanding it as the contingent achievement of consent by the population to social 
projects of the dominant groups of society. In particular, hegemony occupies a central place 
in Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) theory of discourse (see below). According to it, the 
hegemonic discourse formation is inherently linked to the construction of social antagonism: 
the exclusion of a radical otherness that, on the one hand, stabilizes this formation while, on 
the other, prevents its full closure (Torfing, 1999, p. 124). This antagonistic conflict between 
the hegemonic discourse and its ‘outside’ in fact characterizes the reproduction and potential 
for transformation of the former. Drawing from what he calls ‘social-interactive’ discourse 
theory, Hajer (1995, pp. 56–57) has pointed out that the fact that the arbitrary nature of 
structured ways of seeing often remains hidden involves the difficulty of challenging an 
hegemonic discourse if it is not using its own categories (see also Fischer, 2003, p. 88). In 
this respect, he noted that the environmental movement has the dilemma of arguing either in 
the terms set by the government, thus losing expressive freedom, or in their own terms, thus 
risking the loss of direct influence (Hajer, 1995, p. 57).5  
 
 
                                                     
 
4 Hajer (1995, p. 42) has argued that in fact social constructionism has provided the means for the 
refinement of Schattschneider’s theory of organization as mobilization of bias, which stated that ‘[a]ll 
forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and 
the suppression of others because organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized 
into politics while others are organized out’ (1960, p. 71, original emphasis). 
5 The concern with the difficulties in articulating political alternatives to the dominant order is shared 
with recent scholarship, which draws on political philosophy, on a post-political condition in 
environmental politics (Swyngedouw, 2010, 2007a), urban and spatial politics (Raco and Lin, 2012; 
Swyngedouw, 2011, 2009), and spatial planning (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012). Although there 
is some overlap with discourse theory, this literature focuses on the technologies of government – 
based on consensus, partnership, coordination, management, etc. – that foreclose the political by 
avoiding its inherent antagonist dimension. 
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3.1.2 Discourse analysis as an approach in policy studies 
In light of the above discussion, the analysis of discourse seeks to understand how 
conceptions of reality are constructed, transformed, and reproduced, and what are their 
implications for political activity. In particular, discourse analysis has an important role to 
play in examining how a certain understanding of reality gains dominance and authority 
whereas other understandings are discredited (Hajer, 1995, p. 44). In other words, it analyzes 
‘the way hegemonic conceptions of reality are upheld and reproduced by key political 
groups, while oppositional groups seek argumentative strategies to challenge these dominant 
social constructs’ (Fischer, 2003, pp. 90–91). The relevance of this approach to the first 
research question of this thesis is clear: discourse analysis can be a useful tool to ascertain 
whether and through which means a dominant rationale around transnational high-speed 
rail emerges and, if so, which other rationales become marginalized in the process. 
Discourse analysis also implies that this process should not be understood simply through the 
degree to which pre-given interests can be accommodated in a certain policy. Rather, by 
considering interests as constituted discursively through social practices, rationale 
convergence or divergence should be seen through the dynamic production, reproduction, 
and transformation of shared understandings of phenomena. 
Discourse analysis in policy studies has been extensively applied in environmental 
politics (e.g. Dryzek, 2013; Hajer, 1995; Litfin, 1994; Rydin, 2003), due to the close 
relationship of the environmental field to social constructionist perspectives (Feindt and 
Oels, 2005, p. 162; Fischer, 2003, p. 91). However, as Fischer (2003, p. 91) has noted, due to 
the importance of experts – key actors in the production and legitimization of knowledge – in 
contemporary society, the value of discourse analysis is not limited to this field. In fact, over 
the last two decades discourse analysis has also been used in a number of spatially-related 
domains: urban policy (Hastings, 1999; Jacobs, 2006; Lees, 2004); housing policy (Hastings, 
2000; Jacobs et al., 2003); and spatial policy and planning (Richardson and Jensen, 2003; 
Rydin, 2005; Sharp and Richardson, 2001). Research on transport infrastructure policy and 
planning has arguably been resistant to the adoption of social constructionist perspectives, 
probably due to the positivist, apparently value-free orientation of much of transport 
geography work (Hanson, 2000).6 Nevertheless, as it is shown in the previous chapter, some 
authors have addressed transnational transport infrastructure policy from a discourse 
analytical approach (notably Hajer, 2000; Jensen and Richardson, 2004). 
                                                     
 
6 Although see Shaw et al. (2008) and Goetz et al. (2009) for a more nuanced view. 
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This thesis seeks to contribute to this body of work but, due to the variety of existing 
approaches to discourse analysis, it is necessary first to determine which one is more 
adequate to respond to the research question. There are different classifications of these 
discourse analytical approaches or traditions (e.g. Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002; Torfing, 
2005; Wetherell et al., 2001), but common categories are the following: those approaches 
with a narrower linguistic focus, such as content analysis (Holsti, 1969) and conversation 
analysis (Atkinson and Heritage, 1984); discursive psychology (Edwards and Potter, 1992; 
Potter and Wetherell, 1987); critical discourse analysis (Fairclough et al., 2011; Wodak and 
Meyer, 2009); Foucauldian approaches (Foucault, 1991, 1998); and other post-structuralist 
and post-marxist approaches, mainly based on Laclau and Mouffe (Howarth, 1998; Howarth 
et al., 2000; Torfing, 1999). A suitable approach for the aims of this research needs, on the 
one hand, to address the socio-cultural level of discourse (Fischer, 2003, p. 74). At this level 
discourse structures interpretation of phenomena and, consequently, behaviour. On the other 
hand, it also needs to focus on the everyday level of discourse (Fischer, 2003, p. 74) at which 
communicative interaction occurs. Attention to this level is required in order to account for 
the dynamics of policy-making and the role of actors in discourse formation. In this respect, 
language-centred approaches seem inadequate to address the political and power 
implications of discourse (Torfing, 2005, p. 6). On the contrary, approaches based on 
Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe are concerned with overarching discursive patterns but are 
unable to adequately explain agency in discourse production (Hajer, 1995, p. 53; Jørgensen 
and Phillips, 2002, p. 20). The approach adopted in this thesis, developed by Hajer (1995) in 
an influential study of environmental policy-making, effectively combines the attention to 
both levels by drawing on discursive psychology and Foucault’s notion of discourse. 
 
3.1.3 Hajer’s discourse analytical approach 
Hajer’s approach to discourse analysis was presented in his seminal work The Politics of 
Environmental Discourse, an in-depth study of the acid rain controversies in Great Britain 
and the Netherlands.7 His analytical framework was devised to analyze the discursive 
dynamics that take place in environmental politics, in particular the processes by which a 
certain understanding of the environmental problem gains dominance while other 
                                                     
 
7 Apart from its influence in establishing discourse analysis in the study of environmental politics 
(Feindt and Oels, 2005, p. 166), Hajer’s approach has been variously used in the spatial planning and 
policy field, either directly applying it (Hajer, 2003, 2000; Peters, 2003a) or drawing on it in different 
degrees (e.g. Hajer, 2005; Jensen and Richardson, 2004; Linnros and Hallin, 2001; Low, 2005; Sharp 
and Richardson, 2001). 
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representations become marginalized. In the development of his framework, he sought to 
introduce in Foucault’s abstract approach the role of agency or individual strategic action in 
discourse formation by drawing on social psychology, in particular the works of Davies and 
Harré (1990) and Billig (1987). Hajer argued that Foucault’s theory of discourse as 
expressed in his later works (1991, 1998) provided useful insights into the interaction and 
fusion of discourses and the discursive practices through which agency is exercised; 
however, it did not properly explain the role of individual action in discourse reproduction 
and transformation (Hajer, 1995, pp. 47–52). He then sought to operationalize  Foucault’s 
approach by considering the level of interpersonal interaction, on which discursive 
psychology focuses (Hajer, 1995, pp. 52–53). His definition of discourse introduces this role 
of social interaction in discourse formation:  
‘Discourse is here defined as a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, 
reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical 
and social realities’ (1995, p.44). 
In Hajer’s approach, then, the practices through which discourse is performed are central to 
discourse production, reproduction, and transformation.8 Thus the focus of analysis should 
not only be on the content of discourse (the ‘ensemble of ideas, concepts, and 
categorizations’) but also on the context where the ‘particular set of practices’ are carried 
out. Discursive constructs therefore need to be understood according to the specific 
institutional contexts and practices in which utterances are meaningfully stated (Fischer, 
2003, p. 90). Furthermore, this ‘social-interactive’ discourse theory places particular 
emphasis on argumentative interaction as a key moment in discourse formation. While 
constrained by routinized discursive understandings, actors are able to behave strategically in 
order to make others adopt their understanding of a problem and position other actors in 
particular ways (Hajer, 1995, pp. 52–58). In Billig’s words, actors are seen as ‘active, 
selecting and adapting thoughts, mutating and creating them, in the continued struggle for 
argumentative victory against rival thinkers’ (1987, p. 82; cited in Hajer, 1995, p. 54). In 
order to operationalize the analysis of this dynamics and explain discourse production, 
reproduction, and transformation, Hajer proposed the use of two key middle-range concepts: 
‘story-lines’ and ‘discourse coalitions’. 
A story-line is the ‘basic linguistic mechanism’ (Fischer, 2003, p. 86) for creating and 
maintaining discursive order. Introduced by Davies and Harré (1990), Hajer interpreted the 
concept as ‘a generative sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive 
                                                     
 
8 Hajer adopts Davies and Harré’s definition of discursive practices: ‘all the ways in which people 
actively produce social and psychological realities’ (Davies and Harré, 1990, p. 45). 
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categories to give meaning to specific physical or social phenomena’ (1995, p. 56). The 
assumption behind this conception is that actors do not resort to comprehensive discursive 
systems when interpreting phenomena, but to simpler narrative constructions. In this respect, 
story-lines are important insofar they reduce the complexity of a problem by suggesting 
unity in its diverse and separate discursive component parts (Hajer, 1995, p. 56).9 By 
suggesting – but not presuming – a common understanding, they allow the overcoming of 
fragmentation and the achievement of discursive closure (Hajer, 1995, p. 62). The power of a 
story-line lies in that ‘it sounds right’, a characteristic based on the plausibility of the 
argument, the trust in the actor who utters it, and the acceptability of the story-line (Hajer, 
1995, p. 63). Finally, the relevance of story-lines for the policy process lies in their 
importance for strategic action, since they structure understanding and play a key role in the 
positioning of actors and structures. As Hajer stated, ‘[f]inding the appropriate story-line 
becomes an important form of agency’ (1995, p. 56). 
Story-lines are in turn an important cohesive element in the other middle-range concept 
of Hajer’s approach: discourse coalitions. As actors struggle to achieve discursive 
hegemony, Hajer has argued that they form coalitions or ‘policy subsystems’ (Howlett et al., 
2009) around a set of storylines they adhere to. He defined discourse coalitions as ‘the 
ensemble of (1) a set of story-lines; (2) the actors who utter these story-lines; and (3) the 
practices in which this discursive activity is based’ (Hajer, 1995, p. 65). Story-lines, thus, 
serve as the ‘discursive cement’ that holds the coalition together. Discourse coalitions are 
distinct to other types of coalitions in two aspects (Hajer, 1995, p. 66). Firstly, they are based 
on meanings rather than on interests. By considering interests as constituted through 
discourse, story-lines may in fact change the actors’ understandings of their own interests. 
Secondly, discourse coalitions broaden the scope concerning potential participant actors. In 
this respect, the analyst should search for those actors that produce story-lines, such as 
experts, activists and media actors, and the practices through which they do so. 
In Hajer’s approach, politics is thus understood as ‘a struggle for discursive hegemony 
in which actors try to secure support for their definition of reality’ (Hajer, 1995, p. 59). 
Although actors’ behaviour is naturally limited by the ‘webs of meaning’ in which they are 
entangled, these can still exercise a certain degree of choice (Hajer, 1995, p. 56). According 
                                                     
 
9 The notion of story-line is particularly relevant to policy discourses, which, as opposed to more 
formal discourses such as law, are complex and not necessarily coherent (Hajer, 1995, p. 45). 
Environmental discourse is a case in point since, as he noted, it commonly draws on a number of 
different disciplines that do not only include the natural sciences but also economics, engineering, and 
others. Although transport policy may be approached through a narrow transport lens, transport policy 
discourse is likely to involve discursive elements from other disciplines (economics, environmental 
science, engineering, etc.). 
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to Hajer, hegemony in a given domain is achieved when two conditions are satisfied: 
‘discourse structuration’ and ‘discourse institutionalization’ (1995, pp. 60–61). The first one 
occurs when actors need to draw on the terms of a given discourse in order to be credible. 
Discourse institutionalization, in turn, happens when a given discourse is translated into 
specific policies (such as shift of investment in a certain type of transport infrastructure) and 
institutional arrangements (e.g. the establishment of a particular type of cost-benefit analysis 
or the restructuring of government departments). 
All in all, the adoption of Hajer’s discourse analytical framework has clear implications 
for empirical analysis. Following the above definition of discourse coalitions, this should 
focus on three elements: the terms of discourse, i.e. the story-lines through which 
understanding is structured; the formation of coalitions around such story-lines; and the 
understanding of both story-lines and discourse coalitions through the practices in which 
discourse is produced, reproduced, and transformed. As mentioned earlier, Hajer’s approach 
suggests special attention to those actors that are relevant in the production of story-lines. 
Experts seem to be particularly important due to their role in the production, control and 
legitimization of knowledge (Fischer, 2003, p. 45).10 The analysis of these three elements 
involves the following data (Hajer, 2006, pp. 73–74): documents and news articles, for a first 
definition of discursive terms and a basic notion of processes and sites of discursive 
production; interviews with key players, to obtain information about causal relationships and 
the meaning of particular events for them; and evidence to account for the argumentative 
exchange (e.g. parliamentary debates and minutes of inquiries). 
 
To summarize, in order to ascertain whether there is rationale convergence in transnational 
HSR planning and the means through which this happens, this research has adopted a 
discourse analytical approach. This approach assumes that actors’ behaviour is not simply 
self-interested and rational, but is influenced by ideas and discourse. Particularly, the 
adopted framework (Hajer, 1995) bridges the gap between Foucault’s abstract theory of 
discourse and the analysis of political processes by drawing on discursive psychology and its 
emphasis on social interaction. In particular, Hajer proposed the use of the middle-range 
concepts of story-line and discourse coalition in order to operationalize such an approach. 
Accordingly, the analysis of discourse through this framework involves focusing on three 
fundamental elements: the story-lines that provide the basis for creating and maintaining 
                                                     
 
10 Notwithstanding Hajer’s attempt to integrate both agency and structure in discourse analysis, it is 
important to note that his approach has been criticized for not sufficiently defining the role of agency 
within discourse coalitions and, in particular, in the formation of story-lines, which may occur 
deliberately or ‘by chance’ (Peters, 2003b, p. 233). In any case, empirical analysis will shed light on 
the capacity of this approach to adequately explain such a role (see Section 9.3.1). 
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discursive order; the discourse coalitions that form around such story-lines; and the 
discursive practices through which discourse is produced, reproduced, and transformed. 
Discourse, in this view, must not be understood only in terms of its content but within the 
context it is practiced. Hajer’s analytical framework conceptualizes politics as a struggle for 
discursive hegemony, and as such it allows to analyze how actors seek to secure support for 
their understanding of phenomena whilst other views become discredited. Although this 
dimension of the policy process is key for understanding transnational HSR policy-making, 
it is also necessary to address how, beyond discursive struggles, actors try to ensure that the 
development of policy – in this case a high-speed rail line – happens according to their 
views. The next section develops a framework for analyzing this process through a focus on 
the concept of power. 
 
 
3.2 Policy-making as power struggle 
In order to understand how transnational high-speed rail is being developed in Europe, it is 
necessary to develop a conceptualization of power that allows us to ascertain the role of 
actors in that process. In spite of the centrality of the concept in the social sciences 
(Haugaard and Clegg, 2009), its meaning is far from settled. Power has been frequently 
considered an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Connolly, 1993; Lukes, 2005), as any 
conceptualization of it involves adopting a certain moral and political perspective. Haugaard 
(2010), drawing on Wittgenstein (1967), has further argued that power is a ‘family 
resemblance concept’, the meaning of which varies according to the ‘language game’ or 
theoretical perspective it is employed in. This entails that there is no single definition of 
power that encompasses all usages. This section selectively draws on literature on power to 
develop a conceptualization of the term suitable to address transport infrastructure policy-
making.11 The objective is to propose not the correct view on power, but a conceptualization 
that is appropriate for the objectives of this research and applicable to other similar 
undertakings. As Haugaard and Clegg argue, ‘it is still better to think of power as plural, as 
shaped by local context, as a tool which enables us to make sense of the social world rather 
than embodying a singular essence’ (2009, p. 5). Thus, the section first introduces the major 
debates on power in politics in order to specify the scope of the conception of power to be 
                                                     
 
11 The development of a specific conceptualization of the term by drawing on different theoretical 
perspectives faces the difficulty of utilizing concepts that have different meanings according to the 
‘language game’ they are employed in (Haugaard, 2002, p. 3). For that reason, an effort has been 
made to understand these within their own contexts and explicitly state the meanings of the terms 
used. 
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utilized. Second, it addresses the problem of agency, that is of who exercises power. Finally, 
it develops an operationalization of the term that allows the analysis of how it is exercised. 
 
3.2.1 A focus on behaviour: the ‘community power debate’ 
The study of power has been conducted from several, more or less distinct theoretical 
perspectives with their own ‘language games’. For instance, Haugaard (2002) has 
distinguished between conceptual analytical political theory, non-analytical political theory, 
and modern and postmodern social theory. Considering this thesis’ focus on policy-making, 
a useful entry point to the conceptualization of power is the so-called ‘community power 
debate’ that took place among mostly United States political scientists from the 1950s up to 
the 1970s (Clegg, 1989, p. 40). This debate originated in the critique of Mills (2000) and 
Hunter’s (1953) work on the distribution of power in US society. These authors argued that 
US politics was dominated by a ruling elite at the expense of the powerless majority of the 
population. Following Haugaard’s (2002) classification, the scholars who engaged in the 
community power debate are broadly associated with conceptual analytical political theory 
and modern social theory. Generally speaking, they can be grouped in three main approaches 
to power. 
The first approach is the so-called ‘pluralist’ and was adopted by those that first 
engaged in a critique of the elitist approach (Dahl, 2005; Polsby, 1963).12 The pluralists – 
Dahl in particular – sought to counter the elitists’ methodological lack of precision with the 
development of a rigorous methodology for the study of power (Clegg, 1989, p. 8; Lukes, 
2005, p. 5). The concern was with the precise measurement of power, and this was to be 
done by studying its exercise. Thus, this approach involves a focus on behaviour in decision-
making on issues that entail an observable conflict (Lukes, 2005, p. 19). As Polbsy noted, in 
a pluralist approach ‘an attempt is made to study specific outcomes in order to determine 
who actually prevails in community decision-making’ (1963, p. 113; cited in Lukes, 2005, p. 
17). The emphasis on who prevails in decision-making is certainly appropriate for the 
objectives of this research; however, this view of power has been challenged by the second 
approach to power, developed by Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963, 1970). They argued that 
power is not only manifested in observable decision-making on certain issues, but also in 
limiting the scope of decision-making to such issues. As they stated, ‘to the extent that a 
                                                     
 
12 The term ‘pluralist’ refers to the conclusions on the distribution of power that these authors drew in 
their studies. Nevertheless, the focus here, as in Lukes (2005), is on the features of the approach rather 
than on the conclusions reached through it.  
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person or group – consciously or unconsciously – creates or reinforces barriers to the public 
airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power’ (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, p. 
949). Although an important qualification of the pluralist approach, Bachrach and Baratz’s 
conception of power retained a focus on decision-making – considering non-decision-
making a form of it – and the existence of an actual conflict of interests (Lukes, 2005, p. 25). 
In this respect, these two views of power were further criticized by Lukes (2005), who 
famously proposed a ‘three-dimensional’ view of power to overcome the limitations of what 
he termed one-dimensional (pluralist) and two-dimensional (Bachrach and Baratz’s) views 
of power. On the one hand, he criticized the behavioural focus of both approaches as they 
did not sufficiently consider the influence of structural elements on individual action; on the 
other, he expanded on Bachrach and Baratz’s second face of power by considering not only 
decision-making, observable conflict, and subjective interests, but also control over the 
political agenda, latent conflict, and real interests (Lukes, 2005, p. 28). In this respect, Lukes 
argued that power is at work also when securing consent and thus preventing conflict from 
arising (2005, p. 7). Indeed, this third dimension of power is related with the later literature 
on hegemony and discourse reviewed in the previous section.13 The problem, however, lies 
in Lukes’ conception of interests. According to him, power’s third dimension serves to 
conceal people’s real interests and consequently lead to their consent to being dominated 
(Lukes, 2005, p. 13), a notion which has been linked to the Marxist concept of ‘false 
consciousness’ (Clegg, 1989, pp. 127–128; Haugaard, 2002, p. 38). This conception clearly 
conflicts with the social constructionist view adopted in the previous section, which sees 
interests not as pre-given but as constituted through discourse. According to this view, power 
may involve, rather than the concealment of people’s real interests, the gain of support for 
one’s representation of reality. The dimension of power that refers to the shaping of 
consensus is therefore encompassed in the discourse analytical approach used to answer the 
first research question. 
In turn, the conception of power adopted in this section is limited to actual behaviour in 
decision-making, a perspective to which the behavioural aspects of the pluralist and Barach 
and Baratz’s approaches are still relevant. The question of ‘who prevails’ is comparable to 
that of ‘who drives’ proposed in this thesis’ second research question – the difference 
between them being on the degree of conflict they assume, an issue that will be discussed 
later. In this perspective, power is seen as exercised, over both actual and potential policy 
issues, and as involving conflicts over interests understood as preferences or grievances. The 
                                                     
 
13 Lukes (2005, p. 9) in fact emphasizes the prominence of Gramsci’s notion of hegemony in the 
historical context in which Power: A Radical View was written. 
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focus therefore is on the exercise of power in specific instances of policy-making. The 
struggles within this level of decision-making are comparable to those that Haugaard, 
drawing on Foucault, has termed ‘shallow’ conflicts, i.e. ‘‘local’ struggles which take place 
within a regime of power and truth production’ (Haugaard, 2002, p. 186). Deeper struggles 
about this regime are addressed in the discursive dimension of the analytical framework. In 
fact, although this ‘shallow’ level of power has been the object of study of much of the 
modernist tradition on power stretching from Hobbes to Lukes (Clegg, 1989), attention to it 
does not necessarily conflict with the adoption of alternative conceptions of power that 
incorporate for instance discourse theory. As Clegg, who developed a theoretical framework 
that sought to combine both approaches, has stated, ‘[r]estricted to its appropriate context of 
analysis and reformulated accordingly, there is much to recommend the careful analysis of 
causal power, in agency terms, of particular episodes’ (1989, p. 187). The consideration of 
agency in the exercise of power, however, points at a key dimension in debates on power: 
the relationship between structure and agency. 
 
3.2.2 The role of agency and structure in the exercise of power 
A discussion on the relationship between structure and agency can in fact help to identify 
who or what is understood to exercise power in this approach. As the concept of power, the 
long-standing debate on structure and agency is central to the social sciences and refers to 
the degree to which human behaviour is determined by individual action or social structure. 
Both of them are generally deemed relevant, although different approaches dissent on the 
point at which structural determinism gives way to agency.14 Simply put it, social structures 
on the one hand frame social relations in a manner that determine behaviour and partly shape 
outcomes whilst, on the other, actors are able to exercise agency to a certain extent. For 
instance, the configuration of the state at the same time constraints and enables the exercise 
of power by social actors. Government departments are assigned a number of competences 
that enable them to mobilize resources to carry out policy in certain domains, while other 
actors are prevented from doing so. However, this capacity does not fully determine action. 
Decisions need to be made in order to initiate the development of policy, proceed in a certain 
                                                     
 
14 Among the classic works relevant to the power debate that lean toward structural determinism are 
Parsons (1967) and Poulantzas (1973, 2000), whereas causal notions of power such as Dahls’ (2005) 
and Bachrach and Baratz’s (1970) tend to give primacy to agency. Theories that adopt a middle 
ground have been developed by Clegg (1989) and Haugaard (1997). Giddens’ (1984) structuration 
theory sought to overcome the dualism of agency and structure although, according to Clegg (1989, p. 
140), the agency perspective remains dominant in it. 
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direction, prioritize investments, etc. Moreover, the existence of negotiations and agreements 
in political processes also indicate that agency is important in producing policy.  
The difficulty lies in assigning power to structure and agency. Should power refer to the 
constraining and enabling characteristics of structure? Should its conception rather be limited 
to agency? The answer to this problem obviously varies according to the adopted approach; 
since the focus here is on particular episodes of policy-making, a starting point is to consider 
the exercise of power as an indication of agency: agency is present when a change is caused 
in the course of events. Lukes (2005), nevertheless, pointed out the difficulties in 
determining the limit between structural determination and the exercise of power, but he also 
advanced a useful criterion to overcome them: ‘My claim [...] is that to identify a given 
process as an ‘exercise of power’, rather than as a case of structural determination, is to 
assume that it is in the exerciser’s or exercisers’ power to act differently’ (2005, p. 57, 
original emphasis). According to this view, then, the possibility of having acted differently 
indicates the exercise of power and hence of agency. For instance, the allocation of a certain 
amount of investment to a project by a government department, the production of a technical 
report by an expert or group of experts, or the brokering of an agreement between 
government officials, are all evidence of agency as the actors did not need to behave in such 
a way. This implies that, as Clegg (1989, p. 188) has argued, agency is not limited to 
individuals but may assume a collective form. The conceptualization of actors in this thesis 
hence involves both individuals and organizations. 
Nevertheless, the focus on agency should not entail dismissing the role of structure in 
the exercise of power. Naturally, this exercise will be constrained and enabled by certain 
structural relations. While the assignment of competences, for instance, facilitates 
government action in certain domains, this cannot – as long as rules are abided by – exceed 
the scope of these competences.15 This introduces the distinction between power as exercised 
and power as a capacity, one of the central themes in conceptualizations on power. The 
former, as argued above, is linked to agency, while the latter refers to an existing condition 
that bears a certain relation to structure. Wrong (1995, p. 6) in fact distinguished between 
‘episodic power’, which refers to specific behavioural events, and ‘dispositional power’, 
which refers to the latent capacity to exercise the former. This distinction was further 
adopted by Clegg (1989) to develop his theoretical framework on power, which clarified the 
                                                     
 
15 This view of structure slightly differs with Giddens’s (1984), which stated that structure exists when 
reproduced by agency. The notion adopted in this thesis is closer to Clegg’s: ‘The criterion of 
structure is not that there are individuals constituting it through their instantiations but that relations 
between individuals and other forms of collective agency are constituted in relatively enduring ways 
which routinely constrain and enable differential opportunities for action and inaction on the part of 
those agencies’ (Clegg, 1989, p. 145). 
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relationship between agency, structure, and the exercise and disposition of power. This 
framework consists of three different ‘circuits of power’ (at the levels of agency, social 
interaction, and system integration) that correspond, respectively, with episodic power, 
dispositional power, and facilitative power. To the pluralists’ view of power as exercised 
(episodic power) and Wrong’s (1995) conception of power as a capacity (dispositional 
power), he added Parson’s (1967) notion of power as facilitating the production of the norms 
at the roots of social order and the achievement of collective goals (facilitative power). In 
this perspective, facilitative power confers certain dispositional powers to agents, who in 
turn may episodically exercise this capacity. Thus, the exercise of power does not occur in a 
vacuum and hence it is necessary to consider the structural dimension in order to understand 
it. 
However, the emphasis in this dimension of the analytical framework is on episodic 
power or, in Clegg’s (1989) terms, ‘episodic agency power’. It seeks to aid the understanding 
of the actual influence of actors on the development of transnational transport infrastructure. 
Therefore, it does not attempt to analyze the influence of structural conditions on the 
exercise of power or vice versa. Similarly, it is not concerned with the power struggles that 
take place at Clegg’s (1989) levels of social and system integration. The conflicts inherent in 
the power structure of society such as the distribution of competences favouring certain 
actors at the expense of others, while undoubtedly important, are therefore not addressed – 
or, more precisely, they are addressed to the extent they are expressed through specific 
practices. In fact, a focus on the exercise of power, rather than on power as a capacity, in 
transnational transport infrastructure policy-making is arguably a more adequate approach 
due to the complexity of the policy-making environment in the EU, which makes an abstract 
understanding of power a very complex task. In short, although structural elements must be 
considered in the analysis, this is in order to understand its actual focus, i.e. the exercise of 
power. 
 
3.2.3 Episodic agency power: an operationalization 
Once defined the scope of power and its relationship with agency, the last step is to 
operationalize the term in order to analyze how it is exercised. It is firstly necessary to 
propose a definition of power. The diverse ways in which power has been defined do in fact 
reflect different views on the concept and in turn determine different implications for the 
analysis. Let’s consider, for instance, Dahl’s classic definition of power: ‘A has power over B 
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to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’ (Dahl, 1957, 
pp. 202–203, original emphasis). Power is here understood as a capacity (‘he can get’),16 
and, importantly, as involving a relationship of domination (‘power over’). The distinction 
between ‘power over’ and ‘power to’, sometimes conceptualized as between conflictual 
power and consensual power, is in fact key in the literature on power (see Clegg et al., 2006, 
Chapter 7; Göhler, 2009). In terms of this research, it has been noted that power is 
considered as exercised, rather than as a capacity, and as related to agency when events 
could have occurred otherwise. Accordingly, power is defined here as the exerting of non-
predetermined influence on the development of policy by an individual or collective agency. 
The emphasis is therefore on ‘power to’ influence policy, although it may involve ‘power 
over’ other actors – the extent to which it does so depends not only on the existence of a 
conflict of preferences, but also on the degree the exercise of power is considered 
legitimate.17 
Power as conceived here can in turn be exercised in a variety of forms. Based on a first 
distinction developed by Bachrach and Baratz (1963), a number of authors have worked with 
different typologies of power (notably, Allen, 2003; Lukes, 2005; Wrong, 1995). These 
classifications have typically included the modes of coercion, authority, force, manipulation, 
and persuasion, but also others such as domination and seduction (see Allen, 2003). 
Although many of these distinctions have not been retained in contemporary debates 
(Haugaard, 2002, p. 27), attention to the modes through which power is exercised is relevant 
for a more nuanced understanding of this process and its democratic nature. In this respect, 
for the objectives of this research a categorization of a limited number of modes of power 
was developed based on the works cited above. They involve: authority and domination, 
which work through recognition and submission, respectively;18 coercion, which works 
through the threat of force or of sanction; manipulation, which works through concealment 
of intent or of information; and persuasion, which involves a certain degree of reciprocity 
                                                     
 
16 However, later in the same article Dahl emphasized the exercise of power in describing his view of 
the concept: ‘it seemed to involve a successful attempt by A to get a to do something he would not 
otherwise do’ (Dahl, 1957, p. 204, original emphasis). As Lukes (2005, p. 17) notes, this view is more 
consistent with the pluralists’ focus on power as exercised. 
17 The notion of ‘power to’ or consensual power, primarily associated with Parsons (1967), is in fact 
likely to be relevant when analyzing policy-making as state action presupposes a certain level of 
legitimacy in order to effectively achieve particular goals in complex social systems. 
18 The difference between authority and domination is that, as opposed to the latter, the former is 
commonly regarded as legitimate. Although Clegg (1989, pp. 213–215) preferred to use the term 
domination since he was concerned with the processes whereby authority may be granted, in this 
research this distinction is kept since recognition or not of authority may be an important factor in 
determining policy development. 
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and includes inducement and negotiation.19 Thus, the fact that a state actor resorts to the use 
of persuasion instead of authority in the achievement of a certain policy outcome may 
indicate that its capacity to ensure this outcome may be insufficient. Nevertheless, modes of 
power are normally found in temporary combinations (Wrong, 1995) and in any case there is 
not a conclusive, agreed categorization of them; hence, it is adequate to use this 
classification as a reference to be validated and possibly modified through empirical 
analysis. 
Finally, the operationalization of an episodic conception of ‘power’ would not be 
complete without a clarification of how structural conditions should be considered in the 
analysis. Within the circuit of episodic power, Clegg (1989) drew on Harré and Madden 
(1975) and Benton (1981) to argue that agencies’ power is realized through the organization 
of ‘standing conditions’, which involve means and resources: ‘Agencies possess varying 
control of resources which they have varying means of effectively utilizing in order to 
produce consequential outcomes for their own and others’ agency’ (Clegg, 1989, p. 215). 
The concept of standing conditions thus provides the link with – but does not exhaust – the 
notion of structure.20 Means here are broadly understood as rules that allow the mobilization 
of different types of resources, such as financial, human, and knowledge resources. For 
instance, then, the exercise of power that a certain investment in infrastructure entails is 
grounded on the deployment of financial resources acquired and mobilized through rules on 
taxation and the allocation of competences. Means thus permit the differential control of 
resources, so that specific actors are better positioned to achieve certain outcomes than 
others. Attention to the means and resources through which power is exercised is therefore 
essential in order to appropriately understand episodic power. 
Analysis must therefore concentrate on finding evidence of different modes of episodic 
agency power, as defined above, in the policy process, and the means and resources through 
which it is realized. It thus involves the searching for causal relationships between the 
behaviour of actors and changes in the policy process. Indeed, the notion of causality has 
been central to the main tradition in the study of power originating in Hobbes (Clegg, 1989). 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the aim is to provide an explanation of the events 
that led to a certain policy outcome. Evidence to demonstrate causal relationships requires 
                                                     
 
19 Allen’s (2003) notion of seduction has been highlighted by Haugaard (2013) as a prescient 
contribution and a more adequate conceptual tool than ‘false consciousness’ to address Lukes’ (2005) 
third dimension of power. However, it is considered that the discursive approach provides a more 
sound and detailed theoretical basis to examine this type of power and hence seduction is not 
addressed here. 
20 The power relations fixing and governing these standing conditions correspond in turn to other 
circuits of power (Clegg, 1989, p. 125). 
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the use of diverse sources: interviews with key actors in the policy process may be a key 
source of evidence due to their insights into this process; however, as it will explained in the 
next chapter, they need to be complemented by other sources such as newspaper articles and 
official documents. 
 
In short, this section has developed a conceptualization of power that permits the analysis of 
the role of actors in the development of transport infrastructure policy. It first limited the 
scope of the term as understood through behaviour, that is, through its exercise in specific 
instances. Secondly, it clarified the importance of structure and agency by determining that 
this exercise of power is manifested through the non-predetermined action of individual or 
collective agency. Structure is important as it provides the conditions for the exercise of 
power, but in this approach it is relevant to the extent that it is reproduced in practice. This 
results in an understanding of power comparable to Clegg’s (1989) episodic agency power, 
which operates in a reasonably bounded level but is linked to other levels (of social and 
system integration) through complex circuits of power. Finally, this term was operationalized 
by, first, developing a definition of the term based on the previous two points, second, by 
proposing a typology of modes through which power is exercised, and, third, by specifying 
the manner structural conditions are to be included in the analysis. The task is then to search 
for an explanation of the policy process that clarifies which actors have been more influential 
in the development of policy and the means through which they did so. This template, 
together with the discursive approach proposed in the previous section, constitute the 
framework to analyze transnational HSR policy-making. The next section seeks to spatialize 
this framework by drawing on human geography debates on the nature of space and its 
relationship with the concepts of discourse and power. 
 
 
3.3 The spatiality of policy-making 
Chapter 2 introduced how the particular spatiality of transnational HSR infrastructure 
involved, first, a tension between the spatial relations it facilitates and the conventional 
political spaces that are meant to regulate them and, second, a variety of reactions from 
political actors. In order to better understand these implications and overcome simplistic 
notions of space, it was argued that a spatialized account of transnational infrastructure 
policy-making was required. This approach is in line with the ‘spatial turn’ in the social 
sciences, which has emphasized the centrality of space in the understanding of social 
relations (Warf and Arias, 2009) and, in particular, has generated a variety of perspectives in 
the study of the geography of state power (Brenner et al., 2003; Lefebvre, 2003). In terms of 
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the latter, the focus on space required problematizing the territoriality of the modern state 
and overcoming what Agnew (1994), referring to international relations theory, has 
appropriately termed the ‘territorial trap’ and which is defined by three geographical 
assumptions: the reification of territorial states as fixed units of sovereign space; the use of 
the domestic/foreign polarity; and the consideration of territorial states as ‘containers’ of 
society. The questioning of these three assumptions requires as a first step the clarification of 
the nature of the ‘space’ that is being analyzed. In this respect, this section firstly engages 
with debates on scalar and relational approaches to space in order to provide a conceptual 
basis to approach the spatiality of policy-making. Subsequently, the section applies this 
conceptualization to the two dimensions of discourse and power, each of them object of 
important academic attention from geographical perspectives. This application results in 
complementing the framework proposed in the previous two sections for the analysis of 
discourse and power. 
 
3.3.1 A conceptualization: between relationality and scale 
Placing space at the centre of scholarly inquiry does not necessarily mean the dismissal of 
territorial or scalar forms of state and non-state power, but their problematization. The 
nation-state may still play a key role in developing transnational transport infrastructure, but 
a spatially sensitive approach requires recognizing its contingency and ascertaining the 
importance of other spaces, including those that transect its borders. In this regard, the 
conceptualization of the spatiality of social processes has commonly revolved around two 
broad perspectives. One of them approaches the understanding of social life through a scalar 
lens; the other one addresses it in terms of the relations that constitute it. 
The first approach encompasses contributions from what has been termed ‘new political 
economy of scale’ (Jessop, 2002, p. 179; Keil and Mahon, 2009), which is concerned with 
the changing scalar organization of political and economic life. In this perspective, scale is 
considered as socially constructed through socio-political struggles and in turn contributing 
to constitute social, economic, and political relations (Delaney and Leitner, 1997; Marston, 
2000). This view on scale places emphasis on the process through which scale is constructed 
and the conflicts involved in it. As actors engage in struggles to reshape the scalar 
configuration of social interaction to achieve specific goals, they are involved in a ‘politics 
of scale’ that may lead to the establishment of new temporary ‘scalar fixes’ (Brenner, 1998; 
Smith, 2003). ‘Scale’, as Swyngedouw has claimed, ‘is hereby fundamental as it embodies a 
temporal compromise, solidifies existing power relationships, regulates forms of 
cooperation, and defines competitive and other power strategies’ (1997, p. 147). However, 
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scale does not necessarily involve spatial continuity and boundedness. This notion is partly 
clarified by Cox’s (1998, p. 2) distinction between ‘spaces of dependence’ (‘defined by those 
more-or-less localized social relations upon which we depend for the realization of essential 
interests and for which there are no substitutes elsewhere’) and ‘spaces of engagement’ (the 
spaces ‘in which securing a space of dependence unfolds’). Cox (1998) argued that, since 
spaces of engagement are defined by networks of association, the scales of political activity 
are better conceptualized as networked rather than in areal terms. 
The emphasis of networks is further developed by the second approach, which seeks to 
transcend scalar understandings of space through an emphasis on the interrelations that 
traverse it. This more recent approach, commonly called ‘relational’ or ‘topological’,21 
understands space as constituted through the processes and practices that take place across it 
(key contributions are Allen et al., 1998; Amin, 2002, 2004; Massey, 2005; Murdoch, 2006). 
As Massey (2005, p. 9) concisely put it, space is considered in this approach as the product 
of interrelations, as the sphere of the possibility of the existence of multiplicity, and as an 
open system, always under construction. Specific spaces or places, such as regions or cities, 
are then provisional stabilizations – ‘permanences’, in Harvey’s (1996, p. 261) terms – of 
these relations: ‘Places now can be seen as the embodiment of virtual or immanent forces, 
and as the temporary spatiotemporalisation of associational networks of different length and 
duration’ (Amin, 2002, p. 391). Fundamentally, the consideration of networked relations 
challenges the integrity of scalar and territorial forms of social organization (Amin, 2002, p. 
395), which does not just involve that relations cross-cut scalar borders so that, for instance, 
the global penetrates the local, but that both the global and the local are mutually constituted 
(Massey, 2005, p. 184). This has clear implications for the understanding of politics, as it 
questions the adequacy of concepts based on a scalar and hierarchical logic such as multi-
level governance and subsidiarity (Allen and Cochrane, 2007, pp. 1166–1167; Faludi, 2013). 
A relational approach sees instead politics as articulated through policy networks of different 
spatialities (e.g. Allen and Cochrane, 2007, 2010). Place, instead of being associated to local 
politics, is understood as a site where politics of different reach (local, national, global, etc.) 
are juxtaposed (Amin, 2002, p. 397, 2004). 
                                                     
 
21 The terms ‘relational’ and ‘topological’ have been used in human geography to overcome a 
territorial and scalar understanding of space. While both are concerned with interconnections between 
points across space, topology emphasizes spatial properties and relationships regardless of spatial 
shape and is usually contrasted with topography, which studies the features of surfaces, such as shape 
and distances (see for instance the November 2011 issue of Dialogues in Human Geography and 
Martin and Secor, 2013). Since, as it will be argued below, the maintenance of a certain notion of 
distance is relevant for the understanding of the spatiality of policy-making, the use of the term 
‘relational’ is preferred here. Nevertheless, in the subsection on power and space the term 
‘topological’ will be used as, following Allen’s (2011, 2003) lead, it conveys more accurately the 
workings of power through space. 
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There has been significant debate about the spatiality of social relations and whether 
space should be viewed in scalar or relational terms.22 However, a review of this diverse 
body of contributions indicates that in fact both approaches need not be incompatible. Some 
of the key authors on a relational approach have recognized the importance of scale in 
determining spatial limits of authority or control and its use for political mobilization; their 
aim was not to question scalar politics but to overcome the limits of scalar thinking (Allen 
and Cochrane, 2007, p. 1167; Amin, 2002, p. 396). Other authors, discussing the 
conceptualization of the region, espouse a ‘moderate relationalism’ (Jones, 2009) that 
advocates overcoming the understanding of scale and relationality in binary terms (Jones and 
Macleod, 2004; MacLeod and Jones, 2007). From an international political economy 
perspective, Sum (2003) has analyzed the proliferation of networked, trans-border political 
spaces across East Asia, but in relation to existing scales of regulation and indeed involving 
central-local, trans-national, and trans-local tensions related to a politics of scale. This 
relationship between scales and networks has in fact been theoretically addressed by Jessop 
et al. (2008) and Leitner et al. (2008), who have developed frameworks for the understanding 
of socio-spatial relations that recognize their polymorphism, i.e. their organization in 
multiple forms and dimensions, including scales and networks. Ultimately, as Varró and 
Lagendijk (2012) argue, a key source of disagreement in the scale/relations debate has been 
the different understandings of relationality: relational approaches interpret it as ontological, 
that is as constitutive of space, whereas scalar or territorial perspectives see relationality in 
terms of the empirical existence of relations. 
In line with this, this research adopts an approach that understands space as 
constituted relationally but which, depending on the characteristics of the actual, existing 
relations, can be assigned scalar features. This approach permits seeing some of the studies 
reviewed in Section 2.3.2 in a slightly different light. Prytherch’s (2010) study on Catalan 
regionalism shows how networked spatial relations and geographical scale are compatible 
and indeed may be co-implicated in the social construction of regions. Yet the clearest 
illustration of the potential of adopting such a spatially-nuanced approach may be drawn 
from Albrechts and Coppens’ (2003) study on the development of Brussels’ high-speed rail 
station. Although retaining a multi-level vocabulary, they identified conflicting networks of 
actors discursively and materially related to different types of space (the ‘space of flows’ and 
                                                     
 
22 This debate consists of a number of related debates, which mainly involve the conceptualization of 
the region (Allen et al., 1998; MacLeod and Jones, 2007; Varró and Lagendijk, 2012), the ontology of 
space (Jones, 2009; Marston et al., 2005), the spatiality of sociospatial relations (Jessop et al., 2008; 
Leitner et al., 2008), and the spatiality of Europe (Axford, 2006; Paasi, 2001). The objective here is to 
selectively draw on these debates to obtain a valid conceptualization of the spatiality of politics that 
responds to the aims of this research. 
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the ‘space of places’). From a scale-sensitive relational approach this study points at the 
conflict not between levels (European and local) but between actors (those related to the 
‘space of flows’ and those to the ‘space of places’) on space, in this instance the urban 
environment.23 The spatiality of politics is therefore understood as resulting from the 
struggles between actors that through their material or discursive practices are related to 
certain, more or less contiguous and bounded, spaces. Scale, defined as a geographical frame 
of reference for political action, is thus constituted through relations – and vice versa, when 
it in turn facilitates or constrains these. As Murdoch has claimed with regard to a relational 
approach, ‘scale becomes distance, or, more accurately, the ‘length of relation’. Places are 
bound to one another relationally: the significance and composition of the relations defines 
the significance of scale’ (2006, p. 21). 
The task is then to identify the spatiality of the relations through which transnational 
infrastructure policy-making is carried out and the extent to which scalar frames play a role 
in them. If an understanding of politics involving discrete territorial units of sovereign power 
can be assimilated to the frictions between tectonic plates, an adequate representation that 
does not fall either into a ‘multi-level trap’ but is in accordance with the above 
conceptualization of the spatiality of politics could be that of turbulences in fluids. Tensions 
here are still horizontal, but between different groups of actors that penetrate each other in 
complex patterns and to different degrees, conforming political spaces that are not territorial 
but porous, discontinuous and heterogeneous. Notwithstanding this complexity, it is still 
possible to identify certain areas or scales where a specific set of actors predominates and 
has not been significantly influenced by others. Forcing the metaphor, the outcomes of the 
struggles over space can be seeing as adopting two forms: the co-option of fluid particles in 
order to gain (discursive) dominance and the displacement of ‘other’ particles in order to 
secure actual influence (episodic power) over space. The remainder of this section applies 
this understanding of the spatiality of politics to the previously developed analytical 
framework on discourse and power. 
 
3.3.2 A spatialization of Hajer’s discourse analytical approach 
Although the previous chapter noted that several authors had applied a discursive approach 
to the analysis of spatial planning or policy, their problematization of space has generally 
                                                     
 
23 This questions the dominant view of transnational infrastructure development as involving a tension 
between the effective development of a trans-European network and the legitimacy of subnational 
and national interests. 
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been insufficient. Both Hajer (2000) and Peters (2003a), although focusing on transnational 
infrastructure planning as the object of analysis and using the same discourse analytical 
framework as this research, did not adequately addressed the spatiality of this process. Peters 
(2003a) focused on TEN-T policy and thus her analysis was limited to the EU level of 
policy-making, while Hajer (2000), although addressing a wider political environment, 
retained an imaginary of multiple levels of government. A significant exception is Jensen 
and Richardson, who have sought to integrate discourse and socio-spatial relations in what 
they termed a cultural sociology of space (Jensen, 1997; Jensen and Richardson, 2004; 
Richardson and Jensen, 2003). However, these relations are conceptualized as unfolding at 
discrete spatial scales, an approach that as previously discussed may miss more complex 
spatialities. In this regard, this subsection seeks to spatialize Hajer’s (1995) discourse 
analytical approach by addressing each of its three foci of analysis (story-lines, discourse 
coalitions, and discursive practices) through the conceptualization of the spatiality of policy-
making developed above. 
In terms of the first focus of analysis, representations of space and their relationship 
with political processes have been variously addressed in the literature,24 but the concern at 
this point is not with the presence of space in discourse (i.e. the representations and 
imaginaries of particular spaces such as Europe, a city, or a nation-state), which should be 
addressed through the discourse analytical approach. Space is relevant here in terms of the 
spatiality of discourse; in other words, the qualities of the spaces present in the terms of the 
discourse. Therefore, the spatialization of a story-line involves considering the spaces it 
explicitly or implicitly refers to and their relational characteristics. In this respect, a first type 
of space to be considered is what I propose to call a space of concern, formed by the 
geographical basis of an actor’s discursively constituted interests. The realization of such 
interests may in turn depend upon the establishment of a certain set of relations, which 
define what I term a space of reliance.25 Thus, for instance, the discourse practiced by a 
nation-state minister responsible for railway development is likely to have as a space of 
concern the nation-state territory and as a space of reliance that one defined by transnational 
                                                     
 
24 These representations have been termed, according to different perspectives, imaginative 
geographies (Gregory, 1995; Said, 2003), geographical imaginaries (Watts, 1999), geographical or 
geopolitical imaginations (Agnew, 2003; Gregory, 1994; Mansvelt Beck, 2006); and spatial policy 
discourses (Richardson and Jensen, 2003). 
25 The definition of both spaces was inspired by Cox’s (1998) ‘spaces of dependence’ and ‘spaces of 
engagement’, but there are important differences between both conceptualizations. Cox’s definition of 
spaces of dependence is similar to that of spaces of reliance, although the latter need not be place-
specific; in fact, they often stretch beyond the spaces of concern. Furthermore, Cox’s spaces of 
engagement refer to the spatiality of politics (to ‘networks of association’) and hence they are not 
relevant in terms of the content of discourse. The essential difference between both sets of spaces lies 
indeed in the discursive basis of the spaces of concern and of reliance. 
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HSR links if they are expected to derive benefits for the national economy. Similarly, a 
business organization represents the interests of specific businesses usually identified 
according to a spatial – normally scalar – criterion, which defines its space of concern, while 
its space of reliance may also be of a trans-border reach (for instance a European or global 
economy). The scalar or relational nature of these spaces is not predetermined, although 
arguably spaces of concern may typically appear as defined in scalar terms (e.g. the nation-
state space) and spaces of reliance in relational terms (e.g. functional flows). 
In turn, discourse coalitions can also be understood spatially. In the same manner as 
Cox’s (1998) spaces of engagement, as networks of actors their spatiality is better 
conceptualized as networked. This certainly conflicts with Hajer’s view of a transnational 
policy discourse being ‘shared by policy-makers at different levels of government’ (2000, p. 
135). Indeed, this research’s approach requires seeing actors, instead of as being allocated to 
vertical levels of government or governance, as forming horizontal networks of different 
spatial reach. A necessary step is to assign a spatiality to the members of the coalition, which 
can encompass from European Commission officials to localized business associations. A 
possibility is to do so by determining what could be termed the spatial pre-conditions of 
these members (i.e. where they are based and/or space of jurisdiction, if any). This obviously 
entails certain difficulties since within the varied membership of discourse coalitions not all 
the actors can be associated to space unambiguously (e.g. technical experts or environmental 
groups). Therefore, and in line with the discourse approach adopted in this thesis, the 
ascertainment of the spatiality of coalitions will be done according to the content of 
discourse as this is practiced i.e. in terms of the spaces of concern and reliance identified by 
the researcher in actors’ utterances. 
A final but key element of the discourse analytical approach are the practices through 
which discourse is produced, reproduced, and transformed. A starting point to the 
spatialization of these practices is Linnros and Hallin’s (2001) term discursive arenas, 
proposed in their analysis of the environmental conflict surrounding the Øresund link to refer 
to the spaces where discourse is practiced. Discursive arenas may encompass a wide variety 
of spaces, from formal state institutions to informal networks, including as well public 
spaces and the media. Differential access to these arenas influences discourse production as 
some of them are likely to be more influential in this process (e.g. state institutions and the 
media). Linnros and Hallin’s (2001) sought to emphasize the fact that discursive practices 
always take place in space, but a further important issue is the degree to which they influence 
the production of discourse by framing it spatially. For instance, a regional parliament, a 
government ministry, or a media outlet addressing a certain space will likely frame 
discursive practices according to a certain scale of reference. In short, discursive arenas are 
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important in terms of both mediating access to discourse production and influencing the 
spatiality of discourse. 
The discourse analytical approach proposed in a previous section can thus be spatialized 
by focusing on the content of the discourse, the coalitions that sustain it, and the practices 
through which it is produced. Thus, analysis must identify the spatiality of the terms of 
discourse in terms of the underlying spaces of concern and of reliance, assign discourse 
coalitions a certain spatiality according to that of the story-lines they adhere to, and identify 
how the arenas where discourse is practiced influence its production, reproduction, and 
transformation by limiting the access to and framing the spatiality of this process. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that the utterances of actors within a same discourse coalition will 
present some divergences in their spatiality. For instance, actors with in principle different 
spaces of concern such as a subnational or national government and a European institution 
may still converge around a single discourse. The degree to which these differences matter in 
terms of holding the coalition together is therefore important, and hence it is necessary to 
ascertain in which manner the spatiality of discourse is relevant to the formation of discourse 
coalitions on spatial policy issues.  
 
3.3.3 A topological understanding of the exercise of power 
The section on power operationalized this term as the episodic influence exercised by an 
agency in specific forms and through the organization of means and resources. A useful 
starting point to spatialize this notion of power is the standing conditions that constrain and 
facilitate the exercise of power, since one of the ways they are unevenly distributed is 
spatially. For instance, state actors will have certain means to develop policy within a certain 
space defined in scalar terms. According to the literature reviewed in the previous chapter, it 
is likely that nation-states will have a dominant capacity to control and mobilize resources in 
order to produce certain policy outcomes within the nation-state territory. Actors worse 
positioned in this regard may seek to reorganize themselves at a different scale in order to 
achieve more influence, a process that scalar approaches have conceptualized as ‘jumping 
scales’ (Smith, 1992, 2003) or the construction of ‘spaces of engagement’ (Cox, 1998). 
However, a relational approach to the spatiality of policy-making seems to require a 
conceptualization that is less concerned with scalar frames of political activity than with the 
actual workings of power on space. 
In this respect, Allen’s work on the relationship between power and space is particularly 
valuable (Allen, 2003, but also 2004, 2009a, 2009b, 2011). He shares with this research’s 
approach the concern with power as exercised and with the various modes (authority, 
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coercion, etc.) through which this happens, but he adds a fundamental two-fold claim: that 
power and space are inherently linked and that different modalities of power work through 
distinct spatial relations (Allen, 2003, pp. 2–3). He conceptualizes power as ‘a relational 
effect of social interaction’ (Allen, 2003, p. 2), which involves that rather than being an 
attribute that can be possessed it is always constituted in space and time (Allen, 2003, p. 8). 
This constitution in turn depends on the mode of power that is being exercised; for instance, 
Allen (2003, pp. 149–150) argues that coercion tends to be more effective in proximity, 
whereas manipulation works better at a distance. The resulting spatiality of power consists of 
‘the different ways in which relations of proximity and presence play across the gap between 
here and there to bring the far-off within reach, yet for others make the nearby seem closed 
off and distant’ (Allen, 2003, p. 12). Thus, this conceptualization of power as taking place 
through relations of proximity and reach configures a topological landscape that challenges 
topographical understandings of power based on fixed distances and well-defined 
proximities (Allen, 2009a, 2011; Allen and Cochrane, 2010). Such a landscape is configured, 
instead of by the distances between points, by the relations between them, so that distant 
points may become close and, conversely, proximate points may become remote. 
The application of this perspective to transnational infrastructure planning results in a 
view of the spatiality of power radically different from one resulting from a scalar approach. 
Instead of being formed by nested or even overlapping scales of extensive power, the 
resulting landscape is composed of diverse power relations of different reach and intensity, 
forming complex spatial patterns that resemble the aforementioned turbulence metaphor. 
Thus, institutions commonly considered legitimate such as the nation-state executive may 
exert its power in distant places through its authority,26 whereas other actors more proximate 
to the site of the infrastructure (e.g. a community organization or a subnational government) 
may be unable to exercise such a direct influence over it and might therefore resort to other 
modes of power (e.g. persuasion). Importantly, these geographies of power involve that 
actors might need to reach to distant others in order to influence the course of events, seeking 
influence through practices of proximity and reach rather than through changing the scale of 
action. Furthermore, these actors do not necessarily act individually; in fact, the attempt to 
reach other actors and achieve leverage may involve the creation of networks of actors. This 
notion is similar to Cox’s (1998) ‘spaces of engagement’, although the emphasis here is on 
the relations not so much between scales but across space. According to the previously 
discussed notion of agency, as long as their behaviour is not pre-determined these networks 
also constitute a form of agency. 
                                                     
 
26 Note however Allen’s (2003, p.148) suggestion that authority becomes less effective with distance. 
88 
 
This discussion suggests that although power may be seen relationally, it is also linked 
to certain spatial fixities. In this regard, and in a similar way to discursive arenas, I propose 
the use of the term power arena to refer to those spaces through which power is exercised 
and where power struggles take place. These too include state institutions, the media, public 
spaces, and informal networks, and in this respect they may overlap with discursive arenas. 
A state legislature, for instance, is an arena where legislation is enacted and different types of 
initiatives are taken, but it is also a site of argumentation that may certainly influence 
discourse production and transformation. The importance of this notion of power arena is 
illustrated by the popular conflation of the city of Brussels and the European Union. 
Lobbying in Brussels by national and subnational actors does not simply entail ‘jumping 
scales’ to the EU, but reaching to that site involved in the exercise of power (on this notion, 
see also Allen and Cochrane, 2010). In any case, these arenas need not be place-specific but 
can also adopt a networked form, such as the media or informal networks. The existence of 
these spaces attests to the existence of certain means and resources that pre-condition the 
exercise of power. However, rather than seeing them as spaces where power – as a capacity 
– is held, the conceptualization of power developed previously suggests that it is more 
appropriate to consider them as sites where the use of these means and resources is 
temporarily fixed.27 The effective exercise of power thus depends on the means and 
resources available to agencies and, importantly, on their access to these arenas. 
In short, a spatialization of power relations that is in line with a relational approach to 
space has been proposed by adopting a topological view of power that is concerned with the 
actual exercise of power across space. According to this perspective, power is a relational 
practice that is inherently spatial and works differently according to the mode it adopts when 
exercised. By linking distant points and separating proximate ones, it distorts topographical 
understandings of space and constitutes a ‘turbulent’ spatiality where power relations of 
diverse reach and intensity intermingle in complex patterns. In particular, the term ‘power 
arena’ has been proposed to refer to those spaces through which power is exercised. Agency, 
either in the form of individuals, organizations, or networks of actors, seeks to achieve 
influence in the policy process through access to these arenas. Thus, rather than a ‘politics of 
scale’, a notion more attuned to a topological understanding of power would be that of a 
‘politics of reach’. Such a politics would not involve ‘jumping scales’ but, following Allen 
and Cochrane (2010, p. 1075), reaching into the politics of certain spaces, drawing within 
close reach influential actors, and reaching out beyond a space to shape events within it. 
                                                     
 
27 This notion is informed by Allen (2003, pp. 113–116), who argued that, rather than considering 
power as centralized in specific sites, it is resources that should be seen as territorially embedded – 
and subsequently mobilized through networked relationships.   
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To summarize, the spatialization of the discourse and power analytical approaches has 
involved three fundamental steps. The first one has been to develop a conceptualization of 
the spatiality of policy-making that would inform the following two steps. Space was defined 
as constituted relationally and as differently related to scale depending on the spatiality of 
actual relations. Policy-making was thus seen as involving tensions between forces on space 
that compete for prevalence and in some cases define more or less porous scalar frames. 
According to this conception, the section secondly proposed a spatialization of the three foci 
of analysis of the discourse analytical approach. Story-lines – or, more generally, the content 
of discourse – may explicitly or implicitly refer to what was termed ‘spaces of concern’ and 
‘spaces of reliance’, which in turn define the spatiality of discourse coalitions. Linnros and 
Hallin’s (2001) concept of ‘discursive arena’ was included to refer to those spaces where 
discourse is practiced. Finally, the third step proposed the adoption of a topological 
understanding of power, drawing on Allen’s (2003) novel work on the spatiality of power. 
Mirroring discursive arenas, the term ‘power arena’ was also proposed to define the spaces 
that indicate a concentration in the use of means and resources. All in all, the section sought 
to develop a framework to address the third research question of this research, yet the 
intention is also to provide a spatially-sensitive approach to the understanding of policy-
making by supplementing discourse and power analytical approaches. The next section will 
draw together the three dimensions of discourse, power, and space in order to succinctly 
present the adopted analytical framework.  
 
 
3.4 Conclusion: a three-dimensional analytical framework 
This chapter sought to develop an analytical framework to systematically and rigorously 
address the research questions mentioned in Chapter 2 and, more generally, the examination 
of transnational transport infrastructure policy-making. This framework is synthesized in 
Figure 1. It is based first on Hajer’s (1995) discourse analytical approach proposed for the 
study of environmental politics, which seeks to ascertain how a particular understanding of 
reality gains dominance at the expense of others, which become marginalized. In order to do 
so, empirical analysis must focus on the content of discourse, including the story-lines 
mobilized by actors, the discourse coalitions formed around such story-lines, and the 
practices through which discourse is produced, reproduced, and transformed. The second 
cornerstone of the analytical framework focuses on the notion of power, which, drawing 
mainly on Clegg (1989) but also on other key contributors such as Lukes (2005) and 
Bachrach and Baratz (1963), is conceptualized as being exercised in specific instances by an 
90 
 
individual or collective agency. The analysis thus needs to gather evidence of the actual 
exercise of power, taking into consideration both the modes through which this happens and 
the means and resources available to actors. Finally, the analytical framework addresses the 
spatial dimension of policy-making. It first proposes a relational ontology of space that is 
sensitive to scalar configurations in order to subsequently spatialize the discourse and power 
analytical approaches. On the one hand, it proposes the identification of ‘spaces of concern’ 
and ‘spaces of reliance’ in the content of the discourses practised by actors and the 
examination of their role in the formation of story-lines and their related discourse coalitions; 
on the other hand, it adopts a topological approach to power developed by Allen (2003) to 
conceptualize the relationship between power and space. In both cases, the concept of – 
discursive and power – arenas is proposed to refer to those spaces where discourse is 
practiced and from where power is exercised. 
Figure 1. Analytical framework 
 
 
The spatialization of the discourse and power analytical approaches points at the 
relationships between the three dimensions of the framework through the activity of 
agencies, be they individuals, organizations or networks of association. By engaging in 
discursive practices, actors shape their understanding of the transport problem and their own 
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interests in the issue. This discursive constitution in turn influences their behaviour when 
engaging in power struggles to produce a policy outcome that fulfils these interests. 
Fundamentally, the main assumption is that both the production of discourse and the exercise 
of power occur through space, in particular through the mediation of discursive and power 
arenas. By accessing them, actors endeavour to gain prevalence in both shaping and 
reproducing the discursive order and the actual exercise of power. The combined influence at 
these two levels provides an account of the struggles that take place in the development of 
transnational transport infrastructure and who are the winners and losers of such a process. In 
this respect, the spatialization of policy-making proposed in this research seeks to unpack the 
actual spatial workings of discourse and power without assuming certain scalar 
configurations as determining the spatiality of politics. This does not dismiss, however, the 
importance of scale in these politics, yet this importance is to be determined through 
empirical analysis. 
Overall, the framework aims to provide a solid theoretical basis for empirical analysis 
by focusing on a limited number of dimensions: discourse, power, and space. In order to do 
so, it draws from three distinct theoretical and analytical approaches: discourse analysis; 
social and political theories of power; and human geography debates on scale and 
relationality. Due to their different foundations, the two first approaches have been treated 
independently; however, the third one has sought to spatialize them and identify the possible 
overlaps between both. Specifically, the choice of these dimensions seeks to contribute to the 
study of transnational transport infrastructure policy-making in three ways. The focus on 
discourse involves adopting a perspective that sees policy problems as socially constructed 
and considers rationale convergence and conflicts as involving discursively-constituted – 
rather than objective – interests. The attention to power seeks to propose a more solid an 
explicit theoretical basis to the study of transport infrastructure planning, frequently under-
theorized and excessively empirical (see previous chapter). Finally, the spatial approach 
attempts to question conventional assumptions about the spatiality of policy-making. 
In addition to these three types of contributions, the fundamental value of such a hybrid 
analytical framework is intended to lie in the combination of the theoretical and analytical 
rigour of each approach with the establishment of relationships between them, in order to 
provide a thorough – yet naturally partial – understanding of a complex phenomenon. In 
addition, by keeping each perspective separate and by defining the particular links between 
them, research results may contribute independently to each perspective – hence the division 
of Figure 1 in three distinct fields, linked with each other in a limited number of instances. 
This is particularly the case of discourse analysis, since the same approach, although with 
some variations, has been empirically applied to the study of the development of 
transnational transport infrastructure (Hajer, 2000; Linnros and Hallin, 2001; Peters, 2003a). 
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In this respect, this perspective differs from the more eclectic approach developed by Jensen 
and Richardson (2004, pp. 41-66) to study spatial policy discourses. Although they consider 
not only discourse (through its domains of ‘language’, ‘practice’ and ‘power-rationality’) but 
also the framing of space in policy-making, they integrate a wider range of perspectives 
(including, for instance, Flyvbjerg, 1998; Harvey, 1996; and Urry, 2000), and their 
conceptualization of space is not developed in sufficient detail. For the reasons stated above, 
it was decided to adopt a more focused approach that also integrated the exercise of power. 
However, two remarks on the weaknesses of the framework must be made. The first is 
that its capacity to contribute to theoretical development may be compromised by dividing 
attention into three distinct perspectives. Naturally, the focus on a single theoretical approach 
would have facilitated a more complete exploration of its different features. Secondly, the 
focus on the actual policy-making process may not sufficiently consider the relevance of 
structure in framing it. This is not as important in terms of the constraints of structural 
conditions on the capacity of agencies to act, integrated in the framework with the term 
‘standing conditions’, as with regard to the role that actors have had in shaping them. The 
definition of the means and resources available to actors, in particular when defined through 
legislation or policy, also results from power struggles through which a number of agencies 
seek to advance their own interests. Therefore, for instance, the possible influence of the 
European Commission through the provision of financial incentives to transnational 
infrastructure development is the outcome of power struggles concerning the definition of 
the rules for the granting of this financial aid.   
  
4 Methodology 
The previous chapter proposed an analytical framework to address the three research 
questions formulated in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, the application of this framework to 
empirical data requires two further important steps. Firstly, a research strategy must be 
adopted in order to translate the theoretical framework into specific methods of data 
collection and analysis (Creswell, 2009, p. 11; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 14). Different 
strategies provide certain directions for inquiry and have distinct implications for the 
definition of these methods. The second step involves detailing these forms of data collection 
and analysis or research methods, which in turn translate the strategy into practice (Creswell, 
2009, p. 15; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 14). In qualitative research, data collection can 
adopt a wide variety of forms and the process of data analysis is complex and not predefined 
(Creswell, 2007, p. 150). It is therefore important to explain and justify the specific research 
methods utilized. 
These two aspects are addressed in this methodology chapter. It firstly introduces and 
develops the adopted research strategy: single-case study research. By focusing on one case 
of transnational high-speed rail policy-making, the thesis seeks to provide an in-depth picture 
of this process that reflects the tensions involved in it. The second part of the chapter 
develops the research methods used to build the necessary evidence to answer the research 
questions. It not only details the particular forms of data collection, analysis, and validation, 
but also specifies the relationship between them and the analytical framework and the 
implications of the choices made concerning research methods.  
 
 
4.1 Research strategy 
Some prominent research methodologists argue that a strategy of inquiry is needed to link 
the philosophical worldviews or paradigms of the researcher with the specific methods of 
collecting and analyzing empirical data (Creswell, 2009, p. 5; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). 
An strategy of inquiry refers to ‘a bundle of skills, assumptions, and practices that 
researchers employ as they move from their paradigm to the empirical world’ (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2011, p. 14). Part of this strategy has been advanced in the previous chapter through 
the particular approach that the proposed analytical framework entails; however, it did not 
specify how this framework would be applied to empirical data. This section therefore 
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addresses the selection and justification of a strategy of inquiry, namely case study research, 
and introduces the chosen unit of analysis.1 
 
4.1.1 Single-case study research 
Commonly considered an in-depth study of a complex phenomenon within a specific context 
(Creswell, 2007; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009), the significance of case study research is not 
limited to the case itself; a single, instrumental case study (Stake, 1995, p. 3) can also serve 
as an illustration of a wider issue or concern. An in-depth study of a case of transnational 
HSR policy-making would therefore provide an insightful picture of the questions addressed 
in this research. Moreover, Yin (2009, pp. 8–14) further argues that case study research 
presents a distinct advantage with respect to other methods when responding to three 
conditions: the proposal of explanatory (‘how’ and ‘why’) research questions; the little 
control over behavioural events; and a focus on contemporary events. These three conditions 
are present in this research as, firstly, the three research questions are explanatory, secondly, 
the addressed policy process is beyond the control of the researcher and, finally, the 
phenomenon is largely contemporary, although it encompasses several decades. Due to the 
potential to provide in-depth descriptions and analyses of social phenomena, case study 
research has been widely applied in the fields of urban planning and politics (e.g. Dahl, 
2005; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Stone, 1989) and, more generally, in political science, where it 
continues to be a significant contributor to the discipline (Gerring, 2004). 
 Nevertheless, such a research strategy has been commonly subject to criticism by 
researchers (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Gerring, 2004; Yin, 2009, pp. 14–16), in particular concerning 
its validity and reliability and its capacity to provide generalizable evidence. The first aspect 
is relevant to the next section on research methods, but it is pertinent to discuss at this point 
the second one. Generalization is not the aim of qualitative research since its focus lies on 
particularity (Creswell, 2009, pp. 192–193), and indeed case study research is primarily 
concerned with particularization (Stake, 1995, p. 8). However, this does not mean there is no 
scope for generalization and theory-building. Yin (2009, pp. 38–39, 43), whose conception 
of case study is not limited to qualitative evidence, notes that critics to the basis for 
generalization in case studies implicitly consider cases as samples and therefore intended to 
                                                     
 
1 The meaning of strategy adopted in this research is closer to Yin’s (2009) conception of method 
which, as opposed to Creswell (2009) and Denzin and Lincoln’s (2011) notion of strategy of inquiry, 
does not presuppose a relation with certain theoretical or disciplinary orientations. However, the term 
strategy is preferred here since, following Creswell (2009) and Denzin and Lincoln (2011), methods 
are considered the forms of data collection and analysis (see next section). 
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statistical generalization (to populations or universes). Instead, he argues that case studies 
rely on analytical generalization, whereby the empirical results of the study are generalized 
to a previously developed theory. In a similar manner, Flyvbjerg (2006) has argued that case 
study research provides concrete, context-dependent knowledge that can also contribute to 
generalization as a supplement or alternative to other methods. Other scholars have also 
acknowledged a role for case studies in theory generation and testing (Bryman, 2008, p. 57; 
Gerring, 2004; Stake, 1995, pp. 7–8). 
A case study is not necessarily restricted to a single case but may encompass several 
cases and thus constitute a multiple-case study (Yin, 2009) or a collective case study (Stake, 
1995). In fact, Yin (2009, pp. 60–62) has suggested that a multiple-case study reduces the 
risk of relying on just one case, demonstrates the ability to do empirical work beyond that 
case, and leads to stronger results and conclusions. However, in this research the 
examination of transnational HSR policy-making has been done by focusing on a single 
case. Due to the significant resources that multi-case study research may require (Yin, 2009, 
p. 53), it was decided to favour the in-depth nature of the study rather than its 
generalizability. Nevertheless, it is expected that this case study will inform valuably the 
literature on transnational HSR and infrastructure policy-making, currently scarce of case 
studies as understood here, and also shed light on the adequacy and potential of the 
developed analytical framework. 
 
4.1.2 Selection of the case 
The selection of a case or unit of analysis requires, first, to define what a case is and, second, 
to specify the criteria to select it and bound it in time and space. A case can be a wide variety 
of entities, from individuals or organizations to less concrete phenomena such as programs 
or projects; however, it must be specific (non-abstract) and sufficiently bounded (Stake, 
1995, pp. 1–2; Yin, 2009, p. 32). Secondly, the selection of the case must seek to maximize 
the potential learning from it, in particular in relation to the research questions, within the 
researcher’s resources and access to data (Stake, 1995, p. 4; Yin, 2009, p. 26). Case selection 
or sampling with the intention of obtaining information-rich cases that can usefully inform 
the understanding of the research problem is indeed a typical procedure in qualitative 
research (Creswell, 2007, p. 125). Among the number of strategies or rationales proposed to 
carry out this selection (e.g. Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 28; Yin, 2009, pp. 47–50), 
qualitative researchers tend to prefer the selection of unusual cases in case study research, as 
the objective is not statistical generalization and they are likely to provide richer information 
(Creswell, 2007, p. 129; Flyvbjerg, 2006). As Flyvbjerg has noted, 
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‘[w]hen the objective is to achieve the greatest possible amount of information on a given problem or 
phenomenon, a representative case or a random sample may not be the most appropriate strategy. This is 
because the typical or average case is often not the richest in information. Atypical or extreme cases often 
reveal more information because they activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation 
studied’ (2006, p. 229). 
The selection of the case for this study therefore responded to the intention of finding an 
unusual case of transnational HSR infrastructure policy-making that was likely to illustrate 
the tensions and challenges involved in the development of this type of infrastructure and, 
more widely, in European integration. Accordingly, the case, framed as the policy process 
surrounding a specific line, was sought to present a number of specific features that 
determined its unusual nature. The first one was the cross-border nature of the line. Border 
areas are particularly relevant for the European project as they illustrate the conflict between 
the territorial container of the nation-state and the cross-border relations that European 
integration requires. The second feature was that the infrastructure line was to be developed 
in a relatively devolved nation-state. The case would then ascertain the – unclear according 
to the existing literature – role that subnational units of government may achieve in the 
policy process. Thirdly, it was sought that the case gave rise to difficulties in its development 
due to coordination problems, diverging interests, and/or significant contestation. According 
to this criteria, on the one hand the case can be considered extreme as it permits ‘[l]earning 
from highly unusual manifestations of the phenomenon of interest’ (Miles and Huberman, 
1994, p. 28); on the other, it is also critical as the findings may have an impact on theory by 
contributing to generalization by deductions of the type ‘[i]f this is (not) valid for this case, 
then it applies to all (no) cases’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 230). 
Based on these criteria, the case selected is the policy process around the Vitoria-Irun 
(French border) section of the high-speed rail axis linking France with the Iberian peninsula 
on the Atlantic coast (see Figure 2). This section, currently under construction, is of clear EU 
interest – it has been a TEN-T project since the first proposals for a trans-European HSR 
network – yet it is also of national and particularly subnational relevance, as it reduces the 
travel times between a number of Spanish and Basque cities. The time boundaries of the case 
were set at 1986, when the first proposals for the line were made, and 2006, when the 
construction works of the line started. Although the case is circumscribed to the policy 
process around that specific section, consideration must be made too of the policy context in 
which the case is set, in particular as the boundary between phenomenon and context is not 
likely to be clear in case study research (Yin, 2009, p. 18). With regard to the 
aforementioned three criteria for case selection, in the first place the line is part of the 
Vitoria-Dax cross-border section, one of the two key rail links between the Iberian peninsula 
and the European core. Secondly, the line’s route is included in the Basque Autonomous 
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Community, which is not only part of an increasingly federalizing Spanish state but also 
holds greater powers –  including tax collection – than the majority of the other Autonomous 
Communities (Agranoff, 1996; Moreno, 2002).2 Finally, the development of the HSR line 
has faced important challenges due to, first, the complexity arising from the topographically 
difficult, environmentally sensitive and densely populated area and the high number of actors 
involved (Davignon, 2009; Secchi, 2011) and, second, the very active contestation 
movement to the planning and development of the line (Audikana, 2012). Access to data was 
facilitated by the fact that Spanish, my native language, and English were the main 
languages involved. 
Figure 2. The Vitoria-Irun high-speed rail line within the planned TEN-T core network 
 
Source: adapted from EP and Council (2013a). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
2 See Sections 5.1 and 7.1.1 for a more detailed explanation of the territorial organization of the 
Spanish nation-state and the role of its different institutions in rail infrastructure planning and 
development. 
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4.2 Research methods 
Once the strategy of inquiry is decided, the final major step of a research design is the 
determination of the research methods, that is the forms of collection and analysis of data 
(Creswell, 2009, p. 15; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). This definition must be made according 
not only to the characteristics of case study research but also to the previously developed 
theoretical framework. Yin, who argues that theory development is essential in case study 
research (2009, p. 35), states indeed that the preferred strategy for data analysis is the one 
that follows the theoretical propositions that have led to the case study (2009, pp. 130–131).3 
Accordingly, in addition to the research questions, the analytical framework developed in the 
previous chapter has been used to determine the relevance of data and inform data collection 
and analysis. Thus, this section first develops the links between the analytical framework and 
the research methods adopted, to then detail the forms of collection, analysis, and validation 
of data. 
 
4.2.1 The analytical framework and sources of evidence 
Since it seeks to provide a rich and in-depth picture of the unit of analysis, case study 
research is characterized by the use of multiple sources of evidence (Creswell, 2007, p. 132; 
Yin, 2009, p. 115). Nevertheless, the fundamental reason for this use is to build more robust 
evidence on the same phenomenon through data triangulation and to address potential 
problems of construct validity (Yin, 2009, p. 116). This research has therefore sought to use 
a significant number of sources of evidence, which can be grouped in two main bodies: 
documents and interviews. Although these are just two of the six sources that Yin (2009) 
identifies as frequently used in case study research, documents utilized are of three types: 
official documents; newspaper articles; and parliamentary proceedings. 
Mainly useful to verify and expand evidence from other sources, documents provide 
exact information about names, references and events and have a broad coverage in terms of 
time, events, and settings (Yin, 2009, pp. 102, 103). The first type of documents employed 
were official – i.e. non-personal – state and non-state documents (based on Scott, 1990; cited 
in Bryman, 2008, p. 516). This type of documents is particularly useful to develop a first 
                                                     
 
3 Theory in case study research does not need to be formal and fully developed, although it may 
present different degrees of development (Creswell, 2009, pp. 61–64; Yin, 2009, pp. 36–37). Since its 
goal, according to Yin (2009, p. 36), is to provide sufficient guidance for data collection and analysis, 
this research uses an analytical lens through which to interpret phenomena. In this respect, it 
approximates Yin’s (2009, pp. 36–37) notion of descriptive theory and Creswell’s (2009, p. 62) 
conception of a theoretical lens or perspective. 
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description of the policy process and a preliminary identification of structuring discourses 
(Hajer, 2006, p. 73). Official state documents included policy outputs (e.g. infrastructure 
plans and regulations), policy-making documents (e.g. technical reports and draft plans), and 
communication documents (destined to influence or inform public opinion or other actors). 
In turn, documents produced by non-state actors involved policy-making documents (mainly 
technical reports) and communication documents. Newspaper articles, in addition to sharing 
official documents’ functions, are valuable to access context-embedded information such as 
actors’ utterances at particular moments of the policy process. In this respect, the documents 
accessed were news articles, opinion pieces and interviews from the Spanish newspaper El 
País and the Basque El Correo. Finally, parliamentary proceedings, which were obtained 
from the Spanish and Basque legislatures,4 allow not only the reconstruction of the 
arguments used but also the explanation of the argumentative exchange (Hajer, 2006, p. 73). 
A final, important point with regard to all documents is that they should not be treated as 
simply reflecting reality, but rather as texts produced in a specific context for an implied 
audience (Bryman, 2008, pp. 526–527; Yin, 2009, p. 105). Considering both context and 
audience is therefore essential when analyzing documents. 
In-depth interviews with political actors constitute the second body of sources of 
evidence used in this research. Firstly, interviews are useful to produce information on causal 
relationships, which documents alone may be insufficient to provide, but they are also 
particularly adequate to understand the meanings of certain events for the interviewees and, 
consequently, their behaviour (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009; Seidman, 2006). This is 
obviously relevant to the discourse analytical approach adopted in this thesis, as that 
understanding aids the reconstruction of the discourses from which actors approached such 
events (Hajer, 2006, p. 73). The targeted interviewees were individuals involved in the 
policy process understood in a broad sense in order not only to account for the context (Yin, 
2009, p. 46) but also to include those actors that occupy a marginal position in the process. 
Thus, interviewees were sampled purposefully from state institutions, the private sector, non-
state political actors (political parties, trade unions, and political activists), and relevant 
experts. The interviews were semi-structured (Bryman, 2008) and focused (Merton et al., 
1990; cited in Yin, 2009, p. 109), with the objective of allowing the interviewees to develop 
their views whilst following a consistent line of inquiry. Similarly to documents, interviews 
must be addressed with caution. As verbal reports, the interviewees’ responses are subject to 
problems of bias, recall, and articulation (Yin, 2009, pp. 108–109). Moreover, in interviews 
                                                     
 
4 The use of European Parliament proceedings was dismissed since the Spanish and Basque 
legislatures provided sufficient and focused data on argumentative interaction on the case. 
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knowledge is not merely provided by the interviewee but produced through social 
interaction, which in turn is characterized by an asymmetrical power relationship between 
interviewer and interviewee (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). 
Based on the particular features of each of these sources of evidence, Table 1 details 
their relation to the analytical framework proposed in the previous chapter and to the 
description of the case. As mentioned above, due to the distinctive features of each source, 
their combined use helped to corroborate evidence on the same phenomenon. The table 
distinguishes between primary and secondary sources depending on their suitability to 
provide evidence for each dimension (not to be confused with the conventional distinction 
between primary and secondary data). The following subsection details the processes of 
collection, analysis, and validation of the data obtained from these sources. 
Table 1. Sources of evidence 
  
 Categories 
 Categories 
(spatiality) 
Sources of evidence   
  Primary Secondary 
Description 
of the case 
N/A N/A Official documents and 
newspaper articles 
• Chronology and first 
reading of events 
Interviews 
• Interpretation of policy 
process 
Discourse Story-lines 
Discourse 
coalitions 
Discursive 
practices 
Spaces of concern; 
spaces of reliance 
Discursive arenas 
Parliamentary proceedings 
• Reconstruction of 
arguments 
• Argumentative exchange 
Interviews 
• Meaning of events 
Official documents and 
newspaper articles 
• Preliminary 
identification of 
discourses  
Power Episodic agency 
power 
Modes of power 
Standing 
conditions 
Topology of power 
Power arenas 
Interviews 
• Causal relationships 
Official documents and 
newspaper articles 
 
4.2.2 Collection, analysis and validation of data 
In terms of data collection, prior to fieldwork a systematic search online for relevant 
documents was carried out (see Yin, 2009, p. 103). These included a significant amount of 
official documents and newspaper articles and the totality of parliamentary proceedings. In 
order to collect those documents not available online and, importantly, conduct the planned 
interviews, three periods of fieldwork were carried out. The first one (11-15 September 
2011), in the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC), was meant to confirm the relevance 
of the case for my research and to evaluate the access to the necessary data, in order to 
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ensure an adequate selection of the case (Yin, 2009, pp. 49–50). The other two fieldwork 
periods, when the majority of non-online data was collected, took place in December 2011-
January 2012 and in May 2012. In both cases the time was divided evenly between the BAC 
and Madrid. A further period of fieldwork in Brussels was at first considered in order to 
collect data related to the EU but, due to the online accessibility of most of the documents, 
the coverage of EU developments in several interviews, and financial limitations, it was 
eventually discarded. Documents accessed during fieldwork were available at different 
documentation centres and libraries, and when possible they were digitalized fully or in their 
most relevant parts to facilitate their storage and computerized analysis. With regard to 
interviews, a total of 36 were conducted, 20 with mainly state actors, two with private sector 
actors, eight with non-state political actors, five with experts and one with a journalist.5 The 
majority of them were one-on-one and face-to-face and, unless the interviewee preferred not 
to, they were audio-recorded and subsequently transcribed. In addition, a number of informal 
conversations were held with relevant individuals that provided direction and information on 
the case and, in some instances, further contacts. All data, including not only documents and 
interview transcriptions but also the researcher’s notes, were systematically compiled in a 
case study database (Stake, 1995, p. 55; Yin, 2009, pp. 118–122).6   
The data were subsequently analyzed in order to draw empirically-based responses to 
the research questions. In the absence of well-defined rules for data analysis in case study 
research (Yin, 2009, p. 127), this research has adopted a strategy that relies on theoretical 
propositions (Yin, 2009, pp. 130–131), using the analytical framework to organize the 
analysis and focus attention on the relevant data. Qualitative data analysis further 
encompasses a number of phases, which in a concise form can be reduced to three: 
preparation and organization of data; reduction of data into themes through coding and 
condensing the codes; and representation of data through visual and textual means (Creswell, 
2007, p. 148). Due to the importance and complexity of the second phase, it is worthwhile to 
provide more details of the coding process. A first list of codes was produced by reading 
through the data, based on the empirical materials but relevant to the three analytical foci 
(discourse, power, and space) or related to the description of the case (e.g. events and 
actors).7 After coding the data, the codes were used to generate a smaller number of themes 
                                                     
 
5 See Appendix B for a detailed list of the interviews. 
6 Appendix A provides a more detailed account of the collection of data, with sections on official 
documents, newspaper articles, parliamentary proceedings and interviews. 
7 Important in data coding was distinguishing between case-related and context-related data. Both 
types of data are important since case study research involves negotiating the in-depth study of the 
case and the understanding of its contextual conditions (Stake, 1995, p. xi; Yin, 2009, p. 46). 
Although the boundaries between case and context are likely to be unclear (Yin, 2009, p. 18), this 
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that related explicitly to the concepts and categories developed in the analytical framework. 
Data were generally coded in medium to large portions in order to minimize its 
fragmentation and the loss of context that coding entails (Bryman, 2008, p. 553). The 
process of coding and retrieving was done through a qualitative data analysis computer 
software package (NVivo). This allowed to deal with a large database and to make the code-
and-retrieve process faster and more efficient (Bryman, 2008, p. 567; Creswell, 2007, p. 
165).8  
Both data collection and analysis are key phases in determining the internal validity of a 
study, which usually refers to the accuracy of the research findings (Creswell, 2007, p. 206).9 
The most common strategies to ensure the internal validation of findings are triangulation 
and member checking (Creswell, 2007, p. 209; Stake, 1995, pp. 107–116). As mentioned 
above, in terms of data triangulation the combined use of policy documents, parliamentary 
proceedings, newspaper articles, and semi-structured interviews sought to corroborate 
evidence on the different research questions. The roles and complementarities of these 
sources are noted in Table 1. Member checking in turn involves having the draft report 
reviewed by participants in order to corroborate the accuracy of the study and obtain 
alternative interpretations (Yin, 2009, pp. 182–184). However, due to time constraints, the 
limited availability of interviewees, and the fact that the thesis is written in English, member 
checking was not carried out. 
 
4.2.3 Reflexive remarks on the methods used 
The decisions on research methods have sought to adequately link the research questions 
stated in Chapter 2 with the drawing of findings and conclusions. However, these choices 
also involve noteworthy implications and limitations. 
Two significant implications are related to the spatial dimension. The first one concerns 
the difficulties in adopting an approach that does not ascribe data to a scalar spatiality. 
Although an effort was made to identify data according to the case and not to an a priori 
                                                                                                                                                      
 
distinction is useful in order to prioritize data analysis, in particular in the light of the significant 
quantities of data that qualitative research involves (Stake, 1995, p. 84). 
8 More details on the analysis of data, including examples of codes used, are provided in Appendix C. 
9 In qualitative research, internal validity is one of the key features generally used to assess the quality 
of research. The other ones are external validity, which involves the generalizability of findings, and 
reliability, which refers to the consistence of the researcher’s approach (Bryman, 2008, p. 376; 
Creswell, 2009, pp. 190–193). Yin (2009, p. 40), drawing on Kidder and Judd (1986, pp. 26–29), 
further distinguishes between construct and internal validity, concerned respectively with using 
correct operational measures for the studied concepts and with establishing causal relationships. Other 
authors, with the intention to convey the peculiarities of qualitative inquiry, have proposed the use of 
credibility instead of internal validity (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
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spatiality, this approach needed a certain degree of simplification in order to be practicable. 
Firstly, both documents and interviewees usually relate in different forms to scalar or 
territorial spaces. Documents frequently address a certain, bounded space (e.g. the EU TEN-
T guidelines) and/or are produced by an actor associated with such a space (e.g. a 
subnational newspaper). Similarly, although interviewees may operate in different arenas, 
they are commonly related to a certain scale of reference (e.g. nation-state officials to the 
Spanish territory). Secondly, fieldwork required to focus on a series of physical locations, 
due not only to resource limitations but also to the concentration of data in them. These two 
aspects entailed that data collection was approached by focusing on different policy-making 
scales, namely the national and the subnational (the Basque Autonomous Community). This 
simplified approach involved that the analysis may have missed or underestimated other 
scalar or relational policy-making spatialities. 
The second implication with a spatial aspect involves the link between high-speed rail 
and space. Again, two aspects can be distinguished. The first one is the fact that political 
mobilization both in support of and against the high-speed rail line is likely to be more 
intense in the areas directly impacted by it. The second, related aspect is that data on the case 
is more easily accessible the smaller the approached scale is. Document data on the high-
speed rail line were easier to find in the subnational scale, where that line was a prominent 
policy issue, than in national or supranational scales. More importantly, this resulted in the 
difficulty to identify interviewees related to national or supranational scales which had had a 
specific involvement with the case. An important consequence was that no interview was 
managed to be conducted with a representative of ADIF, the nation-state infrastructure 
manager. These two aspects arguably resulted in a certain bias towards the subnational scale, 
which did not necessarily match the relevance of subnational actors in the policy process. A 
sign of this is the number of interviews with actors with some – non-exclusive – relationship 
to the subnational scale: 18 (64% per cent of the total). 
Apart from these implications, other remarks must be made concerning data collection. 
In the first place, although access to data was relatively easy when considering the strong 
contestation that the high-speed rail line had been subject to, the long time span of the case 
posed some challenges in collecting data from the initial period of the policy process – the 
first 5-10 years of the case are especially significant as the main characteristics of the project 
were defined in this period. These challenges involved access to some documents and in 
particular to interview data, due either to difficulties in arranging interviews with actors 
involved in the policy process at that time or to recall errors by the interviewee. A second 
remark must also be made about interviewing. As Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) note, 
interviewing in qualitative research is a craft with complex skills to be learned through 
practice. As such, the conduction of 36 interviews involved a learning process and hence it is 
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likely that the knowledge produced in the last interviews is more complete than in the first 
ones. 
 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has defined the methodology adopted in order to translate the ‘theoretical 
propositions’ (Yin, 2009, p. 36) or analytical framework developed in Chapter 2 into specific 
research methods that allow the drawing of findings and conclusions. It first defined single-
case study as a research strategy suitable to gain an in-depth understanding of transnational 
HSR policy-making. The selection of the unit of analysis responded to the intention of 
maximizing the learning in relation to the research problem addressed in the thesis, and 
hence it followed a critical and extreme case selection strategy. The selected case is the 
policy process surrounding a contested cross-border HSR line in a significantly devolved 
nation-state, which is expected to illustrate the tensions inherent in transnational HSR 
development and, more generally, European integration.  
Secondly, the chapter determined the research methods used to apply the analytical 
framework to empirical materials within a case study research strategy. It first defined links 
between the multiple sources of evidence required in case study research and the analytical 
framework developed in the previous chapter, in line with Yin’s (2009) advocacy of 
theoretically informed case study research. Specifically, it established the relationships 
between official documents, newspaper articles, parliamentary proceedings, and interviews 
with the different analytical foci of the research and the description of the case. It then 
detailed the adopted research methods: data were collected through three periods of 
fieldwork preceded by an exhaustive online document search; they were subsequently 
analyzed with the guidance of the analytical framework and the assistance for coding and 
retrieving of a computer software package; and they were finally validated through 
triangulation. The chapter concluded by highlighting the most significant implications of the 
choices made regarding the research methods, which suggest among other aspects the 
impossibility to avoid certain scalar assumptions in data collection 
Before presenting the empirical findings of the thesis, it is necessary to offer a 
description of the case. Accordingly, the next chapter presents ‘a body of relatively 
uncontestable data’ (Stake, 1995, p. 123) that elaborates a chronological account of the case 
and provides a context for its subsequent analysis. The following three chapters develop the 
analysis with the aim to answer each of the three research questions. The first two chapters, 
on discourse and power, address directly the empirical materials generated by the fieldwork, 
whilst the third one applies the conceptual framework on space to ‘spatialize’ the analysis. 
5 Development of a transnational high-speed rail line 
(1986-2006) 
Between the first proposals to improve the rail network in the Basque Autonomous 
Community and the beginning of the construction of a EU-relevant high-speed rail line, two 
event-filled decades passed. During this lengthy process, Spain joined the European 
Economic Community that would later establish the Single Market and actively promote the 
planning and implementation of Trans-European Transport Networks. In addition, high-
speed rail planning in Spain moved from the proposal, in 1987, of two new lines to improve 
the functioning of the network to the design, in 2005, of a 10,000-km HSR network to be 
developed by 2020. This chapter provides a narrative of the policy process on the Vitoria-
Irun HSR line and its complex context. 
The use in this narrative of ‘relatively uncontestable data’ (Stake, 1995, p. 123), 
however, does not exhaust the issue of their selection and subsequent presentation. A first 
decision was to adopt a chronological structure that wove specific project-related events and 
wider relevant developments and helped to provide a basic understanding of the case. In this 
chronological approach, the ‘stages heuristics’ framework for understanding the policy 
process (Anderson, 2010; Jones, 1984) has not been adopted; however, the terms ‘policy 
formulation’ and ‘policy implementation’ have been used since in this case they provide a 
useful distinction between two stages with clearly different dynamics.1 Secondly, data were 
selected according fundamentally to the collected newspaper articles and official documents. 
The semi-structured interviews also contributed to build the narrative, since they helped to 
identify significant events, but generally they were not considered as evidence on their own. 
Their use, however, was limited to the description of events rather than their explanation – 
this task pertained to the analysis. 
The chapter is therefore structured chronologically; however, an adequate 
understanding of the case requires a previous description of the policy context. The chapter 
thus starts with an introduction to rail infrastructure planning and development in Spain, both 
before and during the current democratic period. Several of the facts addressed here are 
elaborated in more detail in later chapters, yet their introduction at this point is necessary to 
facilitate the comprehension of the subsequent narrative. The following sections present the 
chronology of the case based on four identifiable stages. Firstly, the origins of the Vitoria-
                                                     
 
1 The ‘stages heuristics’ framework, which divides the policy process into a number of distinct stages, 
has been severely criticized on several grounds (see Sabatier, 2007, pp. 6–7), for instance its 
incapacity to accurately describe that process (Nakamura, 1987). Such a simplified approach does not 
seem suitable to provide an account of the prolonged and complex process studied in this research. 
106 
 
Irun HSR line are traced, with an emphasis on a dramatically changing Spanish rail planning 
context. The following section addresses a stage when the project’s development suffered a 
deceleration due to its lack of priority, yet important policy developments took place at the 
Spanish and EU levels. There followed an extended period of policy formulation that led to 
the start of the implementation phase but also entailed an increase in contestation to the 
project. Finally, the last descriptive section describes the troubled years that led to the start of 
the construction works in September 2006. 
 
 
5.1 Rail infrastructure planning and development in the Spanish 
nation-state 
Although at its beginning rail development in Spain was primarily promoted by private 
actors, from the mid-19th century the Spanish Government assumed a central role by 
subsidizing the development of a number of priority routes (Artola, 1978). This function was 
undertaken through centralized administration, specialized departments in the relevant 
ministries and, notably, technically competent staff attached to them (del Moral Ruiz et al., 
2007, pp. 281–282). Central to the governmental project was the desire to link Madrid, the 
political capital, with the periphery of the Spanish territory by developing a radial network 
with its centre at the former (Comín Comín et al., 1998a, p. 40). Indeed, some authors have 
argued that the development of such a network was largely driven not by an economic logic, 
as the first private initiatives, but by a political logic of nation building whereby the nation-
state’s capital became a central transport node (Bel, 2012, 2011; del Moral Ruiz et al., 2007, 
pp. 295–296). Importantly, this network was to be developed with a 1.668-metre track gauge 
as opposed to the 1.435 m that would be used in most of continental Europe, including 
France (Comín Comín et al., 1998a, p. 38).2 As a result of state and private action, by the end 
of the 19th century 87% of the track length of the largely radial conventional rail network 
existing in the mid-1980s had already been laid (Gómez Mendoza and San Román, 2005, pp. 
532–534). In 1941, at the beginning of Franco’s dictatorship, the state’s role in rail planning 
and development significantly increased when all Iberian gauge lines were nationalized and 
placed under the control of the newly created state-owned company RENFE (Comín Comín 
et al., 1998b, pp. 11–46). 
                                                     
 
2 Hereafter, these will be referred to with the commonly used terms of Iberian gauge – Portugal 
adopted it after Spain did – and UIC gauge (for Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer). 
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The consolidation of democracy in the late 1970s-early 1980s added a more complex 
political environment to the continuing centrality of the nation-state in rail development and 
planning. The establishment of a decentralized nation-state involved the creation of 17 
Comunidades Autónomas or Autonomous Communities, which were superimposed on the 
existing provinces and municipalities. This has resulted in a complex political system 
frequently termed Estado de las Autonomías or State of Autonomies, in which each 
Autonomous Community has its own institutions, including government and parliament, and 
a certain degree of autonomy and powers according to its specific Statute of Autonomy. The 
Basque Autonomous Community (BAC), whose limits encompass the project studied in this 
research, was constituted in 1979 from the provinces of Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa and Álava, which 
are in turn governed by their executive (Diputaciones Forales) and legislative (Juntas 
Generales) bodies. The cases of the BAC and its neighbouring Foral Community of Navarre 
are singular since they have been granted significant taxation autonomy in recognition of 
their historic traditions (Ruiz Almendral, 2003). Figure 3 shows the physical configuration of 
the BAC. Bordering with France on the Atlantic coast and with a difficult topography, its 
largest urban areas (Bilbao, San Sebastián and Vitoria-Gasteiz) correspond, respectively, 
with the capitals of the three aforementioned provinces. Their total population amounted in 
1986 to 68.0 % of the slightly over 2.1 million inhabitants of the region (Eustat, 2015).3 
Although large-scale rail projects remain formally the competence of the central state, 
the State of Autonomies seems to provide opportunities for Autonomous Communities and 
other subnational actors to influence their planning and development. To the author’s 
knowledge, there is no specific empirical research on this influence,4 yet in a variety of 
works scholars have suggested that regional demands have in fact contributed to shape – and 
promote (Albalate and Bel, 2011, p. 172) – the extraordinary development of the high-speed 
rail network in Spain over the last two decades. The influence has resulted in two types of 
changes: the establishment of intermediate stops to facilitate regional transport and increase 
access to the network (Bellet et al., 2010, p. 152; Gutiérrez, 2004, p. 202; Marshall, 2013, p. 
152) and the prioritization of lines (Albalate and Bel, 2011, p. 172; Marshall, 2013, pp. 155–
156); in other words, changes in the characteristics of the lines and in the time-scale of their 
development. The nature of this influence, however, is less clear. Marshall (2013, pp. 155–
156) notes how generating support to the central government’s regional affiliate and the 
place of origin of the relevant minister have been key in determining the implementation of 
                                                     
 
3 Their share had slightly decreased by 2011 (66.6%). This population is that of the comarcas or sub-
regions of Gran Bilbao, Donostialdea and Llanada Alavesa, which encompass the urban areas of each 
city. Only the latter is significantly larger than the urban area, although arguably it is still a valid unit 
since its population is less than 10% higher than the one of the Vitoria municipality. 
4 Section 7.2 examines this issue with reference to the case studied in this research. 
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the Spanish HSR plans (see also Albalate and Bel, 2011, p. 172). In addition, modifications 
of the HSR line route in the Autonomous Community of Catalonia resulted from a 
negotiation between the central and the regional government in which the parties agreed to 
share the financial burden of the investment (Marshall, 2013, p. 152). 
Figure 3. The Basque Autonomous Community in 2010. 
 
Source: prepared by the author, based on data from Gobierno Vasco (2011). 
 
 
5.2 Origins within a changing Spanish context (1986-1989)  
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, at the beginning of the current democratic period in Spain, 
the situation of rail transport in the nation-state was precarious. With most of its network 
designed in the 19th century and sub-standard rail services, it was dramatically losing 
demand while its costs were increasing (Comín Comín et al., 1998b, p. 197). In addition, the 
fact that it had a different track gauge from the French network posed an additional 
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hindrance to interoperability across the border. This situation was reflected in a poor rail 
access from the Spanish plateau to the Atlantic coast through the BAC, which had to bridge a 
height difference of around 600 m through topographically difficult terrain (see Figure 4). 
The two existing links were between Alsasua and the French border through San Sebastián 
and Irun and, especially, between Miranda de Ebro and Bilbao through the Orduña pass, a 
partly single-track line with important geometrical limitations and expensive maintenance 
(RENFE and Europroject, 1984).5 In this context, the Spanish Government faced the 
dilemma of containing the deficit of RENFE, then owner and operator of the network, as it 
indeed did in 1985 by closing over 900 km of rail lines (El País, 1984), whilst investing to 
improve the competitiveness of the services provided. Among the latter efforts, a series of 
studies were carried out by state actors in order to propose alternatives to the two 
aforementioned links. 
Figure 4. Rail line altitude map. National Network of Spanish Railways (1945-51). 65 times vertical 
exaggeration. 
 
Source: Madrid Railway Museum (author’s photograph). 
 
 
                                                     
 
5 It is necessary to note the existence of a minor network, with a track gauge of 1.00 m, along the 
Cantabrian coast of Spain until the French border. Since 1982, the lines between Bilbao and Irun have 
been managed by the Basque Administration (Comín Comín et al., 1998b, p. 300), fundamentally 
providing suburban services. 
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5.2.1 A new plan for the Spanish railway network and the Basque response  
In the mid-1980s, the Spanish Government and RENFE started to study the improvement of 
the rail connections between the Atlantic coast and the Spanish plateau through the BAC. In 
order to overcome the geometric problems and high maintenance cost of the Bilbao-Miranda 
line, the study proposed to build a new double-track line between Bilbao and Vitoria, which 
by allowing speeds of 200 km/h would situate both cities 20-25 minutes away from each 
other (RENFE and Europroject, 1984). The new line would, in addition, be compatible with 
passenger and freight transport. A line with similar design parameters (up to 200 km/h yet 
with a slightly higher maximum gradient) was studied to improve the link between the 
Spanish plateau and the French border in Irun, through the town of Irurtzun in Navarre 
(RENFE et al., 1985). 
The Spanish Government started soon after to prepare the most important planning 
exercise until then since the establishment of democracy in the nation-state: the Plan de 
Transporte Ferroviario (PTF) or Rail Transport Plan. The PTF sought to strengthen rail 
transport and increase its role in the intermodal transport system by selectively and 
efficiently using the available resources in the modernization of the network and the 
provision of rail transport services (Ministerio de Transportes, Turismo y Comunicaciones, 
1987, p. 17). It set as a priority to remove all the existing bottlenecks (estrangulamientos) in 
order to homogenize the operation characteristics of the network (Ministerio de Transportes, 
Turismo y Comunicaciones, 1987, p. 17). Nevertheless, the plan reduced the level of 
ambition of the previous studies on the BAC: first, it did propose a new Bilbao-Vitoria line 
in order to remove the Orduña bottleneck, yet designed for speeds of 160 km/h, rather than 
the 200 km/h for new lines determined by the plan, due to the topographical difficulties of 
the area; and, second, it did not address the improvement of the link with the French border 
through Irun (see Figure 5). By the time the PTF was approved in April 1987, Basque and 
Catalan actors had started to make moves in reaction to the lack of action by the central state 
with regard to cross-border connections. 
The Catalan Government took the lead by carrying out on its own a feasibility study on 
a UIC-gauge link between Barcelona and the French border, which was approved in 
December 1986, the same month the Draft PTF was presented (El País, 1986a, 1987a). 
Basque actors, in particular the Basque Government and the Chamber of Commerce, 
Industry and Shipping of Bilbao followed in advocating the development of a similar type of 
link with the Atlantic French border. The Chamber, in particular through the drive of its 
president Antón de Madariaga, was already in the first half of 1986 asserting the necessity of 
an improved rail line in UIC track gauge between the port of Bilbao and the European 
network in the context of an economically integrating Europe (Información, 1986a, 1986b). 
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However, the first steps were seemingly taken cautiously. According to a former CEC officer 
who was then working at the French rail infrastructure manager SNCF, in a conference 
organized in the Chamber of Commerce of Madrid around that time and in which the 
publicly-owned Catalan rail company Ferrocarrils de la Generalitat de Catalunya 
participated, he was approached by the Director of Studies of the Chamber of Bilbao, who 
invited him to Bilbao to talk to the president and director of the Chamber about their 
proposed Atlantic cross-border link (Interview 5). He notes that in the Chamber they were 
reluctant to make their interest public, due to the then negative attitude of the Spanish 
Government towards the adoption of the UIC track gauge, but that they nevertheless wanted 
to study it. 
Figure 5. New lines: double lines and bypasses; international link. Plan de Transporte Ferroviario. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure removed as third party copyright material] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ministerio de Transportes, Turismo y Comunicaciones (1987). 
The Chamber of Bilbao’s interest was shared by the Basque Government, who sought to 
develop an alternative to the Bilbao-Vitoria line proposed by the central government 
ministry that improved the cross-border link and better integrated Bilbao in the network. In 
fact, the PTF did not address not only the Alsasua-Irun line but also the poor existing link 
between Bilbao and the border through San Sebastián. In this respect, the government 
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produced a Plan Ferroviario de Euskadi or Basque Rail Plan presented in two stages, in 
October 1986 and January 1987 (Departamento de Política Territorial y Transportes and 
SENER, 1987). The plan studied three different alternatives, which were evaluated 
according to a spatial economics model developed by the Basque Government, and 
concluded that the one that offered higher rates of return was that of the Santa Águeda 
corridor, a new Y-shaped line designed for maximum speeds of 200 km/h that used a new 
Bilbao-Vitoria connection to improve the link between these two cities – and hence the rest 
of the Spanish network – and the French border (see Figure 6). Additionally, this proposal 
would enhance the integration of Basque cities in the European network at the expense of 
Navarre. While the Bilbao-Vitoria line planned in the PTF had an estimated investment cost 
of 50,000 million pesetas (Ministerio de Transportes, Turismo y Comunicaciones, 1986), the 
Santa Águeda corridor’s was 125,000 million pesetas (Departamento de Vivienda, Obras 
Públicas y Transportes, 2012, p. 28). 
Figure 6. Santa Águeda corridor. Plan Ferroviario de Euskadi. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure removed as third party copyright material] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Departamento de Política Territorial y Transportes & SENER (1987). 
Although contacts between the Basque Government and Spanish state actors to explore this 
option had started soon after this proposal was approved by the former in February 1987, the 
final PTF, approved in April, maintained the Bilbao-Vitoria line and did not include the 
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Santa Águeda corridor. It was not until the first half of 1988 that contacts intensified and an 
agreement was reached. In July of that year, the president of RENFE and the Basque 
Minister for Transport and Public Works signed an agreement in order to study the definition 
of a new rail solution to the links between Bilbao and the Spanish plateau and between the 
Spanish network and the French border, thus adopting the Basque Government’s criteria for 
producing the Basque Rail Plan (Departamento de Política Territorial y Transportes and 
INECO, 1989a, p. 11). The contract for the study was awarded to the publicly-owned 
consultancy firm INECO, although the Basque Government provided technical support and 
developed the cost-benefit analysis of the different corridors proposed. The elaboration of 
the study, however, was to be significantly affected by political developments at the highest 
level in Spain that would result in a decision that would fundamentally change rail 
infrastructure planning in Spain. 
 
5.2.2 The introduction of the UIC gauge and the extension of high speed 
Although the Ministry had been reluctant to consider the adoption of the UIC track gauge 
and the development of a high-speed rail network in Spain, a number of episodes since the 
production of the PTF denoted a change in this attitude. Firstly, despite the measured nature 
of the PTF, it did introduce high speed in two of its new lines: it proposed maximum speeds 
of 250 km/h in the new links with Andalucía, which solved the most important bottleneck of 
the Spanish network and would eventually become the Madrid-Sevilla HSR line, and with 
the north-northwest of Spain (Ministerio de Transportes, Turismo y Comunicaciones, 1987). 
Secondly, the Spanish and French governments started to advance the development of a new 
Mediterranean cross-border link in UIC track gauge. In November 1987, members of the 
Spanish Ministry, RENFE and the Catalan Government met for the first time to analyze the 
aforementioned Catalan study on the Barcelona-French border link (El País, 1987b). In 
October 1988, the Director General of SNCF expressed the French Government’s full 
support to the extension of the TGV network to Perpignan and further to the Spanish border 
(El País, 1988a). Thirdly, on 21 October of that year, the Council of Ministers unexpectedly 
decided to consider the adoption of the UIC gauge in the Spanish network by commissioning 
a report from RENFE on the matter and postponing the award of the contract for the 
provision of the high-speed rolling stock, which was expected for that same day (El País, 
1988b). These developments resulted in a landmark decision by the Council of Ministers, on 
9 December, to build new high-speed rail lines in UIC track gauge and prioritize this 
development in the Madrid-Sevilla and Madrid-Barcelona-French border corridors 
(Ministerio de Transportes, Turismo y Comunicaciones, 1988).  
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This decision did not imply by itself a modification of the Santa Águeda line’s 
characteristics since the latter was not planned as high speed nor did it belong to any of these 
corridors.6 However, it had immediate implications on the development of the study carried 
out by INECO with the collaboration of the Basque Government. After the 9 December 
decision, it took on board the design criteria for high-speed lines and mixed traffic (with 
maximum speeds of 250 km/h) and included the adoption of the UIC gauge as a new 
parameter (Departamento de Política Territorial y Transportes and INECO, 1989a, pp. 14–
15). The reason for this may have laid in, first, the low relative increase in investment cost 
that a high-speed rail line entailed7 and, second, the favourable stance to adopting the UIC 
track gauge of politicians at the highest level.8 Five alternatives were shortlisted and 
compared according to technical and economic and cost-benefit analyses, among which an 
improved Santa Águeda corridor was eventually selected. This alternative, which had now 
an estimated investment cost of 157,000 million pesetas, not only adopted the 
aforementioned design criteria but also included an entirely new section between Beasain 
and Irun through San Sebastián and the possibility of developing a new high-speed rail link 
with Navarre and the Mediterranean via Irurzun (see Figure 7). 
The study, the Estudio de Alternativas Ferroviarias en el País Vasco, was presented on 
22 February 1989, but contacts on the financing of the line started before then (El Correo, 
1988c). In particular, the Basque Government expressed its willingness to contribute to the 
financing of the line since the Spanish Ministry’s resources were allocated to the Sevilla-
Madrid-Barcelona-French border corridor and the link between Madrid and north/north-
western Spain (El Correo, 1988d). This contribution ranged from full financing (El País, 
1989c) to advancing funding and later recovering it through deduction from the BAC’s 
contribution to defray the cost of central state functions and services provided in the 
Autonomous Community (El Correo, 1989a).9 On 27 February, less than a week after the 
study was presented publicly, representatives of the Basque Government and of its political 
                                                     
 
6 In fact, at the time the study on the new line in the BAC was being produced the Spanish 
Government was still considering the extension of the track gauge change to the rest of the network. 
RENFE submitted a second report on the issue in the summer of 1989 and, after discrepancies 
between the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, in November the 
Government relinquished adopting the UIC track gauge on the entire Spanish network due to the high 
cost it involved (El País, 1989a). 
7 In March 1989, the Basque Minister for Transport pointed out that they studied the possibility of 
developing a 160 km/h line (as the Bilbao-Vitoria line in the PTF), yet concluded that a 300 km/h line 
would merely involve around a 6% increase in the total investment cost (El País, 1989b). 
8 Prime Minister Felipe González had expressed in November 1988 his preference to adopt the UIC 
track gauge in all the Spanish rail network (El Correo, 1988a), and the Minister for Transport asserted 
in the Congress of Deputies, at the end of December, that the link Madrid-Irun would be the next 
priority with respect to changing the track gauge (El Correo, 1988b). 
9 See Section 7.1.1 for more details on this financing mode and, more generally, the BAC’s financial 
and taxation regime. 
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parties (nationalist EAJ-PNV and PSOE’s Basque affiliate PSE-PSOE)10 met the two 
ministers responsible for transport and public works to negotiate the financing of a number 
of infrastructure investments in the BAC. This meeting resulted in an agreement whereby the 
Ministry of Transport accepted the Y-shaped route and incorporated it in its planning, and 
the Basque Government would contribute to the production of the technical project and to 
the direct funding of the line (El Correo, 1989b).11 The financing details were nevertheless to 
be defined by a committee formed by the Spanish and Basque governments. 
Figure 7. The rail network in the Basque Autonomous Community within the general basic network. 
Estudio de Alternativas Ferroviarias en el País Vasco. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure removed as third party copyright material] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Departamento de Política Territorial y Transportes & INECO (1989a). 
 
Thus, the first years of the policy process on a new rail line in the Basque Autonomous 
Community sufficed to define its basic characteristics and set the basis for its further 
refining and implementation. The Government of Spain and RENFE first took the initiative 
to solve the deficient link between Bilbao and the Spanish network, yet the activity of the 
Basque Government in response to what they regarded as a lack of consideration of the 
                                                     
 
10 The PSOE was the ruling party in Spain at that time. 
11 The agreement, which involved a total investment of over 200,000 million pesetas, also included the 
extension of the port of Bilbao and the remodelling of the three airports in the BAC (El Correo, 
1989c). 
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cross-border link contributed to shape a more ambitious rail solution in the BAC. The 
adoption of the UIC track gauge and of high-speed rail design criteria as a result of a key 
Spanish Government’s decision provided the last component in completing the basic 
definition of a new high-speed rail line linking Vitoria, Bilbao, San Sebastián and the French 
border in Irun, hereafter the Vitoria-Irun HSR line. 
 
 
5.3 A standstill: planning European and nation-state high-speed 
rail networks (1989-1994) 
As the 1990s approached, high-speed rail as a policy issue gained prominence in both Spain 
and the European Economic Community. Firstly, the importance of cross-border connections 
in an economically integrating Europe – the Single Market envisaged by the Single European 
Act of 1986 would have to be established by the end of 1992 – highlighted by Basque and 
Catalan actors was followed by significant policy developments at the European level. The 
Vitoria-Irun line, due to its border and strategic location, was to figure prominently in a 
proposed trans-European HSR network. In addition, the Spanish Council of Ministers’ 
decision to develop certain UIC-gauge HSR corridors created a new rail infrastructure 
planning scenario in which demands for new lines had to be balanced with the limited 
resources available. In this context, the recognition of the Vitoria-Irun line’s European 
relevance did not immediately translate into notable progress in the policy process. 
 
5.3.1 Vitoria-Dax as a ‘key link’ of a new European high-speed rail network 
Promoted by European state and business actors, momentum towards trans-European HSR 
development built up during the second half of the 1980s (Ross, 1998, pp. 71–75), yet it was 
in the early 1990s when specific policies were formulated. Following a December 1989 
communication by the Commission advocating the development of such a network (CEC, 
1990), the Council adopted the same month a resolution on the development, before 31 
December 1990, of a master plan for the network and the measures required to guarantee the 
technical compatibility of its infrastructure. To this end, the Commission set up in January 
1990 a High Level Group on a trans-European HSR network, which was composed of 
representatives of the European Commission, the European Investment Bank (EIB), the 
member states and business organizations (including the Community of European Railways 
and the Round Table of Industrialists). By the end of 1990, the Group had produced a first 
proposal for establishing a European HSR network by 2010 (CEC, 1991). The network – see 
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Figure 8 – would comprise new high-speed lines, existing lines upgraded to handle speeds of 
around 200 km/h, and a series of link lines to ensure the interconnection of the network. In 
the Spanish territory, the high-speed rail network was largely consistent with the lines being 
planned at the nation-state level at the time: it included the Sevilla-Madrid-Barcelona-French 
border corridor, the access to the north-northwest of Spain, and the Vitoria-Irun line. 
Figure 8. Outline plan of a European high-speed rail network. Proposal by the High-Level Group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure removed as third party copyright material] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CEC (1991). 
An important aspect of the High Level Group’s proposal was the identification of fifteen 
‘key links’ necessary for the satisfactory operation of the network. Generally located in 
border regions and inadequately addressed by nation-states, they were to be given priority in 
implementation. In the Atlantic Spanish-French border, a ‘key link’ was defined between 
Vitoria and Dax, in the French region of Aquitaine, which was mirrored on the 
Mediterranean side of the Pyrenees by the Barcelona-Perpignan ‘key link’. 
The inclusion of the Vitoria-Irun line in a trans-European HSR network was formalized 
in the following years. Firstly, the proposal of the High-Level Group was welcomed by the 
Council in December 1990 and the Group was tasked with carrying out further studies on it. 
Secondly and in parallel, the wider Trans-European Networks (TENs) initiative in the areas 
of transport, telecommunications and energy was gradually taking shape. Their inclusion in 
118 
 
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 provided the legal basis to the development of policy 
guidelines and measures and to the provision of financial support for them. In its December 
1993 meeting, the European Council invited the Commission, which presented then its 
White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, Employment (CEC, 1993), to stimulate the 
implementation of TENs, with the assistance of a working group entrusted with, among other 
tasks, identifying projects of key interest to the EU. Chaired by then Vice-President of the 
Commission Henning Christophersen and formed by representatives of the Heads of State 
and Government and the President of the EIB, the group included the Vitoria-Dax link as 
part of one of the 14 proposed priority projects (CEC, 1995), which were subsequently 
accepted by the Essen European Council in December 1994. By that time, the High-Level 
Group on the high-speed rail network had updated its outline plan,12 which was included in 
the Commission’s 1994 proposal concerning the guidelines for the development of the 
Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) (CEC, 1994). The TEN-T guidelines, finally 
approved in 1996, incorporated both the Essen list of priority projects and, as part of the 
TEN-T rail network, the updated HSR network outline plan13 (EP and Council, 1996). The 
inclusion of the Vitoria-Irun line in these guidelines qualified it for EU support.14 
 
5.3.2 Lack of priority within a consolidating Spanish high-speed rail network 
In Spain, the December 1988 Council of Ministers’ decision did start a new era in rail 
infrastructure planning in Spain, yet its effects in promoting the Vitoria-Irun HSR line were 
not immediate. Although negotiations over the launch and financing of the project started a 
week after the date of the February 1989 agreement (El País, 1989d), central state actors did 
not take long to lower the expectations concerning the line. In March, RENFE’s Director for 
the north of Spain noted that the implementation of the line was not among their immediate 
projects (El Correo, 1989d) and, in May, the advisor on rail issues to the Spanish Minister 
emphasized that the commitments made on the line were not as advanced as they might seem 
due to the extra cost of the Y-shaped solution and the necessity to consider the nation-state 
as a whole (Fernández Lafuente, 1989). In fact, towards the end of 1989 the Basque Minister 
for Transport and Public Works publicly expressed doubts that the Spanish Government 
would ratify these commitments in writing (El Diario Vasco, 1989). 
                                                     
 
12 With regard to the case studied, the Vitoria-Irun line adopted its “Y” shape and its link with the rest 
of the Spanish network was defined. In addition, the Dax-Bordeaux link changed from being an 
upgraded line to a new one. 
13 The final version of the network incorporated the provisions set in the 1994 Spanish infrastructure 
plan (see next subsection). 
14 See Section 7.1.2. 
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The line was on the one hand seen with reluctance by RENFE and the Spanish 
Government on technical grounds. In 1991, members from both institutions noted its high 
investment cost – now calculated in 260,000 million pesetas – and the topographical 
difficulties of the area (El País, 1991a, 1991b). In fact, a cost-benefit analysis of the project 
produced in 1992 by INECO estimated a negative financial profitability and a social and 
economic profitability positive yet lower than the recommended by the Ministry (Ministerio 
de Obras Públicas y Transportes and INECO, 1992). On the other hand, apart from the 
concentration of resources on the Madrid-Sevilla line under construction, the link between 
Madrid, Barcelona and the French border was the second priority of the Spanish Government 
concerning HSR line development. This priority over the Madrid-Vitoria-French border link 
was restated on subsequent occasions by RENFE (El País, 1991c) and the Spanish 
Government (El País, 1989a, 1992). 
The priority of the Mediterranean cross-border link was in fact in line with 
developments on the other side of the border. Once the Spanish Council of Ministers’ 
decision had been taken, the French Minister for Transport expressed his preference for 
connecting to the Spanish HSR network through Catalonia, referring to the development of 
the Madrid-Barcelona HSR line and to the interest shown by the Catalan Government (El 
País, 1990a). The 1991 French 20-year plan for the high-speed rail network formalized this 
preference for the Mediterranean link, which, as opposed to the Atlantic one, was estimated 
to yield the minimum return required by SNCF to assume the lines ordered by the 
Government (El País, 1991d). Developments in both nation-states converged in the Spanish-
French summit held in the French town of Albi in November 1992, when both governments 
signed a memorandum of understanding on support of a high-speed rail link between 
Perpignan and Barcelona by 2002 and on the establishment of a cooperation framework for 
its development (La Vanguardia, 1992). 
During these years, then, progress on the Vitoria-Irun HSR line was slow and limited to 
the development of technical studies, fundamentally under the initiative of the Basque 
Government. Between 1989 and 1991, it produced, under the supervision of the Spanish 
relevant ministry and RENFE, a draft project of the line in two further phases, through which 
the alternative selected in the 1989 Estudio de Alternativas was progressively refined 
(Departamento de Política Territorial y Transportes and INECO, 1989b, 1991). In addition, 
the Basque Government and the Regional Council of Aquitaine carried out a feasibility study 
on the Vitoria-Dax link, proposed as a ‘key link’ of the trans-European HSR network in 
1990 (Gobierno Vasco et al., 1992). 
In 1991, the existing Spanish Ministries of Transport, Tourism and Communications 
and the Ministry of Public Works and Urbanism were merged into the Ministry of Public 
Works and Transport. Under the leadership of Minister Josep Borrell, it undertook the 
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planning of infrastructures in Spain in an integrated manner, resulting in the Plan Director 
de Infraestructuras 1993-2007 or PDI (Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Transportes y Medio 
Ambiente, 1994), formally approved in March 1994. With respect to rail, the PDI proposed a 
high-speed rail network that incorporated the recent developments and clearly considered the 
cross-border connections (resembling to a certain extent the first outline plan produced by 
the High Level Group – see Figure 8), while planning for the modernization of the 
conventional, Iberian-gauge network (see Figure 9).15 The Vitoria-Irun line constituted one 
of the two connections to the French network and was linked with the rest of the Spanish 
HSR network through the Navarrese corridor and Zaragoza. The Bilbao-Vitoria section of 
the line was one of the three ‘strategic actions’ to be funded by the Presupuestos Generales 
del Estado or General State Budget, designed to be initially operated in Iberian track gauge 
to solve existing operation problems and achieve immediate service improvements but 
planned to be integrated in the high-speed rail network in the future (Ministerio de Obras 
Públicas, Transportes y Medio Ambiente, 1994, pp. 148–149).16 The proposal thus combined 
the PTF’s priority of selectively improving an Iberian-gauge rail network and the necessity 
to rationalize the planning of a developing and expanding Spanish HSR network. 
  
                                                     
 
15 The complementarity between both networks was sought through the use of rolling stock with a 
variable gauge system and the strategic location of gauge switches in the network (Ministerio de 
Obras Públicas, Transportes y Medio Ambiente, 1994, p. 148) 
16 This adaptation would be enabled by the use of polyvalent sleepers in their construction. 
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Figure 9. High-speed rail network and main long-term structuring actions. Plan Director de 
Infraestructuras 1993-2007. 
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Source: Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Transportes y Medio Ambiente (1994). 
 
Thus, the Vitoria-Irun line was now an integral part of a network plan that recognized the 
importance of cross-border links and combined the ad hoc decisions on high-speed rail 
development made in the previous years with the existing conventional network. 
Nevertheless, in spite of EU developments that emphasized its importance as a ‘key link’ of a 
European network of European interest, the lack of priority in Spanish planning resulted in 
limited progress in the 1989-1994 period. Only through the Basque Government’s initiative 
the Y-shaped route became progressively refined. The completion of the Madrid-Sevilla 
HSR line, whose operation started in April 1992, and particularly the approval of the PDI in 
1994 would, however, provide a better context for its development. 
 
 
5.4 Completing policy formulation and mobilization of political 
actors (1994-2001) 
Despite the fact that the Vitoria-Irun HSR line was not a priority for the Spanish 
Government, after the approval of the Spanish Plan Director de Infraestructuras in 1994 it 
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soon started the procedures to finish the definition of the project. In December 1994, an Act 
accompanying the 1995 General State Budget17 introduced as a requirement in the 
development of new lines of nation-state interest the production of an estudio informativo or 
study defining the general characteristics of the line. Although the production of this 
document did not involve significant changes in the project, it prompted the participation and 
mobilization of Basque political actors, both for and against it. 
 
5.4.1 Re-launch of the project: the Estudio Informativo and the Plan Territorial 
Sectorial 
Although it was not a requirement, the Estudio Informativo was produced in coordination 
with the Basque Plan Territorial Sectorial of the rail network in the BAC, a sectoral 
instrument aimed at planning rail infrastructure in the BAC in an integrated and coordinated 
manner. According to the Estudio, this coordination not only facilitated the integration of the 
Vitoria-Irun line in regional and local spatial planning but also helped to optimized the 
routes studied (Ministerio de Fomento and INECO, 2000). In general terms, the procedure 
for the production of each document consisted of the preparation of a first plan, followed by 
a public consultation on it and the final approval of the plan amended according to such 
consultation. In the case of the Estudio, this process was complicated by environmental 
impact assessment regulations. Firstly, the ministry responsible of the project must send a 
Summary Report (Memoria Resumen) with its significant characteristics to the relevant 
environmental body, which may conduct a consultation on its environmental impact. 
Following this and taking into account the outcomes of this consultation, the ministry must 
produce an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) on the project, which shall be 
submitted to public consultation together with the Estudio. Finally, and before the final 
approval of the latter, the aforementioned environmental body shall formulate an 
Environmental Impact Statement which, on the basis of the Estudio, the EIA and the results 
of the public consultation process, assesses the desirability of the project and, in case of a 
positive resolution, lays down the conditions for its development. 
The process thus started with the submission of the Summary Report by the Directorate 
General of Rail Transport Infrastructures to the Directorate General of Environmental 
Policy, both within the same ministry, in August 1994 – five months after the PDI was 
approved. After the results of the consultation conducted by the latter body were sent to the 
Directorate General of Rail Transport Infrastructures, the Basque Ministry of Transport and 
                                                     
 
17 Ley 42/1994, de 30 de diciembre, de Medidas Fiscales, Administrativas y de Orden Social. 
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Public Works launched the development of the Plan Territorial Sectorial by holding a 
preliminary consultation with the Basque ministry responsible for spatial planning. The Draft 
Plan Territorial Sectorial was presented in March 1997, when the Estudio and the EIA were 
still under development by the central government’s ministry. From March to September of 
this year, the Basque ministry conducted more extensive consultations with the concerned 
territorial public administrations, including the Ministry of Development.18 This period, 
previous to the public consultation process, was important since significant progress was 
made in the definition of the route. In July, Spanish and Basque government representatives 
agreed on a single alternative for each corridor to be further refined in the next phase19 (see 
Figure 10 for the alternatives studied in this one). In the west section of the high-speed rail 
line, due to the unanimity among local authorities and the support of the Basque 
Government, the Spanish Government decided to accept the alternative to the south of the 
Ibaizabal river, which, although environmentally better integrated, involved a higher cost, 
less flexibility and adaptability to the functional requirements of the line, and did not follow 
a consolidated transport corridor (Ministerio de Fomento and INECO, 2000). In addition, in 
the east section, where there was no consensus among local authorities, the alternative to the 
west of the Oria river was selected due to its numerous advantages over the east one. 
The process reached a milestone in 1998, when both the Estudio Informativo with its 
EIA and the Plan Territorial Sectorial were subjected to public consultation. The Basque 
Government had taken the lead by initially approving the Plan Territorial Sectorial and 
initiating the public consultation process in March. In fact, the Basque Minister for Transport 
and Public Works accused on several occasions the Spanish Ministry of Development of 
delaying the technical approval of the the Estudio and the EIA and their subsequent 
submission to public consultation (El Mundo, 1998; El País, 1998a). The process was 
unblocked in June after a meeting between the Basque and Spanish ministers (El País, 
1998b), and the public consultation period for the Estudio and the EIA started in July. 
Although the consultation period was initially of one month for the Estudio and EIA and two 
months for the Plan Territorial Sectorial, in both cases it was extended until the end of 
October, according to the Estudio due to the technical complexity of the project and the great 
interest aroused (Ministerio de Fomento and INECO, 2000). In fact, the public consultation 
process led to the mobilization of political actors and to a significant debate in the BAC on 
the project. 
                                                     
 
18 Translated from the original Ministerio de Fomento, responsible for public works and transport. In 
1996, the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and the Environment became the Ministry of 
Development and a new Ministry of the Environment was created. 
19 The exception was the access to Vitoria, for which the two proposed alternatives were kept 
(Ministerio de Fomento and INECO, 2000). 
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Figure 10. Alternatives studied in phase II of the Estudio Informativo. 
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Source: Ministerio de Fomento & INECO (2000). 
 
5.4.2 Opening up the regional transport problem: political mobilization and 
potential for reshaping? 
The mobilization of political actors mainly involved the development of an active 
contestation movement to the Vitoria-Irun HSR line. This movement, however, did not 
emerge at this time; its origins date back to 1993. In January of that year, a strong opposition 
had emerged in Aquitaine to the Dax-Hendaye line after its route was disclosed by a French 
Journal (Rui, 2004)20 and the Basque and Spanish governments had announced their decision 
to immediately award the contract for the construction project of the Vitoria-Irun HSR line 
(El Correo, 1993).21 In July, groups that had participated in the contestation movement 
against a motorway across the border between the Autonomous Communities of the Basque 
                                                     
 
20 The route corresponded to the abovementioned 1992 feasibility study on the Vitoria-Dax link. After 
a first mobilization on 9 January 1993 in the French town of Arcangues, the president of Aquitaine 
announced the shelving of the project (Rui, 2004). 
21 This announcement, which to the author’s knowledge was not followed up, may have responded to 
the willingness of the Basque Government to advance the definition of the project. 
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Country and Navarre22 formed the Asamblea contra el TAV, an autonomous, assembly-led 
organization with a strong anti-developmental stance that constituted the first body aimed 
specifically at contesting high-speed rail development in the Basque Country. Although the 
Asamblea played the leading role in the contestation movement until at least 1998, critical 
voices were also expressed by the various Basque environmental organizations (Sanjose, 
1995), the Basque agrarian trade union EHNE (Groome, 1995) and the pro-independence left 
(Erkizia, 1995; Herri Batasuna, 1995). 
In 1998, the movement gained momentum with the increased activity of these actors, 
especially EHNE (El País, 1998c) and the Asamblea (El País, 1998d), and the mobilization 
of new political actors, in particular other Basque trade unions (LAB, ELA and HIRU). A 
three-day conference on the Basque rail system, organized by the Basque Government in 
December 1998, allowed the meeting, in many cases for the first time, of actors from across 
the contestation movement (Larrinaga, 2009, pp. 145–146). Almost a year later, in 
November 1999, the trade unions EHNE, LAB, ELA and HIRU organized a two-day 
conference in Bilbao entitled ‘Which rail for Euskal Herria?’,23 in which they articulated an 
argumentation against the high-speed rail project and agreed on the basic principles for 
developing an alternative (Gara, 1999a). Although the Asamblea, which attended the 
conference, was very critical of proposing any alternative to the high-speed rail line, the 
event resulted in the first clear positioning against the project by ELA, the main trade union 
in the BAC. 
Nevertheless, political activity regarding the Vitoria-Irun line was not circumscribed to 
opposing actors. After the initial promotion by the Chamber of Commerce of Bilbao of a 
new rail line in the second half of the 1980s, the business sector regained a certain 
prominence. In early November of 1998, right after the public consultation period ended, the 
three Basque Chambers of Commerce – one for each province – presented a report in which 
they proposed a radically new, L-shaped HSR line that linked consecutively, at a maximum 
speed of 350/400 km/h, the cities of Vitoria, Bilbao, and San Sebastián (Cámaras de 
Comercio e Industria de Araba, Bizkaia y Gipuzkoa et al., 1998). Although possibly more 
costly than the Y-shaped line due to its lower adaptability to the terrain, according to the 
report the new line would be roughly 40 km shorter, would better integrate Bilbao in the 
                                                     
 
22 The construction of this motorway across the Leitzaran valley, considered of exceptional ecological 
value, originated an environmental conflict that, after the intervention of the terrorist group ETA, 
resulted in a 1991 agreement between the government of the Basque province of Gipuzkoa and the 
majority of the contestation movement (El País, 2008a). 
23 Euskal Herria is a space encompassing the Spanish Autonomous Communities of the Basque 
Country and Navarre and three French former provinces. It is central to the spatial imagination of 
Basque nationalism (see Mansvelt Beck, 2006). 
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network, would reduce both the material and operation costs, and would decrease travel 
times in all cases. In spite of the incipient stage of the proposal, it received significant media 
coverage (El Correo, 1998a; El País, 1998e, 1998f) and was openly supported by the mayors 
of Bilbao and Vitoria (El Correo, 1998b). 
The Basque Government appeared open to discuss the project and achieve a consensus 
among the interested parties. In December 1998, it organized the aforementioned three-day 
conference on the Basque rail system, in which a wide range of speakers, both for and 
against the high-speed rail line, participated. In his opening speech, the Basque Minister for 
Transport and Public Works stated that the conference ‘is meant to encourage the free and 
peaceful participation of all those present, whether speakers or guests. Contributions, in any 
case, will enrich the debate and help making decisions’ (Departamento de Transportes y 
Obras Públicas, 1999, p. 39). In this respect, it is important to note the particular political 
climate of the time, characterized by the improvement of relations between conservative 
(EAJ-PNV) and left-wing nationalist parties.24 In June 1998, the PSE-EE, the regional 
affiliate of the PSOE, had decided to leave the Basque Government due to the 
rapprochement between EAJ-PNV and left-wing nationalist party Herri Batasuna (El País, 
1998g). The portfolio of the Basque Ministry of Transport and Public Works, previously 
held by PSE-EE, was assumed by EAJ-PNV when a new government was formed in July by 
this party and centre-left nationalist Eusko Alkartasuna (EA). In addition, in May 1999 the 
EAJ-PNV/EA Government signed a parliamentary agreement with the pro-independence 
left-wing political coalition Euskal Herritarrok (EH) due to its minority position resulting 
from the October 1998 Basque elections (El País, 2005a).25 
 
5.4.3 Finalizing policy formulation: accommodation of demands and 
reorganization of the contestation movement 
The public consultation process for the Estudio Informativo and the Plan Territorial 
Sectorial concluded with the submission of 693 and 1,667 claims, respectively. Although the 
period for the production of the amended documents was meant to be short – the Basque 
                                                     
 
24 This relationship – and the increased tensions between conservative nationalist parties and the more 
centralist, Spanish-minded parties (PP-PV and PSE-EE) – must be understood in relation to the truce 
declared by the terrorist group ETA in September 1998 and the signature on the same month of the 
Lizarra-Garazi Agreement by Basque – largely nationalist – political groups and organizations in 
order to seek a political solution to the so-called Basque conflict. The breakdown of the truce by ETA 
in December 1999 (El País, 1999a) marked the beginning of the end of this period. 
25 The Basque Government formally broke this parliamentary agreement in February 2000, due to the 
ambiguous stance of EH towards three assassinations by ETA following the breakdown of the truce 
(El País, 2000). 
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Minister for Transport and Public Works said in December 1998 that the project could be 
approved in the first quarter of 1999 (El Correo, 1998c) –, the process took longer than 
stated. In February of this year, he in fact highlighted the difficulties to arrive at a consensual 
decision due to the high number of submitted claims (Gara, 1999b). 
The consideration of the claims resulted in a limited number of moderate modifications 
to the route of the high-speed rail line, which consisted of three by-passes in the Gipuzkoa 
province and the decision to study a fourth one in Vitoria (Secretaría General de Medio 
Ambiente, 2000). The bypass of Lezetxiki avoided affecting two prehistoric sites and a 
quarry; the one of Aduna-Zizurkil-Andoain distanced the line from the town of Aduna and 
diminished the visual impact in the town of Andoain; and the bypass of Ventas in Irun 
avoided the impact of the line on a residential area. These three modifications resulted from 
the claims, respectively, of the concerned local authority and an academic from the 
University of the Basque Country, of the three affected local authorities, and of two 
individuals and the local authority concerned. In addition, the Spanish Government decided, 
following a proposal by the government of Vitoria, to study the feasibility of a new 
underground line through the city that would improve its integration in the network. In terms 
of the Basque Chambers of Commerce’s L-shaped proposal, although the Basque 
Government initially expressed its willingness to study it (El Correo, 1998d), eventually it 
did not influence the characteristics of the project. Notwithstanding the delay that the 
adoption of such a proposal would have entailed, a study commissioned by the Spanish 
Ministry of Development and finished in April 1999 advised against it due to a variety of 
technical reasons, including its higher cost, its bigger environmental impact and its uncertain 
advantages (Ministerio de Fomento and INECO, 1999). 
The dossier on the Estudio Informativo was submitted in November 1999 to the relevant 
body in the Ministry of the Environment for the production of the Environmental Impact 
Statement, which was issued on 22 October 2000. The Estudio was approved a month later, 
on 24 November, and the Plan Territorial Sectorial on 27 February 2001. Nevertheless, this 
was also the time when the contestation movement reorganized to form what would become 
the main organization against the Vitoria-Irun HSR line: AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana. 
In view of the limited changes to the project in spite of the significant public response 
and the advance stage of the policy process, this coalition of opposing actors was formed 
after two meetings on 19 December 2000 and 27 January 2001. Elkarlana’s membership was 
considerably wide: it consisted of the Asamblea contra el TAV, trade unions,26 left-wing 
                                                     
 
26 These included EHNE, LAB and HIRU. However, ELA, in spite of its opposition to the project, did 
not join Elkarlana. 
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political parties (including Herri Batasuna and Ezker Batua-Berdeak, which would soon 
gain relevance), local authorities, Basque environmental groups (in particular Ekologistak 
Martxan and Eguzki) and other social organizations. This diversity indeed involved that 
agreement between the members was based on a bare minimum of premises. In its founding 
manifesto, the principles on which Elkarlana’s activity would be based were three: the 
outright rejection of the high-speed rail line; a firm complaint about the lack of transparency 
of and participation in the policy process; and the need to question the model of transport 
and society that was being promoted (AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana, 2001a). 
 
The long process of policy formulation thus basically concluded with the approval of both 
the Estudio Informativo and the Plan Territorial Sectorial. The following steps would 
involve the development of the construction projects and the start of the corresponding 
works. Yet this advance also implied that contestation to the project became wider and 
stronger in the Basque Autonomous Community; in fact, the end of the policy formulation 
process was simultaneous to the creation of a wide coalition of opposing actors. These two 
aspects (i.e. the beginning of the implementation phase and, to a lesser extent, mobilization 
against the project fundamentally in the BAC) would mark the last stage of the policy 
process addressed in this research. 
 
 
5.5 Policy implementation: towards a Spanish-Basque agreement 
(2001-2006) 
The approval of the Estudio Informativo and the Plan Territorial Sectorial marked the 
beginning of an intense period due to, first, the tensions between the Spanish and the Basque 
governments over the implementation of the project and, second, the consolidation of the 
contestation movement. The Basque Government would have to deal both with a Spanish 
Government that had a different planned timeline for the project and with a growing 
contestation to it, demonstrated by the creation of a wide coalition of opposing actors and by 
the conflicts within the Basque Government as a result of the entrance of the left-wing party 
Ezker Batua-Berdeak. This situation would appease to a certain extent after the PSOE 
replaced the PP in the Spanish Government in 2004 and the foundations of an 
implementation agreement were laid. 
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5.5.1 National-regional conflict over competences 
Already before the Estudio Informativo and the Plan Territorial Sectorial were approved, the 
Basque Government suspected the line would not be a priority for the Spanish Government. 
After the latter announced that the Cohesion Funds for TEN-T projects until 2006 were fully 
committed for the Madrid-Barcelona and Madrid-Valladolid HSR lines (El País, 1999b), the 
Basque relevant minister Álvaro Amann expressed its readiness to assume part of the cost of 
the construction works (El País, 1999c). Nevertheless, the open conflict between both 
administrations started once the Estudio Informativo was finally approved in February 2001. 
In September of this year, Basque Minister Amann asserted that the drafting of the 
construction projects was already delayed (Amann, 2001). While in mid-2001 Spanish 
Ministry sources stated that construction works could start that same year (El Correo, 
2001a), a year later Spanish Minister Álvarez Cascos affirmed that they would begin in 2004 
due to the magnitude of the construction project (El Correo, 2002a). In the face of this delay, 
Amann announced in December 2002 the tendering of the construction projects for most of 
the high-speed rail line in the province of Gipuzkoa (El País, 2002a).27 Although the 
Ministry of Development threatened with bringing this process to court due to infringement 
of competences (El País, 2003a), in July 2003 the Basque Government awarded the contracts 
for four of the six tendered sections. In that same month the Spanish Government launched 
the tender process for the basic projects28 of five sections in Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa, two of 
which encompassed those tendered by the Basque Government. The award of the 
corresponding contracts in October confirmed the overlap of activities by both 
administrations and materialized the conflict over competences.29 During these months the 
tension between members of both governments was evident. Whereas the Basque 
Government justified its right to develop the high-speed rail line on the basis of the Spanish 
Government’s inaction and expressed its willingness to cooperate in its implementation 
(Amann, 2003a; El País, 2003b), the Spanish Government emphasized the former’s lack of 
competences and their need to accept this fact in order to reach any sort of agreement 
(Álvarez-Cascos, 2003; El País, 2003c). 
                                                     
 
27 At that time only the construction projects of two short sections, in the vicinity of Bilbao and San 
Sebastián, had been tendered by the Spanish Government (this process was launched in November 
2002). 
28 The ‘basic project’ or proyecto básico is the part of the construction project that details its 
geometric features and defines the property and rights affected (LSF 39/2003, 2004). 
29 Between January and May of this year, the Spanish Government had carried out the tendering for 
the basic projects of most of the other sections of the line, yet these did not overlap with the sections 
being promoted by the Basque Government. 
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A further difficulty to the improvement of relations between both governments and to 
the realization of the Basque Government’s aspirations came from a European Commission 
‘quick start programme’ – part of a wider ‘European Initiative for Growth’ presented in 
November 2003 – that sought to trigger the launch of key priority projects of European 
interest. The absence of the Vitoria-Dax link of the initial list of projects, which did include 
the Figueras-Perpignan link, prompted a strong reaction by members of the Basque 
Government, who suggested that the Spanish Government and the then Spanish – and 
member of the ruling party PP – Commissioner for Energy and Transport remained passive 
toward the link or even hindered its inclusion in the list (El País, 2003d). This 
Commissioner, in turn, reasserted the European priority of the link but argued that its 
absence from the list responded to the delay of its French section (El País, 2003e).30 The 
reaction of the Basque Government was accompanied by other Basque state and non-state 
actors claiming for the inclusion of the link in the list, which included a motion approved by 
the plenary of the Basque Parliament (Parlamento Vasco, 2003) and a public statement 
signed by the heads of the three Basque Chambers of Commerce, the Basque business 
associations, the three Basque universities and a Basque scientific-cultural institution (El 
País, 2003f). Nevertheless, the Vitoria-Dax link was not included in the Commission’s final 
report on the ‘European Initiative for Growth’ (CEC, 2003), which would be subsequently 
endorsed by the December 2003 European Council. The link remained, however, part of a 
priority project in the revised TEN-T Guidelines approved in April 2004 (EP and Council, 
2004a). 
 
5.5.2 The problem within: growing contestation in the Basque Autonomous 
Community 
The Basque Government faced the challenge of promoting the line not only at the nation-
state and EU levels but also within the BAC. As explained above, Elkarlana had been 
created at the beginning of 2001, shortly after the Estudio Informativo was finally approved. 
Part of its activity was carried out through the courts (Deia, 2001); however, its effort largely 
focused on undertaking different types of protest actions and information activities in the 
affected areas. In June of that same year, Elkarlana held in San Sebastián its first 
demonstration (El Correo, 2001b), which was attended, according to its organizers, by 4,000-
                                                     
 
30 Indeed, in December France presented an infrastructure plan according to which the extension of 
the Paris-Bourdeaux HSR line towards Spain would only be submitted to debate in 2006 (El País, 
2004a). In contrast, the more advanced stage of the Figueres-Perpignan link is shown by the start of its 
construction in November 2004 (El País, 2004b). 
131 
 
5,000 participants (AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana, 2001b). Within the coalition, the Asamblea 
contra el TAV continued its dynamic activity and played in fact, according to a member of 
EHNE, a leading role due to its work and mobilization capacities (Larrinaga, 2009, pp. 149–
150). In fact, the Asamblea’s rejection of considering any alternative to the project prevented 
this possibility within Elkarlana and led to other actors undertaking further initiatives 
beyond it. 
In July 2001, only a month after Elkarlana held its first demonstration, its member 
Ezker Batua-Berdeak, hereafter Ezker Batua, entered the Basque Government and become 
responsible of its Ministry of Housing and Social Affairs.31 Ezker Batua’s discrepancy with 
the project was declared from the outset and the ensuing conflict within the government was 
settled by stating, in the document of adhesion to the Basque Government, that its design 
would be undertaken from a sound environmental-legal basis and that its promotion would 
be addressed by broadening consensus to all government parties (Gobierno Vasco, 2001). 
Nevertheless, this arrangement did not prevent the tensions between Ezker Batua and the 
other members of the government.32 While Ezker Batua’s Minister demanded the production 
of a new EIA, Basque Minister Amann emphasized that particular attention would be paid to 
environmental standards yet no modification of the project’s time-scale would be made 
(Amann, 2001; El Correo, 2001c). In November 2002, Ezker Batua went one step further: 
they proposed a U-shaped alternative to the Vitoria-Irun HSR line that used part of the 
existing network and, according to its promoters, would be more suited to freight transport 
and would have a lower cost and environmental impact (El País, 2002b). Again, the Basque 
Government, through its spokesperson, reaffirmed its commitment to the Y-shaped HSR 
project and noted that only specific contributions to reduce its environmental impact would 
be accepted (El País, 2002c). 
Ezker Batua’s participation in the Basque Government and their proposal of an 
alternative project placed them in a difficult position within Elkarlana, since as mentioned 
earlier the consideration of alternatives was entirely rejected by the Asamblea. Yet Ezker 
Batua was not alone in seeing the need to provide an alternative to the contested project. In 
July 2003, the trade unions LAB, EHNE, HIRU and ELA, which was not part of Elkarlana, 
presented a report on Criteria for a Socially Useful Basque Rail Network (ELA et al., 2003) 
to the Basque Government, with the aim of encouraging social debate on the rail network 
that was necessary for Euskal Herria. By ‘socially useful’ the trade unions understood a 
                                                     
 
31 Ezker Batua would remain in the Basque Government until 2009. 
32 The other government party, EA, in charge of the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial 
Planning, was at first sceptical of the infrastructure due to its environmental impact (Intxaurraga, 
2003), but it finally accepted it on the basis of its alleged capacity to support freight transport (El País, 
2004c). 
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network ‘whose social benefits widely exceed any cost (socio-economic, agrarian, 
environmental...) and that satisfies the maximum number of users according to the frequency 
and geographical reach of its service’ (ELA et al., 2003, p. 3). 
In May 2004, these trade unions, Ezker Batua and other organizations converged in a 
new contestation organization, the Red por un Tren Social or Network for a Social Train. As 
in Elkarlana, the Red’s membership included the trade unions LAB, EHNE and HIRU, 
environmental organizations and left-wing political parties, but significantly ELA was now 
part of it, as opposed to the Asamblea. Importantly, the Red’s argumentation was informed 
by the work of a team of academics at the University of the Basque Country, in particular 
Roberto Bermejo, an expert in sustainable economics who developed a cost-benefit analysis 
on the Vitoria-Irun HSR line that questioned its social and economic profitability (Bermejo, 
2004). Along the lines of the trade union’s 2003 report, the Red produced a more detailed 
study on an adequate rail network for Euskal Herria, which in fact drew directly on 
Bermejo’s paper in its diagnosis of the current situation and especially the proposal of an 
alternative rail strategy (Red por un Tren Social, 2006). Despite of its arguably sounder 
technical basis and ELA’s participation, the Red lacked Elkarlana’s mobilization capacity – 
its first demonstration was attended, according to ELA, by around 2,000 participants (ELA, 
2005) – and its propositions were dismissed by members of the Basque Government (El País, 
2004d; López de Guereñu, 2006a). 
The emergence of the Red por un Tren Social occurred in fact at a time when the project 
gained new momentum. In February 2004, shortly after the European Commission’s ‘quick-
start programme’ was endorsed and one month before the 2004 Spanish general election, the 
Spanish Council of Ministers launched the tender process for the project and construction of 
eight – out of the 15 – sections of the line, for a total sum of 807.4 million Euros (El País, 
2004e). Although, as it is explained below, the arrival in power of PSOE involved a 
temporary setback, the better relations between both governments would provide the final 
impetus to the start of the constructions works.  
 
5.5.3 A new Spanish central government and negotiations towards an 
agreement 
Three days after a series of terrorist attacks that killed over 190 people in Madrid on 11 
March 2004, the PSOE won the general elections and subsequently formed a new Spanish 
Government. This change initially seemed to entail a new delay. In May, the Ministry of 
Development suspended the unfinished tender processes started by the previous government 
that they suspected may had incurred on irregularities, including those related to the 
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aforementioned eight sections of the Vitoria-Irun HSR line (El País, 2004f). In addition, in 
June the new Minister announced that they would revise the ‘disorganized’ Spanish HSR 
network planned by the previous government (El País, 2004g).33 
Nevertheless, soon both governments manifested their willingness to cooperate on the 
project’s implementation and established the basis for a future agreement. After a meeting in 
June with representatives of PSE-EE (PSOE’s Basque affiliate), the Spanish Minister 
announced that the entire Vitoria-Bilbao section would be in tender stage by the end of 2004 
and voiced her expectation that the Basque Government got involved in the rest of the line, 
the Bergara-Irun section in the province of Gipuzkoa (El País, 2004h). According to Basque 
Minister Amann, in July he sent a collaboration proposal to the Ministry of Development, 
whereby the latter would undertake the construction of the Vitoria-Bilbao section and the 
Basque Department of Transport and Public Works would be in charge of developing the 
Bergara-Irun one (El País, 2004i). In September, he ensured, the Spanish Ministry replied 
favourably and expressed its readiness to open negotiations on the basis of such a proposal 
(El País, 2004j). 
Thereafter, events unfolded relatively smoothly in the Vitoria-Bilbao section: between 
September 2004 and January 2005, the Ministry of Development launched the tendering of 
the construction projects for the whole section, which were all awarded by May 2005. On the 
other hand, the Bergara-Irun section, on which a formal agreement had yet to be reached, 
proceeded with more difficulty. In December, in view of the lack of progress towards the 
agreement, Amann stated that there was a political will to delay the works  (El País, 2004k), 
and in March the following year the Basque Government launched the tender process for the 
construction works in two sections in Gipuzkoa. However, the Spanish Government 
appealed this decision and in July the Spanish Constitutional Court suspended the process.34 
The situation was tempered towards the end of the year, when the debate on the General 
State Budget for 2006 in the Spanish Congress of Deputies and the Senate (the Cortes 
Generales) provided an opportunity to negotiate an agreement on the Vitoria-Irun line’s 
implementation. By negotiating their support to the PSOE’s budget, the Basque party EAJ-
PNV sought to secure specific investments in the BAC: particularly the construction of the 
high-speed rail line, but also the regeneration of the port of Pasaia, near San Sebastián, and 
the construction of a high-technology research centre (El Correo, 2005a). On 20 October, a 
preliminary agreement between both parties established that the Basque Government would 
                                                     
 
33 Indeed, the new government would immediately embark on the production of the first infrastructure 
plan for Spain since the 1994 PDI. The draft Plan Estratégico de Infraestructuras y Transporte would 
be presented in December 2004 (Ministerio de Fomento, 2004) and the final plan in July 2005 
(Ministerio de Fomento, 2005). 
34 This suspension was ratified by the same court in November 2005.  
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construct and advance the funding, to be recovered in the future, for the Gipuzkoan section 
of the line, although the planned investment included in the General State Budget (150 
million Euros) would remain the same (El Correo, 2005b). The agreement was concluded at 
the very last minute in mid-December, right before the debate at the Senate on veto 
initiatives to the budget (El Correo, 2005c). Although, according to the Basque 
Government’s spokesperson, the final agreement was identical in content to the preliminary 
one (El País, 2005b), it appears that the novel mode of financing the Gipuzkoan section, 
based on the particular BAC’s financial and taxation regime,35 represented a stumbling block 
in the conversations, in particular with the Spanish Ministry of the Economy and Finance (El 
Correo, 2005c, 2005d). 
Although the Spanish Secretary of State for Planning and Infrastructure’s noted that the 
formalization of the agreement required the completion of certain technical and legal 
procedures (El País, 2006a), the implementation process did not come to a halt. The Spanish 
Council of Ministers that followed the conclusion of the agreement authorized the tendering 
for the start of construction works in a 5.2-kilometre section in the Álava province (El País, 
2005c), with the corresponding contract being awarded in April 2006. The agreement was 
finally signed that month, on the 24th, by the Spanish Government, the Basque Government 
and the Spanish infrastructure manager ADIF, and it in fact consisted of two separate 
agreements: one established the bases for cooperation between the three actors to implement 
the Vitoria-Irun HSR line (Gobierno de España et al., 2006), and another detailed the tasks 
entrusted to the Basque Government in this implementation (Ministerio de Fomento et al., 
2006). The foreseen total construction cost was 4,221 million Euros, of which 1,642 would 
be advanced by the Basque Government. In addition, the signature of the agreement involved 
the withdrawal of the Spanish Ministry’s appeal to the Constitutional Court (El País, 2006b). 
With local protests taking place over and after the summer (El Correo, 2006a, 2006b), 
no ceremony was held to mark the start of construction of the Vitoria-Irun HSR line in Luko, 
in the outskirts of Vitoria (El Correo, 2008a). In November 2006, ADIF sources confirmed 
that the successful tenderers had begun the works in September (El Correo, 2006c).36 
 
In short, the process between the approval of the Estudio Informativo and the Plan 
Territorial Sectorial and the start of construction was not devoid of difficulties for the 
promoters of the project. Contestation in the Basque Autonomous Community and 
particularly the difficult relations between the Spanish and Basque governments hindered its 
                                                     
 
35 See Section 7.1.1. 
36 In the section under the responsibility of the Basque Government, construction works would start in 
April 2008 (El Correo, 2008b). 
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smooth implementation. With the change of government in Spain, these relations were eased 
and cooperation between both governments resulted in a formal implementation agreement. 
The start of construction in the Vitoria-Bilbao section, however, was not followed by an 
uneventful period of smooth project implementation. Rather, it opened a new, extensive 
phase that witnessed an intensification of contestation, ultimately involving attacks by the 
Basque terrorist group ETA, increased EU action on Trans-European Networks, and 
financing uncertainties as a result of the economic downturn started at the end of the past 
decade. This ongoing period, not covered in the case study, is addressed until 2014 in the 
concluding chapter, which also draws the possible implications for this research’s results. 
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
The policy process of the Vitoria-Irun high-speed rail line thus lasted over two decades since 
the formulation of the first studies in the mid-1980s until the start of construction in the mid-
2000s (see Figure 11). The basic characteristics of the line were defined in a relatively short 
period after Basque actors sought to improve the Spanish Government’s proposals for the 
Iberian track gauge network in the Basque Autonomous Community. The Spanish 
Government’s acceptance of a Y-shaped route – now in UIC gauge and with high-speed 
design parameters – was not immediately accompanied by a determined promotion of the 
line. Nevertheless, this early 1990s period consolidated the importance of the line in Spanish 
infrastructure planning and in the developing EU trans-European transport infrastructure 
policy. An extended period followed in which the definition of the project was finalized 
through greater interaction between the Spanish Government and Basque state and non-state 
actors. The conclusion of this phase in fact led to increased Basque actors’ activity 
concerning the high-speed rail line, which translated into a conflict with the Spanish 
Government over the competences to develop it and intensified contestation. A new Spanish 
Government finally provided the opportunity to overcome the tensions between 
governments, reach an agreement on the implementation of the line and start its construction. 
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Figure 11. Chronology of the Vitoria-Irun high-speed rail line policy process. 
 
 
In general terms, the process was characterized by an ongoing interaction between the 
central and the regional government. This relationship was uneven over time and not without 
tensions: it resulted in, consecutively, a productive stage in the late 1980s, unequal activity 
based on different priorities, frequent cooperation over several years to finalize policy 
formulation, an outright conflict over its implementation, and eventual cooperation and 
agreement on the division of responsibilities. Arguably, as the policy process advanced the 
context lost importance and the policy dynamics focused on the project itself. The selection 
of the Vitoria-Dax link as a key section of the planned trans-European HSR network largely 
defined its eligibility to EU support, with the exception of the 2003 Commission’s ‘quick 
start programme’ and occasional references to EU funds, which nevertheless were scarcely 
used up to 2006 (see Section 7.3.1). Similarly, the inclusion of the Vitoria-Irun line in the 
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1994 Plan Director de Infraestructuras completed its integration in Spanish infrastructure 
planning. In addition, both the involvement of the Basque Government through the 
production of the Plan Territorial Sectorial and subsequent conflict over competences and 
the increasing contestation to the project contributed to the dominance of the central-regional 
dynamics since the late 1990s. 
The description of the policy process permits, furthermore, to identify the three themes 
on which this research focuses on. The anti-major infrastructure approach of the contestation 
to the project contrasted with the overwhelming support of state actors at the Basque, 
Spanish and European levels, which saw the new high-speed rail line between Vitoria and 
Irun as a key opportunity to foster development and growth. Moreover, the continuous 
activity of the Basque Government and the policy initiatives at EU level reveal attempts to 
achieve influence in a context where the Spanish Government seems to have a privileged 
position to determine the development of such a line. Thirdly, both discourse production and 
the exercise of power cannot be fully understood without consideration of space. Basque 
actors regarded the Vitoria-Irun link as key to positioning the BAC within an integrating 
Europe; the Spanish Government seemed more concerned with modernizing the network 
within the Spanish territory; and EU actors, in particular the Commission, sought to develop 
a key link of a network that, by shaping a unified European space, would provide the 
required physical support to the Single Market. In addition, the frequent reference to levels 
of government and the relations between them also reveal a spatial differentiation in the 
policy process. The following three chapters apply the analytical framework presented in 
Chapter 3 to the policy process on the Vitoria-Irun HSR line, in order to investigate the 
production, reproduction and transformation of discourse, the exercise of episodic agency 
power, and the spatiality of policy-making in the case studied. 
  
6 Hegemony and antagonism in rail infrastructure policy: 
discourse, story-lines, and possibilities for convergence 
The case described in the previous chapter denotes the existence of a number of different 
attitudes towards the development of a high-speed rail line between Vitoria and Irun. 
Throughout the policy process, the main political and economic actors involved have 
supported the development of the high-speed rail line, although there were certainly tensions 
and disagreements between them. Moreover, a strong opposition emerged early in the 
process and especially developed in the years preceding the start of the works. A discourse 
analytical approach involves uncovering the construction of the transport problem that 
underpins the behaviour of these actors and explaining how this construction is created, 
reproduced, and modified within a social interactive context. The first research question of 
this thesis seeks to clarify the extent to which those different attitudes may be accommodated 
under a single, hegemonic discourse or whether some of them are pushed towards an 
antagonistic ‘outside’. 
Consequently, this chapter presents an analysis of the discursive dynamics related to the 
policy process of the Vitoria-Irun HSR line, since the first studies until the 2006 
implementation agreement between the Government of Spain, the Basque Government and 
infrastructure manager ADIF. According to the analytical framework previously developed, 
the policy process around this line should be understood as involving a series of discursive 
practices through which a discursive order is created, reproduced, and transformed. As such, 
this order is not internal or exclusive to the case: although it may be modified through the 
latter, it is entangled in wider discursive dynamics (e.g. concerning the development of a 
European transport infrastructure policy or subnational responses to the challenges of 
European integration). Analysis must therefore move carefully between these wider 
dynamics and those specifically related to the case studied. However, although the wider 
dynamics are addressed in order to permit the understanding of the case, they are validated 
insofar as they are in concordance with the data obtained to conduct the case study. In other 
words, they are consistent with this case study, yet further analyses of other cases may 
qualify them. 
The chapter is structured in four main sections, focusing first on a description of the 
discursive order and ending with an analysis of argumentative practices through which it 
may have been transformed. The first two sections describe the two discourses – and its 
related story-lines, coalitions, and practices – that have been hegemonic during the 
development of the high-speed rail line, the first based on a technocratic conception of rail 
infrastructure planning and the second one underpinned by a developmental notion of 
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transport infrastructure provision. The latter was in turn articulated through a series of story-
lines that – it is argued – reflect the existing differences within such a discourse. The third 
section focuses on the discourse that framed the contestation to the project and introduces the 
antagonism with the hegemonic discourse, in terms of both content and practices, which 
prevailed in its first stages. Finally, the chapter focuses on a particular episode of the 
discursive dynamics around the project, which involved an attempt by the contestation 
movement to bridge this antagonism and effectively influence the policy process. The 
examination of this episode is sought to clarify not just the extent to which the hegemonic 
discourse may be challenged, but also the possibility of shifting the border between the 
hegemonic discourse and its ‘other’. 
 
 
6.1 The technocratic rail transport policy discourse 
In the mid-1980s, at the time the first proposals to develop a new rail line in the Basque 
Autonomous Community (BAC) were carried out, a discourse based on technocratic and 
transport principles dominated transport infrastructure policy in the Spanish nation-state. 
Such a discourse placed experts (fundamentally engineers) at the centre of developing 
transport infrastructure policy and saw infrastructure development largely from a transport 
perspective, rather than economic, social, or environmental. Based on the discourse analysis, 
this technocratic discourse may be ascribed the following characteristics:  
 
a. Centrality of infrastructure to transport. Although there is a recognition of the 
importance of transport to economic development, infrastructure planning is seen 
fundamentally as responding to transport problems. 
a. The state is conceived as having a prominent role in transport infrastructure 
development. 
b. Efficient use of resources. In view of limited resources, these should be used 
efficiently. This involves a preference for investing on existing infrastructure over 
new infrastructure and a cautious stance concerning resource-intensive high-speed 
rail. 
c. Rail as a specialized mode of transport. In contrast to roads, which provide a 
generalized accessibility, rail transport should be limited to those cases where it can 
be competitive, i.e. to those corridors with the high level of demand that its high 
capacity requires. In order to increase its competitiveness, the reduction of travel 
times plays an important role. 
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d. Due to the technical and resource-conscious approach, this perspective is particularly 
sensitive to the differences between high-speed rail and conventional rail. 
e. As the focus is on transport, infrastructure planning is driven by demand 
management rather than provision of offer. 
f. The use of cost-benefit analysis as an essential policy tool, usually excluding 
regional development and environmental impacts. 
g. The concept of ‘bottleneck’ is central in the policy vocabulary, referring to those 
sections with capacity problems that need to be removed in order to homogenise the 
operational features of the network.    
 
This technocratic discourse based on the work of technical experts was fully institutionalized 
in the Spanish nation-state in the mid-1980s, as it was translated to specific institutional 
arrangements and policies. Rail infrastructure planning was the responsibility of the Ministry 
of Transport, Tourism and Communications,1 and it was largely developed by teams in this 
Ministry and INECO, a publicly owned engineering consultancy firm. In fact, Emilio Pérez 
Touriño, former Head of the Minister’s Cabinet (1985-1986) and Under-Secretary (1986-
1991) of that ministry, pointed out that in those years there was an important participation of 
INECO in infrastructure planning and a significant interchange of staff between the firm and 
the ministry (Interview 6). Yet the institutionalization of the discourse was best illustrated by 
the Plan de Transporte Ferroviario (PTF) or Rail Transport Plan (Ministerio de Transportes, 
Turismo y Comunicaciones, 1987). Effectively a rail infrastructure plan, it proposed an 
efficient use of the available resources and the modernization of rail transport by maximizing 
the performance of its favourable characteristics. More significantly for the purpose of this 
chapter, it mobilized the story-line that would initiate rail infrastructure policy in the second 
half of the 1980s. 
 
6.1.1 The ‘selective modernization of rail’ story-line 
The emergence of a story-line on the modernization of the Spanish rail system has its origins 
in the uncertain situation of the Spanish rail system in the mid-1980s. The interviewees 
involved in Spanish rail infrastructure planning at the time mentioned the backwardness and 
obsolescence of the rail network (Interviews 6 and 11), coupled with the exponential 
                                                     
 
1 A separate department, the Ministry of Public Works and Urbanism, was responsible for road 
infrastructure planning. In 1991, both ministries were merged into the Ministry of Public Works and 
Transport. 
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increase of RENFE’s deficit, the then owner and operator or the Spanish rail network 
(Interview 10). Government’s efforts at the time were aimed at the contraction of the 
network: the Contract-Program 1984-1986, agreed between RENFE and the Government of 
Spain, had involved the closure of over 900 km rail lines in Spain (El País, 1984) in order to 
contain the deficit of the company. 
From a concern with the reduction of services, a new narrative emerged that envisaged 
the solution to the rail problem in Spain through the modernization of the network in those 
sections where it is competitive. This modernization involved speeds sufficiently high to 
compete with other modes (around 160-200 km/h) but, as two of the key players in this 
process recognize, at that time there was no intention to, following the French TGV 
experience, develop lines with speeds of over 250 km/h (Interviews 6 and 10).2 Interestingly, 
the increase of cross-border transport as a result of European economic integration – Spain 
would formally join the European Economic Community in 1986 – does not seem either to 
have been a significant concern in the story-line. The PTF did not propose any measure in 
this respect apart from the extension and improvement of border stations, and Antonio 
Monfort, Executive Advisor of the Minister between 1985 and 1988 and considered the 
father of the PTF by two of the interviewees (Interviews 5 and 6), notes that during the 
preparation of the PTF there was not a special approach to this issue and does not remember 
there was a prediction of traffic growth across the French border (Interview 10). The 
following statement in a specialized journal by Abel Caballero, the relevant minister between 
1985 and 1988, provides a good synthesis of this story-line: 
‘It was about elucidating whether rail had a future or not in our country, whether it was going to continue 
stagnating or, even, whether it was going to disappear. It is clear that a rail system like the current one, with 
intermediate speeds, would not have a great future nor would be able to compete with fast transport modes, 
such as road or air transport. Therefore, it is about placing rail in the context where it belongs, as a 
specialized transport mode, with high-speed passenger transport in intermediate distances, which entails 
going back to the old concept of rail, placing it at the end of the 20th century, beginning of the 21st, making 
this decision of speed, of quality, of comfort and of specialization, and plan it. This is, in short, what has 
been done with the PTF’ (Caballero, 1987). 
The discourse coalition that formed around this story-line was composed notably by officials 
from the Ministry of Transport, Tourism and Communications, but also by other – largely 
Spain-wide – state and non-state actors. According to two of these officials, the Ministry of 
the Economy and Finance shared this perspective of selectively modernizing the rail network 
                                                     
 
2 Nevertheless, the PTF did consider maximum speeds of 250 km/h in two cases: the new access to 
Andalucía, which would later become the Madrid-Sevilla HSR line, and the new access to the north-
northwest of Spain. 
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(Interviews 6 and 10). Monfort notes that there was an implicit agreement between both 
Ministries that consisted in making selective investments in rail as long as the deficit was 
controlled (Interview 6). Although initially slightly sceptical about this approach (El País, 
1986b), the Spanish newspaper El País published, after the award of the contract for the 
construction of the new line that would eliminate the Despeñaperros bottleneck – the most 
important bottleneck of the network according to the PTF –, an editorial that clearly 
reproduced this story-line (El País, 1987c). 
This story-line has a direct relevance to the case studied since it gave impetus to the 
project that would be the origin of the Vitoria-Irun HSR line. The priority of the PTF in 
terms of infrastructure was to solve all the existing bottlenecks (estrangulamientos), defined 
as those sections ‘that show utilization ratios higher than 100%’ (Ministerio de Transportes, 
Turismo y Comunicaciones, 1987, p. 17). The Plan identified a bottleneck in the line that 
linked Bilbao with the rest of the network, specifically at the Orduña pass, where this line 
had a single track and important difficulties on its route. It thus proposed a new line between 
Bilbao and Vitoria designed for speeds of 160 km/h, instead of the preferred 200 km/h for 
new lines in the PTF, due to the topographical difficulties of the area. Monfort mentioned 
that this proposal was indeed motivated, first, by the capacity and operation problems of the 
existing line through Orduña and, second, by the fact that it was politically welcomed in the 
region (Interview 10).3  
 
A discourse that placed experts at the centre of rail infrastructure planning thus created the 
conditions for the first proposal of a new rail line in the Basque territory, which would 
eventually become the transnational rail link studied in this thesis. The difficult situation of 
the Spanish rail system led to the emergence of a story-line based on the selective 
modernization of this system that provided the stimulus for undertaking the project. 
Significantly, European integration – in particular the entry of Spain in the European 
Economic Community in 1986 and the upcoming establishment of the Single Market in 1993 
– did not have a discernible presence in this story-line. However, whilst the PTF was being 
prepared a number of story-lines based on a fundamentally different discourse were 
emerging that did integrate concerns on European integration and would radically reshape 
the project. 
 
                                                     
 
3 The Bilbao-Vitoria link had already been object of a 1984 study (RENFE and Europroject, 1984), 
which explicitly recognized the Orduña bottleneck and considered design criteria that would allow 
speeds of 200 km/h. This early concern suggests that, although the technocratic discourse dominated 
certain technical circles, at that time it may have lacked a wider discourse coalition that triggered the 
project. 
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6.2 The developmental transport infrastructure policy discourse 
In the second half of the 1980s a number of developments of subnational, national, and 
European relevance started to shape a new discourse on transport infrastructure planning that 
substantially differed from the technocratic discourse addressed in the previous section. 
Rather than seeing rail infrastructure from a technical and transport-centred point of view, it 
considered its provision as essential to economic development within an economically 
integrating Europe. The emergence of this discourse can be better explained through the 
different story-lines through which it was articulated; nevertheless, before addressing them it 
is necessary to detail its defining characteristics. In fact, this developmental discourse shares 
many of them with Hajer’s (2000) ‘Europe of Flows’ policy discourse, notably its belief in 
infrastructure as a key policy tool for economic development and its commitments to market 
integration and ecological modernization: 
 
a. It sees infrastructure as central to economic development, in particular by promoting 
the conditions for economic development and productivity through investment and 
the reduction of transport costs. 
b. The state is conceived as a catalyst for economic and transport infrastructure 
development. Although its role is not necessarily reduced, the involvement of the 
private sector is sought.  
c. The differences between high-speed rail and conventional rail are less emphasized 
than in the technocratic discourse; the former mode is indeed often seen as a 
modernized rail. 
d. As the focus is on infrastructure as a tool for economic development, planning is 
driven by infrastructure provision, rather than by demand management. 
e. Infrastructure provision is in turn seen as contributing to enhance both the economic 
competitiveness and the balanced development of a certain space.  
f. It is committed to ecological modernization. As such, it considers transport 
infrastructure development as potentially contributing to economic growth and 
environmental protection at the same time. 
g. The policy vocabulary is varied, from network-related concepts such as ‘missing 
links’ or ‘key links’ to spatial development concepts such as ‘development corridor’ 
or ‘cohesion’. 
 
As it is explained in more detail throughout this chapter, the institutionalization of this 
discourse determined the change from the initial Bilbao-Vitoria proposal to the Vitoria-Irun 
HSR line. Generally speaking, the developmental discourse has dominated policy-making, 
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although its relationship with the technocratic discourse, in particular in the Spanish arena, 
has been complex. Since 1991, Spanish transport infrastructure planning, including rail, has 
been the responsibility of a single ministry. Its first infrastructure plan, the Plan Director de 
Infraestructuras 1993-2007 or PDI (Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Transportes y Medio 
Ambiente, 1994), sought to integrate the new high-speed rail developments and the 
increasing investment in infrastructure in a coherent and multimodal approach through an 
important planning effort (Interviews 10 and 11) led by the aforementioned ‘father’ of the 
PTF (Interview 6). Concerning the high-speed rail line between Vitoria and Irun, due to its 
high cost and technical difficulties the proposal was seen with reluctance by the planning 
team of the ministry (Interview 6) and RENFE (El País, 1991b). In 1992, INECO produced a 
cost-benefit analysis of the project which estimated a negative financial profitability and a 
social and economic profitability that, although positive, was lower than the 6% 
recommended by the Ministry (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes and INECO, 
1992). However, the influence of cost-benefit analyses seems to have been limited since, as 
Pérez Touriño notes, they were produced as part of the project documentation, never a priori 
(Interview 6). 
The developmental discourse, nevertheless, was not uniform. Different discourse 
coalitions can be identified that mobilized a number of story-lines and, while sharing a 
similar understanding of the transport infrastructure problem, steered the project in different 
directions. The differences between story-lines influenced, on the one hand, the formulation 
of policy (e.g. the features of the line such as its maximum speed or track gauge) and, on the 
other hand, its implementation due to differences in priorities. The remainder of this section 
elaborates on these story-lines. 
 
6.2.1 Avoiding marginalization in an integrating Europe: a subnational story-
line 
In parallel to the story-line that advocated a selective modernization of the Spanish rail 
network, another one – more conscious of European integration – emerged among 
subnational actors. In the light of the upcoming establishment of the Single Market in 1993 
and the concentration of important investments in the south (the Sevilla Expo ‘92 and the 
Madrid-Sevilla HSR line) and east (the 1992 Olympics in Barcelona) of the nation-state, 
Basque actors, especially from the moderate nationalist political parties and the business 
sector, expressed a clear concern of becoming economically marginalized from Europe’s 
development axes and thus miss the potential benefits of European integration. This concern 
had clear roots in the traditionally productive and dynamic economy of the region (Interview 
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15; Atienza, 1989), but also in the pro-European stance that Basque moderate nationalism 
adopted since the first half of the 20th century, which saw Europe as a source of economic 
opportunities and of support for their self-government aspirations and their cultural and 
linguistic promotion (Keating, 2000b).4 The possibility of such a productive and 
entrepreneurial society becoming isolated from European economic integration constituted a 
‘dystopian myth’5 that was at some point characterized as leading to a ‘dark future’ (Amann, 
2003b; El Correo, 2003). 
Accordingly, this new story-line emphasized the necessity of developing a rail network, 
fundamentally for freight transport, that integrated the region and the port of Bilbao in the 
European economy and prevented its marginalization. Significantly, not only the connection 
with the European network was important but also the promotion of an Atlantic development 
axis with its core in the BAC-Aquitaine cross-border region (Ardanza, 1989). In fact, 
‘development corridor’ or ‘development axis’ are key concepts in the vocabulary of this 
story-line. In a 1989 interview, the president of the Chamber of Commerce of Bilbao 
expressed that they had been thinking about this issue for several years when a DATAR 
report that demonstrated the existence of an axis of economic dynamism in Europe prompted 
them to make this concern public (Información, 1989).6 The editors of the Bilbao-based 
newspaper El Correo expressed well the characteristics of this story-line in an editorial titled 
‘Not missing the train’: 
‘Not only the Basque Country – natural link with much of continental Europe and Great Britain – but also 
all the Cantabrian coast, seem condemned to wait much more. There is a risk of becoming disconnected 
from that development axis already evident in the Cataluña-Madrid-Sevilla triangle, because 
communications remain the basis of any development and the Basque Country, in particular, is another 
natural bridge towards the countries of the European Economic Community. There are here, besides, 
additional factors the strengthening of which will be possible if a good rail network is in place: in particular, 
the Port of Bilbao, poorly linked, by land, with the rest of Spain and Portugal and, by rail, badly linked too 
with Europe’ (El Correo, 1988e). 
As it was mentioned before, Basque moderate nationalism and the business sector were key 
actors in the articulation and promotion of this story-line, in particular, the Basque 
                                                     
 
4 Apart from new political opportunities, European integration has indeed provided a new ‘symbolic 
realm’ through which nationalist claims can be advanced (Keating, 2000b, pp. 30–31). As Bray and 
Keating argue, it has created ‘a new discursive space in which ideas of identity can be linked to a 
transnational order, allowing Basques and other nationalists to portray themselves as one of the 
“peoples” of Europe alongside the state-nations’ (2013, p. 141). 
5 A narrative that ‘makes people cohere to avoid a catastrophe’ (Hajer, 2003, p. 105). 
6 This report is very likely Brunet’s (1989), which proposed a core-periphery conceptualization of the 
European space that introduced the influential spatial metaphor of the ‘Blue Banana’ but also 
represented most of the Atlantic regions as ‘finisterres’. 
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Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV) (Amann, 2005; Bergara, 1989) and the Chamber of Commerce 
of Bilbao (El Correo, 1988f; Información, 1989). Yet apart from these two actors the 
discourse coalition had a wide membership, mainly related to the BAC: centre/left-wing 
political parties PSE-PSOE (El Correo, 1989e) and EE (El Correo, 1989d), later merged into 
the PSE-EE; business associations (El Correo, 1988g, 1988h); trade unions (Muñoz, 1989); 
media outlets (El Correo, 2006d, 1988e); and academics (del Castillo, 1989). Importantly, 
actors beyond the borders of the BAC have also shared and practiced this story-line. These 
largely included both business organizations (El Correo, 1989f; El País, 2004l) and regional 
governments (El País, 2002d, 1988c) from French and Spanish Atlantic regions. Although, 
as it will be explained below, new story-lines emerged throughout the lifetime of the rail 
project, the marginalization story-line continued to be articulated by members of this 
coalition. 
The emergence of this story-line led to a series of practices that sought to influence the 
development of a new rail network in the BAC. An early reproduction of it was the Basque 
government’s proposal of a “Y” route that would improve the link between Bilbao and both 
Vitoria – and consequently the Spanish network – and the French border (Departamento de 
Política Territorial y Transportes and SENER, 1987). As shown in Chapter 5, the solution 
proposed by the Spanish government to the integration of Bilbao in the Spanish railway 
network – and included in the PTF – did not suffice to improve the connection with the 
European network. 7  The further study of the Basque Government’s proposal was agreed 
with RENFE in July 1988, but this did not alter another important issue: the different track 
gauge on both sides of the border. Actors who practiced this story-line frequently maintained 
that the adoption of the UIC gauge in the Spanish network would facilitate cross-border 
transport and effectively integrate it in the European network. At that time, however, and in 
consistency with the technocratic discourse, the Spanish Ministry of Transport was reluctant 
to carry out this change due to its cost and technical difficulties. 
This attitude was soon to change when in December 1988 the Government of Spain 
made the landmark decision to introduce the UIC track gauge in new high-speed rail lines 
and prioritize the development of these lines in the Madrid-Sevilla and Madrid-Barcelona-
French border corridors (Ministerio de Transportes, Turismo y Comunicaciones, 1988). This 
                                                     
 
7 Apart from developments directly related to the cross-border rail link, this story-line led to a series of 
other relevant discursive practices. The Plan Europa 93, presented by the Basque Government in 
September 1988, proposed a number of extraordinary investments in infrastructure, including the “Y” 
line, in order to promote the development of the BAC within an economically integrated Europe 
(Gobierno Vasco, 1989). Moreover, actors from the discourse coalition engaged in a series of 
networks in order to lobby for an Atlantic transport corridor (Interviews 15 and 25; see also above on 
actors from Atlantic regions). 
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decision, which would significantly influence the Basque Government’s proposal of the “Y” 
line, is indeed the materialization of a new story-line that emerged largely among central 
state actors and that would signify an important change in Spanish rail infrastructure policy. 
 
6.2.2 High-speed rail as key to modernization and catching up with Europe: a 
nation-state story-line 
In the Spanish nation-state, the modernization of the rail system had already been proposed 
under the technocratic discourse explained previously. However, towards the end of the 
1980s a remarkable cognitive shift occurred that linked this modernization with the overall 
development of a nation-state that had just joined the European Economic Community in 
1986. The poor state of the rail – and, more broadly, transport – system started to be seen not 
just in transport terms (e.g. as inefficient or non-competitive) but as a hindrance to economic 
growth in an integrated Europe (Interviews 6 and 11). Spurred by the availability of 
European funds through the Structural Funds and, especially, the Cohesion Fund (Interviews 
10 and 11), a story-line emerged that claimed the necessity to modernize the outdated 
Spanish infrastructures in order to catch up with the other EEC economies. Furthermore, 
high-speed rail and the introduction of the UIC gauge were central to this effort. 
The emphasis in this story-line, in contrast to the previous one, was not so much on 
promoting economic integration through the establishment of transport infrastructure links, 
but on providing transport infrastructure that, on the one hand, fostered economic 
competitiveness and, on the other, contributed to balanced development throughout the 
Spanish territory. This second aspect became first evident with the Madrid-Sevilla HSR line, 
which, although it had its origins in a technical solution to the most important capacity 
problem of the Spanish network (Ministerio de Transportes, Turismo y Comunicaciones, 
1987; also Interviews 6 and 10), became not only a sign of modernization but also an 
instrument to promote the development of southern Spanish region Andalucía (Borrell, 1993; 
also Interview 6). This story-line, with its underlying assumption of higher accessibility 
leading to economic development, masks the related uncertainties introduced in Section 
2.1.1, apart from underestimating the high cost of achieving such accessibility. Both the 
dimensions of economic competitiveness and balanced development became part of the same 
narrative about the modernization of the nation-state, as the following statement by 
Magdalena Álvarez, Minister of Development between 2004 and 2009, in the Congress of 
Deputies shows: 
‘As I have expressed on other occasions, infrastructures are for this government an instrument to enhance 
the competitiveness of our economy, of our productive system and also an instrument of spatial structuring 
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[vertebración del territorio], with the clear objective of promoting our internal cohesion and contributing to 
the development of the less favoured area. In short, it is an instrument at the service of the modernization of 
the country and the quality of life of its citizens’ (Congreso de los Diputados, 2004). 
As noted in Section 5.1, according to certain authors rail infrastructure planning in Spain had 
been driven by a political logic that promoted the development of a radial network (Bel, 
2011, 2012; del Moral Ruiz et al., 2007). The evidence collected for this particular case 
suggests that, at least since the early 2000s, the ‘balanced development’ or ‘structuring’ 
(vertebración) – a term also used by proponents of this story-line – rationale has been more 
prevalent than the radial one. The provision of an infrastructure network that stretches across 
the Spanish territory might be the outcome of the regional demands that accompany the State 
of Autonomies (see Section 5.1), but it might also stem from a long-standing issue in 
Spanish politics: the difficulty to constitute an integrated nation-state territory (see Linz, 
1973).8 The issue was probably most firmly tackled during Franco’s dictatorship (1939-
1975) – Erik Swyngedouw (2007b), for instance, has explained how Franco’s hydraulic 
politics were predicated upon national territorial integration – yet it remains important in the 
face of the current territorial tensions in Spain, in particular concerning Catalonia.9 
A broad and long-standing discourse coalition formed around this story-line, 
fundamentally of a Spanish scope. Although this approach was not understood by the 
technical ‘core’ of the technocratic discourse (Interviews 6 and 10), it was shared and 
reproduced by notably the nation-state’s political majority (Álvarez, 2006; Borrell, 1993), 
main media outlets (El País, 1988d, 2005d), major construction companies (Interview 24), 
and academics (Izquierdo, 2003). Significantly, it was initially questioned by left-wing 
political actors such as Izquierda Unida (El Correo, 1989g) and trade union CCOO (Santiso 
and Núñez, 1989, 1990), who mainly criticized the marginalization of the conventional 
network and therefore of large areas of the country. However, after the success of the 
Madrid-Sevilla HSR line, CCOO saw the extension of the high-speed rail network – 
fundamentally towards the north-west of Spain – as an opportunity to foster balanced 
development (Interview 27). In line with this, numerous Spanish regional actors demanded 
their territories to be included in the network (see El País, 1990b, for an early instance);10 
                                                     
 
8 In fact, the relevance of the term vertebración for territorial integration is also shown by its use by 
Catalanists (vertebració) to construct their Catalan and Mediterranean regional spaces (Prytherch, 
2010). 
9 In May 2008, three months after the Madrid-Barcelona HSR line become fully operational, the then 
Minister for Development stated, with regard to high-speed rail, that ‘we are sewing Spain with steel 
wires. That is the real way to build a country (hacer país), to defend the unity of Spain: to sew it with 
steel wires’ (Álvarez, 2008).   
10 According to two former senior officials of the Ministry, these demands, in a federalizing state such 
as Spain, have favoured the creation of such an extensive high-speed rail network (Interviews 6, 11). 
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however, these requests may respond to other story-lines within this developmental 
discourse, such as the marginalization one in the case of the BAC, rather than to a Spain-
wide modernization through high-speed rail. 
This story-line was reproduced through a series of discursive practices that were to 
gradually promote the development of a high-speed rail network in UIC track gauge, which 
in 2005 was planned to reach around 10,000 km by 2020 (El País, 2005e). These policy 
decisions, in particular the aforementioned 1988 Government of Spain’s decision, were to 
significantly change the “Y” line proposed by the Basque Government. The basic “Y” route 
was kept, but it was now designed for high speed (250 km/h for mixed traffic) and in UIC 
track gauge (Departamento de Política Territorial y Transportes and INECO, 1989a). Also, 
the new design parameters involved the proposal of a new section between Beasain and Irun, 
instead of adapting the existing one. This reshaped proposal did not conflict in principle with 
the marginalization story-line, as it improved the connection with the French border and 
allowed goods traffic. The new “Y” line was subsequently included in the PDI, which 
integrated it in the high-speed rail network through the Navarrese corridor towards the south-
east and the cross-border connection. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the emphasis of this story-line on catching-up with Europe, the 
network connection with Europe does not seem to have been a priority, at least in its early 
stages. The emphasis, as Pérez Touriño notes, laid on the domestic network rather than on its 
borders: 
‘I think I am not wrong if I tell you that at the beginning it is a decision [that of developing high-speed rail 
lines in UIC track gauge] that has a component of necessity to modernize our infrastructures to be in 
Europe and not to miss the train with Europe, but as an internal matter, as a matter of modernizing our 
network’ (Interview 6). 
However, at this time a third story-line which more explicitly addressed the trans-European 
dimension was also gathering support and leading to some relevant European policy 
developments. 
 
6.2.3 Towards a friction-less European space: a European story-line 
During the intense European integration developments that took place in the second half of 
the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, a new story-line emerged that claimed the necessity of 
                                                                                                                                                      
 
This possible influence, however, corresponds to what in this thesis has been termed ‘episodic agency 
power’ and hence will be studied, for the case of the BAC, in the next chapter. 
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facilitating the free movement of persons and goods in order to complete the Single Market 
and maximize its benefits. This involves the development of the appropriate transport 
infrastructure in order to reduce transport costs and travel times across the European space. 
The specific advantages of high-speed rail are a significant reduction of travel times, its high 
capacity, and the provision of a high-quality service (CEC, 1991, p. 9). This story-line 
clearly reflects the ‘EU rationale’ addressed in Section 2.1.1 and is the one that most closely 
resembles Hajer’s (2000) policy discourse on a ‘Europe of Flows’. The important difference 
is that here this European discourse is conceptualized as one of the several story-lines 
through which a wider developmental discourse is articulated. 
This story-line therefore places emphasis on trans-European relations, yet it is important 
to highlight a further difference with the other story-lines: the centrality of the concepts of 
‘network’ and ‘key link’. The network constitutes the physical support of the free movement 
of passengers and goods and therefore of the Single Market. As the 1993 White Paper put it, 
‘[n]etworks are the arteries of the single market. They are the lifeblood of competitiveness, 
and their malfunction is reflected in lost opportunities to create new markets and hence in a 
level of job creation that falls short of our potential’ (CEC, 1993, p. 75). In order for the 
network to be operational, the completion of certain key links was deemed necessary (CEC, 
1991, p. 12). Alfonso González Finat, former Head of Unit (1991-1995) of the ‘network’ 
sub-group of the High Level Group on a trans-European HSR network (see Section 5.3.1), 
notes that in particular those key links that are cross-border pose a special difficulty because 
of nation-state planning differences, relatively limited national attention, and interoperability 
problems (Interview 4). The progressive development of the network, including its key links 
would generate a ‘network effect’ that would translate to increases in international traffic 
flows (High-Level Group “The European High-Speed Train Network,” 1995). The relevance 
of both concepts is expressed by the description of the High Level Group’s work by a former 
European Commission official involved in it: 
‘After that year of work, [...] I think that – how to put it – the important idea was to present a map of 
Europe. And then, when we started to talk about the fact that it was evident that, especially bearing in mind 
the budget of the European Community at that time, there was no money for it, and at some point the idea 
came up that maybe the financial – but also the technical – contribution should focus on what was called 
‘key links’’ (Interview 5). 
The cross-border link between Spain and France on the Atlantic side had been considered 
one of these ‘key links’ (Vitoria-Dax) already in the first master plan for the network 
proposed by the High Level Group (CEC, 1991). From a European perspective, González 
Finat sees the function of the Vitoria-Dax as more appropriate for freight transport, since the 
high distances between large urban areas in its corridor (e.g. Madrid-Paris) makes high-
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speed passenger transport uncompetitive (Interview 4). This is in principle compatible with a 
mixed-traffic Vitoria-Irun “Y” link, although he notes that the European Comission 
maintained that high-speed rail was meant for long-distance relations rather than those 
between Bilbao, San Sebastián and Vitoria (Interview 4). Particularly important in this key 
link was the track gauge difference between the Spanish and French networks. Etienne 
Davignon, the European Coordinator for TEN-T Priority Project 3 appointed by the 
European Commission in 2005, stated in his first progress report on the project that the 
Vitoria-Dax link ‘is unquestionably the section of the Atlantic corridor that shows the 
greatest European added value, since it will allow breaking the “bolt” imposed by the gauge 
between the two networks’ (Davignon, 2006, p. 6).11 
This story-line was mobilized primarily by European actors such as the European 
Commission (CEC, 1991) or Europe-wide business networks (CER, 1989; ERT, 1984), 
although references to the necessity to overcome the cross-border transport difficulties 
between Spain and France in order to achieve a fully integrated Single Market have been 
occasionally made by other actors such as the Basque newspaper El Correo (1988i), the pro-
European Basque organization Eurobask (González Zorrilla, 2003), and a Madrid-based 
academic (Izquierdo, 2003). In any case, as the development of the project moved forward a 
new one story-line emerged which, underpinned by the principles of ecological 
modernization, integrated the varied set of relations that the previous story-lines advocated 
separately. 
 
6.2.4 Bringing the story-lines together: towards sustainable spatial structuring 
Towards the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, as the Vitoria-Irun HSR line 
gradually moved from policy formulation to implementation, the actors involved in the 
diverse discourse coalitions explained above practiced a story-line that, if it did not bring 
them together, approximated them. On the one hand, the high-speed rail line started to be 
seen as supporting a number of spatial relations of different reach at the same time. It would, 
first, help constitute the trans-European HSR network, second, facilitate the relations 
between the Iberian peninsula and the rest of Europe and, third, provide a fast means of 
communication between the main cities of the BAC. This physical support was commonly 
named by Spanish speaking actors vertebración del territorio or spatial structuring, a 
concept that links the provision of a physical (infra)structure with the achievement of a 
                                                     
 
11 In fact, the track gauge difference is central to this story-line, as the aforementioned former 
European Commission official emphasized (Interview 5). 
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balanced regional development. On the other hand, the environmental dimension of the 
discourse gained prominence as the high-speed rail line became regarded as fostering 
economic development whilst contributing to sustainable transport, in particular by 
promoting modal shift from air and road transport to rail. In this respect, the story-line 
reflected the more general developments exemplified by the 2001 Gothenburg sustainable 
development strategy (European Council, 2001) and the subsequent White Paper on a 
sustainable transport system (CEC, 2001). In short, according to this story-line, which may 
be termed that of ‘sustainable spatial structuring’, the new Vitoria-Irun HSR line would 
promote balanced and sustainable development on a series of different spatial scales. 
The manner this story-line was articulated varied according to the wide membership of 
the corresponding discourse coalition. In terms of spatial structuring, it was mobilized 
mainly by nation-state and subnational actors since EU-related actors tended to emphasize 
trans-European relations more than other types of relations (see González Finat’s 
abovementioned remark on the use of the line for intra-regional relations). For instance, the 
following statement by a Member of the Basque Parliament of the Basque Nationalists 
Parliamentary Group refers to the benefits of the Vitoria-Irun line at both the European and 
the BAC level, plus its contribution to sustainable transport: 
‘We [the Basque Government] maintain that it is an infrastructure that is part of a trans-European network 
of general interest and is key to guarantee competitiveness and employment at European level. [...] It also 
involves making progress in the structuring of the region [vertebración del país], in its internal cohesion. 
Emphasis should also be made on the importance of this infrastructure in terms of supporting both 
passenger and freight transport, which on the one hand facilitates the free movement of people by public 
transport, and on the other entails substantial progress in our transport network, since there will be an 
important transfer of goods from roads to rail’ (Parlamento Vasco, 2005a). 
In terms of the environmental benefits of the high-speed rail line, all actors of this coalition 
shared the consideration of high-speed rail as a sustainable mode of transport, but the 
potential of the line to reduce cross-border road traffic, in particular concerning freight 
transport, was particularly prominent. The Basque Government’s recognition of cross-border 
goods traffic as a key problem can be traced back to the early 2000s (Amann, 2004; El 
Correo, 2000). Apart from advocating the development of the cross-border rail link, this 
government has also sought to address this issue and, more generally, the sustainability of 
transport by promoting initiatives such as ferroutage12 or short sea shipping through the 
PLAE or ‘Aquitaine-Euskadi Logistic Platform’ (El Diario Vasco, 2004; Interview 19), and 
the work in the Atlantic Arc Commission of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions 
                                                     
 
12 A form of combined transport that consists in transporting road trucks by rail. 
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(Interview 18). The problem of freight transport by road also entered the agenda of the 
Spanish Government, who designed for mixed traffic the high-speed rail network of its 2005 
infrastructure plan (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005)13 and more recently issued a strategic plan 
for the promotion of rail freight transport (Ministerio de Fomento, 2010). With regard to the 
Atlantic cross-border rail link, the Spanish Secretary of State for Planning and Infrastructures 
between 2004 and 2011 points out how the studies of the Franco-Spanish trans-Pyrenean 
traffic observatory (OTP) clearly indicated the necessity of improving it in order to shift 
passenger and freight traffic to rail (Interview 8). Finally, the importance of this cross-border 
HSR link in shifting traffic, especially goods, from road and air to rail, has also been 
emphasized by the European Commission (CEC, 2008; Davignon, 2006). 
In spite of the wide membership of the discourse coalition, this story-line is the one that 
most clearly masks its own contradictions and uncertainties. Although all spatial scales are 
said to benefit due to increased spatial integration through transport infrastructure 
development, as explained in Chapter 2 economic development impacts are likely to be 
unevenly distributed. The environmental benefits of the line are likewise uncertain due to, 
first, the actual impacts of high-speed rail noted in the aforementioned chapter and, second – 
and assuming that the compatibility between passenger and goods traffic is possible –, the 
shift of traffic from road and air to rail frees capacity on the former modes and may indeed 
generate new demand on the latter. 
Nevertheless, by masking these contradictions and uncertainties the story-line may have 
helped to develop an all-encompassing discourse coalition that could conceal disagreements 
and help to counter contestation. This is more evident concerning its environmental 
dimension which, as it will be seen later on in the chapter, has helped to counteract 
arguments from the contestation movement, yet it seems it has also been effective in 
narrowing differences within the discourse coalition. According to an environmental 
consultant who worked for the Basque departments of Transport and Public Works and of 
the Environment, in the first half of the 2000s the relationship between these departments, 
governed respectively by EAJ-PNV and EA, was tense (Interview 34). The then Basque 
Minister for the Environment had indeed been very critical of other large infrastructure 
projects being planned at that time (El País, 2004m, 2004n) and had expressed doubts about 
the Vitoria-Irun HSR link (Intxaurraga, 2003). However, this consultant suggests that the 
support from him and other environmental experts who had had a critical stance towards 
infrastructure development in the BAC (Olabe, 2004a, 2004b; Olabe and Ansuategi, 2004) 
                                                     
 
13 Antonio Monfort, at that time Secretary General for Infrastructures of the Ministry of Development 
(2004-2005), notes however that this decision was based on the uncertain demand that part of such an 
extensive passenger-only HSR network would have (Interview 10). 
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brought credibility to the story-line and helped the Department of the Environment – and 
probably other actors – to adopt a favourable position towards the project.14 The 
aforementioned Minister eventually made his support to the line conditional on its capacity 
to carry goods (El País, 2004c). 
 
In short, a discourse became prevalent in the early 1990s that emphasized the economic 
development dimension of transport infrastructure and the role of high-speed rail in this 
development. This was articulated through a series of story-lines, broadly related to different 
spaces (European, national, etc.). In this respect, Hajer’s (2000) discourse on a ‘Europe of 
Flows’ is here conceptualized as a specific story-line within this wider developmental 
discourse. Each story-line had different implications for the Vitoria-Irun HSR line, which 
was gradually shaped by them. In the 2000s, these story-lines tended to converge in a 
conception of the high-speed rail line as promoting sustainable transport and balanced 
development on several spatial scales. This convergence seems to have helped to increase 
the discourse coalition, but a further question refers to the extent it could be mobilized to 
also co-opt the actors of the significant opposition to the project. The next two sections will 
introduce the antagonistic discourse that underpinned this contestation and explore the 
argumentative dynamics between this and the previously analyzed hegemonic discourse. 
 
 
6.3 Alter-globalization and environmentalism: the antagonistic 
discourse 
Apart from the discourses that dominated the policy process around a new rail line between 
Vitoria and the French border, an alternative discourse was practiced by opposing actors. 
This discourse is characterized not only by the strong environmentalist dimension common 
in the contestation to large infrastructure projects (e.g. Linnros and Hallin, 2001) but also by 
a critique of the current model of development based on capitalist globalization. This alter-
globalization stance (Pleyers, 2010; see also della Porta and Piazza, 2007) plus the localized 
impacts of the high-speed rail line have contributed to the centrality of the local in this 
discourse, which in addition is reinforced by traditionally important – though decreasing – 
links between environmental contestation movements in the Basque Country and Basque 
                                                     
 
14 This causal link could not be checked with other related actors and therefore is of limited validity; 
nevertheless, this point was also suggested by a long-standing member of the contestation movement 
(Interview 2). 
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nationalism (Barcena et al., 2003). The characteristics of the discourse may be summarized 
as follows: 
 
a. Transport infrastructure is seen as inherently linked to the model of development of 
society. High-speed rail is in this respect considered a symbol of a capitalist 
globalization model that, apart from its environmental impacts, fosters for instance 
the relocation of production and the depopulation of rural areas. 
b. The state is conceived as the single provider of transport infrastructure, according to 
the needs of the majority of the population. 
c. High-speed rail is regarded as clearly different from conventional rail, as it is more 
selective socially and spatially, is inadequate for freight transport, involves a high 
concentration of resources, and has a high environmental impact.  
d. Conventional rail is seen as a generalized, public mode of transport that serves the 
needs of the majority of society causing less environmental damage than road 
transport. 
e. Infrastructure planning should be driven by demand management or, rather, 
restriction. The focus is on modal shift towards rail and non-motorized transport 
modes and the limitation of road and air transport. 
f. It adopts an environmental perspective that takes into account not only the localized 
impacts of high-speed rail (e.g. on land and habitats), but also – and fundamentally – 
those related to the current model of development. 
g. A concern with taking decisions as close to the citizen as possible, reflected in a 
preference for local democracy and public participation. 
h. Whereas the developmental discourse favoured the notion of network, this one 
favours the notion of topography, which sees space as a surface where proximity and 
distance are important. Rather than the reduction of travel times between distant 
points, the priority is to homogeneously serve a continuous geographical area. 
 
Importantly, this discourse is antagonistic with respect to the previously explained ones, in 
particular the developmental discourse, since it conflicts with most of its characteristics. As 
explained in Chapter 3, the achievement of hegemony in the discursive field involves the 
exclusion of a radical other that, due to the differences between each other’s categories, has 
difficulties in achieving any influence. This antagonism was also reinforced by the 
dominance of the Asamblea contra el TAV in the contestation movement since its creation 
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until the late 1990s.15 This organization was adamant about rejecting any discussion on the 
project and the proposal of alternatives to it. As a former, long-standing member of the 
Asamblea explained (Interview 2), the reason for this emerged from the result of a previous 
environmental conflict in the region: a motorway across the Leitzaran valley, whose final 
outcome route (a variation of its route that avoided the valley, agreed with the majority of the 
contestation movement) was perceived with regret by its most radical sector. Nevertheless, 
towards the end of the decade, when the design phase of the line was in its last stages and 
became more public, a story-line developed that could form a broader discourse coalition. 
 
6.3.1 Envisaging a different future from the local: the antagonistic story-line 
In 1998, both the Spanish Government’s Estudio Informativo (Ministerio de Fomento and 
INECO, 2000) and the Basque Government’s Plan Territorial Sectorial (Departamento de 
Obras Públicas y Transportes, 2001) on the new rail network in the BAC were subjected to 
public consultation. The engagement in this procedure and the realization that the project 
was in an advanced stage led to the mobilization of new actors and to the emergence of a 
discourse coalition that considered the Vitoria-Irun HSR line as causing, as an expression of 
capitalist globalization, a negative impact on locality – broadly understood as the proximate 
environment16 – in environmental, economic and social terms. This impact affects not only 
the local environment in term of noise, pollution, land movements, habitat fragmentation, 
etc., but also local communities by harming the rural economy and by not serving the spaces 
between the nodes of the network. This story-line thus incorporated the main features of the 
antagonistic discourse but articulated them through a narrative that placed at its centre the 
local. In the words of Iñaki Antigüedad, a key member of the contestation movement: 
‘And then I think that the fact that the struggle against the Basque “Y” was very strong for years made that 
many bodies, mainly trade unions and political organizations, assimilated that environmental, territorial, 
creation of proximity issues are an integral part of a serious project for the left – so to speak – and for a 
country [de país]’ (Interview 23). 
This story-line is usually represented with the image of a high-speed train cutting across the 
Basque rural space (e.g. AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana, 2001c; Asamblea contra el TAV, 1998), 
which points at the links between anti-capitalist globalization, environmentalism, and 
territorial identity. European integration was seen as integral to this type of globalization, 
                                                     
 
15 See Section 5.4.2. 
16 As explained in Section 8.1.2, the spaces of concern of the antagonistic discourse’s story-lines are 
defined by physical proximity.  
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and the spatial frame of reference was rather Euskal Herria, a ‘geopolitical imagination’ of 
Basque nationalism that encompasses two Spanish Autonomous Communities and three 
French former provinces (see Mansvelt Beck, 2006). 
The emergence of this story-line had in EHNE, a Basque agricultural trade union, an 
instrumental actor. Its importance in shaping a common view towards the project was 
pointed out not only by a former EHNE member (Interview 29) but also by other individuals 
centrally involved in the contestation movement (Interviews 2 and 23). Apart from its 
initiative in facilitating discussion and cooperation, the relevance of EHNE lies in having 
previously developed a clear narrative that permitted to link the high-speed rail project with 
a model of development seen as harmful to the non-metropolitan locality, as Josu Larrinaga, 
former EHNE member, explains: 
‘Well, it is true that EHNE is there from the beginning, that it has a very elaborate discourse on small-scale 
agriculture, family farming, on how to protect it, on how... and on the potential of that agricultural model 
for an alternative management of land. It is the alter-globalization discourse especially in its aspect of 
defending the local against the global. Agricultural issues are very likely where the ways in which those 
two models conflict can be best seen. You know, meat production that ends up in the mad cow disease, or 
local meat production or... And how the annihilation of all those peasant cultures also causes that the land is 
abandoned or is at the mercy – let’s say – of those major global processes, here, in Brazil, or wherever’ 
(Interview 29). 
Nevertheless, the influence of this story-line was also fostered by other factors. Larrinaga 
suggests that the assimilation of this discourse in nationalist sensitivities was facilitated by 
the centrality that the rural world has had in the symbolic imaginary of Basque nationalism 
since its founding (see also Elorza, 1977, 1978). Furthermore, it seems EHNE functioned as 
a link between the diverse groups of this coalition and contributed to ease the existing 
tensions among some of them (Interview 2). For instance, its role in mobilizing trade unions 
ELA and LAB, also emphasized by Antigüedad (Interview 23), is expressed by Larrinaga in 
these terms: 
‘In EHNE, somehow the political sensitivities that in ELA and LAB were separated met in the agricultural 
world. So EHNE was like a kind of cushion or bridge to move from one sensitivity to the other. But also 
somehow ELA and LAB looked at EHNE with respect and I don’t know if even with admiration, because 
they suddenly discovered that a small agricultural organization was capable of moving around in that 
globalized scenario17 and had a presence and had a discourse, when they were positioning themselves in 
that reality. So there is a lot of interest in working on common issues, etc. and then EHNE took this 
                                                     
 
17 For instance, EHNE is an active and founding member of La Vía Campesina, an international 
coalition of peasant organizations (EHNE and La Vía Campesina, 2009). 
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opportunity to try for reflections to begin to emerge in the workers’ world on the issue of high-speed rail 
and that high-speed rail project, which was there, making progress little by little’ (Interview 29). 
The discourse coalition was thus formed by a diverse membership that shared a concern with 
the localized, spatial impacts of the line. It included notably the Basque trade unions ELA, 
LAB, EHNE, and HIRU, the Basque environmentalist organization Ekologistak Martxan, 
left-wing political groups (Ezker Batua, EH) and the Asamblea, but also other social 
organizations and various local authorities. This discourse coalition eventually led to the 
creation in 2001 of AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana, which through its communication documents 
clearly articulated this story-line, highlighting the impacts on the physical environment but 
also on the development of non-metropolitan areas (AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana, 2001a, 
2001c).18 As noted in the previous chapter, Elkarlana was able to achieve significant 
mobilization; however, the impact of the contestation movement in challenging the 
hegemonic discourse seems to have been very limited. The following subsection examines 
this through the analysis of the argumentative practices that took place within this 
antagonism. 
 
6.3.2 Antagonism in argumentative practices 
At the time the antagonistic story-line was being articulated, a number of arenas became 
available to enter into argumentative action with proponents of the hegemonic discourse. The 
Basque Government organized in December 1998 a three-day conference on the Basque rail 
system, with a wide range of speakers and frequent opportunities for discussion 
(Departamento de Transportes y Obras Públicas, 1999). Moreover, the new nationalist EAJ-
PNV/EA Basque government formed following the 1998 Basque elections signed a 
parliamentary agreement with Euskal Herritarrok (EH), the at the time political coalition of 
the left-wing Basque nationalism. Iñaki Antigüedad, then Member of the Basque Parliament 
of EH, notes that he had several meetings with Amann in order to seek common ground 
regarding the high-speed rail line (Interview 23). Other members of Elkarlana claim they 
also participated in meetings with the government at that time (Interviews 2 and 29). The 
interpretation of these conversations as involving ‘a dialogue of the deaf’ (Interview 2), 
‘both sides trying to gain time’ (Interview 29), or ‘a lack of possibilities to try to seek points 
                                                     
 
18 Nevertheless, ELA did not join Elkarlana and Ezker Batua participated in it only intermittently 
(Interview 22). 
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of agreement’ (Interview 23) suggests that antagonism may have characterized them.19 An 
analysis of actual transcripts of argumentative activity may help to clarify this. 
In this respect, between 1998 and 2006 the Basque Parliament held a number of plenary 
debates on the Vitoria-Irun HSR line as a result of initiatives to either support or oppose the 
project.20 Their analysis shows that contestation groups who uttered the antagonistic story-
line (Ezker Batua and the left nationalists EH and PCTV-EHAK) often argued that there was 
no consensus in society about the project, and that therefore there was a need to suspend it 
and deepen the debate on it (see, in particular, Parlamento Vasco, 1999, 2004b, 2005b). 
These groups, particularly the left nationalists, had a conception of democracy that 
transcended representative democracy and claimed for an engagement with social 
organizations beyond the Parliament. The main response to these groups by the hegemonic 
block (EAJ-PNV, PSE-EE, PP, and EA) was based on the one hand on the necessity to move 
forward with the project. They argued there had been a previous long formulation process, 
which included opportunities for participation (e.g. during public consultations), that it was 
necessary to avoid obstructing the development of the project in order to facilitate Spanish 
government action and the securing of EU funds (expressed in particular by PP when it was 
the ruling party in Spain), and that there was an urgency to develop it. On the other hand, this 
response was also based on the support of the majority of the population through its 
representative institutions and the legitimacy of the Basque Parliament and Government to 
take decisions in representation of the Basque society. In other words, debate was prevented 
on the grounds that the project had all the democratic guarantees and must not be delayed 
any longer. Additionally, there was an occasional positioning of opposition actors as related 
to ETA (Parlamento Vasco, 2005b) or, more frequently, against progress or modernity 
(Parlamento Vasco, 1998, 1999, 2005b). This statement by the spokesperson of conservative 
Partido Popular to left nationalist PCTV-EHAK expresses well this positioning: 
‘Well, the conclusion is that we are confronted with two models. [...] On the one hand we have the option, 
the model of society of those of us who propose a modern society, competitive, an agile society, a society 
that offers opportunities to citizens, that does not make us endure the torture of moving on obsolete 
infrastructure. And on the other hand we have the absolutely legitimate model of society of those who, from 
their communist worldview of reality, advocate what for me is an out-of-date society, a grey society, 
boring, self-centred, a rural society, a society that does not move forward, a society that does not relate to 
others and a society that does not look outwards’ (Parlamento Vasco, 2005b). 
                                                     
 
19 Unfortunately, the views of actors from the Basque Government on these meetings could not be 
obtained. 
20 A total of 10 debates were found and analyzed. 
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This positioning was accompanied by a rejection by both sides to find shared terms that 
could help to reduce this antagonism. In short, both the rejection to enter into an in-depth 
debate – although there were frequent statements regarding the reasons why one group or 
another supported or contested the project – and the antagonism in both the occasional 
positioning of actors (as ‘for vs. against progress’ or as ‘democratic vs. undemocratic’) and 
the terms of the discourse contributed to the reproduction of discursive antagonism.  
 
During the first years of contestation to the Vitoria-Irun HSR link, this antagonism 
dominated the discursive order. Among the actors that mobilized the antagonistic story-line, 
however, there were different sensitivities and, beyond the common recognition of the high-
speed rail line as a problem, some of them sought to influence its development by engaging 
in argumentation with the proponents of the hegemonic discourse and articulating a new 
story-line that could reduce that antagonism. These developments occurred fundamentally in 
the Basque political arena, which a priori has limited power to have an impact on the line’s 
formulation and implementation; nevertheless, their importance lies in the fact that it was the 
most significant attempt to bridge antagonism and influence the dominant discourse. 
Theoretically is also relevant as it permits to examine the limit between the hegemonic 
discourse and its ‘other’; in other words, to explore the extent to which this boundary may be 
permeated. Consequently, the following section will focus on the emergence of this new 
story-line and the discursive struggles that took place between it and the hegemonic 
discourse. 
 
 
6.4 Bridging the antagonistic gap? Discursive attempts to influence 
the hegemonic discourse 
As the policy process progressed and the contestation movement consolidated through 
Elkarlana, a significant number of actors from this movement felt that they needed to move 
beyond the uncompromising negative to the high-speed rail line if they were to influence its 
development. Although Elkarlana, and in particular the Asamblea, had an important 
mobilization capacity, the antagonism it maintained with the proponents of the project did 
not allow to exert such an influence. This shift consisted not only of proposing alternatives to 
the project but also of widening the scope of the contestation movement, as the following 
reference to discussions with a member of the Asamblea by Antigüedad, one of the 
individuals who contributed to it, shows: 
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‘The HST is not going to be stopped by the gaztetxes,21 the path towards sustainability is not going to be 
done by gaztetxes, nor by the communes that live together in I don’t know which baserri.22 Those are 
references that are essential, as it is the historic auzolan23 that has been here, the traditional, but you need 
broad social movements to face the situations, with all the contradictions it involves’ (Interview 23). 
Indeed, the path towards achieving a broader social base in the contestation movement 
implied a discursive shift that, ultimately, consolidated in the emergence of a new story-line 
that had conventional rail transport at its centre. 
 
6.4.1 Towards an alternative: the ‘social train’ story-line 
The discursive shift that the attempt to achieve a bigger influence in the policy process 
involved entailed a certain change in the terms of the discourse and, as part of it, the use of 
new vocabulary. The anti-capitalist globalization stance of the previous story-line had to be 
articulated through terms closer to the hegemonic ones if it was to achieve a broader 
coalition. In particular, the rejection of words such as ‘infrastructure’ or ‘development’ by 
especially the more radical sector of the contestation movement had to be overcome, for 
instance by recognizing the necessity of a certain degree of infrastructure provision or 
advocating development but of another type. As Antigüedad argues: 
‘These [the members of Asamblea], since their sphere of activity and discourse is the sphere of the gaztetxe, 
all assume that there are a number of words that are toxic, that are taboo. OK, but when you are in the 
sphere of the radio, of the television, of ordinary people, to whom you want to somehow explain the 
negligence of major projects [...], you can’t go with a notion of that so that instead of promoting people’s 
reflection, self-criticism, so that they mature mentally, they leave at the end saying ‘where can I sign for the 
high-speed train? These want to take us back to Atapuerca!’24 (Interview 23). 
This discursive shift was fundamentally articulated by advocating what was called a ‘socially 
useful’ rail network, a term first introduced by the Basque trade unions ELA, LAB, EHNE 
and HIRU (2003) in a report presented to the Basque Government (see Section 5.5.2). 
According to the new story-line, the Vitoria-Irun HSR line was not socially useful since it 
did not serve – socially and spatially – the majority of Euskal Herria and hence did not 
respond to its transport needs (also Red por un Tren Social, 2006). There was the perception 
that it would be mainly used by economic elites from the main urban nodes, leaving aside a 
                                                     
 
21 Self-managed youth social centre, usually linked to radical left and nationalist positions (Elzo and 
Arrieta, 2005). 
22 The traditional Basque family farmhouse; caserío in Spanish. 
23 A traditional form of community work in the Basque Country (Caro Baroja, 2000, p. 225). 
24 Area located in the northern Spanish province of Burgos that houses ‘the earliest and most abundant 
evidence of humankind in Europe’ (UNESCO, 2000). 
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dispersed settlement structure that in addition was poorly served by rail. Furthermore, its 
proponents argued that high-speed rail was unsuitable for freight transport and therefore did 
not facilitate its shift from road to rail.25 In order to achieve a ‘social train’, they advocated 
the development of a rail network that, based on the existing one, provided a general increase 
in accessibility across the region, contributed to modal shift to rail by supporting freight 
transport, and minimized the environmental impacts of transport. This story-line retains 
many of the characteristics of the antagonistic one, in particular the notion proximity, and in 
fact the image of the high-speed train across the rural environment was still appropriate. 
The discourse coalition was in fact basically formed by those actors that had mobilized 
the antagonistic story-line except the Asamblea, and it notably included the aforementioned 
trade unions (ELA et al., 2003), Ekologistak Martxan, and various left-wing political groups 
(mainly Ezker Batua and Aralar). In 2004, it crystallized in the Red por un Tren Social or 
Network for a Social Train, which, as opposed to Elkarlana, now included ELA. 
Significantly, the story-line was also supported by several academics who, due to their 
credibility and expertise, contributed to make the story-line ‘sound right’ (Hajer, 1995, p. 
63). In particular, Roberto Bermejo, an economist at the University of the Basque Country, 
was seen by some actors of the contestation movement as a key figure that provided a 
technical basis to the proponents of this story-line (Interviews 2 and 22). Bermejo firstly 
produced an expert report on the high-speed rail line commissioned, following a lawsuit by 
Elkarlana, by the National High Court of Spain26 (El País, 2003g), and in 2004 he published 
a cost-benefit analysis that sought to promote debate in the new stage began by the entry of 
PSOE into the Spanish Government (Bermejo, 2004).27 Furthermore, according to a former 
member of Ezker Batua and Bermejo himself, he was one of the persons who developed the 
party’s alternative to the project. This former member explains the influence of these experts 
as follows: 
‘And from then on, I think that Ezker Batua’s – and I understand that many other organizations’ – stance, is 
very much influenced by the reasoned and – from my point of view – reasonable position of a university 
group led by Roberto Bermejo, who is the one that somehow supports with a serious analysis the 
contestation to the route. I mean, I think it is the first time that someone explains with a rigorous study why 
                                                     
 
25 The transport of freight on the high-speed rail line has in fact been a contentious issue throughout its 
development. Although it has been designed to support mixed traffic since its inception, with a 
maximum speed of 250 km/h, a senior official at the Directorate-General for Railway Infrastructures 
of the Spanish Ministry of Development notes that, in his opinion, until recently there has been 
scepticism about the possibility of this due to the lack of experiences in the country. 
26 Audiencia Nacional de España. 
27 According to Bermejo, this report was in fact produced with other two persons whose names were 
omitted due to possible reprisals (Interview 35). 
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the high-speed train as it is designed is not necessary, from an unequivocal commitment to public transport 
and to public transport improvement’ (Interview 22). 
The development of a story-line on a ‘social train’ therefore responded to the intention to 
reduce the antagonism present in the contestation to the project and thus seek to influence its 
development. The main actors in this attempt were Ezker Batua through its participation in 
the Basque Government and the Red por un Tren Social. Their possible direct influence – or 
‘episodic agency power’ – will be explored in the next chapter, but it is relevant at this point 
to discern whether the new story-line as mobilized by them had any impact on the 
hegemonic discourse. 
 
6.4.2 The social train vs. sustainable spatial structuring: a continuing 
antagonism? 
Apart from parliamentary activity, the opportunities for argumentation between the social 
train story-line advocates and those practicing the hegemonic discourse were, first, a series 
of negotiations within the Government between EAJ-PNV, responsible for transport and 
public works, and Ezker Batua (Interviews 22 and 35)28 and, second, a number of meetings 
between the Red por un Tren Social or any of its members and the Basque Government 
(Interview 28). During the first term in which Ezker Batua was in the Government (2001-
2005), Bermejo affirms there were meetings between this party and EAJ-PNV, in which he 
participated, and in fact claims that at some point there were possibilities of achieving a 
common position (Interview 35). In the second term of office (2005-2009), during which the 
construction of the line started, the meetings with Ezker Batua continued and were also held 
with other members of the Red. According to representatives of both Ezker Batua and ELA, 
at this time the Government claimed the project was in an advanced stage and hence tried to 
engage them in order to, through their closeness to the contestation movement, improve the 
project in its implementation29 and thus reduce this contestation, an instrumentalization that 
both say to have rejected (Interviews 22 and 28). 
As in the case of the territorial story-line, an examination of parliamentary minutes can 
help to shed light on this interaction. The initiatives analyzed are the same as in the case of 
the antagonistic story-line, as from 2002 the use of both story-lines overlapped in 
                                                     
 
28 To the author’s knowledge, the Basque Government did not publicly recognize these negotiations. 
Its spokesperson did only acknowledge that ‘contacts and conversations have taken place’ (El País, 
2002c). 
29 For instance by looking after the interests of expropriated land owners (Interview 22) and 
contributing to decide the location of the dumpsites for the soil excavated from tunnels (Interview 28). 
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parliamentary debates. In general, there was a reluctance by the political majority (EAJ-
PNV, PSE-EE, PP, and EA) to enter into in-depth debate due to largely the same reasons 
identified earlier (see, in particular, Parlamento Vasco, 2002, 2004a, 2006a): the past long 
formulation process and debate; the risk of delaying the project and thus losing funding; and 
the representativeness and legitimacy of Basque institutions. As the spokesperson of PP 
stated, ‘[t]he rest of us have already got past the debate on the route, we are in the debate on 
the works’ (Parlamento Vasco, 2002).30 The discussion was also hindered by some insistence 
by these groups in placing the problem in antagonistic terms (Parlamento Vasco, 2005a, 
2005b), a positioning that the political groups that practiced the social train story-line (Ezker 
Batua and Aralar) complained about and directly sought to avoid, as the spokesperson of 
Ezker Batua stated explicitly at some point: 
‘Because it is not an anti-developmental opposition the one we maintain concerning the “Y”, we have 
already let the [Basque Government] Minister know and we think he knows it. [...] Rather, we believe – and 
we take notice of the words of the very Transport Plan debated here31  – that what is important is to seek in 
transport ‘the joint planning of the different transport modes to avoid duplicating investments, to structure 
[vertebrar] the territory from a social point of view, to limit mobility growth and to shift traffic from road 
to rail’. Following that, taking that, we understand it is difficult, due to the rail route of the “Y”, that that is 
possible’ (Parlamento Vasco, 2004b). 
When there was argumentative interaction, Ezker Batua and Aralar largely focused on the 
project’s lack of sustainability due mainly to its alleged inadequacy to support freight 
transport and to its lack of service to non-metropolitan areas (Parlamento Vasco, 2002, 2003, 
2004a, 2005a, 2006a). With regard to the first criticism, the parties that supported the project 
replied that it was designed for mixed traffic; concerning the second one, these actors argued 
that the project, which was part of a wider, trans-European network, was complementary 
with the conventional rail network that would serve smaller towns, which, since the high-
speed rail line was to be financed by Spanish and European funds, could be itself financed by 
the Basque Government. Overall, these responses reproduced the sustainable spatial 
structuring story-line, which neutralized the social train story-line by emphasizing the 
complementarity of networks of different reach and the environmental benefits of shifting 
traffic to rail. Although Ezker Batua mentioned several times the negative conclusions of the 
                                                     
 
30 The lack of opportunities for argumentation is also shown by the only appearance of Red por un 
Tren Social members before the Basque Parliament, in October 2006 and once construction works had 
started (Parlamento Vasco, 2006b). Of the majority parties, only the PSE-EE was open to debate 
specific aspects of the project, but to improve it rather than re-plan it. The representatives of the Red 
were at pains to request a more stable space for discussion on the project. 
31 The Basque Government’s Plan Director del Transporte Sostenible (Departamento de Transportes 
y Obras Públicas, 2002).  
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previously mentioned Government of Spain’s (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes 
and INECO, 1992) and Bermejo’s (2004) cost-benefit analyses, these references received 
little feedback or, in the case of Bermejo, whose expert report the National High Court had 
dismissed, were delegitimized (Parlamento Vasco, 2003, 2004a, 2004b). 
Notwithstanding these limited instances of argumentation, their purpose was at best 
restricted to improve, rather than reconsider, the project. Former Basque Minister Álvaro 
Amann claims that they listened but there were no serious alternatives to the project, and that 
it was not about starting to study it from scratch (Interview 15). Moreover, in line with the 
interpretation of the meetings with the Government by the representatives of Ezker Batua 
and ELA, the actual debate seems to have been directed towards minimizing or co-opting 
contestation, as Amann implies: 
‘We had many debates with all the institutions and initiatives around that infrastructure – logically, because 
that widespread social acceptance of these infrastructures must also be achieved. And, well, there was 
debate because it was the time of the debate. Why was it the time of the debate? Because it was when the 
project was finally approved: the construction project of the line, the environmental impact assessment... 
That is to say, it is the time, on the one hand, of the formalization of the project and, on the other hand, it is 
also the time of starting the works, and therefore the bigger tensions, logically, happen at that moment, 
because it is the time of the real debate’ (Interview 15). 
 
In short, although the social train story-line effectively helped to form a broad discourse 
coalition that encompassed the majority of the contestation movement, it was counteracted 
by the sustainable spatial structuring story-line in a context of limited possibilities for 
meaningful argumentation. This context makes it difficult to assess whether antagonism 
could have been overcome if these possibilities had existed; nevertheless, it seems that the 
change in the terms of the discourse that the articulation of the social train story-line 
entailed was not sufficient to bridge the gap between the two discourses. Although both 
story-lines claimed for the development of a modern rail network, the meaning of ‘modern’ 
was clearly different in each of them: whereas the sustainable spatial structuring story-line, 
underpinned by a conception of transport infrastructure provision as key to economic 
development and compatible with environmental preservation, advocated the need to 
develop complementary networks of different reach, the social train story-line, based on a 
conception of rail as a generalized public transport mode where the mobilization of limited 
resources should respond to existing transport needs, argued that only one network to serve 
short-and medium-distance passenger transport and long-distance freight transport was 
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necessary.32 Ultimately, the antagonism denoted by the previously mentioned quote by a PP 
spokesperson on a ‘modern society’ vs. an ‘out-of-date society’ (Parlamento Vasco, 2005b) 
seems to have remained also in the case of the social train story-line, as the following 
statement by Amann suggests: 
‘Then I don’t know what the social train was about [laughter]. I mean, conceptually, what do you call a 
social train? One that goes slower, that doesn’t arrive, that uses the existing infrastructure, and that then no 
one gets on it?’ (Interview 15). 
 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented an analysis of the discourses present in the policy process around 
the Vitoria-Irun HSR line and the dynamics between them. A technocratic discourse was 
hegemonic at the start of this process but was gradually replaced by a wider, developmental 
discourse that was articulated by four story-lines that reflected the different stances on the 
project among its proponents. This hegemonic discourse was confronted by an antagonistic 
discourse based on an alter-globalization and environmentalist perspective, which in turn led 
to a discourse coalition formed around the negative environmental, economic and social 
impacts of the high-speed rail line on the locality. In order to avoid the antagonism that 
prevented influencing the development of the project, a second story-line was developed that 
sought to argue in similar terms as the hegemonic discourse. However, and facilitated by the 
lack of opportunities for in-depth argumentative interaction, antagonism remained. 
Chapter 2 introduced the problem of encompassing within a single discourse a wide 
range of actors that do not necessarily share the same interests. The analysis carried out in 
this chapter suggests that in fact a single discourse does not need to be monolithic; it may be 
articulated by a number of story-lines associated with partially overlapping discourse 
coalitions that do not necessarily share the same understanding of the problem. In this 
respect, instead of conceiving a single discourse that promotes the seamless transport of 
goods and persons across the European space (Hajer, 2000) and that is articulated through a 
series of conflicting story-lines (Peters, 2003a), I propose to conceptualize a wider, 
developmental discourse which is articulated in certain cases by a story-line that advocates 
such friction-less trans-European relations. This story-line, alongside others within the same 
discourse, such as one arguing for the integration in Europe’s development axes or another 
                                                     
 
32 Note that the term ‘modern’ as used by actors is related to progress: they advocated the 
development of a new rail network adapted to current needs, in contrast to the existing dated network. 
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one conceiving high-speed rail as central to the development of a relatively backward nation-
state, have contributed to shape the project in a certain manner.  
The other relevant issue was the potential for challenging the hegemonic discourse and 
overcoming the border or bridging the gap with its ‘outside’. The efforts of the proponents of 
the social train story-line were certainly unsuccessful in achieving this, partly due to the late 
stage of the policy process in which they acted and the political majority in Basque 
institutions. Yet the limited instances of argumentation suggest that antagonism would have 
likely remained in any case; in other words, that actors on each side of the border shared 
fundamentally different conceptions of the transport problem which prevented exerting any 
significant influence on the hegemonic discourse, in spite of efforts to adopt similar terms of 
discourse such as sustainable development or spatial structuring. Interestingly, this story-line 
presented some of the characteristics of the technocratic discourse that had once been 
hegemonic, in particular the emphasis on transport rather than economic development, the 
efficient use of limited resources, the adoption of demand management as guiding 
infrastructure provision, and the use of cost-benefit analyses. Bermejo, for instance, notes 
that the proposal for a new rail network he defended with Ezker Batua in the 2000s basically 
corresponded with the two new lines proposed by RENFE in the mid-1980s (Interview 35). 
15 years on, with a growing and modern high-speed rail network in Spain and Europe and a 
quickly developing nation-state within an integrated EU, those moderate proposals had 
limited possibilities to strike a chord with the social and political majority. This suggests that 
in fact the hegemony of the developmental discourse may have pushed positions close to the 
technocratic discourse to the ‘otherness’ of the antagonistic discourse. 
In short, the discourse analysis of the case addressed in this thesis suggests the 
conception of broad discourses on transport infrastructure planning, each of them potentially 
articulated through different story-lines that formed different yet partly overlapping 
discourse coalitions. This discursive order appears to confirm the existence of antagonism, 
whereby an hegemonic discourse excludes a radical otherness that struggles to challenge the 
former (Hajer, 1995, pp. 56–57; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). Once this chapter has clarified 
how actors’ construction of reality – and thus the discursive constitution of their interests – 
has occurred, the following chapter will focus on the actual power that they exerted in the 
development of the Vitoria-Irun HSR line. 
 
 
  
7 Episodic agency power in rail infrastructure policy: 
nation-state politics, European integration, and 
subnational resistances 
According to the analytical framework developed in Chapter 3, discourse is integral to the 
constitution of actors’ interests, who then engage in episodic power struggles in order to 
satisfy such interests. The previous chapter showed how variations in the development of the 
project responded to differences in the discourses articulated by actors; this chapter further 
seeks to explain in detail and with accuracy how these variations occurred and thus answer 
this thesis’ second research question, namely which actor or actors have driven the policy 
process. The task is to find causal relationships between the actors’ behaviour and these 
changes. The key concept to explain the influence of actors in the policy process, drawn 
from Clegg (1989), has been episodic agency power, here defined as ‘the exerting of non-
predetermined influence on the development of policy by an individual or collective agency.’ 
This definition places emphasis on the actual exercise of power rather than on the capacity to 
do so, which, in the complex transnational high-speed rail policy-making environment, is 
argued to be insufficient to clarify such an influence. Likewise, the focus is on agency; 
structure is relevant insofar it is actualized through the exercise of power. 
The exercise of power, as it was explained, does not occur in a vacuum. In Clegg’s 
(1989) terms, apart from the circuit of episodic agency power there are two other circuits of 
power (dispositional power and facilitative power) relevant to the development of a high-
speed rail line, which in turn condition such an exercise. Power may be exerted, even by the 
same agencies that exercise episodic agency power, to define the standing conditions that 
provide the possibility for that first type of power. For example, a nation-state government 
may strive to include its own planned lines in EU schemes that would later determine 
opportunities for obtaining EU funds for such lines. Similarly, the creation of institutions 
such as the European Coordinator and the TEN-T Agency or the production of the TEN-T 
regulations and guidelines, which could potentially impact on the development of a 
transnational transport infrastructure line, involves power struggles among actors, including 
the European Commission and the member states, in order to advance their own interests. As 
the focus is on episodic agency power around a specific high-speed rail line, these struggles 
are not directly addressed in this research. 
The non-predetermined influence which signals the presence of episodic agency power 
refers to both changes in the content of the project (i.e. its characteristics) and changes in the 
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course of events, by promoting or hindering its development (e.g. by committing an 
investment or by delaying a procedure).1 The analysis first identified those key ‘episodes’ of 
the policy process when a change of any of these types – or the attempt to prompt it – 
occurred, between 1986 and the 2006 implementation agreement.2 These episodes were 
subsequently subjected to an in-depth analysis that sought to establish causal relationships 
between the behaviour of actors and changes in the policy process, primarily through 
interviews but also through the analysis of official documents and newspaper articles. Since 
interviewees did not always provide consistent and detailed evidence of these relationships, 
their establishment required in some cases interpretation on the basis of an in-depth 
understanding of the case study. 
The chapter is structured in two main parts. The first one introduces the standing 
conditions that form the frame within which episodic agency power is exercised. It 
particularly focuses on the relationship between the nation-state and the Spanish 
Autonomous Communities and on the potential influence of EU institutions, although other 
actors related to European integration are also considered. The rest of the chapter presents 
the analysis of the aforementioned episodes structured according to the influence of three 
types of actors: the central (Spanish) and subnational (Basque) state; actors related to 
European integration, which transcend nation-state politics; and Basque, largely non-state, 
actors, which include those belonging to the contestation movement. This analysis evaluates 
the degree and form of actual power exercised by these actors in order to ascertain their 
relative importance in the policy process. 
 
 
7.1 Standing conditions: means and resources in a complex Spanish 
and European context 
As explained in Chapter 3, the exercise of power must be understood within a set of 
‘standing conditions’ that agencies organize to realize it. These standing conditions involve 
resources of different types (e.g. financial or knowledge resources) and the means that allow 
their mobilization, which include the existing regulations. The differential control of 
resources and the various means of utilizing them means that some actors are better 
                                                     
 
1 The identification of the latter type of changes often required a degree of interpretation by the 
researcher due to the difficulties to determine what the normal course of events was or would have 
been. 
2 It is important to note that the notion of ‘episode’ is not limited to a moment or specific event (e.g. a 
policy decision or a particular instance of influence) since the exercise of power may happen over 
longer time periods. 
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positioned to achieve influence in the policy process, yet their power is considered to the 
extent that it is actually exercised. Therefore, although the analytical approach adopted in 
this research places the focus on the actual exercise of power in specific episodes and by 
certain agencies, it is necessary to introduce the standing conditions that provide the capacity 
for such an exercise in order to understand the latter. Since rules on infrastructure planning 
and development largely refer to the role of the state, this section mainly focuses on the 
standing conditions pertaining to state actors, although occasional reference is made to non-
state actors when relevant. The subsequent analysis does include both state and non-state 
actors, providing they participate in the episodic agency power struggles of the policy 
process. 
 
7.1.1 The Spanish competence and the role of Autonomous Communities 
The establishment of democracy in the late 1970s in Spain involved the constitution of a 
decentralized nation-state composed by 17 Autonomous Communities. Each of them have 
institutions of their own, including government and parliament, and certain competences, 
both specified by their respective Estatutos de Autonomía or Statutes of Autonomy after a 
complex mechanism of negotiation with central state institutions (Smith and Heywood, 
2000, p. 25). In addition, there are 50 provinces, which in the Basque Autonomous 
Community (BAC) have a significant degree of self-government through their Diputaciones 
Forales and Juntas Generales (their executive and legislative bodies, respectively). In the 
Spanish context, the cases of the BAC and Navarre are special due to their high degree of 
taxation autonomy (see Ruiz Almendral, 2003). The Basque Economic Agreement 
(Concierto Económico), the legal instrument that regulates the financial and taxation 
relations between the Spanish central state and the BAC, provides the latter with a capacity 
to regulate and administer taxation with just a few limitations. This role is fundamentally 
played by the Diputaciones Forales, which in turn provide the so-called Cupo, the 
contribution that the BAC makes to the central state to defray the cost of those functions and 
services provided by the latter in the Autonomous Community.3 On the whole, the complex 
territorial organization of Spain constitutes a singular political system, commonly called 
Estado de las Autonomías, where the asymmetric relationship between the central state and 
the Autonomous Communities has been of central importance (Moreno, 2001; Watts, 2008, 
                                                     
 
3 The calculation of the Cupo is determined by a method regulated by the Economic Agreement Act 
and the quinquennial Cupo Acts (Ruiz Almendral, 2003, p. 59). 
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pp. 41–42).4 Importantly, it is not a static system; rather, it is in continuous evolution 
towards increasing federal arrangements (Agranoff, 1996; Moreno, 2002). 
Notwithstanding this complexity, it is clear that, in terms of major rail infrastructure 
policy, the nation-state is meant to play a primary role. The 1978 Spanish Constitution 
assigned exclusive competence to the central state over ‘railways and land transport crossing 
through the  territory of more than one Autonomous Community’, as well as the general 
system of communications and those public works considered of general interest or the 
execution of which affects more than one Community (Art. 149). On the basis of this, 
Spanish legislation has allocated to the central state the competence to plan, develop, and 
manage a rail network of general interest,5 composed by those lines that are essential to 
ensure a common rail transport system throughout the Spanish territory or that require to be 
managed jointly with the former for the proper functioning of such system. These include 
those related to international transport routes, those linking different Autonomous 
Communities and those providing access to either major population or transport centres or 
essential economic or defence facilities for the nation-state (LSF 39/2003, 2004, Art. 4). The 
network is to be defined by the Spanish Government, following a report produced expressly 
by the affected Autonomous Communities and, in case the infrastructure to be incorporated 
to the network is entirely included in the territory of one of them, the consent of it.6 
The Spanish state also occupies a central position in the development of a new line of 
this nation-state-relevant network. The decision to carry out a new development is to be 
taken by the ministry responsible for public works, which must approve a draft project or 
estudio informativo on the new line. On the basis of this study, the relevant body in the 
Spanish Government then formulates an environmental impact statement which determines, 
for environmental purposes, whether the project should be developed or not and, if so, the 
conditions for it (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Urbanismo, 1986, 1988). Once the estudio 
informativo is formally approved, an action that determines the inclusion of the line in the 
general interest network, implementation occurs through the development of the 
corresponding basic and construction projects and the subsequent construction works, a stage 
                                                     
 
4 Authors have been reluctant to identify Spain’s political system with a federation; instead, they have 
characterized it in a variety of ways, for instance as an ‘incomplete federation’ (Agranoff, 1996), an 
instance of ‘devolutionary federalism’ (Moreno, 2002), ‘a unitary state engaged in devolutionary 
federalization’ (Watts, 2008, p. 42), or a system of ‘asymmetrical devolution’ (Smith and Heywood, 
2000, p. 25). 
5 Firstly termed Rail Transport Integrated National Network (LOTT 16/1987, 1987) and later General 
Interest Rail Network (LSF 39/2003, 2004). 
6 The legislation on this matter is extensive and under continuous development; nevertheless, the two 
key relevant acts, both substantially modified throughout time, are the Ley 16/1987, de 30 de julio, de 
Ordenación de los Transportes Terrestres and the Ley 39/2003, de 17 de noviembre, del Sector 
Ferroviario, on the regulation, respectively, of land transport and the rail sector. 
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at which other actors may enter the policy process. The construction and management of the 
new lines may be carried out by the ministry, but it may also be entrusted to the state-owned 
rail company attached to this ministry (in different periods, RENFE, GIF, and ADIF). 
Moreover, implementation may be financed through the General State Budget, but also 
through the resources of those state-owned companies, other state actors and the private 
sector. 
Autonomous Communities may in fact contribute to the financing of the 
implementation of the project, which gives a role not only to the regional executive but also 
to the legislative as the latter is responsible for approving the regional annual budget, but 
they also have more formal and informal opportunities for influencing the policy process.7 
Concerning the development of a new line, first, the production of preliminary studies is not 
completely predetermined by legislation and thus there is certain room for taking the 
initiative and, second, the preparation of the estudio informativo involves consultation with 
the affected Autonomous Communities over the route of the line. More generally, 
regionally-based parties also have the possibility of participating in nation-state politics 
through their presence in the Cortes Generales (Senate and, especially, Congress of 
Deputies) and may in fact be influential when the ruling party requires their support. 
Marshall (2013, p. 142) also notes that the regional affiliates of Spain-wide political parties 
have partly become regional baronies to be satisfied by the central government.  These two 
cases are relevant to the BAC, where a Basque nationalist party (EAJ-PNV) has been 
regularly present in the Spanish state institutions and the Basque regional affiliate of the 
Spanish PSOE (PSE) has been an important political actor in the region and, as it will 
become clearer in this chapter, has also been influential in the case studied. Finally, the BAC 
may also participate in the financing of major investments in its territory by advancing funds 
to be deducted from the aforementioned Cupo, thus reducing the burden on the BAC funds.8 
  
7.1.2 The potential influence of EU institutions 
Apart from Spanish and regional standing conditions, European integration has provided 
some capacities to influence the development of transnational HSR lines. Although Chapter 
2 has outlined the main ways in which European institutions may be relevant to this 
                                                     
 
7 See also Section 5.1. 
8 As established in Additional Provision Four, still in force, of the Ley 12/1981, de 13 de mayo, por la 
que se aprueba el Concierto Económico con la Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco, or Economic 
Agreement Act. 
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development, this section refines the argument towards the characteristics of the case 
studied. 
The capacity of European actors to influence HSR infrastructure development is 
primarily related to their financial contribution. In fact, as a cross-border section of a TEN-T 
priority project in what was, prior to the 2004 enlargement, still a comparatively 
underdeveloped EU country, the Vitoria-Irun line was in principle in a good position to 
receive EU financial support, in particular from the Cohesion Fund. In the 1994-1999 and 
2000-2006 programming periods, the Cohesion Fund was set to provide financial 
contributions of 80% to 85% of public or equivalent expenditure to Trans-European 
Networks projects in those member states with a per capita gross national product (GNP) of 
less than 90% of the Community average, among which Spain was included (Council of the 
EU, 1994, 2000). Additionally, TEN-T funds were also available, albeit in a much more 
limited amount. Until 2004, although this financial aid could generally cover 50% of the cost 
of studies related to the project, the total TEN-T contribution could not exceed 10% of the 
total investment cost. Since the 2004 revised regulation on the granting of Community 
financial aid for TENs (EP and Council, 2004b), the potential EU participation in cross-
border sections of priority projects could reach 20% of that cost.9 Finally, in the 
aforementioned programming periods, although the ERDF could participate in the financing 
of Trans-European Networks, the BAC was not among the eligible Objective 1 regions 
(Council of the European Communities, 1993; EP and Council, 1999a). 
In addition, the granting of EU financial aid through both the Cohesion Fund (Council 
of the EU, 1994, 2000) and the TEN-T funds (Council of the EU, 1995; EP and Council, 
1999b, 2004b) in the period covered in the case study was dependent on a series of 
conditions that may have influenced the characteristics and time-scale of a transport 
infrastructure project. Firstly, the Commission’s decision to grant this aid depended on the 
compliance of the project with EU policies and on the fulfilment of certain criteria such as its 
expected socio-economic benefits. In addition, this decision not only determined the amount 
of the financial support but also laid down provisions and conditions necessary for the 
implementation of the project. If these conditions were not met, the aid may have been 
reduced, suspended, cancelled or even recovered. In particular, since 1999 this aid would 
generally be cancelled if the project for which it was granted did not start within two years 
after the date of its expected start (EP and Council, 1999b).10 
                                                     
 
9 This rate reached 30% of the eligible cost in 2007 (EP and Council, 2007). 
10 The inclusion of projects in EU strategies so that they become eligible for EU financial aid entails 
as well a series of struggles among a large number of actors that include not only EU institutions but 
also member state representatives or ministers. However, as noted earlier this research considers this 
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Chapter 2 also pointed out that the European Commission had some capacity to 
promote, coordinate, monitor and evaluate the implementation of the network. Nevertheless, 
the two key institutions aimed at facilitating this task (the European Coordinators and the 
TENT-T Executive Agency) were set up during the last period of this case study, so it is 
likely that their influence has been limited for this research’s purposes. The European 
Commission appointed Etienne Davignon as European Coordinator of Priority Project no. 3, 
to which the Vitoria-Irun line belongs, in July 2005,11 with his first annual report on the 
project being issued in July 2006 (Davignon, 2006). Similarly, the TEN-T Executive Agency 
was established in 2006, the last year addressed in this case study. 
 
7.1.3 The trans-border dimension 
Apart from the means and resources available to European institutions, the relevance of 
European integration to the Vitoria-Irun HSR line is also reflected in the capacities of other 
actors that transcend the Spanish nation-state borders. Due to the transnational character of 
this line, developments in other nation-states and cross-border arrangements are likely to 
play a role on its development. For instance, delays on implementing a section of a 
transnational HSR corridor might prompt further delays on sections in an adjacent nation-
state, since the persistence of conventional speeds in part of this corridor would compromise 
its long-distance functionality. Similarly, cross-border governance arrangements may help to 
overcome coordination problems and technical differences in the planning and 
implementation of such a corridor, in particular in its cross-border sections. 
Of particular interest for the Vitoria-Irun HSR line is the role of the French nation-state. 
Like Spain, the central state, fundamentally the government and infrastructure manager 
SNCF,12 still plays the main role in HSR infrastructure planning and implementation. SNCF 
has been a primary actor in planning the development of the high-speed rail network, with a 
particular focus on the financial profitability of new lines, with the central state contributing 
according to their social rate of return (Vickerman, 1997, pp. 22–27). As Marshall (2013, pp. 
112–114) explains, this model of centralized state-centred infrastructure planning is 
                                                                                                                                                      
 
process as the shaping of the standing conditions that would frame the subsequent exercise of power 
(i.e. the effective granting of financial aid) and therefore does not address it in detail. 
11 He was succeeded by Carlo Secchi from 2009 until 2013. In March 2014, Secchi was appointed 
European Coordinator for the newly planned TEN-T Atlantic Corridor, to which the Vitoria-Irun line 
still belongs. 
12 In 1997, as part of the liberalization of the rail system imposed by EU competition policy 
regulations, the separation of infrastructure and train operations led to the creation of Réseau Ferré de 
France (RFF), responsible for the rail French infrastructure network. SNCF retained the management 
of the operation of the national rail services. 
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gradually changing in several ways, including the increasing importance of subnational 
actors due to decentralization and the promotion of public participation. In this respect, it is 
worthy to highlight the French procedure of the débat public, a type of public debate on 
important projects introduced in 1995 and framed by an independent body set up by the state 
(Marshall, 2013, pp. 135–138). Its function is to provide a public space for the discussion on 
the need, characteristics and desirability of a project and, although it has no binding 
outcomes for its development, according to Marshall (2013, p. 136) it led to the withdrawal 
or significant modification of one third of over 50 projects that had been subject to such 
debates. 
Finally, it is worth noting the existence of a series of relevant structures that facilitate 
the establishment of cross-border or transnational spaces for cooperation and lobbying in the 
EU. This is the case of the Atlantic Arc Commission of the Conference of Peripheral 
Maritime Regions of Europe, a think tank and lobby for over 150 regions from the EU 
(CPMR, 2015). Moreover, the EU supports territorial cooperation across borders through its 
Cohesion Policy. Particularly relevant for this case study are the transnational cooperation 
areas of the Atlantic Area and South-West Europe (INTERREG B), and the Spain-France-
Andorra cross-border cooperation area (INTERREG A).13 Finally, the EU also encourages 
cross-border cooperation through the creation of new legal entities such as European 
Economic Interest Groupings (EEIG) and, since 2006, European Groupings of Territorial 
Cooperation (EGTC). With regard to the Atlantic Spanish-French border, two EEIGs have 
been established: the PLAE (‘Aquitaine-Euskadi Logistic Platform’), established in 2001 by 
the Governments of the BAC and Aquitaine but constituted as an EEIG in 2004 in order to 
promote the Atlantic transport corridor and encourage modal shift from road to rail and 
shipping (El Diario Vasco, 2004); and the Vitoria-Dax EEIG, set up in 2005 by the Spanish 
and French infrastructure managers to produce the necessary studies and projects to 
implement and operate the international section of the Vitoria-Dax HSR link (RFF and 
ADIF, 2007).14 
 
The primary role that the Spanish constitution grants to the nation-state is therefore 
potentially mitigated by the capacity of subnational actors, European institutions, and other 
trans-border actors to influence the policy process. This capacity depends fundamentally on 
the existing competences and institutions, the opportunities for participating in the process, 
                                                     
 
13 The cooperation programmes for these areas in the 2007-2013 programming period can be found, 
respectively, in North Regional Coordination and Development Commission (2015), Comunidad 
Autónoma de Cantabria (2015) and Comunidad de Trabajo de los Pirineos (2015). 
14 Beyond the time period covered in the case study, the Aquitaine-Euskadi Euroregion was created in 
2011 as an EGTC (Gobierno Vasco and Région Aquitaine, 2012). 
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the available financial resources, and also the potential to influence related developments 
such as other sections of the transnational corridor. The means and resources available to 
actors thus provide a frame for the exercise of power yet, as it is argued in this thesis, they do 
not completely determine it. The remainder of the chapter examines the actual power – the 
episodic agency power – exercised by the Spanish and Basque governments, actors related to 
European integration and Basque, largely non-state, actors. 
 
 
7.2 Spanish-Basque governmental relations 
The description of the case presented in Chapter 5 suggests that the Spanish nation-state has 
had the primary role in the development of the Vitoria-Irun HSR line. In fact, a first analysis 
of episodic agency power confirms this primacy: the Spanish nation-state, through the 
exercise of its authority, has been able to largely control the characteristics of the project and 
the time-scale of its development. However, in parallel to this dominance of the nation-state, 
Basque state institutions consistently took the initiative to promote a project that fell outside 
its competences. This section delves into the intricate power struggles between both set of 
actors in order to ascertain the nature and extent of the Basque Government’s influence in 
the process. This is all the more relevant due to not only the under-researched role of 
regional actors in transnational transport infrastructure policy-making, but also the 
complexities associated with the Spanish State of Autonomies. In this respect, two main 
phases can be distinguished concerning this influence: a first one based on persuasion in 
various forms; and a second one when the Basque Government challenged the authority of 
Spanish institutions and started a dispute that would eventually lead to a Spanish-Basque 
agreement on the implementation of the line. 
 
7.2.1 Prevalence of central state authority and occasional exercise of 
persuasion (1986-2001) 
As explained in Chapter 5, the Basque Government took the initiative to propose an 
alternative to the Bilbao-Vitoria line that the Ministry of Transport, Tourism and 
Communications had included in its Plan de Transporte Ferroviario (Ministerio de 
Transportes, Turismo y Comunicaciones, 1987). Although, according to an advisor to the 
Minister, the participation of the Autonomous Communities in the production of the plan 
was set aside to a certain extent due to the negotiations between this Ministry and the 
Ministry of the Economy and Finance on the plan’s budget development (Fernández 
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Lafuente, 1989), after the plan was approved the Spanish Government was open to dialogue 
with them. The rail infrastructure company RENFE, which at the time was responsible for 
producing a report prior to the decision on the construction of a new line of the network of 
general interest, endorsed the basic criterion of the Basque Government’s proposal, namely 
the improvement of the north-south connection with the French border through Irun, and 
signed an agreement with the Basque Government in order to cooperate on the preliminary 
study of such a link (Departamento de Política Territorial y Transportes and INECO, 1989a, 
p. 11). The outcome of this study, carried out by the Spanish publicly-owned consultancy 
firm INECO with the support of the Basque Government, was a similar route to the one 
proposed by the latter, but included an entirely new section between Beasain and Irun, the 
possibility of connecting with the Autonomous Community of Navarre in the future, and the 
new high-speed and UIC track gauge technical standards determined by the ministry 
(Departamento de Política Territorial y Transportes and INECO, 1989a). This outcome was 
the result on the one hand of what may be termed reasoning by the Basque Government, 
since, as a former senior official at the central government ministry notes, the proposal used 
part of the foreseen investment to improve the cross-border connection (Interview 10), and, 
on the other, of the authority of the Spanish Government, in particular through the Prime 
Minister, in determining such standards. After negotiations with the Basque Government, the 
Ministry endorsed the new route and both institutions agreed to cooperate in the 
development of further studies and the financing of the works. Through this outcome, the 
PSOE, at the time the ruling party in Spain, strengthened the position of its regional affiliate 
PSE-PSOE in the Basque Government without a firm financing commitment, while the 
members of the latter government (EAJ-PNV and PSE-PSOE) chalked up a success. 
Although a committee with members from both governments was set up to specify the 
details of the financing, this agreement did not crystallize in a time-scale and financing 
commitment. The Basque Deputy Minister for Transport at the time notes that the 
agreement, which also included investment in other infrastructures in the BAC, was of a 
political nature and that in any case the important item in that agreement was not the rail line 
but the extension of the port of Bilbao (Interview 14). In fact, the aforementioned advisor to 
the Spanish Minister underplayed, only a few months after the agreement, the commitments 
made in it due to the difficulty of facing the extra cost involved and the necessity to consider 
the problems of the whole nation-state (Fernández Lafuente, 1989). The priority  of the 
Spanish Government, formalized in the 1988 Council of Ministers decision, was the Sevilla-
Madrid-Barcelona-French border corridor and, according to Pérez Touriño, who occupied 
senior positions at the Ministry then, the planning team at the Ministry saw the Vitoria-Irun 
line as costly and questionable (Interview 6). Both this interviewee and Antonio Monfort 
(Interview 10), another senior official at that time, point out that due to these different 
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priorities the Ministry left the initiative of producing preliminary studies of the line to the 
Basque Government, which allowed buying time and ‘beating around the bush’: 
‘And thus, to be clear, it could be said in a more or less political-colloquial language that that process is 
relatively numbed. I mean, it is not the Ministry the one that takes the initiative of setting in motion all the 
procedure and all the process, as it is with the Madrid-Sevilla [line] or as it is starting to be with the 
Madrid-Barcelona [inaudible], but, well, if the Basque Government wants to get this through let’s ask them 
to analyze it. The Basque Government accepts it, understands it, knows perfectly what we are talking 
about... There is no deception, but a reality that is shared’ (Interview 6). 
In short, the Ministry, through its authority and in spite of the initiative and lobbying of the 
Basque Government, controlled the time-scale of the process although, through reasoning, 
the latter managed to persuade RENFE and the Spanish Government to substantially modify 
the route of the line. 
Once the Plan Director de Infraestructuras 1993-2007 or PDI (Ministerio de Obras 
Públicas, Transportes y Medio Ambiente, 1994) integrated the Vitoria-Irun HSR line in the 
planning of the Spanish rail network, the Ministry responsible launched the process to 
develop the Estudio Informativo of the line, in effect the study that defines the general 
characteristics of the line. As explained in Chapter 5, this Estudio was produced in 
coordination with the Basque Plan Territorial Sectorial of the rail network in the BAC 
(Departamento de Obras Públicas y Transportes, 2001), a procedure in principle not 
necessary but that allowed, according to the Estudio, to enrich the latter and facilitate the 
incorporation of the project in local spatial planning (Ministerio de Fomento and INECO, 
2000). A senior official at the Ministry involved in the process explains that in fact this 
cooperation allowed a fast production of the Estudio, in particular in the light of anticipated 
environmental and political problems (Interview 9). The at the time Basque Minister for 
Transport and Public Works pointed out a delay caused by the Spanish Government in the 
first half of 1998, before launching the public consultation process (El Mundo, 1998; El País, 
1998a); however, this delay arguably had little significance since it seems to have lasted less 
than half a year (Interview 9). In terms of the characteristics of the line established by the 
Estudio Informativo, these were fundamentally defined by the Ministry and, to a lesser 
extent, by the Ministry of the Environment, but a number of local authorities and a reduced 
number of individuals managed to persuade both governments to make slight modifications 
to the project.15 The Spanish Government, again through its authority, thus controlled the 
timing of the process and the characteristics of the line, although the involvement of the 
Basque Government seems to have facilitated this action. 
                                                     
 
15 These influences are addressed in Section 7.4.1. 
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7.2.2 Central authority challenged: from domination to negotiation (2001-
2006) 
After the final approval of the Estudio Informativo in February 2001, the Spanish 
Government and in particular its Ministry of Development continued to play the primary role 
in determining the timing of the process. Thus, in the first stages it delayed the development 
of the necessary basic and construction projects of the different sections of the line. In the 
opinion of the aforementioned senior official from the Ministry, in particular until the end of 
2001, when the management of the development of projects was entrusted to infrastructure 
manager GIF, the line lacked the decisive political push that was given to other lines granted 
a higher priority16 (Interview 9, also Interview 15). After this phase, the Spanish Government 
started the tender of the works for eight sections before the 2004 Spanish general election, 
after which this tender process was subsequently suspended under a new ruling party. In 
2005 it awarded the contracts to draft the construction projects of the whole Vitoria-Bilbao 
section, and it finally awarded the contract for the start of construction works in April 2006. 
The Basque Government did not accept the fact that the Spanish Government decided 
on the timing of the implementation process, yet due to its lack of competences it was not 
able to directly intervene itself. In other words, it was not able to overcome, through their 
exercise of authority, what they saw as domination by the Government of Spain.17 Although 
in July 2003 the Basque Government managed to award the contracts for the construction 
projects of four sections in spite of an appeal by the Ministry of Development, a second 
appeal led to suspension by the Spanish Constitutional Court of the tendering, started in 
March 2005, of the construction works of two sections. However, the Basque Government 
was able to effectively influence the development of the line through other modes of power. 
The initiative of the Basque Government, although at certain points it may have 
hindered the implementation of the line when the relationship with the Spanish Government 
was tense,18 might have also prompted the latter to launch the tender of projects in order to 
avoid appearing as delaying the process. This proposition is difficult to confirm; however, 
                                                     
 
16 For instance the Ourense-Santiago line and the Pajares bypass in the north-west of Spain, both 
mentioned by the interviewee. These two projects, as opposed to the Vitoria-Irun line, had not been 
proposed in the 1994 Spanish infrastructure plan (Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Transportes y Medio 
Ambiente, 1994). 
17 This conflict is illustrated by this statement by Amann, Basque Minister for Transport and Public 
Works (1998-2005): ‘And there it came the great debate, especially when the project had just been 
finally approved. It had just been approved and we said ‘well, it’s already approved; let’s do the 
works.’ ‘Oh no, now it depends on how I plan Spain.’ ‘No way, man. Tell me about the planning... 
Well, we don’t share it.’ ‘Well, then you’ll see.’ ‘No, we won’t see. We do it ourselves’’ (Interview 
15). 
18 This causal link has been suggested in the press (El Mundo, 2003) and by members of PP, the ruling 
party in the Spanish Government from 1996 to 2004 (Interviews 13 and 21). 
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the Basque Government was certainly influential in the negotiation that led to the April 2006 
agreement between the Spanish Government, the Basque Government and infrastructure 
manager ADIF that established the basis of the implementation of the Vitoria-Irun line. 
Although the Basque Government had expressed its willingness to participate in the 
development of the line from the beginning of the policy process, only after the Estudio 
Informativo was approved an agreement was announced – yet not signed – that involved the 
Basque Government in its implementation (El Correo, 2002a). However, it was only when 
the PSOE came into power at nation-state level, in particular, when the 2006 General State 
Budget was debated in the Spanish Cortes Generales (the Congress of Deputies and the 
Senate) that a negotiation over such an agreement took place. This agreement was not 
necessary in order to develop the line, as the aforementioned officer of the Ministry noted 
(Interview 9), but provided advantages for both the Spanish and the Basque Government. 
The ruling party (PSOE) sought the – unnecessary for budget approval purposes –  support 
of the Basque Government’s party EAJ-PNV in order to widen its then fragile parliamentary 
support and possibly strengthen its Basque affiliate PSE-EE in the negotiation of the General 
Budget of the BAC, while EAJ-PNV regained influence in the Cortes Generales and ensured 
investment in the Autonomous Community (El Correo, 2005b; Surio, 2005). According to 
news sources, the agreement was concluded at the highest political level, between, first, 
Prime Minister Rodríguez Zapatero and the president of the PNV and, second, by the Second 
Vice-President and Minister of the Economy and Finance and the President of the Basque 
Government (El Correo, 2005d). 
The content of the agreement, which entrusted the Basque Government with managing 
the implementation of the Gipuzkoa section (Bergara-Irun) and advancing the funding for it, 
to be subsequently recovered via Cupo, was based on a Basque Government’s proposal of 
July 2004 (El País, 2004i, 2004j). According to actors centrally involved in the process, this 
arrangement sought on the one hand to accelerate this section, which was less advanced than 
the Bilbao-Vitoria one (Interviews 9 and 16) and on the other to emphasize the involvement 
of the Basque Government so that the project was not seen as imposed on the BAC 
(Interviews 8 and 9). In short, as expressed by the Basque Minister for Transport and Public 
Works when the agreement was signed, it allowed to tackle more effectively the high 
technical and, above all, social complexity of the project (Interview 16). The then Spanish 
Secretary of State for Planning and Infrastructures expressed the value of this cooperation as 
follows: 
‘And the truth is that at all times I tried – I tried – to not have any kind of problem with the Government of 
the Basque Country because, you know, we sought a common objective, which was the construction of the 
infrastructure. And we had problems that did not exist elsewhere, and we had go to hand in hand to 
overcome them’ (Interview 8). 
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Ultimately, the agreement did not only satisfy the Basque Government’s aspiration to 
promote and participate in the development of the line, but it also facilitated its 
implementation for the Spanish Government.19 Thus, although the latter exerted its authority 
throughout the whole period, the former managed to exert power through negotiating its 
participation in the implementation of the line. This participation, however, was not caused 
only by the Basque Government’s initiative. Other regional actors, in particular those 
belonging to the contestation to the project, seem to have influenced the Basque and Spanish 
Governments’ attitude towards implementation. This indirect exercise of power will be 
addressed in Section 7.4. 
 
As the previous two sections show, the Spanish Government, in particular through its 
Ministry responsible for rail infrastructure planning and development, largely controlled the 
time-scale and characteristics of the Vitoria-Irun project through its authority. However, the 
Basque Government was able to exert a considerable influence on this process through 
persuasion rather than authority. In the first stages, it managed to change the route of the 
line through what may be termed reasoning – the provision of a convincing argument – and, 
in the later stages, it became involved in the implementation of the line through negotiation, 
whereby both sides had something to gain. The Basque Government on the one hand 
succeeded in adapting the characteristics of the line to regional needs, by improving the 
integration of Bilbao in the network and the links between the three Basque cities, and 
increased its involvement in its implementation, which may have strengthened the 
government parties in the BAC. On the other hand, the Spanish Government achieved a 
better optimization of its investment in the region by adopting the Y-shaped route and 
widened its parliamentary support by making concessions to the Basque party EAJ-PNV. In 
addition, of course, the ruling party in Spain would likely increase its electoral support in the 
BAC both directly and through its regional affiliate. In any case, the development of this line 
has been affected not only by Spanish and Basque state actors. As suggested during this 
section, other actors seem to have had an influence – albeit arguably less – on this process. 
These can be classified as, first, those state actors related to European integration (EU 
institutions, other nation-states, and trans-border actors) and, second, largely non-state 
actors, in particular related to the Basque Autonomous Community. The remainder of the 
                                                     
 
19 Leopoldo Barreda, a long-term member of the PP in the BAC, insightfully characterizes the 
relationship between both governments during this period: ‘first, it [the debate] was very much 
presented in the realm of political prestige and sovereignty, [...]; then it was brought into a more 
practical ground’ (Interview 13). 
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chapter presents an analysis of the episodic agency power exercised by each of these two 
groups. 
 
 
7.3 European integration: influences beyond the nation-state 
The process of European integration, understood as involving a decreasing relevance of 
nation-state borders in determining the development of policy, may potentially have a 
decisive influence on transnational high-speed rail planning and implementation. This 
influence may be commonly identified with that of EU institutions such as the European 
Commission, the European Parliament, or the European Investment Bank (EIB). 
Nevertheless, two other types of actors related in a certain way to European integration may 
be identified that are relevant to the policy field studied in this research. The first ones are 
other nation-states, which by having competences over sections of transnational corridors 
may influence not only the development of these sections but also of those located in the 
territories of other nation-states. The second type of actors is formed by networks of 
association among subnational state and non-state actors which seek to influence the 
development of infrastructure corridors that transcend nation-state borders. This section 
examines the extent and form of the effective influence of these three types of actors on the 
development of the Vitoria-Irun HSR line. 
 
7.3.1 Unsuccessful inducement by EU institutions 
In the first section of this chapter, it was noted that the capacity of EU actors to influence the 
development of high-speed rail lines was in principle directly related to the provision of 
financial support in order to foster this development. Nevertheless, at least during the period 
of the Vitoria-Irun line case studied in this research (1986-2006) this support has been 
limited and scarcely significant. By the end of 2006, a very limited amount of funding – 
exclusively from the TEN-T Fund – had been obtained from EU institutions for the Vitoria-
Irun HSR line (see Table 2). Although this contribution was aimed at co-financing studies 
and projects, a senior official involved in the project considers it has not been influential in 
changing its time-scale (Interview 9). As the table shows, from 2007, once construction 
works had started, the EU contribution through TEN-T Funds and EIB loans has increased 
significantly, and in fact this senior official notes that in recent years the TEN-T Funds have 
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gained more importance.20 In addition, an important amount of funding has been obtained 
through EIB loans since 2012. In any case, before 2006 the influence of EU funds might 
have come more from the expectation of obtaining EU financial support than from the actual 
funds received. However, the only specific sign in this respect was suggested by the 
aforementioned ministry official. In his opinion, the inclusion of the Vitoria-Dax line as a 
‘key link’ of the trans-European HSR network may have contributed to launch the drafting 
of the Estudio Informativo in the mid-1990s (Interview 9). In any case, he does not think that 
being part of such a network was a decisive factor in promoting the line.21 
Table 2. EU financial support to the Vitoria-Irun high-speed rail line 
Period Object Funding source 
EU contribution 
(€ million) 
1994-1999 
Study on the Spain-France rail link, through the Atlantic 
coast (1996 application). Assistance to finance the 
drafting of the Estudio Informativo. 
TEN-T Fund 0.162 
2000-2006 Joint financing of studies and projects TEN-T Fund 16.0 
2007-2013 
Joint financing of the platform works of the 
Arrazua/Ubarrundia-Elorrio, Abadiño-Galdakao and 
Astigarraga-Irun sections 
TEN-T Fund 84.1 
Joint financing of the final construction projects of the 
Elorrio-Bergara and Bergara-Arrasate/Mondragón 
sections and the design of the railway power supply 
equipment for the line 
TEN-T Fund 2.4 
Construction of high-speed rail line between Vitoria, 
Bilbao and San Sebastián in priority TEN-T corridor 3 
connecting Iberian Peninsula to France (finance contracts 
signed between June 2012 and July 2013) 
EIB loans 1,400.0 
 
Sources: J. Ballesteros Sánchez, Directorate General of Railways, Ministry of Development (2012, 
personal communication, 8 February); ADIF (2012); EIB (2013). 
 
 
Apart from financial support, the EU may in principle contribute to the promotion of HSR 
line development by facilitating coordination through the European Coordinators and the 
TEN-T Executive Agency, replaced in 2014 by the Innovation and Networks Executive 
Agency. The data obtained for this thesis does not grant significant importance to their 
                                                     
 
20 This statement is also supported by the EU contribution to the projects managed by the TEN-T 
Executive Agency since 2007 relevant to the Vitoria-Irun HSR line, which amounts to 14.1 % of the 
total cost of these projects (INEA, 2014). 
21 This limited influence of EU funds is not generalizable to high-speed rail development in the rest of 
Spain. Several relevant interviewees highlighted the decisive importance that Structural Funds and, 
especially, the Cohesion Fund have had in transport infrastructure development in Spain over the last 
decades (Interviews 4, 10 and 11). The Madrid-Barcelona HSR line, for instance, received in the 
2000-2006 period a contribution of 3,349.5 million Euros from the Cohesion Fund, out of a total 
investment of nearly 9,000 million Euros (ADIF, 2013). This suggests that the Government of Spain 
exercised its episodic agency power by prioritizing certain lines at the expense of others such as the 
one addressed in this research. 
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participation, which in any case mostly exceeds the time-frame of this case study. With 
regard to Etienne Davignon, the European Coordinator relevant to the Vitoria-Irun line, the 
three interviewees who worked in the Ministry at that time agree that he has had no 
relevance with regard to the cross-border section, apart from being informed and updated 
about the progress on it (Interviews 8, 9 and 11). His only contribution might have been 
making France aware of the possibility of obtaining EU funds if it increased the pace of 
development of its sections (Interview 9). Nevertheless, the Spanish Secretary of State for 
Planning and Infrastructures between 2004 and 2011 argues that the figure of the European 
Coordinator is gradually gaining importance (Interview 8), so it is likely to have been more 
influential in recent years.  
A further possible influence of the EU may have been on nation-state policy, in 
particular on the characteristics of the high-speed rail line and the planning of the national 
network. Pérez Touriño points out that the basic rationale of the government has been, first, 
to seek the inclusion of projects in the trans-European network so that they would be eligible 
for EU funding later on and, second, to consequently incorporate them in the nation-state 
plans (Interview 6). Nevertheless, little evidence supports this thesis in the case of the 
Vitoria-Irun HSR line. Once the Basque proposal of a Y-shaped route was assumed by the 
Spanish relevant ministry in February 1989, the foreseeable consequence was that it became 
integrated – as it was – in the next Spanish infrastructure planning exercise, namely the PDI 
(Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Transportes y Medio Ambiente, 1994). The influence of EU 
developments seems to have been limited, since the first proposal of a trans-European HSR 
network by the High-Level Group, set up by the Commission and that included member state 
representatives, was prepared afterwards, during 1990 (High-Level Group “The European 
High-Speed Train Network,” 1995, p. 3). Although the PDI explicitly recognized the 
coherence of its planned network with the High-Level Group’s proposal and emphasized the 
importance of integrating the Spanish HSR network in the European one (Ministerio de 
Obras Públicas, Transportes y Medio Ambiente, 1994, p. 148), the features of the Vitoria-
Irun line and its position within nation-state planning had been established beforehand. 
In short, the influence of EU state actors has been quite limited in the case of the 
Vitoria-Irun HSR line, at least until the end of 2006 – or, in other words, until the start of 
construction works. The only instance of specific influence is suggested by a ministry senior 
official, who points out that the incorporation of the Vitoria-Dax line as a ‘key link’ of the 
trans-European HSR network may have helped to launch the Estudio Informativo. Although 
due to its lack of competences EU institutions would need to exercise power through modes 
other than authority (e.g. inducement, by providing financial incentives attached to certain 
conditions), little evidence has been found that confirms this exercise. 
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7.3.2 Other nation-states: negative inducement through lack of action 
As part of a transnational transport corridor, the functionality of the Vitoria-Irun link 
depends on its continuity in France and, to a lesser extent, towards Portugal. Although some 
interviewees noted the lack of decisiveness to develop the link with Spain by the Portuguese 
Government (Interviews 4 and 13), the case of France is the most significant. The 
Government of France and rail infrastructure manager SNCF have generally had other 
priorities than the connection with Spain, and in any case they have regularly prioritized the 
Mediterranean link via Catalonia. As early as 1988, when the decision on the track gauge 
change and the establishment of high-speed rail lines in Spain was being considered, these 
two French actors supported the development of the link along the Mediterranean coast, 
depending on progress on the Spanish side (El Correo, 1988j; El País, 1988a). This 
preference was restated by the French Minister for Transport in 1990, once the decision by 
the Spanish Government to prioritize the Sevilla-Madrid-Barcelona-French border corridor 
had been taken (El País, 1990a); was formalized in the 1991 French master plan for the high-
speed rail network, which prioritized the Mediterranean link (El País, 1991d); and was 
ratified in the subsequent 2003 French master plan, where the only commitment to extend 
the Paris-Bordeaux HSR line towards Spain was to debate this development in 2006 (El País, 
2004a). Although the Spanish Government’s priority has been the Mediterranean corridor, its 
progress on both cross-border links has been greater than the French Government’s one. The 
difference in priorities between both nation-state’s governments was publicly highlighted at 
various points by Minister Borrell (El País, 1995), Minister Arias Salgado (El País, 1998h), 
and Secretary of State Vilalta (El País, 1999d). Furthermore, it is also pointed out by Spanish 
interviewees that participated in bilateral meetings with representatives of the French 
Government (Interviews 7, 8 and 11) 
This clear divergence of priorities has arguably influenced negatively the development 
of the Vitoria-Irun HSR line. The Technical Secretary of the Ministry of Development 
stated, when asked about this line, that ‘the problem is not so much Madrid but France’, 
since it was not known when they would link with the Basque Country (El Diario Vasco, 
1999). Nevertheless, evidence about specific instances of this negative influence is difficult 
to find. The clearest episode may have been the non-inclusion of the line in the ‘quick start 
programme’, promoted by the European Commission in 2003 to trigger the development of a 
number of high-priority projects of European interest, an absence which, according to the 
then Spanish Commissioner for Energy and Transport, was due to the lack of progress on the 
French side (El País, 2003e). However, the impact that its inclusion in the list may have had 
is uncertain in any case since, according to a Spanish senior official who worked on that 
programme, the compilation of the list had merely “propaganda” purposes (Interview 7). The 
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coordination between the Spanish and French infrastructure managers carried out within the 
Vitoria-Dax EEIG, established in 2005 to jointly address the implementation and operation 
of the cross-border connection, seems to have been useful to accelerate the recent definition 
of this section of the line (Interview 9), but no evidence was found of its influence on the 
development of the rest of the network. 
The cases of France and Portugal suggest that their governments and rail infrastructure 
managers have exerted a negative inducement to develop the Atlantic link through the BAC 
– or a positive inducement to effectively develop other links, such as the Mediterranean one. 
This negative inducement is also reinforcing or two-way; i.e. the reluctance of one 
government to prioritize its section of the link discourages the other to do the same with its 
own section, and vice versa. However, and although as noted above particularly Spanish 
Government officers and politicians highlighted the difficulties derived from France’s 
different priorities, the importance of this negative inducement must not be overemphasized. 
First, the Vitoria-Irun HSR line would still be functional without a new French section since 
the Hendaye-Bordeaux line in France has the UIC track gauge and is therefore able to 
support freight and conventional passenger traffic, although with less capacity and speed 
than a new high-speed rail line. And, secondly, since the late 1990s the Spanish Government 
has anyway prioritized other lines with seemingly less economic justification or importance 
within the network (e.g. the aforementioned Ourense-Santiago line and the Pajares bypass),22 
so the rationale of network functionality has not been the only one. Hence this negative 
inducement may have been, at least during the last period of the case studied, somewhat 
limited. 
 
7.3.3 Transnational networks of association 
Finally, the planning of a trans-European HSR network has led to a series of networks 
between subnational state and business organizations, with the objective of lobbying those 
governments responsible for developing a transnational Atlantic rail corridor. As former 
Basque Minister López de Guereñu suggests, their engagement in these networks sought to 
overcome the competence limitations of the government (Interview 16). On the one hand, the 
Basque Government participated, along with the Regional Council of Aquitaine, in the 
                                                     
 
22 If the PDI is understood as a technical effort to plan for the increase in infrastructure investment in 
Spain (Interviews 10 and 11), it is indicative that the Vitoria-Irun line and its link with Zaragoza are 
the only sections of the high-speed rail network defined in the PDI which are not operative at the time 
of writing, unlike the A Coruña-Ourense and the Albacete-Alicante HSR lines, which had not been 
planned as high-speed in the PDI. 
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creation and running of the Aquitaine-Euskadi Logistic Platform (PLAE) and was also in 
charge of leading the Working Group on Transport of the Atlantic Arc Commission, one of 
the six Geographical Commissions in the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of 
Europe (CPMR). In this latter case, the then Director for Transport of the Basque 
Government and coordinator of this Working Group notes that their aim was to make their 
voice heard at the European level (Interview 18). On the other hand, two business networks 
with similar lobbying aims were formed at different stages: the Conference of Chambers of 
the Atlantic (CCA); and the International Conference of Chambers of Commerce of the 
Atlantic Trans-European Rail Axis (CEFAT). 
In spite of the interest that these networks may have concerning the development of new 
political spaces within an integrating Europe, no evidence was found of their actual influence 
on the development of the Vitoria-Irun line and, more generally, the Atlantic rail transport 
corridor. Firstly, the role of the PLAE does not seem to have been decisive. Its Director in 
2005-2007 characterized it as a ‘small cross-border missionary’ in its beginning, working in 
a difficult terrain due to the concentration of competences in the Spanish and French central 
states (Interview 19). According to him, the work of the Platform with respect to the cross-
border rail link involved occasional meetings with the respective Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, which were scarce, vague and with few outcomes, and daily coordination work with 
Spanish and French state actors.23 In terms of the Atlantic Arc Commission, land transport 
was scarcely addressed and in any case its work was centred on cooperation initiatives 
among regions (e.g. regarding the establishment of ‘motorways of the sea’) and on 
contributing to the drafting of EU documents such as White Papers (Interview 18). Finally, a 
senior representative of the Chamber of Commerce of Bilbao notes that the two mentioned 
business networks had a certain media impact and gathered the support of a significant 
number of subnational institutions, including at some point regional and local governments 
(Interview 25), but no direct causal link could be ascertained between their activities and 
developments on the Vitoria-Irun HSR line. 
 
The episodic agency power that actors related to the European integration process have 
exerted concerning the development of the Vitoria-Irun HSR line has thus been limited. 
Firstly, the EU through its financial support and pan-European HSR network masterplans has 
not been significantly influential, at least until the start of construction works in 2006. 
Secondly, developments in Portugal and, especially, France, do not seem to have contributed 
                                                     
 
23 In fact, the interviewed senior representative of the Chamber of Commerce of Bilbao remarks that 
the Chamber did not have an active role in the PLAE since they did not consider this organization 
very attractive from a practical point of view (Interview 25). 
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to promote the line, yet in any case the actual negative inducement exerted by them does not 
seem to have been decisive. Finally, in spite of the lobbying activity of subnational and 
cross-border networks of association, no evidence could be found of their actual exercise of 
power on the development of the line. On the whole, the dynamics within the Spanish 
nation-state seem to have dominated the policy process. Nevertheless, as occasionally 
pointed out in the previous section, these dynamics have not only involved the Spanish and 
Basque Governments. The next section examines the power that may have been exercised by 
other actors, primarily related to the Basque Autonomous Community. 
 
 
7.4 Other actors: resisting the dominant exercise of power 
‘Power, as the realization of outcomes, cannot simply be assumed from the capacities of those exercising 
power [...]. There is always a dialectic to power, always another agency, another set of standing conditions 
pertinent to the realization of that agency’s causal powers against the resistance of another’ (Clegg, 1989, p. 
208). 
Although there were certainly different preferences among actors regarding the 
characteristics and time-scale of the Vitoria-Irun HSR line, the previous analysis may 
suggest that the exercise of power has been carried out largely unidirectionally, as ‘power to’ 
develop a project according to the different agencies’ access to means and resources. Thus, 
the relative importance of each actor in the policy process may have seemed as mainly 
defined by these capacities and not by the constraints to their action. Although in fact their 
power has been dominant in episodic agency terms, other actors from mainly the private 
sector and the civil society have provided some friction to its exercise. In other words, the 
‘power to’ of pro-HSR line actors became also ‘power over’ other actors who resisted it.24 
This section examines the episodic agency power exerted by these actors through an analysis 
of the dispute with those that promoted the project, in particular the Basque Government. 
 
7.4.1 The apparent lack of influence of Basque actors 
Within the subnational arena, a number of actors have attempted, largely unsuccessfully, to 
modify, delay or stop the Vitoria-Irun HSR line. This objective was sought, firstly, by a 
diverse range of civil society organizations, grouped initially in AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana as 
                                                     
 
24 Notwithstanding this distinction, actors in the latter group were not necessarily situated in 
antagonistic discursive terms with respect to those in the former, as the case of the Basque Chambers 
of Commerce explained below shows. 
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the main contestation organization and later in the Red por un Tren Social or Network for a 
Social Train. Their impact on the policy process in terms of episodic agency power, 
however, has not been discernible. Elkarlana, as a grass-roots movement, had a certain 
mobilization capacity (Interviews 2, 22 and 31), but its demonstrations rarely reached 10,000 
participants.25 The Red, in turn, despite an important membership that included the main 
regional trade union ELA, did not have the mobilizing capacity of Elkarlana as it lacked the 
unequivocal support of the Asamblea contra el TAV (Interviews 22 and 28). In fact, 
according to several members of the contestation movement, it functioned more as a 
discussion group or lobby than as a mobilization organization (Interviews 2, 22 and 31). 
Both the Red and Elkarlana seem to have functioned more as producers of a common 
discourse (Interview 23) than as actors that exerted actual episodic agency power in the 
policy process. 
Apart from these two organizations, Basque left-wing political party Ezker Batua 
occupied a privileged position to influence the policy process since it was a member of the 
Basque Government from 2001 to 2009. From the beginning of its participation in the 
government, Ezker Batua expressed its discrepancy with the project, stated explicitly in the 
document of adhesion to the Basque Government (El País, 2001). In the end of 2002, they 
proposed a U-shaped alternative project with lower speeds and cost than the official project 
(El País, 2002b), which they claimed was supported by experts from the Department for 
Transport and Public Works (El Correo, 2002b). Similarly, the academic Roberto Bermejo, 
who participated in the development of Ezker Batua’s alternative proposal (Interviews 22 
and 35), maintains that at some point Basque Minister Amann accepted it (Interview 35). 
However, publicly the EAJ-PNV members of the government – the ruling party in the 
government and the abovementioned Department – did not recognize this and, although they 
stated they would consider specific contributions to reduce the environmental impact of the 
project, they claimed these would not delay or modify the line’s route (Amann, 2003a; El 
País, 2002c). This suggests that EAJ-PNV sought to alleviate the tensions within the 
government rather than to reach an agreement that would satisfy both parties. This may thus 
have been a case of manipulation, by which an actor conceals its intent to another, but it is 
likely that both parties knew precisely what the situation was: the former Coordinator of the 
Chairmanship of Ezker Batua is indeed sceptical that there was any possibility of an 
                                                     
 
25 Media outlets rarely specified the number of participants in the demonstrations against the high-
speed rail line, beyond ‘thousands’ or ‘several thousands of people’, although in one case they noted a 
number of 4,000, estimated by the municipal police (El Correo, 2006e). Interviewees from Elkarlana 
mentioned attendance limits of 10,000-15,000 (Interview 2) and of 6,000-7,000 (Interview 31). 
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agreement; he believes that his former party’s attitude of conveying that image was due more 
to electoral reasons (Interview 22). 
Apart from these attempts to confront the development of the line, actors also sought to 
modify its characteristics through the formal procedures of the policy process, occasionally 
resulting in modest modifications to the project.26 Firstly, the common stance of local 
authorities in the surroundings of Durango, in Bizkaia, and the subsequent support of the 
Basque Government prompted the Spanish Government to accept the alternative to the south 
of the Ibaizabal river, which, in spite of its better environmental integration, was more 
costly, less flexible and adaptable to the functional requirements of the line, and did not run 
through a consolidated transport corridor (Ministerio de Fomento and INECO, 2000). 
Secondly, three modifications of the route proposed in the public consultation process were 
accepted, apart from the access to Vitoria, as they were compatible with other demands: the 
bypasses of Lezetxiki, Aduna-Zizurkil-Andoain, and Ventas in Irun (Secretaría General de 
Medio Ambiente, 2000). These modifications were the result of claims made by three local 
authorities, an academic from the University of the Basque Country and two individuals 
affected by the project. Concerning the access to Vitoria, the local authority of this city 
managed to persuade the Spanish Government – despite the Ministry’s recommendation – to 
prevent the new line from running through the existing central station and to study an 
underground line through a new axis across the urban fabric, which, by building a new 
through station on it, would allow to keep the city integrated in the network. 
A further, significant attempt to modify the characteristics of the project was proposed 
in 1998 by the Basque Chambers of Commerce, who suggested to radically change the 
characteristics of the line by developing a single high-speed rail (350 km/h) line through the 
three main Basque cities (Cámaras de Comercio e Industria de Araba, Bizkaia y Gipuzkoa et 
al., 1998). The Ministry of Development, after being consulted by the Basque Government 
(Interview 9), commissioned a study on the proposal that advised against it due to a number 
of technical reasons (e.g. its higher cost and environmental impact) (Ministerio de Fomento 
and INECO, 1999), of which the fundamental one was the impossibility of utilizing the 
Bilbao central station as a through station (Interview 9). The negative conclusion of the 
report suggests that the rejection of the Chambers’ proposal was based on technical 
grounds,27 although the delay it would entail may have also been important. As pointed out 
                                                     
 
26 Further details of this are provided in Section 5.4. 
27 These technical grounds were, according to one of the consultants that drafted the Chambers’ 
proposal, in any case debatable, since they centred on the infrastructure itself and neglected the 
operation and capacity benefits of a network with through stations (Interview 33). 
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previously, the Basque Government at that time was open to discussing alternatives, but 
without substantially modifying the project or its time-scale. 
Thus, subnational actors achieved little direct influence in the policy process. The only 
episodes where this influence is evident refer to slight modifications of the route of the line 
in order to accommodate different requests by some individuals and, mainly, local 
authorities. In principle these changes on the route responded to a type of persuasion 
(reasoning) by the claimants since, as a senior official from the Ministry explained, they 
contributed to improve the spatial integration of the project (Interview 9). However, as 
suggested earlier in the chapter, these changes may have also been the result of an indirect 
influence on the behaviour of both the Spanish and the Basque Governments or, in other 
words, of an interest by these governments in gathering support and avoiding contestation to 
the project. First, the selection of the alternative to the south of the Ibaizabal river mentioned 
above indeed responded to a consensus among the concerned local authorities. In addition, 
and according to the aforementioned senior official, out of the 16 proposals to modify the 
route submitted during the public consultation process only the four that were compatible 
with the claims of the other concerned actors were considered (Interview 9). Indeed, the 
consensus sought generally involved a higher cost due to the improvement of the 
environmental and urban integration of the route. This interest in avoiding contestation is 
also partly the case of the Basque Government’s will, formalized in the 2006 agreement with 
the Spanish Government, to participate directly in the implementation of the project. 
Although in this manner it obviously gained political ownership of the project, its 
participation also sought to reduce the local resistance to the project (Interviews 8 and 16). It 
is therefore important to examine in detail how the power struggles between the state and the 
contestation may have influenced the development of the line beyond specific modifications 
such as those just reviewed. 
 
7.4.2 Countering contestation: between reasoning and manipulation 
Although non-state Basque actors have not influenced the project significantly, there has 
been a change in the behaviour of the Basque Government that suggests that there has been a 
power struggle in order to prevent such an influence. This change has adopted four forms. 
Firstly, there was an insistence on dialogue in order to achieve a maximum consensus on the 
project. The organization of the 1998 three-day conference on the Basque rail system, the 
attention paid to the claims made during the public consultation process, which in fact 
involved a lengthening of the process, the meetings with contestation groups, and even the 
image of dialogue with Ezker Batua are instances of this attitude. Secondly, the Basque 
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Government emphasized the environmental adequacy of the project, in particular through an 
emphasis on mixed traffic (Amann, 2004; López de Guereñu, 2006b), and the measures to be 
adopted in order to reduce its environmental impact (Amann, 2001). Thirdly, this emphasis 
was accompanied by an effort to communicate the benefits of the project through several 
communication campaigns and documents (e.g. Departamento de Transportes y Obras 
Públicas, 2006) and a website (Gobierno Vasco, 2015), both of a clear regional scope.28 
Finally, there was also an attempt, mentioned in the previous chapter, to engage opposing 
actors in the implementation in order to reduce the contestation to the line (Interviews 22 and 
28). 
The aim of this behaviour was, in general terms, to neutralize or – if possible – satisfy 
the contestation without substantially modifying or delaying the project. This suggests that 
there was an actual exercise of power by other actors that needed to be countered in order to 
reassert the authority of the state, yet which form of power was exercised and by whom? 
First of all, leading party EAJ-PNV yielded the exercise of part of their authority in order 
both to achieve political objectives and facilitate the implementation of the project. These 
objectives included the political support of Ezker Batua to maintain the stability of the 
Basque Government and of left-wing nationalist Euskal Herritarrok (EH) to sustain the 
parliamentary agreement between both and the Lizarra-Garazi process promoted by largely 
nationalist forces. There may also have been an intention to gain electoral support among a 
population that might become convinced by some of the contestation arguments. Both those 
political parties and the regional electorate thus exercised inducement by conditioning their 
support to the leading party and the Basque Government. 
Secondly, the government’s behaviour seems to have intended to avoid the use of 
violence by certain actors, which could hinder the implementation of the project. The 
previous environmental conflicts over a nuclear power plant in Lemoiz, permanently halted, 
and a new motorway across the Leitzaran valley, eventually modified significantly, suffered 
the intervention of terrorist group ETA, which included the murders of nine persons linked to 
these projects (El País, 2008a).29 In 1998, the Bilbao-based newspaper El Correo stated that 
                                                     
 
28 These campaigns, carried out towards the start of construction works, involved a travelling 
exhibition, advertising reports and advertisements in media outlets, and brochures and leaflets. They 
emphasized the regionally-relevant characteristics and benefits of the network, as the titles of some of 
these show: The Basque Y: so that Euskadi [the BAC] does not Stop; The Y: so that Euskadi 
Progresses; or It is the Way: New Basque Rail Network (Departamento de Transportes y Obras 
Públicas, 2005, 2006, 2007). 
29 The construction of a nuclear power plant in Lemoiz, Bizkaia, was virtually halted when, after three 
workers were murder in 1978 and 1979, the chief engineer was kidnapped and subsequently murdered 
in 1981. ETA killed the new chief engineer in 1982 and the construction of the plant was never 
completed. In the Leitzaran valley, Gipuzkoa, after threatening in 1989 the key persons involved in 
the construction of the motorway, the terrorist group started a series of attacks that resulted in the 
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the dialoguing attitude of the Basque Government responded to the fear of repetition of 
similar events (El Correo, 1998c). This is therefore a case of – although non-explicit in the 
period studied in this thesis – coercion, as it involves the threat of force. In short, the will to 
neutralize contestation seems prompted by the actual or anticipated pressure of regional 
actors exerted through inducement and coercion. 
The way the Basque Government neutralized this exercise of power so that it did not 
affect the development of the Vitoria-Irun line was partly through reasoning, by explaining 
the benefits of the line to the Basque population, partly through manipulation, in those cases 
when the information provided was purposely biased30 or when the goals underpinning its 
behaviour were concealed. The insistence on mixed traffic and its environmental and 
congestion reduction benefits seems to have been exaggerated since, according to experts 
interviewed, until only recently it was believed that the line would not carry goods due to the 
lack of experiences in Spain (Interview 9), and in any case freight traffic is a complex 
problem that does not only involve the infrastructure itself but also other aspects such as 
network management (Interview 11). Moreover, the emphasis on measures to reduce the 
environmental impact of the project does not seem to correspond to the policy outcome. 
Although in 2003 the Basque Government developed environmental and landscape 
instructions for the development of the construction projects of the line (Departamento de 
Transportes y Obras Públicas and ESTEYCO, 2003), ADIF is the ultimate responsible for 
these projects. In fact, a senior official from the Ministry of Development claims that the 
actual outcome does not substantially differ from other projects in Spain but that it was used 
to counter contestation actors (Interview 9). 
With regard to the communication activities, leaving aside the disputable assumptions 
that underpin the developmental discourse, there are a number of missing aspects that 
suggest they have been omitted on purpose. Two instances are the insistence on modal shift 
from road to rail without mentioning the induced transport demand resulting from new 
infrastructure construction, and the non-consideration in the environmental performance of 
the project of the carbon dioxide emissions caused by this construction (Departamento de 
Transportes y Obras Públicas, 2005, 2006).31 A last instance of manipulation has been the 
                                                                                                                                                      
 
murders of two businessmen and two policemen. In 1991, the government of Gipuzkoa agreed with 
the majority of the contestation movement a modification of the route that avoided the valley (El País, 
2008a). 
30 Note that a discourse analytical approach entails considering information as intrinsically biased. 
Manipulation is here deemed to exist when there is an intention to adopt this bias. 
31 In the absence of a more detailed analysis, the calculation of some data might have been skewed 
towards positive results. For example, the project’s internal rate of return according to a cost-benefit 
analysis commissioned by the Spanish relevant ministry in the early 1990s did not reach 6% under 
any scenario (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes and INECO, 1992), whereas the Basque 
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insistence on dialoguing with opposing actors since they had no intention to modify the 
project or its time-scale (Amann, 2003a; El País, 2002c) but instead to achieve ‘that social 
majority’s acceptance of these infrastructures’ (Interview 15).32 Lastly, the unsuccessful 
attempt to co-opt opposing actors in the implementation can be conceptualized as failed 
inducement, as it entailed the incentive of partly reducing the negative impacts of the project. 
 
To summarize, within the subnational arena, a series of organizations both from the 
contestation to the project (grouped in Elkarlana and in the Red por un Tren Social) and 
from the hegemonic discursive construction (the Basque Chambers of Commerce) have 
unsuccessfully attempted to significantly modify, delay or stop the project. The most 
noticeable influences have been some slight modifications achieved through the formal 
procedures of the policy process and a more responsive attitude by the Basque Government 
towards opposing sensibilities. These changes may have partly responded to reasoning by 
those actors, but the evidence obtained suggests that they – especially the different Basque 
Government’s behaviour – also sought to neutralize the exercise of actual inducement by 
political actors and foreseen coercion by certain sector of the contestation movement. This 
was done – rather successfully for the time period covered in this research, since the 
development of the project was not altered due to that exercise – through reasoning and 
manipulation. 
 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
In accordance with the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 and the standing conditions described 
in an earlier section, this chapter has shown that the Spanish central state has played the main 
role in shaping and promoting the development of the Vitoria-Irun HSR line. Through its 
authority, and despite apparent tensions within it, it controlled the time-scale and the 
definition of the characteristics of the project. Nevertheless, the analysis has also provided 
some insights into two of the issues identified in the literature review as requiring more 
academic attention: the importance of EU institutions and the role of subnational actors. 
Due to the lack of competences of EU institutions concerning transnational transport 
infrastructure development, their potential influence comes from modes of power other than 
                                                                                                                                                      
 
Government estimated this rate to be 8,38% in the mid-2000s (Departamento de Transportes y Obras 
Públicas, 2005). 
32 Nevertheless, as noted earlier with regard to Ezker Batua, it is likely that certain actors knew about 
the improbability of their influence. 
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authority, such as inducement through the provision of incentives (e.g. financial or technical 
support). However, no evidence was found of significant influence in the period studied in 
the case study. The existing financing opportunities did not function as a decisive incentive; 
in fact the use of the abundant Cohesion Funds seems to have been focused on other projects 
with a higher priority, such as the Madrid-Barcelona HSR line. Likewise, the influence of the 
drafting of trans-European HSR network outline plans on the development of the line seems 
to have been negligible. However, the time period addressed in this research, resulting from 
the characteristics of the studied case, does not encompass recent significant developments. 
From 2006, the potential EU financial contribution for cross-border sections has increased; 
the figures of the European Coordinator and the TEN-T Executive Agency have been 
consolidated and there are signs of their greater importance. Therefore, further research on a 
more recent period may indeed qualify these findings. 
A different conclusion was drawn with respect to subnational actors. The Basque 
Government has indeed been able to exert a significant influence on the policy process 
through the exercise of different types of persuasion. During the first years of this process, it 
managed to persuade the Spanish Government to modify the route of the project through 
what I propose to term reasoning, by using part of the investment needed to develop the 
Bilbao-Vitoria line in order to improve the link with the French border. In the latter stages of 
the case, it brokered an agreement with the Spanish Government through negotiation that 
allowed it to become involved in the implementation of the line. This achievement, however, 
may not seem commensurate with the significant initiative and activity that the Basque 
Government displayed throughout the policy process, which testifies to the dominance of the 
central state. Nevertheless, the case in fact constitutes an illustration of the complex transport 
infrastructure development politics within the Spanish State of Autonomies. It illustrates, 
apart from the formal opportunities of participating in the policy process, how both the 
presence of regionally-based parties in the nation-state institutions and the strengthening of 
the central government party’s regional affiliate may lead to changes in the development of a 
centrally-driven major infrastructure project. 
Apart from EU institutions and the subnational state, the influence of other actors has 
also been examined, although generally it has not been very significant. A first group of 
actors is related to the transnational characteristics of the Vitoria-Irun HSR line: other 
nation-states and a series of transnational networks of association. However, only France 
seems to have exerted a noticeable influence (negative inducement) by failing to promote the 
French section of the Atlantic HSR link. A second group, on which analysis has focused 
especially due to the power struggles they engaged in with the Basque Government, are 
subnational actors who sought to modify, delay or stop the project. The existence of political 
incentives (inducement) and of potential threats of force (coercion) prompted the Basque 
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Government to intensify its effort to convince, partly through reasoning and partly through 
manipulation, those actors. Finally, it is worth pointing out the lack of influence of the 
private sector, which in other cases reviewed in Chapter 2 had played a more important role 
(Lemberg, 1995; Ross, 1998, pp. 203–205). Only the Chambers of Commerce were found to 
have significantly attempted to exercise power in episodic agency terms, although with little 
effect on the project. The continuing importance of the state in Spanish rail infrastructure 
planning and development and the unfavourable characteristics of high-speed rail for private 
participation may have been the two key reasons for the limited relevance of private sector 
actors. 
To conclude, in spite of the increasing importance of actors related to European 
integration and to the activity of groups from the private sector and the civil society, the 
power dynamics between Spanish and Basque state actors have dominated the policy 
process. This resulted in a project which reproduced fundamentally both the subnational and 
the nation-state story-lines presented in the previous chapter: a modernized, high-speed rail 
network, which provides fast passenger transport between Spanish cities while it allegedly 
supports freight transport on a trans-European scale. The European story-line, although 
certainly in line with this policy outcome, was not sufficiently backed by actual influence in 
order to secure the effective implementation of the cross-border section Vitoria-Dax in a 
coordinated manner. The exercise of authority by the central state was recognized by most 
actors – although even the Basque Government challenged it at some point – so their 
influence or episodic agency power took place fundamentally through persuasion 
(reasoning, inducement, and negotiation). A more intricate power struggle took place among 
subnational actors, mainly opposed to the project, and the Basque Government, yet as it was 
shown it eventually had little impact on the development of the high-speed rail line, at least 
during the time period addressed in this research. All in all, this chapter and the previous one 
have provided a theoretically-informed examination of the policy process surrounding the 
Vitoria-Irun HSR line, through the lenses of discourse and power. Both analyses are brought 
together in the next chapter through a third, spatial perspective. 
 
8 Relations and scale in rail infrastructure policy: 
discourse and power through a spatial lens 
The previous two chapters have analyzed the policy process surrounding the Vitoria-Irun 
high-speed rail line from two distinct analytical perspectives: Hajer’s (1995) discourse 
analytical approach and a power exercise analytical framework developed from the work of 
several theorists on power, in particular Clegg (1989). This final analytical chapter seeks, in 
response to the third research question of this thesis on the spatiality of transnational HSR 
policy-making, to spatialize both approaches and unify them through a focus on space. 
Relations, understood as constituting space, and scale, understood as framing the former, 
combine in order to produce a particular landscape of policy-making. Actors, discursively 
and materially associated to relational spaces of different reach but that may be assigned 
scalar features, interact through certain more or less proximate arenas, which may as well be 
related to certain bounded spaces, in order to produce policy. Furthermore, as policy-making 
seeks to adapt and plan for the transnational relations promoted by European integration, the 
scalar frames of regulation transcending traditional political spaces, which in conventional 
representative democracy provide the legitimacy for policy, may become restructured. 
Notwithstanding the debate about which spaces – scalar or otherwise – are the most suitable 
for a democratic politics, a necessary first step is to provide a description of how relations 
and scales unfold in transnational infrastructure policy-making, that is, to reflect on the 
spatiality of the process. 
In Chapter 3, a conceptualization of space as relationally constituted but sensitive to 
scalar configurations was first proposed in order to be subsequently applied to the discourse 
and power analytical approaches. This application is presented in the first two sections of 
this chapter, by using the concepts and categories proposed separately for each approach. 
Thus, with regard to the former the following section examines the spatiality of both the 
content of discourse (that is, the spaces of concern and of reliance present in story-lines) and 
of the processes by which it is produced, reproduced and transformed (i.e. the discursive 
arenas through which these processes take place). Both aspects should not simply be 
considered separately, hence the section explores the relationship between the spatiality of 
the content of discourse and the spatiality of its production. In order words, it examines the 
extent to which the spatial mediation through which discourse is produced influences the 
spatial characteristics of the discourse. The spatialization of the analysis of episodic agency 
power is subsequently addressed in the second section of the chapter. Based on Allen’s 
(2003) topological perspective on power, the exercise of power is considered to always take 
place across space (through relations of proximity and reach) and through space (via certain 
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arenas that actors seek access to). The resulting description of the spatiality of power is 
meant to provide a more complex and thorough picture of politics than scalar or multi-level 
perspectives.  
In order to answer the research question, however, it is necessary to consider both 
approaches in a united fashion. Firstly, although the consideration of space as relationally 
constituted and potentially related to certain scalar frames provides a common basis for the 
spatialization of both approaches, it is possible to identify further points of convergence. The 
clearest common element is the assumption that discourse production and power exercise 
occurs through space, in this approach discursive and power arenas. In this respect, the 
topological understanding of power is also applicable to the dynamics of discourse: the latter 
may as well be produced by reaching into certain discursive arenas, near or far. The second 
step in developing a single approach to the spatiality of policy-making is to ascertain the role 
of relations and scales in policy-making. Both discursive and power arenas may be 
associated to certain scales (e.g. state institutions) and may indeed influence the content of 
discourse or influence the exercise of power across those spaces. Yet the importance of scale 
is not pre-determined and must be ascertained empirically. This is particularly relevant since, 
as discussed in the introductory chapter, scale is central to the definition of the spaces of 
conventional representative democracy. These two issues are thus addressed in the third 
section of the chapter, which is followed by a concluding section summarizing the findings 
and elaborating on the answer to the third research question. 
 
 
8.1 The spatiality of discourse: spaces of concern, spaces of reliance 
and discursive arenas 
Due to the spatial and, more specifically, territorial tensions that the development of 
transnational transport infrastructure involves, the spatial dimension is a key element in the 
actors’ representations of the transport problem. This dimension was articulated in the 
discourse analytical approach developed in Chapter 3 through two main aspects: the content 
and the production of discourse. Firstly, two types of spaces can be distinguished in the 
content of the story-lines mobilized: the spaces of concern, or the geographical basis of the 
actors’ discursively constituted interests; and the spaces of reliance, upon whose constitution 
the realization of such interests depends. Secondly, the production of discourse is mediated 
by certain spaces or discursive arenas (Linnros and Hallin, 2001), which might influence in 
turn the spatiality of discourse. This section thus complements the results presented in 
Chapter 6 with the application of these concepts to the discourse analysis. It first identifies 
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the spaces of concern and of reliance underpinning the different story-lines through which 
both the hegemonic discourses and the antagonistic discourse were articulated. Finally, it 
examines the discursive arenas through which the story-lines were produced, reproduced and 
transformed and how they related to the spatiality of these story-lines. 
 
8.1.1 Relationality and compatible diversity in the hegemonic discourses 
As the fundamentally Spanish-wide membership of the coalition formed around the story-
line of the technocratic selective modernization of rail suggests (see Section 6.1.1), the space 
of concern of this story-line was defined by the limits of the nation-state. However, in this 
case this space should not be conceptualized simply in scalar terms. The geographical basis 
of its members’ discursively constituted interests were in fact the relations facilitated by rail 
within the nation-state territory, and not those promoted by other modes of transport or, at 
least in the first instance, the Spanish territory as a whole. Attention was focused on 
enhancing the functioning of the rail network, not the performance of other transport modes 
or economic development throughout the nation-state. For example, the 1987 Rail Transport 
Plan made clear that its objective concerning infrastructure was to selectively modernize the 
rail network in order to make it competitive over other modes (Ministerio de Transportes, 
Turismo y Comunicaciones, 1987, p. 17). These relations, upon whose establishment the 
competitiveness of the rail network depended, thus also constituted the space of reliance of 
this story-line. The stance of the members of its discourse coalition with respect to the track 
gauge issue in Spain is also indicative of the identification of both types of spaces with the 
rail-based relations within the Spanish territory: the priority was to improve the functionality 
of the nation-state network rather than the integration with the European network through the 
adoption of the UIC track gauge, which would in addition cause significant problems in the 
Spanish network (El País, 1989e; Monfort, 1988). 
The developmental discourse, hegemonic during the majority of the time period covered 
in the case study, presents a more complex spatiality. In fact, a key difference – if not the 
main one – between the four story-lines identified is their spatial characteristics. What they 
share, however, is the understanding of the spaces of concern as bounded and continuous 
since, through transport infrastructure development, they sought to enhance the economic 
development of certain territories, rather than simply the relations within them. 
Thus, the space of concern present in the subnational story-line (see Section 6.2.1) was 
largely the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC), although it sometimes varied when 
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actors were related to smaller or greater spaces, for instance in cross-border arrangements 
(e.g. the BAC-Aquitaine cross-border region in Bujanda Arizmendi, 2006a).1 The relations 
on which the realization of the interests of those actors that mobilized this story-line 
depended were generally of a trans-European reach and largely referred to freight transport: 
improved accessibility to markets was required in order to better compete in an integrated 
Europe (Amann, 2005; Atienza, 1989). This space of reliance was sometimes further 
identified with an Atlantic axis or corridor, an economically integrated space that needed to 
be established in order to counter the uneven development of the European territory. As 
Basque President Ardanza stated in a 1989 interview, ‘there is a shared need [by the BAC 
and Aquitaine] to promote the economic development of the European Atlantic axis that 
allows balancing the degree of attraction that, due to agglomeration, the central and 
Mediterranean regions have in the current European integration process’ (Ardanza, 1989). 
Interestingly, this duality of a Basque space of concern and a trans-European space of 
reliance is coherent with the political stance towards Europe of Basque moderate 
nationalism, as the at the time Director of the Aquitaine-Euskadi Logistic Platform 
eloquently expressed: 
‘Throughout history, each stage of socioeconomic development has required a certain living space, and thus 
today the differences, the local, the most intimate identity, the most non-transferrable feeling of belonging 
are cultivated most naturally with the openness, with the acceptance of the other, with relation, with 
exchange and with communication. [...] I believe that making ourselves known beyond our borders is vital 
for the Basques, we must get it right and say that we are here and that we want to relate to those from 
outside. That is the bet of the New Basque Rail Network, that is the bet of the “Y”, the bet of the Basque 
identity of the future’ (Bujanda Arizmendi, 2006b). 
The spatiality of the nation-state story-line (see section 6.2.2) naturally revolved around the 
Spanish territory. As explained in Chapter 6, extensive high-speed rail development would 
significantly contribute to achieve its balanced development in order to catch up with the 
economy of other EU member states. The space of reliance was not strictly limited to those 
relations within the nation-state, but these seemed to have had priority over the network 
connections with Europe. In any case, this space was not particularly defined by relations of 
a certain length (for instance between the main urban areas or industrial nodes) but by a 
                                                     
 
1 In fact, the concern with becoming marginalized was shared by actors related to other subnational 
spaces, to the extent that in some occasions groups of subnational state and private sector actors from 
French and Spanish Atlantic regions practiced story-lines that had as spaces of concern the 
corresponding regions or even the Atlantic axis as a space being itself marginalized (El Correo, 1989f; 
El País, 1988c, 2002d, 2004l). All these cases shared nevertheless the space of reliance (an Atlantic 
rail corridor) and, accordingly, engaged in networks of association that sought to promote its 
development.   
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general increase in accessibility that would presumably promote such balanced development. 
This was clearly expressed in the 2005 Spanish infrastructure plan, which sought to achieve 
this increase in accessibility without showing a particular concern for cross-border 
connections. Out of its 16 policy guidelines for the rail sector, the fifth one prescribed ‘[t]o 
set a target for a reduction in total travel times for all interurban links’ (Ministerio de 
Fomento, 2005, p. 64), whereas there was little reference in them to the development of 
transnational links beyond ensuring the interoperability with the rest of the European 
network. The spaces of concern and reliance in this story-line thus approximately match 
those in the technocratic policy discourse story-line in terms of their scalar limits, although 
the two fundamental differences between them are, first, that in this case the space of 
concern is continuous (development was meant to be fostered throughout the nation-state) 
and, second, that the space of reliance is denser (the aim was not to act only on those 
corridors where rail may have been competitive, but to integrate as much Spanish territory as 
possible in the high-speed rail network). 
The coincidence of the scalar limits of the spaces of concern and of reliance is more 
clearly seen in the European story-line (see section 6.2.3): the objective of trans-European 
HSR infrastructure development was to facilitate the establishment of a fully functional 
Single Market (space of reliance), with the expectation that the EU as a whole (space of 
concern) will benefit from it. However, the space of reliance is clearly networked – 
‘[n]etworks are the arteries of the single market’ (CEC, 1993, p. 75) – whereas the space of 
concern is, as in the previous story-line, continuous. The relations that form the space of 
reliance, furthermore, tend to be long-distance. According to González Finat, the CEC’s 
point of view was that high-speed rail was not to reduce travel times between the main 
Basque cities to 30 minutes but to support long-distance connections (Interview 4; also CEC, 
1991, p. 6). However, this distinction was to be blurred in the sustainable spatial structuring 
story-line. 
The spatiality of this story-line (see Section 6.2.4) is indeed less defined than in the 
other ones reviewed, not surprisingly due to the varied membership of the discourse 
coalition. As with the previous story-line, different spaces of concern within the EU were 
said to benefit from transnational HSR infrastructure development, yet in the sustainable 
spatial structuring story-line this outcome does not simply result from the establishment of 
long-distance links but from facilitating relations of different reach, from the trans-European 
to the subnational. Thus, the new Vitoria-Irun HSR line would promote balanced and 
sustainable development on a series of spatial scales: the BAC would benefit from the 
establishment of intra-regional HSR relations as well as trans-border transport; the Spanish 
nation-state would enhance its own network whilst improving its integration with the rest of 
the European one; and the EU would be provided with a key link that facilitated the seamless 
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flow of goods and persons across its territory. Former Spanish Minister of Development 
Álvarez Cascos articulated this story-line in the Congress of Deputies as follows: 
I agree with the Honourable Member that this work is fundamental for three reasons: first, because it will 
allow to effectively structure [vertebrar] by rail the Basque Country with Spain’s high-speed network; 
secondly, because it will allow to connect through the Basque Country the Spanish high-speed network 
with Europe; and third, because it will allow as well to link the three Basque capitals with each other and 
promote the territorial cohesion of the Basque Country’ (Congreso de los Diputados, 2000).2 
Therefore, in the sustainable spatial structuring story-line the spaces of concern and of 
reliance are – rather confusingly – varied: a number of scalar spaces would benefit for the 
establishment of a link that facilitates relations of a different reach. 
All in all, the spatiality of the hegemonic discourses’ story-lines has been generally 
characterized by a ‘compatible diversity’: a significant variety in terms of the spaces of 
concern but sufficiently similar spaces of reliance to make the story-lines of the 
developmental discourse compatible. As shown in Figure 12 below, the different discourse 
coalitions were formed around distinct spaces of concern, hence their members were usually 
associated with certain, more or less bounded, spaces. The differences in the spaces of 
reliance may have in fact caused disagreements between coalitions (e.g. between the 
subnational and the nation-state ones), as ultimately these spaces are about policy objectives 
– they are formed by the set of spatial relations that, if established, are meant to enable the 
realization of actors’ discursively constituted interests. However, their overall compatibility 
with the Vitoria-Irun HSR line – or, vice versa, the capacity of this line to fulfil different 
policy objectives – allowed to advance and carry out the project. In terms of the nature of 
these spaces, within the developmental discourse the spaces of concern are always 
continuous and largely bounded since the coalitions sought, through transport infrastructure 
development, to enhance the economic development of certain territories. This is not the case 
of the selective modernization story-line, where the space of concern is relational as it 
consists of just the relations facilitated by rail, with no explicit impact on regional 
development (hence the more limited discourse coalition). In contrast to the spaces of 
concern, the spaces of reliance are always relational, as their definition implies, yet in 
comparison with the antagonistic discourse (see below) their relations involve the linkage of 
more distant nodes over a wider area. However, they are also generally bounded, although 
the clarity of their boundary varies with the story-line. 
                                                     
 
2 This statement is the beginning of a response to a question to the Government made by a Member of 
the Congress of Deputies for Bizkaia from the same parliamentary group, which attests to the capacity 
of the story-line to bridge differences between actors, which in this example were basically spatial. 
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Figure 12. Spatiality of the hegemonic discourses’ story-lines 
 
 
8.1.2 Proximity and spatial continuity in the antagonistic discourse 
The spatiality of the antagonistic discourse (see Section 6.3.1) is clearly based on the notion 
of proximity. The high-speed train, accompanied by the fragmentation of space caused by its 
linkage of distant points, would have a significant impact on locality not only in its 
immediate environmental sense but also regarding its socioeconomic development. The 
alternative to the existing model of development based in capitalist globalization lay, 
according to the members of the antagonistic story-line discourse coalition, in promoting this 
proximity at the expense of the long-distance relations facilitated by high-speed rail. As a 
member of agricultural trade union EHNE put it, ‘so, indeed, many times the discourse is 
localization against globalization’ (Interview 29). Placing the locality at the centre was the 
foundation on which an alternative to the current model of development was to be based. 
Thus, similarly to the environmental conflicts analyzed in della Porta and Piazza (2007), at 
least at the discursive level this coalition was not characterized by simple NIMBYsm as it 
addressed the wider issue of the model of development. 
Accordingly, the space of concern of the antagonistic story-line is the locality or 
proximate environment. Although contestation actors certainly focused their attention on 
sites or settlements impacted by the line and occasionally mentioned the need to revitalize 
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the euskaldeak3 (Interview 23), the space of concern has been usually framed as Euskal 
Herria, a greater Basque Country to which the BAC belongs and which has become the 
dominant geopolitical imagination of Basque nationalism (Mansvelt Beck, 2006). In any 
case, more important than the exact boundaries of the space of concern is its continuous 
nature: the area to benefit must be the whole region, not just the urban areas. Hence the 
duality occasionally used by opposition actors of Euskal Herria (‘Basque Country’) vs. 
Euskal Hiria (‘Basque City’), a notion proposed by the Basque Government and a spatial 
planning think tank to conceptualize the BAC as a city-region (Interview 36; see also 
Departamento de Ordenacion del Territorio y Medio Ambiente and Fundación Metrópoli, 
2002). Referring to this duality, the continuous character of the space of concern is expressed 
by a professor of urban and regional planning at the University of the Basque Country, who 
wrote critically against the high-speed rail line, thus: 
‘Euskadi is not a city. Euskadi is a country [país] with county towns [cabeceras de comarca], with rural 
towns, with agricultural areas that must be recouped, with wooded areas, with coastal areas, with urban 
areas, with everything. But it is not a city’ (Interview 1). 
The insistence on the necessity to facilitate local, intra-regional relations suggests that the 
boundaries of this story-line’s space of reliance correspond to those of the space of concern. 
However, the emphasis on rejecting the project rather than on proposing alternatives – and 
therefore making explicit the relations to be established – prevents a precise definition of 
such a space. 
This is less the case of the ‘social train’ story-line (see Section 6.4.1) which, being also 
based on the notion of proximity and having as space of concern Euskal Herria, advocated 
the development of a rail network ‘of social utility’ that satisfied the maximum number of 
users without inducing new overall transport demand and allowing at the same time freight 
transport on it (ELA et al., 2003, p. 3). Thus, the space of reliance basically consisted of 
dense relations within Euskal Herria, although it is important to note that this notion did not 
exclude passenger and, particularly, freight transport beyond its borders. Roberto Bermejo, 
an academic who was instrumental in providing a technical basis to the story-line, explains 
this with reference to the connection with Europe: 
‘We are perfectly linked with Europe. Firstly by car, at least in medium or not very long distances. 
Secondly, planes link with everywhere, and besides air transport will always be cheaper than rail, 
particularly if it is high speed, because it requires virtually no infrastructure. [...] A network for each 
country [país], better connected especially with the next cross-border country [país] and so on, fine, but not 
                                                     
 
3 Sub-regions or districts in Basque, used here to refer to traditional regions smaller than the 
provinces, comarcas in Spanish. 
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in high speed. [...] Now, we have always considered that – improving as well the passenger connection – 
the key element was freight transport, here, in the Basque Country, and generally in all Europe. We do 
recognize that’ (Interview 35). 
The image is thus of a patchwork of networks that serve their territories as homogeneously 
as possible, yet not in isolation from each other. Moreover, the promotion of long-distance 
HSR relations is seen as linked to the interests of an economic minority,4 and hence local 
relations are prioritized.  
A representation of the spaces of concern and of reliance of both story-lines can be seen 
in Figure 13 below. The two story-lines of the antagonistic discourse shared a common space 
of concern (Euskal Herria), which is coherent with the nationalist dimension of the 
contestation movement. The main spatial difference between this discourse and the 
developmental one is that the former tends to see space – both of concern and of reliance – in 
topographical terms, i.e. as a continuous surface where distance – and thus proximity – is 
important. Although the space of reliance in the antagonistic discourse is obviously 
networked, the grid is as dense as possible in order to homogeneously serve a continuous 
geographical area. In this respect it clearly contrasts with the more networked nature of the 
spaces of reliance of the developmental discourse, which promoted the reduction of travel 
times between distant points in order to benefit certain spaces commonly defined in scalar 
terms. Discursive antagonism is thus reflected in the radically different types of spaces of 
reliance of each discourse. 
Figure 13. Spatiality of the antagonistic discourse’s story-lines 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
4 A minority which, as suggested by a member of the Red por un Tren Social at the Basque 
Parliament, is not just non-local but also off-space: ‘On the economic side we see that actually all 
these infrastructures draw wealth out of the local and take it elsewhere. [...] So, who is interested in 
this? This is of interest to an institution so much from above that we the people are unable to see it, 
the economic interests are so much from above that we don’t see it’ (Parlamento Vasco, 2006b). 
206 
 
8.1.3 Spatial discursive dynamics: discourse production through distinct and 
scale-related discursive arenas 
Once the main spatial features of the story-lines identified have been defined, it is necessary 
to analyze how they were produced, reproduced and transformed through discursive arenas. 
With regard to the technocratic discourse on rail transport policy, although the data collected 
is not exhaustive in this respect, there is evidence that the discursive arenas were limited to 
certain political institutions and networks of experts along with, to a lesser extent, the media. 
Until 1991, the planning of rail and road infrastructure was split between two ministries5 
with distinct approaches to transport infrastructure planning (Interview 6). Nevertheless, the 
network of experts that supported and practiced the discourse stretched beyond state 
institutions. According to a former senior official between 1985 and 1994, in those years 
there was an important interaction between the Spanish ministry responsible for rail 
infrastructure planning and the publicly owned consultancy firm INECO, in terms of both 
participation of the latter in Spanish infrastructure planning and of a significant interchange 
of staff between both bodies (Interview 6).6, 7 Due to its importance within the discourse in 
producing and legitimating a particular form of knowledge, this network resembles Haas’ 
notion of ‘epistemic communities’, ‘a network of professionals with recognized expertise 
and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area’ (Haas, 1992, p. 3). Although the discourse was 
reproduced in the media to a certain extent (El País, 1987c), its production and reproduction 
remained largely confined to technical circles and the government departments responsible 
for rail planning. This explains that the space of concern was bounded by the Spanish 
borders and consisted specifically of the rail transport relations within the Spanish territory. 
This limited nature of the discursive arenas was less visible in the developmental 
discourse. In the four identified story-lines, the relevant ministries or government 
departments were still important, but other state bodies such as those responsible for the 
economy or the environment and the government as a whole became more relevant as the 
policy issue gained centrality and the discourse widened its scope. This increased importance 
also entailed that the main media outlets became a relevant discursive arena, as they often 
covered and presented opinions on the issue (e.g. ABC, 2004; El Correo, 1988e; El País, 
                                                     
 
5 The Ministry of Transport, Tourism and Communications and the Ministry of Public Works and 
Urbanism, respectively. 
6 This is the case of two of the interviewees in this research (Interviews 10 and 11), who worked both 
at the ministry and at INECO. 
7 A measure of the spatiality of these discursive arenas is the fact that the offices of the Ministry of 
Development, the Directorate-General for Rail Infrastructures, and INECO are located within walking 
distance of each other, in an area of two square kilometres in Madrid. 
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2005d). In general terms, it is reasonable to link scalar discursive arenas with the production 
of story-lines with bounded spaces of concern, a relationship that can be most clearly seen in 
the nation-state and subnational arenas. Firstly, both the Spanish government and the 
Spanish parliament naturally promoted the formation of a story-line with a space of concern 
defined by the Spanish territory. Access to the Government of Spain from the private sector 
involved bodies with a similar spatial coverage, such as the Association of Nationwide 
Construction Companies of Spain (SEOPAN) (Interview 24).8 Similarly, actors in Basque 
state institutions usually framed their concerns around the BAC. The Basque Parliament was 
an important – although not influential in episodic agency power terms – space for 
discussion on the high-speed rail line. A former Member of it, from left-wing party Ezker 
Batua, highlights that the majority of political forces – both nationalist and non-nationalist – 
assigned a certain ‘national’ dimension to the institution, where any issue of relevance to the 
BAC had to be addressed regardless of its actual capacity to influence it: 
 ‘That is, there can’t be a debate concerning Euskadi [the BAC] that has no space in the Basque Parliament 
and that does not leave us at least with the – the word comes to me in Basque – feeling that we decide on 
what is ours, even if it’s not real, as you say’ (Interview 22) 
The previously discussed influence of environmental consultants on the Basque 
Government’s – and possibly on the Basque citizenry’s – stance with respect to the project 
took place through professional links with this government and through regional or 
regionally focused media (Olabe, 2004a; Olabe and Ansuategi, 2004; also Interview 34). 
Moreover, traditionally there seem to have existed informal networks involving Basque 
politicians and the Basque private sector, including the Chamber of Commerce of Bilbao 
(Interview 14).9 
European arenas, due to the fact that its political actors are frequently related to smaller 
spaces such as nation-states or subnational regions, are arguably weaker in terms of 
promoting a pan-European space of concern. This is the case, for instance, of the Council of 
the EU, formed by the relevant nation-state ministers, the Christophersen group responsible 
for identifying TENs priority projects, which included representatives of – apart from the 
CEC and the EIB – the Heads of State or Government, and the High-Level Group on a trans-
                                                     
 
8 Although beyond the time-frame of the case study, the existence of this networked discursive arena 
is demonstrated by the designation as President of SEOPAN of the former Director of the Economic 
Office of Prime Minister Rodríguez Zapatero immediately after he left this post (El País, 2008b). 
9 Similarly to the Spanish case, the existence of these informal networks is illustrated by the 
appointment of the Basque Minister for Transport and Public Works between 2005 and 2009 as 
Secretary General of the Basque business association Confebask in 2010 (El Correo, 2010a). 
208 
 
European HSR network, formed by representatives of the CEC, the EIB, the private sector 
(including the CER and the ERT), and the member states.10 
In fact, these European arenas may be better seen as arenas where no scale 
predominates among its actors. A number of arenas that also transcend nation-state borders 
and include actors relatable to different spaces can be further identified. Firstly, the Basque 
Government participated in forms of cooperation with the Government of Aquitaine, which 
was formalized in the ‘Aquitaine-Euskadi Logistic Platform’ (PLAE), and engaged in 
networks of association between Atlantic regions, including the Atlantic Arc Commission of 
the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions, and cross-border cooperation structures (the 
Communauté de Travail des Pyrénées). Secondly, Basque private sector actors also engaged 
in networks with similar actors across the Atlantic area (the CCA and the CEFAT). Other 
arenas may have provided more specific and occasional opportunities for discourse 
production. For instance, a former CEC official mentions a conference in the late 1980s, 
when he was still working for French rail infrastructure manager SNCF, in which 
representatives of the Government of Catalonia, the Chamber of Commerce of Bilbao and 
SNCF discussed the possibility of developing cross-border rail links, an issue that at that 
moment was not well seen by the Spanish Government (Interview 5). Similar cases, although 
perhaps less influential due to the later date on which they were held and their wider range of 
participants, were two three-day conferences held in the BAC: one on the Basque rail system 
(Departamento de Transportes y Obras Públicas, 1999) and another one on the Trans-
European Networks (Consejo Vasco del Movimiento Europeo, 2001). 
The extent to which these eclectic discursive arenas have prompted discourse 
production and transformation is difficult to determine. In some cases it is reasonable to 
claim they have reinforced the existing story-lines by facilitating interaction between actors 
with similar concerns (e.g. subnational networks of association and the aforementioned late-
1980s conference). In others, discursive arenas may have helped the convergence of story-
lines towards the sustainable spatial structuring one (e.g. the PLAE and the Atlantic Arc 
Commission). Finally, other arenas seem to have been less influential, either due to their 
one-off character (the other two aforementioned conferences) or because they functioned 
more as sites of power struggles or power arenas (see next section) rather than arenas for 
discursive interaction (e.g. the Council of the EU and the High-Level Group on a trans-
European HSR network). What seems certain is that all these arenas helped to reproduce the 
developmental discourse, beyond differences with regard to the spaces to be benefitted 
(spaces of concern) and, to a lesser extent, the spaces to be developed (spaces of reliance). 
                                                     
 
10 See Section 5.3.1 for further details on the latter two groups.  
209 
 
In contrast, the antagonistic discourse was produced and reproduced through 
significantly different arenas. The Asamblea contra el TAV, which initiated the contestation 
movement, had an assembly-based local character and the youth social centres gaztetxes as 
key spaces of discourse production and reproduction (Interviews 2 and 23). The antagonistic 
discourse coalition, formalized in AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana, emerged as a result of three 
conferences between 1999 to 2001 in a social centre in Bilbao and the town hall of Elorrio, 
located near the centre of the Y-shaped Vitoria-Irun HSR line (Interviews 2 and 29). The 
reproduction of the discourse by this coalition took place mainly through public and rural 
spaces and informal networks: demonstrations in the Basque cities and towns affected; 
information and discussion sessions in municipalities; protest marches, sit-ins and other non-
violent actions on sites related to the project; and the production of communication materials 
such as leaflets, documents and videos (Interview 2). As several interviewees pointed out, 
the intention of Elkarlana was to generate a grassroots social movement and hence its work 
was based on local mobilization and information (Interviews 2 and 31). In addition, minority 
media outlets Egin and Gara, with a left-wing and pro-independence editorial line, also 
contributed to produce and reproduce this discourse (e.g. Antigüedad, 2001; Cabareda, 
1995). In turn, the Red por un Tren Social functioned more as a discussion group able to 
generate an alternative discourse (Interviews 22 and 28) yet without Elkarlana’s grassroots 
mobilization (Interview 2), and thus the arenas where the social train story-line was 
mobilized were more limited to Basque academic circles,11 informal networks among 
associations, and regional media and communication networks. In any case, what all these 
arenas have in common is their local character; the antagonistic story-lines were rarely 
practiced beyond the boundaries of the BAC or Euskal Herria.12 Not surprisingly, the 
discourse presented a local and topographical dimension which included but was not limited 
to nationalist positions, as a member of Elkarlana points out: 
‘Well, we, as a movement, have been a Basque movement, clearly. [...] I think that national expression is an 
– I think – very heartfelt, very cherished expression. ‘But it’s a movement only of abertzales.’13 No, it’s not 
only of abertzales. [...] I think that in the anti-HST movement there are many people that do not carry the 
label of ‘nationalist’ or ‘abertzale’, but simply they are in the struggle because it is an important struggle’ 
(Interview 31). 
                                                     
 
11 As noted in Chapter 6, the technical basis to the story-line was provided by a group of academics at 
the University of the Basque Country (Interviews 2 and 22). 
12 However, actors from the contestation movement participated in meetings with other similar 
movements within and outside the Spanish nation-state (Interviews 2 and 31) and, in turn, actors from 
other movements occasionally were involved in events in the BAC (Interview 26). Arguably, these 
different movements shared the antagonistic discourse in its main features, but the articulation of the 
story-lines for the particular case addressed in this research was fundamentally done in Basque arenas. 
13 ‘Patriot’ or ‘nationalist’ in Basque (Aulestia and White, 1992, p. 1).  
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Access to the main discursive arenas by proponents of the antagonistic discourse was 
limited, and in any case it was restricted to Basque state institutions. Opposing political 
parties have generally had a minority presence in the Basque Parliament which, as was 
shown in Chapter 6, allowed them to engage in argumentative interaction with the 
proponents of the hegemonic discourse. This presence resulted once in a parliamentary 
agreement between the Basque Government and the left-wing nationalist party Euskal 
Herritarrok (EH), which provided further opportunities for interaction. Moreover, the left-
wing political party Ezker Batua, which opposed the project, was a member of the Basque 
Government between 2001 and 2009. Finally, meetings with representatives of the Basque 
Government were also held with members of Elkarlana and the Red por un Tren Social, in 
particular the opposing Basque trade unions. Nevertheless, as it was shown in Chapter 6, 
access to the Basque Parliament and the Basque Government by these actors did not result in 
any significant impact on the hegemonic developmental discourse. 
The discursive dynamics discussed in this section are represented in Figure 14. For the 
sake of clarity, the diagram has been simplified and hence some data have been omitted: the 
technocratic discourse and the sustainable spatial structuring story-line; the differences 
within actors and arenas; and certain arenas with limited influence (trans-border contestation 
networks and one-off conferences). In any case, the diagram shows how the production of 
discourse was mediated by arenas mainly related to a certain scale, linked to the state and the 
media in the case of the developmental discourse and to more marginal spaces in the case of 
the antagonistic one. Those arenas that involve actors associated to different scales (Council 
of the EU, EU working groups and trans-border subnational actor networks) have not been 
found to be significantly influential and therefore do not result in discourse production. By 
means of the structuration of discourse and its institutionalization through particular policies 
and institutional arrangements, the developmental discourse achieved hegemony in the 
discursive order. 
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Figure 14. Spatiality of the discursive dynamics 
 
 
 
To summarize, this section has shown how the hegemonic discourses were articulated 
through a series of story-lines that spatially differed significantly in terms of their spaces of 
concern. However, although their clearly networked spaces of reliance did not necessarily 
match, in the developmental discourse story-lines they were compatible enough to prevent 
major disagreements over the Vitoria-Irun HSR line. In contrast, the antagonistic discourse 
was articulated through story-lines based on the notion of proximity, to the extent that their 
spaces of reliance covered as homogeneously as possible a continuous geographical area. 
The radical difference between the spaces of reliance of the developmental and the 
antagonistic discourses mirrors the contrast between the models of development advocated 
by each discourse and reflects the existing discursive antagonism. Moreover, the arenas 
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through which both discourses were produced, reproduced and transformed differed not 
only in their characteristics but also in their spatiality. Whereas the different story-lines of 
the developmental discourse may be associated to discursive arenas related to particular 
scales ranging from the subnational to the European, other arenas where actors were 
associated to different scales seem to have helped to consolidate the wider hegemonic 
discourse. In turn, and in line with its spatiality, the antagonistic discourse was produced and 
reproduced in other types of discursive arenas fundamentally related to the ‘local’, 
understood as those spaces encompassed by the BAC or Euskal Herria. Argumentative 
interaction between both discourses was scarce and in any case largely limited to Basque 
arenas. 
 
 
8.2 The spatiality of power: a politics of reach through topology 
and power arenas 
Following the analytical framework presented in Chapter 3, the basic assumption of the 
spatialization of policy-making with respect to power is that its exercise is always mediated 
by space. On the one hand, power takes place through relations of proximity and reach and, 
furthermore, the characteristics of these relations are inherently linked to the modes of power 
exercised. Thus, certain modes of power tend to be more effective at a distance, and vice 
versa. On the other hand, the exercise of power also occurs through certain spatial fixities or 
power arenas, which constitute those spaces where power struggles take place and the use of 
means and resources is temporarily fixed. Accordingly, this section spatializes the analysis 
of episodic agency power presented in Chapter 7 by focusing on two aspects. It first 
addresses the spatiality of the actual power exercised, by examining the relations on space 
that constitute it and the modes of power adopted. Secondly, it identifies the arenas through 
which power has been exercised and reflects on how access to them has conditioned this 
exercise. However, these two aspects do not address a series of power struggles that, 
although not resulting in an effective exercise of power, are clarifying with regard to debates 
on the spatiality of power. A last subsection therefore focuses on them. 
 
8.2.1 Bringing the far-off within reach and distancing the nearby through 
authority 
The clearest conclusion of Chapter 7 has been that central state actors have exercised their 
authority throughout the policy process to determine the characteristics of the Vitoria-Irun 
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HSR line and its time-scale. Most of the actors involved in the policy process, including EU 
and Basque state institutions, recognized this authority and sought to influence the 
development of the projects through other modes of power. In this respect, distance between 
the exerciser of power and its object was not important; Spanish state actors, and in 
particular the Spanish Government, were able to reach into a border region in Spain and 
develop and implement a particular policy in spite of the strong opposition showed by 
certain actors. 
Indeed, the exercise of power through distance does not mean authority has not been 
challenged on the basis of such a distance. The obvious example of this has been the activity 
of the contestation movement which, as explained in the discourse analysis of Chapter 6, 
included both nationalist and ‘local impact’ dimensions. The Spanish Government’s 
authority –and frequently the Basque Government’s too – was not recognized as the high-
speed rail line was stated to be promoted by economic and political elites. In fact, the project 
is considered an imposition in documents produced by the Asamblea contra el TAV (2002) 
and AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana (2001a).14 As a member of Ekologistak Martxan, an 
environmental organization integrated in Elkarlana, argued, ‘it is a project that is decided by 
supranational15 entities, but that is imposed in this country [país] in complicity with local 
authorities and elites that support it and defend it’ (Interview 31). This lack of recognition 
also involved carrying out practices that claimed for a form of democracy more based on 
proximity, such as the organization from 2006 of a series of popular consultations in several 
concerned localities (Barcena, 2009). 
In any case, more significant than this has been the conflict of competences between the 
Spanish and Basque governments in the first half of the 2000s, since in this instance it was a 
(subnational) state actor that did not recognize the Spanish Government’s authority to 
determine the timing of the project. The non-recognition of the exclusive competence of the 
central state in developing the line was based on the alleged failure to meet the foreseen 
deadlines on the project (El País, 2002a). The subsequent tendering of construction projects 
and works by the Basque Government was justified, according to the then Basque Minister 
for Transport and Public Works, with reference to the functionality of the new line: 
‘Since the central government does nothing to develop the ‘Y’ as a trans-European network, the Basque 
executive works as if it was an internal network that would serve the [Autonomous] Community. For that 
we already have all the competences. Later on it can be reclassified as trans-European, which is what is 
important’ (Amann, 2003a). 
                                                     
 
14 The Red por un Tren Social, with a more conciliatory attitude towards the Basque Government, did 
not employ such terms in its documents (ELA et al., 2003; Red por un Tren Social, 2006). 
15 The nation here is to be understood as the Basque Country. 
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The stance of the Spanish Government was no less firm, and reflected the strong territorial 
dimension of the conflict. The struggle over space is shown by the vocabulary used by the 
Spanish Minister of Development in a visit to the BAC a few days after the Basque 
Government awarded the contracts for the construction projects of four sections of the line: 
‘I think that the Basque Government should deal with the issues within its competence and 
leave other people’s houses to be managed by their title holders’ (Álvarez-Cascos, 2003). In 
spite of the central state’s eventual prevalence, this case is indeed indicative of the potential 
territorial struggles associated with exerting power ‘at a distance’. An editorial by the 
Madrid-based conservative and centralist newspaper ABC, which refers to the tendering of 
eight sections of the project by the Spanish Government, illustrates this point expressively: 
‘It is about addressing an economic and social need of the Basque Country, but it equally involves a 
political dimension that translates into the effective presence of the [central] State in the development of 
this [Autonomous] Community, which must also be defended without any fear’ (ABC, 2004). 
Although the exercise of authority by the Spanish central state was not noticeably affected 
by distance, this is not necessarily the case of the other modes of power identified in the 
analysis. Nevertheless, the influence that the Basque Government managed to exert through 
reasoning and negotiation does not seem to be related to the distance to the Government of 
Spain either, but to its lack of competences regarding the high-speed rail line. Likewise, the 
possible inducement by the activity – or lack thereof – of the High-Level Group on a trans-
European HSR network and the Government of France occurred notwithstanding their 
distance to the project. In both cases, then, persuasion by subnational, European and other 
national state actors was able to reach to far-off places. Where distance seems to have been 
important is in the power struggles between the Basque Government and the other Basque 
political actors. Out of the three ways the Basque Government has exercised power in this 
respect (manipulation to neutralize opposition parties, manipulation to counter coercion by 
certain groups of the contestation, and reasoning and manipulation to gain electoral support), 
the latter two seem to a certain extent related to proximity. The exercise of coercion, since it 
involves the threat of force, is facilitated by physical proximity,16 and the use of the media 
and communication instruments to shape public opinion is arguably easier in a limited space 
due to the less variety of interests involved. Moreover, interaction between Basque actors 
                                                     
 
16 The Head of the Minister for Transport and Public Works’ Cabinet between 2006 and 2009 points 
out how meetings in the local authorities governed by the pro-independence left were logistically very 
complicated due to the security arrangements employed (Interview 19). He also mentions that EAJ-
PNV mayors (the ruling party in the Basque Government) in the Goierri, an area in Gipuzkoa where 
contestation to the project was very high, faced intense pressure – even physical – by some supporters 
of such pro-independence left. 
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was facilitated by the small dimension of the region: interviewees from the contestation 
movement mentioned meetings with members of the Basque Government in a government’s 
office (Interview 22), in the head office of a trade union (Interview 28), in a hotel (Interview 
35) – all in Bilbao – and even in farmhouses (Interview 23). 
In other words, these power dynamics indicate the existence of a topology of power 
whereby the Spanish central state was able to reach even into those areas where 
contestation was strongest, while subnational actors in the vicinity of the project struggled to 
influence the process or were simply excluded from it. Through authority, the far-off was 
brought within reach of the central state at the same time that more proximate actors were 
distanced from it. The Basque Government had to exert persuasion (reasoning and 
negotiation) in order to reach out to the central government and influence the development 
of the high-speed rail line within its territory. Only coercion and the modes of power related 
to communication (manipulation and reasoning) seem to have had some relation to 
proximity. All in all, these explanations do not sufficiently elucidate how power is exerted 
across space since they do not specifically address the spaces where the struggles to exercise 
this power take place. This is necessary to, for instance, clarify what ‘reach out to the central 
government’ means. A complete assessment of the practices of proximity and reach through 
which agencies seek to exercise power requires the consideration of power arenas and the 
ways they mediate such an exercise. 
 
8.2.2 Spatial power dynamics: the centrality of the Spanish state power arenas 
The power arenas through which agencies seek to influence the policy process are spaces 
where the use of means and resources is temporarily fixed. As such, as argued in Chapter 3, 
they may include well-defined, physical arenas such as the executive and the legislature of 
the state, but also other more networked arenas such as informal networks or the media. 
Figure 15 depicts the power dynamics identified in the case study and how these have been 
mediated by those power arenas. Following the analytical framework, agencies, episodic 
agency power exercises, power arenas and policy outcomes are represented. It is important to 
note that, conversely to the fact that a group of actors may constitute a single agency if their 
behaviour is unified, an agency may function as a power arena in those cases when it 
becomes a site of power struggles. For instance, the Basque Government constituted an 
agency when dealing with the central government, but it also became a power arena through 
which left-wing political party Ezker Batua sought to influence the stance of ruling party 
EAJ-PNV concerning the development of the high-speed rail line. 
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Figure 15. Spatiality of the episodic agency power dynamics 
 
 
The diagram clearly shows how the successful exercise of episodic agency power was almost 
always mediated by Spanish state institutions, be it informal arenas (contacts with the 
government), the formal policy development procedures (e.g. consultation processes), or the 
Cortes Generales or legislature of Spain. The Basque Government thus reached out to these 
arenas in order to influence the development of the project, mainly through reasoning but 
also, at some point, through negotiation by the nationalist party EAJ-PNV. Nevertheless, 
power dynamics in arenas beyond the nation-state have also appeared to influence the policy 
process, albeit indirectly through inducement. Firstly, the Spanish Government participated 
in the High-Level Group that defined the Vitoria-Dax key link, which according to a 
ministry senior official may have prompted the launch of the Estudio Informativo (Interview 
9). Secondly, decisions not to promote the Atlantic cross-border HSR link originating from 
French state institutions have negatively induced the development of the Spanish section. In 
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both cases this exercise of power seems to be indirect – the consequence of a first policy 
outcome – and hence it is represented as dashed line and not involving any power arena. 
Although the effective exercise of power took place through power arenas related to the 
central state, a series of significant power struggles occurred in BAC-related arenas between 
the Basque Government or the party in charge of transport infrastructure planning (EAJ-
PNV) and opposing political parties (Ezker Batua and EH), contestation groups and the 
Basque electorate in general. As explained in the previous chapter, these struggles were 
dominated by the ruling party through reasoning and manipulation, yet the relevant aspect 
here is that the arenas where they took place were included within the BAC’s borders: the 
relevance of Ezker Batua stemmed from its participation in the Basque Government and that 
of EH from its presence in the Basque Parliament, the neutralization of contestation groups 
by the government was done through meetings with them in different types of spaces,17 from 
government offices to farmhouses, and the attempt to influence Basque public opinion was 
carried out through regionally-based communication campaigns.18 
The diagram maps only those instances when evidence was found of a specific exercise 
of episodic agency power. Therefore, it does not show the possible influence of Basque 
actors on the Basque Government’s attitude with respect to the line, for instance when it 
supported spatial integration measures in the formal consultation process. A first reason for 
this is the doubtful impact that this attitude has had on the actual project, since a senior 
official involved in it maintains that the actual policy outcome does not significantly differ 
from other cases within Spain (Interview 9). Second, the actual influence of contestation 
actors and the Basque citizenry on the general attitude of the Basque Government is difficult 
to determine, so it was represented only when a particular exercise of power was identified. 
Moreover, any electorate naturally conditions the development of policy by its respective 
government – this is also obviously the case of the Spanish Government – , hence this 
exercise of power is implicit in the actual governmental agency. 
Finally, the diagram shows that, apart from the cases of the High-Level Group and 
French state institutions, where power was exercised indirectly, access to power arenas has 
been necessary in order to be able influence policy development in episodic agency terms. In 
                                                     
 
17 It is important to note that the contestation actors that participated in these meetings did not 
necessarily intend to exercise coercion (the data collected for this case study certainly did not point at 
this). The inclusion here of this mode of power responds to the intention of Basque Government actors 
to avoid potential coercion by certain groups, based on the experience of previous environmental 
conflicts, as explained in Section 7.4. 
18 In the last two cases, the exercise of coercion by certain contestation actors and of inducement by 
the Basque citizenship does not take place through these arenas, but through other spaces such as 
construction sites and polling stations, respectively. Since in the case studied these two modes of 
power are not actual but potential, the arenas represented here are those through which the Basque 
Government exercised its power.  
218 
 
this respect, it is remarkable how Basque actors were only able to access central state arenas 
through the Basque Government and, by representation in the legislature, through nationalist 
party EAJ-PNV. Contestation actors, although as it is shown in the next subsection they tried 
to reach out to other arenas beyond the BAC, centred their struggles in Basque power arenas. 
The previously cited member of environmental organization Ekologistak Martxan notes that 
this focus of action was easier and was somehow more workable in the Basque society – 
proximity is thus important here too (Interview 31). In fact, Figure 15, as it only shows the 
effective exercise of episodic agency power, does not represent other power struggles that 
did not result in a change in policy development but that are nevertheless valuable to inform 
the discussion presented in Section 2.3 on the spatiality of policy-making. The following 
subsection addresses them. 
 
8.2.3 Politics of scale vs. politics of reach through unsuccessful power exercises 
The lack of effective access by a diverse of agencies to the main power arenas 
(fundamentally Spain’s state institutions) indeed omits a number of attempts to achieve 
influence in the policy process which provide insights into the spatiality of power. Firstly, 
subnational state institutions and business organizations sought to lobby the governments 
with a role in the development of the line by engaging in networks of association with 
similar entities (Interviews 15, 16 and 25). The Basque Government in particular sought to 
overcome its limited competence on the issue, as former Basque Minister for Transport and 
Public Works López de Guereñu notes: 
In terms of the ‘Y’, the complexity of promoting the issue was partly the sphere of competence. Because no 
matter how much we have always, very intensely developed stable relations on different issues with the 
surrounding regions, well, we have always clashed with – let’s say – the limitations set to us by the central 
government to even make international agreements’ (Interview 16). 
These networks of association that transcend the borders of the BAC may be interpreted as 
Cox’s (1998) ‘spaces of engagement’, whereby its members reorganize themselves at a 
different scale – or ‘jump scales’ (Smith, 1992, 2003) – in order to achieve more influence in 
the policy process. Nevertheless, in line with the topological view of power adopted in this 
thesis, they may be better conceptualized as the constitution of an agency in order to reach 
into power arenas relevant to the policy at stake. Thus, the participation of the Basque 
Government in the Atlantic Arc Commission of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime 
Regions of Europe (CPMR), which may be seen as a clear instance of ‘jumping scales’, 
sought to enter arenas (EU institutions) through which they could actually influence the 
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development of EU policy. The words of the Director for Transport of the Basque 
Government from 2005 to 2007 express this intention to reach out to these arenas: 
Ultimately, we realised that at European level somehow we did not have a voice as regions, so we 
understood that the CPMR and the Committee of the Regions was a forum to which we could take our voice 
as such. [...] We participated – and in Transport, besides, very actively – but always with that perspective of 
saying ‘well, everything that leaves these working groups can be taken as our voice to Europe.’ [...] So we 
said ‘clearly, the Spanish state will defend in Brussels whatever it wants or interests it at that moment. Well, 
and what is the way we could take our voice?’ And here we found a route that was interesting for us’ 
(Interview 18, emphasis added). 
Apart from participating in these networks of association, the Basque Government also 
sought direct access to a relevant EU institution: the European Coordinator of Priority 
Project no. 3, Etienne Davignon. In spite of the understanding between both actors, the little 
influence of Davignon during the period covered in this case study, notwithstanding his 
access to the relevant nation-state arenas, made this interaction irrelevant for promoting the 
development of the high-speed rail line. Its importance seems to have been limited to 
supporting the Basque Government’s stance on the project in the face of strong internal 
contestation, an aspect mentioned by two former members of the government (Interviews 16 
and 18). 
The second instance of ineffective efforts to influence the policy process comes from 
the contestation movement which, although it concentrated its efforts on power arenas within 
the BAC, also sought to reach out to others. First, a number of Basque local authorities, 
organizations and individuals filed in 2001 an administrative appeal against the final 
approval of the Estudio Informativo by the Ministry of Development; however, this appeal 
was dismissed by the National High Court of Spain19 in 2005.20 Second, contestation actors 
maintained relations with other movements within and outside Spain, in particular with the 
Italian No TAV (‘No HST’) movement in the Val di Susa21 (Interviews 2 and 31), but joint 
attempts to influence EU and nation-state actors took place only recently.22 
Regardless of the influence that both the Basque Government and the contestation 
movement might have achieved in EU arenas, the truth is that these in turn were largely 
ineffective in terms of accessing the Spanish state power arenas. The only identified possible 
                                                     
 
19 Audiencia Nacional de España. 
20 National High Court (Administrative Chamber) ruling of 12 January 2005. 
21 See della Porta and Piazza (2008) for an extensive analysis of this movement. 
22 Indeed, these relations consolidated in 2010 in a joint declaration (“Charter of Hendaye,” 2010) 
signed by associations and movements against high-speed rail from France, Spain and Italy and 
addressed to the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the governments of these 
countries. 
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influence took place indirectly through a policy outcome resulting from the work of the 
High-Level Group on a trans-European HSR network. No other policy outcome (e.g. the 
regulations on EU financial aid) or EU actor (e.g. the CEC) were able to have a noticeable 
impact on the policy process in episodic agency power terms. 
The analysis presented in this section shows that rather than seeing power struggles as 
involving a politics of scale, whereby actors organize themselves at appropriate scales to 
influence policy-making, a topological view of power places emphasis on the politics of 
reach (see Section 3.3.3), i.e. how actors seek to exercise power across space, by dealing 
with the distance with both the policy outcome and the power arenas relevant to it. 
Obviously, arenas that involve a larger scale encompass a higher number of actors and hence 
exerting influence through them is more difficult. The challenge for agencies, however, is 
not only to overcome this problem caused by scale but also to reach into those arenas. For 
instance, the influence of the Basque Government in Spanish state arenas did not stem from 
its association with other subnational governments, but from its penetration in Spanish state 
institutions through various means, including the presence of nationalist party EAJ-PNV in 
the Spanish legislature. The ‘jumping scales’ involved by the networks of association in 
which Basque state and private sector actors engaged was not able to have the desired 
influence without effective access to fundamentally nation-state arenas. A topological view 
of power does not therefore mean that scale is irrelevant, but that is secondary to the actual 
exercise of power across space. 
 
To conclude, this section has shown how power was exercised through a politics of reach, 
both across space and through specific arenas. In a highly formalized transport infrastructure 
policy-making environment, the Spanish central state was able to exercise its authority 
across the nation-state territory, even in an Autonomous Community located in its border 
and with a significant degree of autonomy, and overcome the resistance and preferences of 
actors more proximate to the future high-speed rail line. These, in turn, had to exercise other 
modes of power (mainly reasoning and negotiation) in order to be able to influence the 
development of the project. Fundamentally, these dynamics occurred through certain power 
arenas where the use of means and resources is temporarily fixed and where power struggles 
took place. Again, Spain’s state institutions constituted the key arenas through which power 
was exercised – and through which the Basque Government was able to be influential – 
whereas other arenas such EU or Basque state institutions were largely ineffective to impact 
on the policy process. Basque arenas nevertheless constituted important sites of power 
struggles between the government and actors from the contestation movement, which rarely 
reached out to arenas beyond it. The section, in short, sought to present an approach to the 
spatiality of power that transcends a purely scalar view of politics, where reorganization on a 
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higher scale provides the possibility of achieving more influence. The priority task for 
agencies is to access those arenas through which the exercise of power is likely to be more 
significant, and this does not need to happen through this reorganization. 
 
 
8.3 Synthesizing: space in infrastructure policy-making 
As argued in the introduction to this chapter, fully answering the third research question 
requires complementing the analysis presented in the previous two sections with two further 
steps. The first one consists in advancing a united approach to the spatiality of policy-making 
by jointly considering discourse and power arenas as the spaces through policy-making takes 
place. Second, the relations that constitute space and the scales that may frame them must be 
explicitly addressed in order to present a complete description of the spatiality of policy-
making. This step would also help to validate the specific conceptualization of space that 
underpins the spatialization of the discourse and power analytical approaches. Attention to 
relations and particularly scales is all the more relevant since traditionally the spaces of a 
democratic politics have been defined through boundaries and continuity. Accordingly, this 
section first focuses on unifying the discourse and power analytical approaches through a 
focus on arenas, to subsequently clarify the importance of relations and scale in policy-
making. 
 
8.3.1 Discourse and power on space: towards a single conceptualization of 
space in policy-making 
The analytical framework developed in this research adopted two distinct approaches to 
discourse and power, which were subsequently spatialized by drawing on debates on the 
spatiality of policy-making. The basic assumption underpinning such spatialization is that 
both discourse production and the exercise of episodic agency power are mediated by space, 
in particular through what has been termed discursive and power arenas. Treated separately 
throughout the analysis, it is necessary to examine their commonalities and differences in 
order to advance an integrated spatial approach to the study of policy-making. 
A simple look at the two diagrams on the dynamics of discourse production and 
exercise of power indicates that power arenas are more specific than discursive arenas. 
Discourse production does not take place, as power struggles may do, ‘behind closed doors’, 
but in spaces which defy a cut-and-dry definition. The practice of a discourse through 
parliamentary activity may continue in a working lunch with fellow party members, in a 
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statement to the media and in an evening event with members of the business sector, not to 
mention informal communications between the proponents of such a discourse.23 Also, the 
power dynamics explained in this thesis refer exclusively to the case studied, whereas 
discourse production is relevant to this case but is not limited to it. The Vitoria-Irun rail link 
did not occupy a central place in the production of, in particular, the European and nation-
state story-lines, which involved a larger context that included not only other projects but 
also wider societal developments. Moreover, the diagram on power only represents the 
specific instances of power exercise identified in the analysis; it thus omits the variety of 
power struggles that took place concerning the studied case but did not result in a change in 
the development of the project.  
However, this difference in definition does not mean that a relationship between both 
types of arenas cannot be established. Power arenas are generally contained within discursive 
arenas, except in those cases where they can be considered sites exclusively of episodic 
agency power struggles. The clearest case is state institutions which, apart from being central 
to the production and reproduction of discourse, encompass specific sites where power 
struggles take place, such as the executive and the legislature. Thus, considering Spain’s 
state institutions, the legislature functioned as a discursive arena, where story-lines related to 
spaces other than the nation-state territory had a limited influence, yet at the same time it was 
the site of episodic agency power struggles in the development of the General State Budget 
that would lead to the 2006 implementation agreement between the Spanish Government, the 
Basque Government and rail infrastructure manager ADIF. Indeed, state institutions are 
arguably the arenas which best combine the discursive and the episodic agency power 
dimensions. As sites where the use of means and resources in order to produce policy 
outcomes is temporarily fixed, they are central to the exercise of power, whereas other 
arenas such as the media or informal networks between actors seem to be basically – 
although not exclusively (e.g. the use of media for manipulation) – limited to discourse 
production. 
Overall, discourse was mainly produced and reproduced in arenas which, although 
frequently localized, were linked to certain scales, in particular in terms of the story-lines’ 
spaces of concern. The arenas that involved actors related to different scalar spaces tended to 
function more as power arenas as they brought together different interests and were usually 
less frequent than scalar arenas. This is arguably the case of the Council of the EU or the 
working groups on trans-European transport networks. Given the national perspective on rail 
                                                     
 
23 Nevertheless, this lack of definition does not diminish the importance of accessing these arenas in 
order to influence discourse production. 
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transport prevalent in member state actors mentioned in Chapter 2 (Johnson and Turner, 
1997, p. 173; Romein et al., 2003), it is doubtful that a single story-line was shared within 
these institutions. An exception to this rule is the trans-border subnational actor networks 
which, in their constitution as an agency to influence the policy process, seem to have 
worked as well as discursive arenas where story-lines related to the marginalization of the 
diverse regions represented were produced and reproduced.24 The importance of scale in 
discourse production introduces the key issues of how relations constitute the spatiality of 
policy-making and the extent to which scalar frames play a role in them. 
 
8.3.2 Prevalence of scale in discursive production and in the exercise of 
authority 
The examination of both relations and scale in the policy process may be first addressed 
separately for discourse and power. With respect to the story-lines mobilized by actors in the 
policy process, it has been shown how these are generally, although to different degrees, 
underpinned by scalar understandings, in particular concerning their spaces of concern. Scale 
is a useful notion to represent space in a simplified and easily understandable manner, but it 
is also related to existing or imagined political boundaries. Discursive arenas were therefore 
commonly associated to certain scales, and utterances often referred to the spaces defined by 
the corresponding boundaries. The spaces of reliance could generally be ascribed to a certain 
scale, although they were less explicitly stated and certainly less sharply defined. There 
were, however, notable differences in the clarity of the scalar definition of the story-lines’ 
spatialities. Whereas the subnational and the European story-lines present clear spaces of 
concern and of reliance, the sustainable spatial structuring story-line is noticeably vague. 
Nevertheless, the fundamental difference in spatial terms between the hegemonic 
developmental discourse and the antagonistic one is in fact the emphasis on networks in the 
case of the former, especially with regard to the spaces of reliance, and the centrality of 
topography concerning the latter. As explained earlier, whereas the developmental discourse 
sought to connect distant points through high-speed transport links, the antagonistic 
discourse prioritized serving as homogeneously as possible a continuous geographical area. 
                                                     
 
24 In fact, the distinction or identification between agency and discursive and power arenas should not 
be established a priori. An executive, for instance, may function as an agency by acting as a single 
entity and in a non-predetermined manner, but it may also be the site of episodic agency power 
struggles and of discourse production and reproduction. Its identification with any of these three 
categories depends on the particular process studied. 
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This discursive difference in fact reflects the duality of the ‘space of flows’ and the 
‘space of places’, proposed by Castells (2010) and used with reference to transnational 
transport networks by several authors (Albrechts and Coppens, 2003; Hajer, 2000; Jensen 
and Richardson, 2004). Nevertheless, the analysis of the spatiality of discourse permits to 
qualify this duality, at least with respect to transport infrastructure. In this distinction, the  
networked, ‘global’ or ‘pan-European’ space of an elite is opposed to the ‘local’, self-
contained and continuous space of a majority (Albrechts and Coppens, 2003; Castells, 2010), 
yet the space of flows is not necessarily alien to locality. The example of the subnational 
story-line, based on a small space of concern yet advocating an extensive space of reliance, 
demonstrates that places are not necessarily overcome by flows; these may in fact become 
embedded in them, as part of a network that prioritizes distant relations at the expense of 
others. The local thus becomes the arena where both discourses – and the material relations 
associated to each of them – coexist and conflict. Following the conceptualization of space 
developed in Section 3.3.1, and apart from the profound implications that relational 
approaches to the ontology of space have for the notion of self-contained places,25 the duality 
‘space of flows vs. space of places’ is not based on their different nature (e.g. networked vs. 
contiguous) but on the density and reach of the relations that constitute it. Whereas one set of 
relations is characterized by the linkage of a few distant points, the other is defined by 
physical proximity and presents a higher density of relations. Therefore, rather than the 
notion of places being opposed to flows, a conceptualization that integrates this relational 
ontology of space contrasts topography, whereby distance is central to relations, with 
topology, which distorts the topographical space by giving more prominence to connectivity. 
In terms of episodic agency power, even a topological approach that conceptualizes 
power as constituted through social interaction across space leads to the conclusion that scale 
matters. The means and resources available to actors, which include the competences legally 
granted to them, are used in a stable manner through specific power arenas. Thus, in order to 
influence the development of an infrastructure project that crossed the BAC, Basque actors 
had to reach out to the arena through which power was exercised in any part of the Spanish 
territory. The centrality associated to sites of power such as this one does not stem from 
power being concentrated in them, but from the temporarily fixed exercise of power through 
those arenas. The presence of more important networked arenas might have unsettled this 
centralized landscape of power, but engagement in networked political spaces that 
transcended political borders (see Section 8.2.3) did not yield noticeable results. Indeed, this 
                                                     
 
25 See for instance Massey's (1991) outward-looking description of Kilburn in London in comparison 
with Castells' (2010, pp. 453–456) account of Belleville in Paris as constituted through physical 
contiguity and self-containment. 
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conclusion on the importance of scale is arguably reinforced by the characteristics of the 
case studied: since a clear definition of competences grant the possibility to exercise 
significant authority throughout the nation-state territory, the legally-defined scalar limits of 
this authority are important. Since, as noted in Section 1.1.2, traditionally legitimate political 
power is organized territorially, scale is central in authority as a mode of power, and hence a 
case where other modes of power are prevalent might result in a different conclusion. 
A common characteristic to both discourse and power is that not only the exercise of 
power happened through practices of proximity and reach, but also the production of 
discourse: actors reached into certain discursive arenas in order to influence the production 
and transformation of discourse. However, distance seems here more important than in the 
exercise of power. Discursive arenas were generally related to a particular scale and the 
production of discourse rarely happened in arenas linked to more than one scale, except 
perhaps the subnational story-line (in BAC arenas and in the Atlantic subnational actor 
networks). The centrality of discourse to the production of the subject and its relationship to 
routinized practices indicate the importance of the spaces of everyday life (from the corridors 
of Brussels to local gaztetxes) in discourse production and hence the unlikelihood of 
producing discourse beyond them. 
In short, policy-making around the Vitoria-Irun HSR link happened through relations 
across space yet with scale playing a central role. In discursive terms, scale is a useful 
notion for representing space and is undoubtedly linked with political boundaries, hence the 
clearer definition of spaces of concern. Discursive arenas and the relationship between actors 
and certain, bounded spaces, most clearly seen in the case of state actors, influenced the 
production of discourse around particular scalar spaces. Similarly, scale was also relevant in 
the episodic agency power dynamics. The embeddedness of scale in the means and resources 
available to actors meant that their temporarily fixed exercise of power through certain 
arenas granted these arenas a scalar quality. Nevertheless, this does not seem to be 
generalizable since in other cases scale may have less relevance for the exercise of power. 
 
The spatialization of the analysis on discourse and power thus shows that the policy process 
surrounding the Vitoria-Irun HSR line has happened through relations across space, as actors 
reached into the arenas that mediated the production of discourse and the exercise of power. 
However, the relational constitution of space was compatible with an important presence of 
scale in the content and production of discourse and the exercise of power. In terms of 
episodic agency power, the embeddedness of scale in the means and resources available to 
fundamentally state actors entailed that, through the temporary stabilization of their use in 
certain arenas, these acquired scalar attributes. This scalar quality of power arenas was also 
present in discursive arenas, which were generally related to a certain scale and in turn 
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influenced the spatiality of the story-lines, in particular the definition of the spaces of 
concern.  
 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a complex picture of the spatiality that policy-making has adopted 
in the case studied. It addressed the spatial dynamics of discourse production and the 
resulting representations of space in discourse, which reflected the existing antagonism 
through contrasting topological and topographical understandings. It also described the 
intricate spatial practices involved in the exercise of power, both across space and within 
particular arenas where power struggles took place. Overall, it has hopefully shown how 
struggles over and across space, which in the case of the development of transnational HSR 
infrastructure were likely to be acute, unfolded. Compatible and conflicting 
conceptualizations of space were developed and reproduced in distinct arenas, and 
occasionally clashed in heated debates in a parliamentary commission or an isolated 
farmhouse. The specific attitudes to the studied transnational HSR link that these notions on 
space led to were subsequently mobilized through power struggles in arenas often distant 
from the very terrain on which the tracks would be laid. Networks were formed across vast 
spaces, encompassing the political and economic elites of a variety of subnational areas, and 
European Commission officials strived from their Brussels offices to inject some dynamism 
on that delayed ‘key link’, yet the central government proved to be largely unresponsive. The 
application of the adopted analytical approach, in short, sought to provide a spatially-
nuanced understanding of transnational HSR policy-making, in particular of the spatiality of 
the state and the rationales articulated by actors. 
Firstly, with regard to the tension between the trans-border flows promoted by 
transnational infrastructure development and the spatiality of the state that seeks to regulate 
them, this chapter has shown how at least in this case the nation-state remained the most 
important spatial frame for infrastructure planning. In the terms set by the analytical 
approach on power, its exercise to influence the development of the high-speed rail line 
occurred fundamentally through nation-state arenas and largely through authority exercised 
by central state actors. This does not imply, however, that alternative spatial configurations 
have not been attempted. Agencies emerging through the reorganization of actors in cross-
border or transnational arrangements – in the case of the Atlantic Arc Commission closely 
fitting the reach of the relations sought – have not been noticeably influential in the time 
period covered by the case study, nor have been EU actors. The complex landscape formed 
by transnational networks of association of state and non-state actors, cross-border 
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subnational cooperation arrangements, and bilateral institutions set up to improve the 
coordination between central state actors, superimposed on the conventional Russian doll-
landscape of the Autonomous Community, the Spanish nation-state and the EU, was 
eventually unable to translate itself in actual episodic agency power. Blatter’s (2004) notion 
of functional governance, which seeks to regulate socioeconomic relations through a narrow 
scope and a variable geometry of scale among other characteristics, is largely absent in this 
case, where the multi-functional, formal and stable  territorial governance of the nation-state 
was dominant. 
In terms of the rationales articulated by actors in the policy process, the analytical 
approach has demonstrated the complex ways in which space is present in them. The actors 
who promoted the Vitoria-Irun were discursively related to different spatial scales or spaces 
of concern and to the establishment of different but compatible set of relations or spaces of 
reliance. In turn, although locality certainly had a central presence in the contestation to the 
project, the simple identification of the protests with NIMBYsm is not adequate. The 
discursive focus on proximity was not merely based on an egotist stance but on the 
opposition to a model of development that promoted long distance spatial relations at the 
expense of shorter ones. Overall, the spatial concerns of actors, although frequently 
expressed through scales, are better understood as involving relations of different spatial 
reach. In some cases these relations were compatible enough to permit the formation of a 
single discourse; in others, they conflicted to the extent of reflecting discursive antagonism.26 
In this respect, as argued in the previous section, the duality ‘space of flows’ vs. ‘space of 
places’ may be better conceptualized as a conflict between topological and topographical 
spaces. Transport infrastructure development, through the support to spatial relations that it 
provides, involves a struggle over space that, rather than being based on mobility vs. absence 
of it, is based on an insurmountable difference between distinct types of relations across 
space, in one case those between a limited number of distant nodes, in the other those 
covering a certain physical area as homogeneously as possible. 
 
  
                                                     
 
26 It is important to note, however, that the spatiality of discourse is not independent from its content 
(e.g. a belief in market integration entails the establishment of certain spatial relations) and therefore 
is not the only factor in determining discursive antagonism. 
9 Conclusion  
‘See, the question that comes to my mind is: why doing a PhD thesis on a project which also has a 
significant political component? Because the area in the territory... the State, the Autonomous Community, 
reaching agreements... Terrorism was against the project there, and they placed bombs, and... So there you 
play with so many variables that a – let’s say academic – confusion is created’ (Interviewee). 
Complementing the limited number of studies that have critically addressed the politics of 
transnational transport infrastructure, this research endeavour has sought to contribute to the 
understanding of European integration through devoting close attention to how this process 
is produced, reproduced and contested on the ground through the development of high-speed 
rail infrastructure. Hence the study of a single, complex case – “political” according to the 
interviewee above, who saw the policy problem fundamentally in technical terms – to reveal 
the tensions that this development may involve. At the same time, this empirical study 
required the definition of a detailed research approach, particularly in the light of the variety 
of perspectives on the topic and its weak or partial theorization. In other words, the objective 
was to combine the study of an information-rich case of transnational HSR policy-making 
with a theoretically sound and analytically rigorous approach. Facing the “academic 
confusion” derived from such a case may indeed have been a challenge, but it was an 
essential aspect of the task. 
Through the lenses of discourse, power and space, the three preceding chapters have 
provided both a description and an explanation of the production, reproduction and 
transformation of rationales on transnational HSR policy-making, of the influence of actors 
in the policy process, and of the presence and relevance of the spatial dimension in these two 
cases. This chapter presents a summary of these findings and situates them within the wider 
field of transnational transport infrastructure politics and European integration. Thus, the 
first section synthesizes the results of the research in accordance with the proposed research 
questions. It first provides an answer to the secondary research questions specific to the 
analytical framework and case study selected, to subsequently address the three main 
research questions and the consequent contribution to the literature on transnational HSR 
development. The second section summarizes the developments on the Vitoria-Irun HSR 
line between the start of the works in 2006 and 2014, suggesting in turn their implications for 
the research findings. Finally, the third section of the chapter reflects on the wider 
contribution of this research to the study of the relationship between infrastructure 
development and European integration. It first assesses the value of the proposed theoretical 
and analytical approach for this study. It then reflects on the democratic implications of 
transnational infrastructure politics on the basis of the empirical results, and finally proposes 
several areas for further research. 
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9.1 Transnational high-speed rail infrastructure politics: research 
findings 
The results of the analysis presented in the previous three chapters sought to provide an 
answer to the three research questions, which would in turn contribute to fulfil the aim of the 
research project. These were: 
 
1. What are the rationales mobilized around transnational high-speed rail policy-
making, to what extent are they compatible or mutually exclusive, and how are they 
produced, reproduced and transformed? 
2. What is the influence of actors in the development of transnational high-speed rail 
infrastructure, how do they exert it, and at the expense of whom? 
3. How is space present in transnational high-speed rail policy-making and how does it 
determine the production of the aforementioned rationales and the influence of 
actors in the policy process? 
 
Answering these questions required the application of a particular analytical framework to a 
certain case, a step guided by the set of specific, secondary research questions presented at 
the end of Section 1.3. Thus, this section first addresses this set of questions by synthesizing 
the results of studying the Vitoria-Irun HSR policy process through an approach that 
combined discourse analysis, social and political theories of power and a spatially nuanced 
perspective. Thereupon, it elaborates on these findings to answer the three main research 
questions in relation to the existing literature reviewed in Chapter 2. 
 
9.1.1 Discourse production, episodic agency power and the spatiality of policy-
making in the Vitoria-Irun high-speed rail line case 
As explained in Chapter 3, discourse theory claims that the formation of a hegemonic 
discourse involves the exclusion of a radical otherness, from which actors with alternative, 
discredited understandings struggle to challenge the former (Hajer, 1995; Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2001). This feature was arguably present throughout the Vitoria-Irun HSR line 
policy process, but it became evident since opposing political actors emerged in the early 
1990s. The hegemonic, developmental discourse that followed a previous technocratic 
discourse conceptualized transport infrastructure provision as being fundamental to balanced 
economic development and as potentially contributing to environmental protection. In 
contrast, an antagonistic discourse informed by alter-globalization perspectives was 
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constructed around the assumption that high-speed rail represented a model of development 
detrimental to not only the environment but also local economies and societies. This did not 
imply, however, that the hegemonic discourse was monolithic. It was articulated through a 
series of story-lines that reflected different concerns with respect to the high-speed rail line, 
from avoiding marginalization within an integrating Europe to achieving the ‘sustainable 
spatial structuring’ of its territory. Although the importance of space in these story-lines was 
variable, the divergence between them was largely spatial; they were characterized by 
different, more or less scalar, spatial frames of reference. Notwithstanding the diverse 
‘spaces of concern’ of the story-lines, the compatibility between their ‘spaces of reliance’ 
allowed blurring the discrepancies between the actors sharing the same discourse. In 
contrast, the radically different spaces of reliance of hegemonic and antagonistic story-lines 
(the former clearly topological, the latter largely topographical) reflected the antagonism 
between the two discourses.  
The struggle for discursive hegemony concerning the high-speed rail line took place 
mainly in subnational arenas, due to their proximity to the project and the local roots of the 
contestation movement. The hegemonic and antagonistic discourses, however, were 
produced and reproduced in fundamentally distinct arenas: state institutions, informal 
networks between state and private sector actors, and mainstream media in the first case; 
public and rural spaces, informal networks within the contestation movement and minority 
media outlets in the second. The spaces for argumentative interaction between the 
proponents of both discourses were in fact limited and encompassed mainly Basque state 
institutions. From a first articulation of the antagonistic discourse that rejected discussion in 
the terms of the hegemonic discourse, some of the contestation actors sought to achieve 
broader social support by adopting some of these terms and engaging academics in the 
construction of a new story-line, thus seeking a story-line that ‘sounded right’ (Hajer, 1995, 
p. 63). However, both the political majority that supported the hegemonic discourse and the 
late stage of the policy process did not facilitate meaningful argumentative interaction, and 
discursive antagonism remained. Although the new contestation story-line shared some 
principles with the formerly dominant technocratic discourse, from the perspective of the 
developmental discourse they were dismissed and excluded from the hegemonic discursive 
order. 
In terms of the exercise of power, the main finding has been the continuing dominance 
of nation-state institutions in transnational HSR development. Their position in terms of 
means and resources was already privileged as they had the main competences to undertake 
this task, but in practice they managed to control the policy process through their exercise of 
power, mainly through the authority granted by the legitimacy assigned to state power. 
However, Basque state actors did use the opportunities they had to influence the process, 
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certainly through reasoning but also through negotiation by using the access of the Basque 
nationalist party EAJ-PNV to the Spanish legislature. In any case, as this example shows, the 
exercise of power always took place through nation-state arenas. The importance of actors 
primarily concerned with the transnational dimension of the line was, however, minor. In 
spite of the potential of EU institutions to induce the development of the line, mainly through 
financial support, no evidence was found of a decisive actual influence.1 Moreover, although 
subnational state and non-state actors actively engaged in transnational networks of 
association to reach into relevant power arenas, their efforts were unsuccessful. Finally, 
contestation actors were a priori clearly in a weak position to influence the policy process. 
They had a minority representation in formal state institutions, which in any case were 
restricted to the Basque Autonomous Community and therefore were not central to this 
process. The main focus of their action on Basque arenas, as with discourse, led to intense 
power struggles which nevertheless did not impact the development of the project. 
Finally, as this account of the policy process hopefully shows, the understanding of 
transnational infrastructure policy-making was aided by the adoption of a spatially-nuanced 
approach. In discourse analytical terms, on the one hand, the different spaces (e.g. the EU or 
the nation-state) linked to the sites of discourse production and reproduction largely 
determined the varied perspectives within the hegemonic discourse; on the other, their 
different qualities (e.g. state institutions or public spaces) reflected – if not contributed to – 
discursive antagonism. Space was also important in the exercise of power. Although distance 
in itself was not an obstacle for the exercise of authority remotely at the expense of more 
proximate actors, proximity was relevant both in the exercise of certain modes of power (e.g. 
coercion) and in the development of the contestation movement, a feature that at the same 
time restricted its potential influence. The spatiality of a transnational HSR line also resulted 
in the involvement of actors that transcended nation-state borders, whether the EU or 
networks of association of a transnational nature, although they have been largely 
inconsequential. In short, access to and effective influence in discourse and power arenas 
determined the development of the policy process. The latter, in addition, did not simply take 
place through and across space; it was importantly mediated by scale. Both discursive and 
power arenas were usually associated to scalar spaces, which in turn influenced discourse 
production and power exercise: on the one hand, these spaces were generally reflected in the 
story-lines that articulated the wider discourses; on the other, scale determined the space 
over which state power could be exerted. 
                                                     
 
1 As noted in Section 7.3.1, the Spanish Government made substantial use of EU funds to finance the 
development of other high-speed rail lines. 
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9.1.2 Rationales, influence and space in the policy process: contribution to 
literature 
The findings of this research first qualify the assertion of the existence of a single discourse 
‘shared by policy makers at different levels of government’ (Hajer, 2000, p. 135) that pushes 
‘towards a new European space of uniform flow’ (Jensen and Richardson, 2004, p. 3). By 
conceptualizing the articulation of discourse through a series of story-lines, this research has 
shown how the hegemonic discourse could accommodate a variety of perspectives, of which 
the promotion of a ‘Europe of flows’ was just one of them, which nevertheless remained 
compatible. Although the different discourse coalitions shared the general understanding of 
the transport infrastructure problem, the specific contexts in which the story-lines were 
produced prompted different articulations of the discourse. Importantly, the boundaries of 
the hegemonic formation were clearly defined, with a wide variety of perspectives being 
pushed to its ‘outside’. In addition, the analysis has provided insights into the processes 
through which discourse was produced, reproduced and challenged, an under-researched 
issue as discourse analysis on transnational infrastructure policy has largely focused on the 
content of discourse (Hajer, 2000) and EU policy-making (Jensen and Richardson, 2004; 
Peters, 2003a). The exception is Linnros and Hallin’s (2001), who analyzed the discursive 
struggles in the environmental conflict over the Øresund link. In line with their findings, this 
research has shown how contestation was neutralized by the proponents of the hegemonic 
discourse by incorporating part of their arguments (i.e. the social nature and environmental 
benefits of the line) into their story-lines. Both studies indeed confirm the difficulties that 
contestation movements have when seeking to challenge the hegemonic discursive 
construction by using the latter’s terms, as other authors had highlighted (Fischer, 2003, p. 
88; Hajer, 1995, p. 57). 
In terms of the influence of actors in the policy process, this research has confirmed the 
continuing dominance of nation-state actors in transnational HSR development. In 
consistence with the authors that have highlighted the incapacity of EU policy to effectively 
drive transnational infrastructure development (e.g. Ross, 1998, p. 202), the influence of EU 
institutions up to 2006 in the case studied has been negligible. The definition of the 
characteristics and integration of the high-speed rail line in nation-state planning preceded 
EU action, the Commission initiatives to facilitate TEN-T implementation had little effect in 
the period studied and, importantly, the financial incentives were not sufficient to determine 
the development of the project. The case studied, however, provided valuable insights into 
the relatively unexplored role of subnational actors. As in the Catalan example noted by 
Marshall (2013, p. 152), Basque state actors managed to exert influence in the policy process 
through the use of persuasion, making use of their high degree of autonomy and presence in 
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the Spanish legislature. With regard to non-state actors, the lack of private sector influence in 
episodic agency power terms confirms the difficulties in engaging private capital in high-
speed rail development noted by Ross (1998, pp. 195–198) and demonstrated by existing 
experiences in Europe such as the construction of the Channel Tunnel (Ross, 1998, pp. 203–
205).2 The active yet seemingly inconsequential contestation to the project, in turn, contrasts 
with the delays caused to the Øresund link (Ross, 1995) and the Turin-Lyon line in the 
Italian Val di Susa (della Porta and Piazza, 2008, p. 21). To summarize, the findings 
concerning the influence of actors are, with some distinctive features, largely in line with the 
existing literature,3 but the thorough and theoretically informed approach has also allowed to 
provide a detailed and consistent account of the actual workings of power in transnational 
HSR infrastructure policy-making. 
Finally, the contribution on the presence and influence of space in transnational HSR 
policy-making lies more in the insights allowed by the spatially-nuanced analytical approach 
than in obtaining new data on the topic. The application of this perspective reveals a policy-
making landscape formed by the activity of actors across space and through certain arenas 
that mediate their production of discourse and exercise of power. In particular, the notion of 
scale was important in defining the spaces to which actors related and in framing the 
capacity of the latter to influence the policy process. Thus, the central government of Spain 
was able to secure its influence through the use of its authority in arenas associated to the 
nation-state territory. The lack of influence of less formalized and functionally specific 
governance arrangements such as transnational networks of association indicate the 
dominance of what Blatter (2004) has termed territorial – instead of functional – governance. 
Moreover, the analytical approach to space also reveals how attitudes to transnational HSR 
development should not be simply understood through a multi-scalar imaginary, as 
conventional transport and political economic approaches to TENs, or through the tension 
between the space of flows and the space of places (Hajer, 2000; Jensen and Richardson, 
2004). As the case study showed, the different concerns of actors over space are better 
understood as involving varied and possibly conflicting sets of relations (e.g. trans-European 
vs. intra-regional) rather than simple scalar geographies (e.g. the European vs. the local). In 
this respect, and in line with Prytherch’s (2010) insightful analysis of the spatial vocabularies 
of Catalan regionalism, actors may articulate complex spatial imaginaries that combine 
relations with scale to position themselves in a wider spatial context. 
                                                     
 
2 This lack of influence contrasts with the important role that private sector actors played in discourse 
production. 
3 Attention to developments since 2006 may in fact qualify this assertion. The following subsection 
provides an initial discussion on this. 
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This points at the significant contribution of a relational conceptualization of space to 
the understanding of the spatial conflicts resulting from transport infrastructure development 
beyond the ‘flows vs. places’ duality. If places are understood as the temporary stabilization 
of relations of different length, they are not simply potentially overcome or ‘wiped out’ 
(Albrechts and Coppens, 2003) by external flows but are instead constituted by them. As 
‘sites of multiple geographies of affiliation, linkage and flow’ (Amin, 2004, p. 38), places 
involve a politics not only of the local but also of the national and the transnational. In the 
studied case, actors discursively and materially related to sets of relations of different spatial 
reach converged around the Basque Autonomous Community and struggled to advance their 
interests in the making of transport infrastructure policy. Thus, as argued in Section 8.3.2, 
the supra-local or the ‘space of flows’ is not necessarily opposed to the local or ‘space of 
places’ but may indeed be embedded in it. A more adequate notion than ‘flows’ to reflect 
this may be ‘networks’ but, due to the fundamental difference in the spatialities of the 
developmental and antagonistic discourses, it is proposed that the conflict should instead be 
framed as between a topological space and a topographical space. Rather than between the 
local and the trans-local, the struggle was between two distinct and largely incompatible set 
of relations: one characterized by a limited number of links between distant nodes, 
configuring a landscape shaped by uneven connectivity; the other based on the homogeneous 
coverage of a geographical area through short and dense relations, reflecting the importance 
of proximity and distance. 
 
 
9.2 Postscript (2006-2014) 
The findings presented above refer to the period covered in the case study, which finished in 
September 2006 with the start of construction in the Vitoria-Bilbao section of the high-speed 
rail line. At that stage not only the project had been defined, but also the conditions for its 
implementation had been formally established through an agreement between the main 
actors that would undertake it. However, from this date on a distinct period started that 
involved not only different policy-making dynamics (e.g. decision-making on the funding to 
be allocated to the project) but also important contextual developments, in particular the 
economic recession which started towards the end of the decade and the increasing EU 
action on transnational transport infrastructure development. Moreover, limited academic 
attention has been devoted to this topic during the past decade. Hence, even though the 2006-
2014 period has not been analyzed in depth in this research, it is valuable to provide a brief 
account of it and suggest its possible implications for the research findings. 
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9.2.1 Rail line construction: from terrorist actions to the economic downturn 
Since the start of works in the Vitoria-Bilbao section in September 2006, contestation to the 
project entered a new, more intense phase. The biggest demonstrations organized by the 
contestation movement seem to have taken place at this stage. The demonstrations of 
November 2006 in Vitoria and of December 2006 in the town of Arrasate, which according 
to a long-standing member of the contestation movement marked its mobilization limits 
(Interview 2), reached, according to their organizers, 10,000 and 15,000 participants 
respectively (El Correo, 2006e, 2007a). In addition, local contestation by local authorities 
and other actors intensified through, first, the organization of popular consultations in 
affected municipalities4 and, second, the hindering of administrative processes, such as 
boycotting the signature of the land expropriation certificates at relevant town halls (El 
Correo, 2008c, 2008d). In January 2008, regional and nation-state actors sought to counter 
resistance to the project through the launch of an information campaign by the Basque 
Government and the setup of an information stand on the line in the train stations of the three 
Basque cities by the Spanish Ministry of Development (El Correo, 2008e). The situation had 
indeed been aggravated when, at the end of 2007 and a few months before the Basque 
Government started – in April 2008 – the construction works in the section under its 
responsibility, the Basque terrorist group ETA established the line as one of its priority 
targets (El Correo, 2007b). After numerous acts of sabotage against the works and three 
bomb attacks against the construction companies (El País, 2008c), in December 2008 two 
members of ETA shot dead Inaxio Uria, a Basque businessman and co-owner of one of these 
companies (El País, 2008d).  
The murder of Uria prompted a firm commitment from the Spanish Prime Minister and 
the Basque President to continue the works (El País, 2008e) and indeed had, according to 
several of its members, a strong impact on the contestation movement (Interviews 2, 22, 29 
and 31). However, the effects of the economic recession and developments beyond the 
Spanish borders would pose further obstacles to the project’s implementation. Firstly, 
although coordination between the Spanish and French governments would be facilitated by 
an Intergovernmental Commission established at the beginning of 2009 to supervise the 
definition of the international section of the Vitoria-Dax link, the French Government 
announced in June the suspension of the studies on a new high-speed rail line between 
Bayonne and the Spanish border for environmental reasons (El Correo, 2009). With the 
                                                     
 
4 According to Barcena (2009, p. 277), by June 2009 ten consultations had taken place in localities 
along the route of the Vitoria-Irun HSR line. With participation rates ranging between 31% and 94%, 
in all cases over 85% of the participants opposed the line. 
236 
 
cross-border connection undefined, the Spanish and Basque governments decided to adapt 
the existing line between the outskirts of San Sebastián and the French border to the UIC 
track gauge (El Correo, 2011a).5 Moreover, a significant budgetary reduction led the 
Portuguese Government to defer the development of the Lisbon-Madrid HSR link, which 
belonged to the same trans-European corridor (El País, 2010a).6 In Spain, the economic 
situation appeared to prompt a shift in the government’s attitude towards infrastructure 
planning and development. The Minister for Development stated in May 2010 that ‘we have 
planned public works beyond the needs and realities of the country’ and announced a 6,400 
million-Euro adjustment in the ministry’s investment in 2010 and 2011 (Europa Press, 
2010). The government recognized that this cut would involve a delay in the construction of 
high-speed rail lines of between six months and a year (El Correo, 2010b) and, in fact, 
towards the end of 2010 the works on most of the sections of the line had virtually stopped 
due to the exhaustion of ADIF’s resources for that year (El Correo, 2010c). 
Nevertheless, for the following two years the development of the line progressed 
seemingly smoothly and its wider context showed some favourable signs for its 
implementation. The European Commission presented in October 2011 a proposal of an 
infrastructure package that included revised TEN-T guidelines, which included the Vitoria-
Irun HSR line in its ‘core network’ (consisting of the parts of the TEN-T with the highest 
European added value), and a new 50 billion-Euro infrastructure financing instrument for the 
2014-2020 period (CEC, 2011).7 In the same month, ETA announced the permanent 
cessation of its armed activity (El País, 2011). By the end of 2012, only the construction 
works of the central node of the line, which links the branches implemented separately by 
the Spanish and Basque governments, and of a 6.6-kilometre section in Bizkaia remained to 
be tendered.8 The situation, however, seemed to worsen in the first quarter of 2013. The 
Spanish government had reduced by 38.5% the amount assigned to the line in the 2013 
General State Budget, and in February the companies undertaking the construction of one 
section of the line decided to stop the works after knowing the limited funds allocated by 
ADIF to that section for that year (El País, 2013a). Despite Prime Minister Rajoy’s 
                                                     
 
5 This would provide continuity to the network until a new cross-border link was developed. Thus, the 
main station in San Sebastián would become a through rather than terminus station in the high-speed 
rail network. 
6 This project would be withdrawn ‘permanently’ by the Portuguese Government in March 2012 (El 
País, 2012). 
7 The regulations on the revised guidelines and the financing instrument (the Connecting Europe 
Facility) were approved in December 2013 (EP and Council, 2013a, 2013b). 
8 This excludes the international section between the vicinity of San Sebastián and the French border, 
less advanced as it requires coordination with the French Government, and the new rail accesses to the 
three Basque cities, which have been planned independently and are not essential for the operation of 
the line. 
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commitment to complete the works (El País, 2013b), the delays in construction and 
particularly in tendering the works of the central node of the line tensed the relationship 
between the Basque and Spanish governments until the end of 2014 (El País, 2013c, 2014). 
In addition, the French Government decided in June 2013 to postpone until 2030 the 
construction of the Bordeaux-Spanish border HSR link due to lack of funding (El País, 
2013d). 
Finally, in February 2015 the Spanish Council of Ministers authorized the tender 
process for the remaining sections of the central node of the line (El País, 2015a). With this 
decision, the works on the entire line – except the international connection and the accesses 
to the three cities, which would be temporarily carried out through the existing tracks – were 
underway. If the deadline set in January by the Minister of Development is met, the line will 
become operational in 2019 (El País, 2015b), a year earlier than foreseen at the time yet nine 
years after the date laid down in the first TEN-T guidelines. 
 
9.2.2 Possible implications for the research findings 
This brief account suggests a number of implications for the research findings presented in 
the previous section. In terms of discourse, events after 2006 suggest that there have not been 
substantial changes in the developmental discourse and that antagonism has consolidated. 
Firstly, although senior politicians recognized the need to revise the existing transport 
infrastructure policy and the debate indeed entered the mainstream media in Spain (El País, 
2010b, 2010c), the developmental discourse does not seems to have been fundamentally 
challenged by the radically different economic context. Although there has been an emphasis 
on rationalizing infrastructure policy, its importance in promoting economic growth and 
balanced development does not appear to have been questioned. For example, the current 
Minister for Development stated in 2013 that ‘we will move forward with the structuring of 
our country through rail, but we will do it with projects that are rational and shorten travel 
times’ (Pastor, 2013).9 What seems to have gained more prominence in the discourse is, in 
line with the sustainable spatial structuring story-line, a concern with freight transport. Apart 
from a greater presence in the media (e.g. El País, 2008f, 2010d), this concern prompted the 
production of a strategic plan for the enhancement of rail freight transport in Spain 
(Ministerio de Fomento, 2010) and a report on the impact of the new Vitoria-Irun HSR line 
on freight transport in the BAC (Departamento de Transportes y Obras Públicas, 2008). As 
                                                     
 
9 Also, in an editorial titled ‘HSR with restraint’, Spanish newspaper El País claimed that ‘the high-
speed network is a factor in progress, but its development must be revised’ (El País, 2013e).  
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this story-line became more important, however, antagonism seems to have been enhanced, 
in particular after the intervention of ETA in the conflict, by the positioning of opposing 
actors as against progress and in some cases as against freedom. For instance, the Basque 
President stated that ‘the train is the future and is progress. Progressing is not placing bombs 
against the train, but getting on it’ (El País, 2008g).10 
With regard to the exercise of power, the review of the 2006-2014 period confirms the 
continuing dominance of the nation-state in rail infrastructure development. However, as a 
result of the 2006 agreement that gave the Basque Government the responsibility to 
implement the Bergara-Irun branch of the line, this government was able to determine its 
time-scale and thus presumably exert pressure on the Spanish Government to develop their 
branch between Vitoria and Bilbao. Moreover, two other significant aspects qualify the 
findings of the case study. The first one, not explicit in the previous subsection, is the 
growing relevance of EU actors. As showed in Section 7.3.1, the EU financial contribution 
grew notably in the 2007-2013 period, and the consolidation of the institutions of the 
European Coordinator and the Innovation and Networks Executive Agency (until 2014 the 
TEN-T Executive Agency) may have increased their influence. The second aspect is the 
influence that contestation actors seem to have had in the initial period of the construction 
stage. In spite of their failure in the discursive struggle, it appears that the use of coercion by 
certain groups and of authority by local authorities has in fact delayed the necessary land 
expropriation processes (El País, 2008i; El Correo, 2011b). This is indeed an instance of the 
difficulties that contestation actors may pose to the implementation of the project if they are 
not taken into consideration in earlier stages of the policy process (Romein et al., 2003; 
Ross, 1995). A final mention must be made of the impact of the French Government’s 
decisions. Since the Vitoria-Irun line not only has a trans-border functionality but also 
supports relations between cities in Spain, the deferral of the development of the high-speed 
rail link with the Spanish border seems to have mainly affected the development of the 
international section in Spain; in the rest of the line nation-state and subnational dynamics 
appear to have been more decisive. 
Finally, from the perspective of the spatiality of policy-making, the construction of the 
line seems to have brought to the foreground the discursive and power arenas most 
proximate to the route of the high-speed rail line. Surely the reproduction and practice of 
discourse continued at the numerous arenas described in the analytical chapters and the 
                                                     
 
10 Utterances in this line were abundant after the murder of Uria. The then Spanish Minister stated that 
‘[n]othing will stop us achieving our objective. We will keep building infrastructures of coexistence 
and progress’ (El País, 2009). Similarly, an editorial by El País and an opinion piece by 
environmental consultant Antxon Olabe were titled, respectively, as ‘Bullets against progress’ (El 
País, 2008h) and ‘The train of freedom’ (Olabe, 2008).  
239 
 
essential allocation of funds for the works occurred mainly through nation-state and Basque 
state institutions, yet important discursive and power struggles between opposing actors 
happened through sites in the immediate area of the line. As popular consultations were 
being organized in affected municipalities, a travelling exhibition was set up by the Basque 
Government in seven towns in Gipuzkoa and information stands were installed by the 
Ministry of Development in the stations of Vitoria, Bilbao and San Sebastián.11 Importantly, 
coercion by both the terrorist group ETA and other contestation actors was facilitated by 
proximity. The construction works and the offices of the companies involved constituted a 
material and accessible site for the exercise of this type of power, and the signatures of land 
expropriation certificates were boycotted through the occupation of the town halls where 
they were to take place (El Correo, 2008c). While coercion in the first case was countered by 
strengthening the security services on the works (El País, 2008j), in the second it was 
avoided, interestingly, by distancing the arenas where the signing events were held: from the 
relevant town halls to the corresponding Government Representation Departments, located in 
the provincial capitals (El País, 2008i). The struggle over space arguably became more 
evident at this stage. 
 
The more than eight years that passed since construction started in September 2006 therefore 
seem to have involved both continuity and change in the discourse, power and spatial 
features of the policy-process. Although the discursive order does not appear to have 
changed significantly – even in the face of the economic recession which started towards the 
end of the past decade – antagonism may have consolidated, aided by the use of violent 
means by part of the contestation movement. This violence managed to temporarily slow 
down the implementation process, but the role of subnational state actors in the construction 
of part of the line and the insufficiently explored growing relevance of EU actors also seem 
to have been significant. This last stage of the implementation process has also given more 
prominence to local arenas, transferring the conflict from distant sites of decision-making to 
the spaces where the line was being developed. Naturally, more in-depth research on the 
2006-2014 period would confirm, qualify or question these implications for the findings 
drawn from the case study. 
 
 
                                                     
 
11 The communication campaign undertaken by the Basque Government also included the renovation 
of the website on the project, a media information campaign, and the delivery of a leaflet on the 
project to every Basque household (El Correo, 2008e). 
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9.3 Wider debates on the study of transnational infrastructure 
politics and European integration 
Beyond the in-depth attention to a particular case and the contribution to existing literature 
on the topic, the aim of this research has been to advance the understanding of how European 
integration occurs on the ground by critically focusing on transnational HSR policy-making. 
To this end, an analytical framework that adopts a social constructionist perspective, is 
sensitive to the detailed workings of power and presents an elaborate understanding of space 
was developed. This last section seeks to broaden the discussion and reflect on the 
contribution of this research to theoretical development, the insights it provides into debates 
on the democratic nature of transnational infrastructure politics, and the avenues for further 
research that it points at. 
 
9.3.1 Contribution to theoretical development 
Pursuing the objective of performing a detailed analysis of a process that lasted for an 
extended period of time using an analytical framework that draws from three distinct 
approaches risks both covering an excessive breadth of information and insufficiently 
examining the distinct theoretical approaches. For instance, the remarkable and evolving 
variety of political actors in the Basque Autonomous Community showed very rich 
discursive dynamics that may not have been fully elaborated on in this research (e.g. the 
discursive spatial ambiguity of the Spanish parties’ regional affiliates PSE and PP-PV or the 
detailed dynamics within the contestation movement). Also, power struggles occurred within 
institutions and organizations that could not be adequately reflected here, for example 
between the Spanish Prime Minister and the ministers responsible for transport and the 
economy, or between the different groups of the contestation movement. In theoretical terms, 
devoting attention to several approaches may have also undermined the capacity to 
contribute to each of them. Every effort has been made to minimize these drawbacks; 
however, it is expected that the combined use of these perspectives on an information-rich 
case would provide insights into transnational HSR infrastructure policy-making that neither 
the study of a particular aspect of this process nor the adoption of a single theoretical 
approach would provide. This research has sought to explain, in an integrated way, the 
rationales underpinning the behaviour of actors, the effects of this behaviour, and how these 
two issues are inextricably linked with space. Nevertheless, it also permits to draw some 
conclusions on the distinct theoretical perspectives adopted. 
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Hajer’s (1995) discourse analytical framework has indeed been adequate for the 
adoption of a social constructionist perspective that transcends understandings of behaviour 
based on rationality and self-interest and places a critical focus on how dominant 
constructions of a problem are produced and become dominant while others become 
marginalized and struggle to challenge the former. Nevertheless, its application calls 
attention to two aspects. As mentioned in Section 3.1.3, Peters (2003b, p. 233) has argued 
that Hajer’s approach does not sufficiently clarify the role of agency in discursive dynamics. 
Certainly the capacity of actors to act was restricted as they were ‘entangled in webs of 
meanings’ (Hajer, 1995, p. 56), but examples were found where agency was key to the 
development of discursive constructions (e.g. in the emergence of the ‘social train’ story-
line) and to the positioning of actors (e.g. of contestation as against progress). This suggest 
that the relationship between structure and agency is not predetermined and therefore the role 
of theory should be limited to allow for the explanation of the empirical manifestation of this 
relationship. Where the approach seemed to be unsatisfactory was in accounting for the role 
of interests – themselves discursively constituted – in shaping in turn discourse and its 
dynamics. The analysis suggests that a story-line may be practiced not only because of its 
discursive power but also because it favours certain interests, and these two reasons are not 
always easy to disentangle. This is the case, for instance, of the promotion of the 
developmental discourse by business actors: to what extent did it respond to a genuine 
construction of the transport problem or to the particular interests of their members? 
Secondly, the examination of the influence of actors in the policy process has followed 
a relatively simple conception: agencies realize their aspirations in the policy process 
through the exercise of a certain mode of power and in accordance with the means and 
resources available to them and to other agencies in line or opposed to them. 
Notwithstanding its simplicity, the intention is that this theoretically informed approach 
provides a solid basis from which to approach power struggles in the policy process, which 
in the study of transnational infrastructure policy-making has been under-theorized. A 
further contribution has been the proposal and empirical testing of a list of modes of power: 
authority; domination; coercion; manipulation; and persuasion, which in turn includes 
inducement, negotiation and, based on the obtained evidence, reasoning. Nevertheless, this 
approach did not seem to be suited to adequately explain the influence of a potential (as 
opposed to actual) exercise of power. As shown in the thesis, the Basque Government sought 
to counter not only the actual but also the anticipated exercise of power by actors from the 
contestation movement. Although presented as an episodic power struggle, this instance may 
have been better conceptualized as an exercise of power (episodic agency power) to 
neutralize the capacity of other actors to exercise it (dispositional power). The influence of 
the latter actors may have been based either on past instances (e.g. violent intervention in 
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previous environmental conflicts) or on an assessment of that dispositional power (e.g. of 
their mobilizing capacity). This suggests that the understanding of the exercise of power by 
one agency requires the integration, as a variable in the analytical framework, of the capacity 
of other agencies to exercise it as estimated by the former. This could also serve to better 
explain general behaviours that do not pertain to specific conflicts; for instance, the Spanish 
Government’s receptive attitude to integrating local concerns in the definition of the line’s 
route and to engaging the Basque Government in its implementation, a behaviour that 
seemed to respond to an interest in avoiding contestation. 
Thirdly, it is hoped that the nuanced spatial approached developed in this research 
permits not only explicitly considering space in transnational infrastructure policy-making, 
but also achieving a better understanding of its role beyond simpler notions based on levels, 
scales or the duality flows vs. places. It is argued that these conventional conceptualizations 
of space obscure the real relations involved in that process by underplaying the extent to 
which these may transcend boundaries and constitute spaces that are not geographically 
continuous and bounded. In contrast, this research has sought to see policy-making – or, in 
other words, the production of discourse and the exercise of power – through the workings of 
actors across and through space, in a politics of reach through which they seek to overcome 
distances and access arenas. In fact, apart from drawing on human geography debates on 
scale and relationality, the terms discursive and power arenas have been proposed, inspired 
by Linnros and Hallin (2001), to refer to those spaces through which policy-making takes 
place. However, this approach has also demonstrated that scale must not be dismissed and in 
fact plays an important role in policy-making through its framing of discourse production 
and the exercise of power. Indeed, the adoption of a relational understanding of space does 
not reject the notion of scale, but considers that it must be established not a priori but 
through empirical analysis. 
By decoupling who is involved in policy-making from the spaces through which they 
achieve discursive or episodic agency influence, this spatial approach also provides a better 
critical insight into who gains and who loses in the policy process. The nation-state story-
line, for instance, does not simply represent in an unproblematic manner the views of its 
citizenry, but represents a particular view promoted by certain actors actively involved in its 
production and reproduction. Likewise, it is not the Basque Autonomous Community as a 
whole that managed to influence the policy process, but particular Basque Governments and 
political parties. However, it may be argued that, in a policy issue such as rail infrastructure 
planning, where in principle the means and resources available are concentrated among a 
limited number of actors, the adoption of such an approach is not as insightful as in more 
complex topics such as regional governance (e.g. Allen and Cochrane, 2007). Yet the 
differentiation of spatial relations that transnational high-speed rail implies nevertheless 
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points at the value of a relational approach to space, since actors within a certain scalar frame 
will be discursively and materially related to sets of relations of different reach. In other 
words, rather than seeing trans-European relations as advancing a wider interest, they 
should be regarded as related to particular sets of actors. This leads to the democratic 
implications of transnational HSR politics as revealed by the research results. 
 
9.3.2 Democratic challenges revealed by the three-dimensional approach to 
policy-making  
As introduced in Section 1.1.2, the conventional notion of the nation-state as the legitimate 
scale of politics is based on the establishment of a fundamental link between its territory and 
a people or nation. Assuming this notion and notwithstanding the growth of transnationalism 
and the existence of other nationalisms,12 the Vitoria-Irun HSR line policy process does not 
pose important democratic concerns in terms of episodic agency power. Most of the 
instances of power exercise that led to a policy outcome occurred in nation-state arenas. In 
addition, manipulation has been exercised, but other ‘soft’ modes of power such as 
persuasion and negotiation and, in particular, the authority of the Spanish Government, 
which works through recognition, have been prevalent. Although contestation groups and 
parties have seemingly been manipulated by the Basque Government or its ruling party, the 
vast majority of the elected representatives supported the project, at least at nation-state and 
regional state arenas. Within the Spanish nation-state arenas, however, one concern with the 
unequal influence of subnational actors must be highlighted. Access to the Spanish 
legislature by nationalist parties entail the potential direct influence of regional actors, a 
possibility that does not exist for Autonomous Communities with no nationalist parties 
present in it. Apart from this conventional idea of the nation-state as the appropriate scale for 
a democratic politics, regional/local, particularly non-state, actors had a limited influence in 
the policy process. 
What seems to have been more controversial is discourse production. From a 
constructionist and interpretative point of view, the issue with the hegemony of discourse is 
not the extent to which it is detrimental to the ‘real’ interests of the less powerful, since these 
cannot be determined from outside their own terms of discourse.13 Rather, the concern is 
about how the hegemonic construction of the problem has been constructed and by whom. In 
                                                     
 
12 See footnote 3 in Chapter 1. 
13 As noted in Section 3.2.1, the notion of ‘real interests’ has been used by Lukes (2005, p. 28) in his 
three-dimensional view of power, which was dismissed precisely due to its conflict with a social 
constructionist perspective.  
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this respect, two particular aspects are worthwhile of attention: the representations of space 
in discourse and the role of the private sector in discourse production and transformation. 
With respect to the first one, it has been explained how the spaces of concern of the 
hegemonic developmental discourse’s story-lines were defined in scalar and spatial 
continuity terms (fundamentally the BAC, the Spanish nation-state and the European Union). 
This consideration of the spaces of concern masks the diversity within them and implies that 
the benefits would be obtained homogeneously throughout it. Therefore, the presence of 
scale in discourse may be perverse: territories are diverse within, they do not constitute 
actors in themselves, as Colomb et al., building on Oriol Nel·lo, highlight in a recent 
working paper on devolution and independence in Europe: 
‘They [geographers and planners] can unpack the fraught spatial metaphors, which have taken a central role 
in political, media and popular debates and which are often used to mask the reality that it is not territories 
which compete, but social groups, economic interests and political projects’ (Colomb et al., 2014, p. 11 
original emphasis).14 
Story-lines, according to the results of this research, therefore conceal not only possible 
incoherencies within the discourse but also – potentially – the diversity of actors associated 
to their spaces of concern. In fact, the basic narratives that constitute story-lines seem to be 
complemented by simplified spatial understandings (based on scale and continuity) and 
associated to the discursive arenas in which these story-lines were produced and 
transformed. However, the need to constitute a collective subject in order to achieve 
discursive hegemony may also have played a role in their definition. The concept of myth, as 
Hajer (2003) has suggested, contributes to this constitution: a ‘dystopian myth’, represented 
for instance by the isolation of Basque society from European integration, ‘makes people 
cohere to avoid a catastrophe’ (Hajer, 2003, p. 105). The fact that the spaces of concern 
frequently correspond with the spaces of political representation (e.g. in the nation-state and 
subnational story-lines) adds importance to the democratic concern that this concealment of 
diversity implies. The challenge would then be to disentangle the various groups and 
interests tightly wound in story-lines and to develop alternative, spatially differentiated 
story-lines that take into account and reflect such heterogeneity. 
Secondly, the production of the hegemonic discourse was characterized by an important 
presence and – at least in some cases – influence of private sector actors. The influence of 
the private sector in the emergence of a discourse supporting the development of 
transnational transport networks has been pointed out on several occasions (Jensen and 
                                                     
 
14 Similarly, Marcuse (2005) has warned of the perverse political implications of using the term 
‘cities’ as if they were actors, components of globalization or unified aggregate groups. 
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Richardson, 2004, pp. 73–75; Peters, 2003a), and indeed the presence of the ERT, the CER 
and other private sector organizations as the only non-state actors in the High-Level Group 
on a trans-European HSR network is remarkable. However, this discursive relationship 
between state actors and the private sector was also present in Spanish and Basque discursive 
arenas, fundamentally through informal networks. The specific influence of the Spanish 
construction lobby on the emergence of the nation-state story-line could not be 
demonstrated, but Basque industrial actors, in particular the Chamber of Commerce of 
Bilbao, were active and important in promoting the subnational story-line. It is true that the 
majority of political representatives supported and practiced – in other words, reproduced – 
the developmental discourse, but from a discursive approach the democratic nature of 
politics should not be evaluated through the reproduction of discourse, but through its 
production and transformation. 
In short, if the policy process is seen in terms of the exercise of power, this research has 
not led to worrying results on the influence of non-elected institutions or interest groups. The 
fact that power was effectively exercised mainly through authority and through arenas 
associated to the Spanish nation-state is not problematic if the conventional notion of this 
space being the natural frame for a democratic politics is adopted. In addition, the influence 
of central state actors and, to a lesser extent, of subnational state ones entails that the 
‘democratic deficit’ attributed to EU policy-making due to, among other factors, its lack of 
accountability and distance from citizens (Føllesdal and Hix, 2006; Weiler et al., 1995) is not 
a significant issue here. The principle of subsidiarity, which as noted in Section 1.1.2 sought 
to find a balance between the effectiveness and legitimacy of policy, was insufficient to 
ensure the completion of EU priority projects by their planned date and satisfy the 
expectations of the European Commission. Similarly, the lack of influence of cross-border 
and transnational arrangements, such as the Atlantic networks of association in which 
subnational state and private sector actors engaged, confirms the prevalence of the 
traditional, territorial spaces of representative democracy. Nevertheless, both the potential of 
scale to conceal diversity within the spaces represented by it and the significantly uneven 
access to discursive arenas by non-state actors pose important concerns about the democratic 
nature of transnational infrastructure policy-making. 
 
9.3.3 Directions for further research 
On the basis of the research undertaken for this thesis, three avenues for further work are 
suggested: one related to the actual research results; another that refers to more recent 
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developments; and a final one on theory building for the analysis of transnational transport 
infrastructure and, more generally, spatial politics.  
Firstly, the results of the analysis of the policy process of the Vitoria-Irun HSR line 
point at some particular topics that, due to the scope of the thesis, have not been fully 
addressed. A first, potentially productive one is the production of discourse that transcends 
the case studied. This refers not just to the European story-line (Section 6.2.3), which has 
been addressed elsewhere in various ways (Jensen and Richardson, 2004; Hajer, 2000; 
Peters, 2003a), but also the nation-state story-line (see Section 6.2.2), about which there is no 
agreement on whether it is underpinned by a radial or a networked conception of 
infrastructure development. Moreover, further attention to subnational actors may result in 
fascinating accounts of regionalist spatial imaginaries, as Prytherch’s (2010) work on 
Catalonia shows. Also in discursive terms, research on other contestation movements would 
provide insights into the possible discursive overlap in terms not only of content (e.g. by 
presenting alter-globalization features) but also of spatiality (i.e. whether or not they are also 
based on the idea of proximity), and therefore into the potential for building trans-local 
discourse coalitions. A second topic for further research concerns the influence of actors in 
the policy process. In this respect, additional attention to the role of subnational actors would 
complement the findings obtained for the singular Spanish case. The focus on the French 
section of the Vitoria-Dax link, where some evidence was found of regionally-caused delays, 
would permit a direct comparison with the case studied here. Moreover, although 
transnational networks of association have not been found to be influential in this case, their 
relevance in constituting political spaces that transcend the nation-state deserves careful 
attention and possibly further research to test this thesis’ results. A possible and comparable 
case could be the Mediterranean Arc transnational cooperation area (Durà i Guimerà and 
Oliveras González, 2013). 
The second direction for further research concerns those recent developments that may 
have important implications for the results presented in this thesis. In this respect, two main 
issues may be identified. As briefly explained in the postscript on the 2006-2014 period, the 
‘deepening’ of European integration continues and there are signs of a growing importance 
of EU institutions in transnational infrastructure development, although they were not 
addressed in detail in the thesis. Secondly, the extent to which the current economic 
downturn will contribute to discourse transformation remains to be seen. Concerning the 
Vitoria-Irun line, it seems to have slowed down the implementation of the project due to a 
reduction of the resources available, yet it does not appear to have fundamentally challenged 
the principles of the developmental discourse. Nevertheless, critical reports on HSR 
development are now being produced beyond the academic environment and contestation 
movements. In October 2014, the French Court of Auditors released a report which calls for 
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greater guarantees of relevance and profitability in promoting new high-speed rail projects in 
the light of a biased decision-making process and the unsustainable cost of the French HSR 
system (Cour des Comptes, 2014), and in March 2015 the Spanish think tank FEDEA 
presented an analysis on the Spanish HSR corridors in operation in 2013 that concluded that 
none of them were financially or socially profitable (Betancor and Llobet, 2015).15 As key 
agents of knowledge production, the intervention in the public debate of experts not 
specifically linked to contestation movements might prompt discourse transformation. 
Finally, a third avenue for further works involves the refinement of the theoretical 
framework. A first task would be to correct the drawbacks pointed out in Section 9.3.1, 
fundamentally a clearer integration of the role of interests in the production of discourse and 
the inclusion of the capacity of actors to exercise power as a variable in actually influencing 
behaviour. Yet probably more valuable would be to advance a more thorough theorization of 
the role of space in the policy process. This would on the one hand clarify the relevance of 
distance in this process and the actors’ necessity – or lack thereof – to overcome it in order to 
pursue their interests, yet more significantly it would devote detailed attention to the 
characteristics of arenas and their links with the outcomes of the policy process in terms of 
both discourse production and exercise of power. This would provide a sounder critical basis 
for the study of transport infrastructure politics and would contribute to the wider body of 
work that seeks to integrate space in the study of social and political processes. 
  
                                                     
 
15 FEDEA is a think tank on applied economics sponsored by some of the main Spanish banks and 
Spanish-based companies (e.g. Santander and Repsol). 
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Appendix A. Data collection 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, data collection for the case study consisted of two distinct 
periods. The first one involved the systematic online search of relevant documents, which 
resulted in the collection of a significant amount of the total number of official documents 
and newspaper articles and of the entirety of the parliamentary proceedings. The second 
period involved a series of fieldtrips intended for collecting the remaining documentary data 
and to conduct the necessary interviews. These fieldtrips, which in total encompassed around 
three months, were undertaken in three distinct periods: 
 
• Basque Autonomous Community (BAC) (11-15 September 2011) 
• BAC (26 November 2011-22 December 2011) and Madrid (8 January 2012-5 
February 2012) 
• BAC (6 May 2012-20 May 2012) and Madrid (20 May 2012-2 June 2012) 
 
The purpose of the first fieldwork period was to ensure the adequacy of the case and the 
feasibility of its study. Four interviews were carried out and several sites relevant to the case 
were visited. The second and third fieldwork periods involved the collection of the 
documentary data not available online and the conduction of the majority of interviews. As 
data was being collected, it was systematically organized in order to facilitate its later 
retrieval and analysis. The following sections provide more details on the collection of each 
type of data. 
Fieldwork involved a certain level of direct observation of environmental conditions 
(Yin, 2009, p. 109). I visited the three main stations of the line (which had information 
centres on the project), the cities in which they are located (Bilbao, San Sebastián, and 
Vitoria-Gasteiz), and three towns bypassed by the infrastructure (Amorebieta-Etxano, 
Durango, and Ordizia). The settings of the interviews (government or other types of offices, 
universities, cafés, etc.) also provided information of the environment where actors develop 
their activities. However, since this direct observation was not done in a systematic and 
significant manner as its relationship with the research questions is not clear, it has not been 
used as a research method. 
 
Official documents 
Apart from those documents obtained through online means, policy output, policy-making, 
and communication documents were accessed through three publicly accessible 
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documentation centres: the Library of the Spanish Railways Foundation (Madrid); the 
Transport Documentation Centre of the Ministry of Public Works (Madrid); and the 
Environmental Documentation Centre of Ekologistak Martxan16 (Bilbao). In some instances 
documents were provided by interviewees (e.g. communication outputs) and in one case a 
written request was made in order to access a specific document (a feasibility study on the 
high-speed rail line) that was not publicly available anymore. When possible documents 
were digitalized fully or partly, either directly or by previously photocopying them, in order 
to facilitate their storage and analysis. 
 
Newspaper articles 
The collection of this type of documents focused on two newspapers: the Spanish El País 
and the Basque El Correo. El País is the highest-circulation daily newspaper in Spain 
(Información y Control de Publicaciones, 2012) and has a specific section on the Basque 
Autonomous Community since 1997. In turn, El Correo is a Bilbao-based newspaper with 
the seventh highest circulation of all the general information daily newspapers in Spain 
(Información y Control de Publicaciones, 2012). It was selected as an additional source that 
could provide more detailed evidence on subnational developments. The possibility of using 
a European source of news (EUobserver) was considered, yet after a pilot search it was 
discarded due to the limited results obtained. 
Data collection proceeded first through online means. All articles from El País were 
obtained through the newspaper’s online archive and the LexisNexis database (the latter only 
available from 1996). In terms of El Correo, only those articles published in 2006 were 
available online, so the majority of them (from the period 1986-2005) were collected in the 
Library of the Provincial Council of Bizkaia, in Bilbao, through either microfiches or CD-
ROM (the latter option available from 2004 onward). The procedure for locating the articles 
at this library was as follows: a number of months when key events had happened were 
sampled (a total of 17) and subsequently the newspaper was checked manually for each day 
of such months. 
In addition, a number of articles from different sources were also accessed by other 
means. The Environmental Documentation Centre in Bilbao holds a selection of materials 
relevant to the case from different newspapers. These materials were particularly useful to 
obtain the editorial views of other newspapers. Moreover, interviewees occasionally 
                                                     
 
16 Basque environmental association. According to its website, the Documentation Centre is supported 
by the Bilbao City Council and occasionally by the Basque Government. 
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mentioned specific articles such as editorials or opinion pieces, which if relevant were later 
searched for online. The table below summarizes the collection of El País, El Correo, and 
other newspapers’ articles. 
Table 3. Newspaper article collection 
Newspaper Time frame Source Type of search 
El País 1986-2006 
Newspaper's online library and 
LexisNexis 
Keyword search: red ferroviaria (rail 
network) 
El Correo 
1986-2005 
Library of the Provincial Council 
of Bizkaia (Bilbao) 
Checked months were key events had 
occurred 
2006 Online newspaper library 
Keyword search: red ferroviaria (rail 
network) 
Others 1986-2006 
Environmental Documentation 
Centre (Bilbao) 
Other newspapers’ online archives 
Documents related to the project 
 
Parliamentary proceedings 
Parliamentary proceedings focused on the Spanish Congress of Deputies and the Basque 
Parliament. The Congress of Deputies (Congreso de los Diputados) is the lower house of 
Spain’s legislature (the Cortes Generales) and has greater powers than the Senate (Senado), 
the upper house. In turn, the Basque Parliament is the legislature of the Basque Autonomous 
Community. The activity in both legislatures (for both plenary sessions and thematic 
committees) is transcribed verbatim and made fully available through their respective online 
archives, a fact that facilitated enormously their collection. The types of proceedings 
gathered mainly comprise debates on non-legislative motions, written and oral questions to 
the government, and appearances of the government before the plenary or a thematic 
committee. The online search was carried out with the use of a number of keywords that 
included “alta velocidad” (high speed), “redes transeuropeas” (trans-European networks), 
and “País Vasco” (Basque Country), among others. A total of 118 relevant initiatives were 
accessed (64 from the Congress of Deputies and 54 from the Basque Parliament). 
 
Interviews 
The first step of interview data collection involved the identification of potential 
interviewees. This was done through the purposeful sampling (Miles and Huberman, 1994, 
p. 28) of interviewees that represented the wide range of actors related to the case whilst 
providing relevant and useful information on it. Thus, the preferred individuals either had 
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occupied a position of responsibility in the studied policy process, represented organizations 
concerned with the project, or had a valuable knowledge of the case due to an extensive 
involvement in it. Therefore, target interviewees included senior officials and politicians in 
the European Commission, the Spanish government, and the Basque government, Members 
of Parliament involved in thematic committees relevant to the case, individuals involved in 
business bodies, political parties, trade unions, and other types of organizations, and experts. 
The standard procedure for arranging interviews consisted first in approaching the 
prospective interviewees by e-mail and following up with phone calls in case there was no 
reply. In some occasions access to interviewees was gained through contacts made in the 
course of the research.  
A total of 36 semi-structured interviews were carried out, all of them in Spanish. They 
generally lasted between 45 and 60 minutes and were conducted face to face, one on one, 
and on a single occasion. Apart from being easier to record, Bryman (2008, p. 457) notes 
that face-to-face interviewing is better suited than telephone interviewing for qualitative, 
long interviews and it also allows to observe the interviewee’s body language. There were 
however some exceptions: in two instances the interview was conducted telephonically due 
to the lack of direct access to the interviewee (one of them in three different dates according 
to the interviewee’s availability); and in other two cases they were carried out with two 
participants, following a suggestion by the contacted individuals. Three of these 36 
interviews, conducted during the first fieldtrip, were planned to obtain an overview of the 
case from the perspectives of different actors or ‘helicopters’ (Hajer, 2006, p. 73). Appendix 
B presents a list of the interviews conducted, including these ‘helicopter interviews’ and a 
series of informal conversations with individuals that provided guidance on accessing 
information and in some cases further contacts. 
The interviews were conducted following an interview protocol (Creswell, 2009, p. 
183) or guide (Bryman, 2008, p. 442) tailored to each case, which contained a limited 
number of open-ended questions referring to the research questions. In addition to this, the 
protocol included a heading with key information on the interview and interviewee, a 
reminder of issues to address before starting the interview, and a list of relevant key events 
or phases. A sample of the interview protocols used is provided in Table 4. Before starting 
each interview, I summarized the purpose of the study, introduced the format and length of 
the interview, explained the use of the data to be obtained, and agreed with the interviewee 
whether his or her contribution would be kept anonymous or not. The majority of the 
interviews were audio-recorded following agreement with the interviewee and in all cases 
notes were taken during them. Although recording interviews may prevent respondents from 
expressing their views comfortably (Bryman, 2008, p. 452), among other advantages it 
allows the researcher to focus on the interview, it helps to avoid bias in interpreting the 
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interviewees’ answers, and it facilitates their more systematic analysis (Bryman, 2008, p. 
451). Immediately after each interview I made notes of the first impressions about it, the 
main issues that emerged, and the tasks to follow up (e.g. accessing new documents or 
contacting new prospective interviewees). Finally, the interviews were fully transcribed 
word for word. 
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Table 4. Sample interview protocol (translated from Spanish) 
Interviewee José Luis Burgos Date and place 16 May 2012, Bilbao 
Relevant 
position 
Deputy Minister for Transport (1987-1991). Basque Government - Ministry of 
Transport and Public Works. 
(Provide description of research and interview) 
(Agree on anonymity and recording) 
1. Discourse 
 
• What was the positioning of the Basque Government with respect to the project? 
 
• Type of line: 
• Type of traffic (passengers, goods) 
• Relations (interregional, intrarregional) 
 
• Modes of transport: roads; rail; high-speed rail; aircraft. 
 
• Did it change over time? Why? 
2. Power  
 
• How did a certain policy change come about? What or who prompted it? 
 
• How was the interaction with: 
 
• Basque institutions (Basque Parliament)? 
• Other Basque actors (political parties, Chamber of Commerce, etc.)?  
• Nation-state institutions (Spanish Government) 
 
• Which was their role? 
Main phases / events 
 
• 1987 – Rail Plan of the Basque Country. Santa Águeda corridor. 
 
• 1988 – Gauge change and introduction of high-speed rail in Spain 
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Appendix B. List of interviews 
Type of actor Interviewee Organization and most relevant position(s)* Date(s) Recorded 
 
Informal conversations / meetings 
State actor 
Juan Sánchez 
Agüero 
Basque Government - Ministry of Transport and 
Public Works 
• Engineer 
29.07.2011 
No (phone 
conversation) 
State actor 
Juan Carlos 
Huertas de Andrés 
Government of Spain - Ministry of Development 
• Deputy Director General for Infrastructure 
Planning and Transport 
27.01.2012 No (meeting) 
State actor 
Carlos García 
Salvador 
Government of Spain - Ministry of Development 
• Directorate-General for Rail Infrastructures 
30.01.2012 No (meeting) 
State actor 
Pablo Vázquez 
Ruiz de Castroviejo 
Government of Spain - Ministry of Development 
• Transport adviser. Permanent representation of 
Spain before the European Union (1993-1998) 
30.01.2012 
No (phone 
conversation) 
Expert 
José Manuel 
Vassallo Magro 
Technical University of Madrid  
• Senior Lecturer/Reader, Transportation 
Department, Civil Engineering School 
23.05.2012 No (meeting) 
      
‘Helicopter interviews’ 
1 Expert José Allende Landa 
University of the Basque Country 
• Professor of Urban and Regional Planning 
13.09.2011 Yes 
2 
Non-state 
political 
actor 
Anonymous 
Asamblea contra el TAV 
• Former member 
AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana 
• Member  
14.09.2011 Yes 
3 Journalist Luis López 
El Correo 
• Writer / journalist 
12.09.2011 No 
Interviews         
4 State actor 
Alfonso González-
Finat 
European Commission 
• Director of Transeuropean Networks, Directorate 
General Energy & Transport (2000-2004) 
• Responsible for Transeuropean Networks (1996-
1999) 
• Head of Unit, Networks and Transport 
Infrastructure (1991-1995) 
25.01.2012 Yes 
5 State actor Anonymous 
European Commission 
• Former official, Directorate General Transport and 
Energy 
18.02.2012; 
20.02.2012; 
15.03.2012 
No; no; yes 
(phone 
interview) 
6 State actor 
Emilio Pérez 
Touriño 
Government of Spain - Ministries of Public Works 
and Transport 
• Senior positions in the 1985-1994 period, including 
Secretary General for Land Transport Infrastructures 
(1991-1994) 
Government of Galicia 
• President (2005-2009) 
10.04.2012 Yes 
7 State actor 
Antonio M. López 
Corral 
Government of Spain - Ministry of Development 
• Director General for Economic Programming 
(2000-2004). Member of the Van Miert High Level 
Group 
30.05.2012 Yes 
8 State actor 
Víctor Morlán 
Gracia 
Government of Spain - Ministry of Development 
• Secretary of State for Planning and Infraestructures 
(2004-2011) 
Congress of Deputies 
• Member (1986-2008). PSOE 
26.01.2012 Yes 
9 State actor Anonymous 
Government of Spain - Ministry of Development 
• Senior official, Directorate-General for Rail 
Infrastructures 
28.05.2012 Yes 
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10 
State actor 
Expert 
Antonio Monfort 
Bernat 
Government of Spain - Ministries of Public Works 
and Transport 
• Senior positions in the 1985-2005 period, including 
Director General for Rail Transport Infrastructures 
(1994-1996) 
INECO 
• Several positions since the 1980s, including 
Director General (2005-2010) 
29.05.2012 Yes 
11 
State actor 
Expert 
Casimiro Iglesias 
Pérez 
Government of Spain - Ministries of Public Works 
and Transport 
• Senior positions in the 1994-2008 period, including 
Director General for Planning and Territorial 
Coordination (2005-2008) 
INECO 
• Director of Consulting (2009-) 
22.05.2012 Yes 
12 State actor Pere Macias i Arau 
Congress of Deputies 
• Member (2008-). CiU 
Government of Catalonia 
• Minister for Spatial Policy and Public Works 
(1997-2001) 
• Minister for the Environment (1996-1997) 
29.05.2012 Yes 
13 State actor 
Leopoldo Barreda 
de los Ríos 
Congress of Deputies 
Member (2011-). PP 
Basque Parliament  
• Member (1990-2011). Basque Popular Group 
11.05.2012 Yes 
14 State actor 
José Luis Burgos 
Cid 
Basque Government - Ministry of Transport and 
Public Works,  
• Deputy Minister for Transport (1987-1991) 
16.05.2012 Yes 
15 State actor 
Álvaro Amann 
Rabanera 
Basque Government - Ministry of Transport and 
Public Works 
• Minister (1998-2005). EAJ-PNV 
Basque Parliament 
• Member (1990-1999) 
13.12.2011 Yes 
16 
State actor 
Private 
sector actor 
Nuria López de 
Guereñu 
Basque Government - Ministry of Transport and 
Public Works 
• Minister (2005-2009). EAJ-PNV 
Confebask  
• Secretary General (2010-) 
19.12.2011 Yes 
17 State actor 
Francisco José 
Ormazábal 
Zamarkona 
Basque Government - Ministry of Spatial Planning, 
Housing and Environment 
• Minister (1995-2001). Eusko Alkartasuna 
Basque Parliament 
• Member (1980-1995; 1998-99). Eusko Alkartasuna 
19.12.2011 Yes 
18 State actor 
Iñigo Palomino 
Zubiaurre 
Basque Government - Ministry of Transport and 
Public Works 
• Director for Transport (2005-2007). Coordinator of 
the Transport Group of the Atlantic Arc Commission 
(CRPM) 
15.05.2012 Yes 
19 State actor 
José Manuel 
Bujanda Arizmendi 
Basque Government - Ministry of Transport and 
Public Works 
• Head of Minister's Cabinet (2006-2009) 
PLAE 
• Director (2005-2007) 
11.05.2012 No 
20 State actor 
Julio Herrero 
Romero 
Basque Parliament 
• Member (1986-1995). Basque Socialist Group 
14.12.2011 Yes 
21 State actor 
Gonzalo Machín 
Espósito 
Basque Parliament  
• Member (1998-2005). Basque Popular Group 
01.12.2011 Yes 
22 
State actor 
Non-state 
political 
actor 
Oskar Matute 
García de Jalón 
Basque Parliament 
• Member (2002-2009). Ezker Batua-Berdeak 
Ezker Batua-Berdeak 
• Former Coordinator of the Chairmanship 
21.12.2011 Yes 
23 
State actor 
Non-state 
political 
actor 
Iñaki Antigüedad 
Auzmendi 
Basque Parliament  
• Member (1990-1994; 1998-2001). Several Basque 
left nationalist groups 
AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana 
• Member (2001-) 
17.05.2012 Yes 
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24 
Private 
sector actor 
José María Duelo 
Marcos 
SEOPAN 
• Director of Economic Studies 
23.05.2012 Yes 
Alicia Revenga 
Martínez de Pazos 
SEOPAN 
• Manager of Export Group 
25 
Private 
sector actor 
Anonymous 
Chamber of Commerce of Bilbao 
• Senior representative 
10.05.2012 Yes 
26 
Non-state 
political 
actor 
José Luis Ordóñez 
Izquierda Unida 
• Coordinator of the Ecology and Environment 
Federal Area 
Coordinadora Estatal en Defensa del Ferrocarril 
Público 
• Spokesperson  
29.05.2012 
Yes 
(phone 
interview) 
27 
Non-state 
political 
actor 
Santos Núñez del 
Campo 
Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) 
• Former engineer of the Transport Federation 
22.05.2012 Yes 
28 
Non-state 
political 
actor 
Mikel Noval 
ELA 
•  Coordinator for the Environment 
15.05.2012 Yes 
29 
Non-state 
political 
actor 
Josu Xabier 
Larrinaga Arza 
EHNE 
• Technical Coordinator of Bizkaia 
30.11.2011 Yes 
30 
Non-state 
political 
actor 
Francisco Segura 
Ecologistas en Acción 
• Transport Coordinator 
17.01.2012 Yes 
31 
Non-state 
political 
actor 
Iñaki Bárcena 
Hinojal 
Ekologistak Martxan 
• Member 
05.12.2011 Yes 
32 
Non-state 
political 
actor 
Juan José Álvarez 
Rubio 
Eurobask 
• Secretary General 
09.12.2011 Yes 
33 Expert 
Javier Bustinduy 
Fernández 
BB&J Consult 
• Director General 
24.01.2012 Yes 
34 Expert Antxon Olabe 
A. Olabe Ambiental 
• Partner 
05.12.2011 Yes 
35 Expert 
Roberto Bermejo 
Gómez de Segura 
University of the Basque Country  
• Senior Lecturer/Reader, Sustainable Economics 
13.09.2011 Yes 
36 Expert 
Ignacio Alcalde 
Marcos 
Fundación Metrópoli  
• Vice President 
Taller de Ideas  
• Director of Urbanism 24.01.2012 Yes 
Gabriel Escobar 
Gómez 
Taller de Ideas  
• Director of Spatial Planning 
 
* Unless indicated otherwise, the positions refer to the time of the interview. 
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Appendix C. Data analysis 
The analysis of data to answer the three research questions was developed independently for 
each of them, according to the respective dimension of the analytical framework. This 
appendix provides details on how this analysis was conducted, with a particular emphasis on 
the process of coding used to reduce the data into the necessary themes. When coding, apart 
from the specific codes used for each of the three dimensions, all data were coded as either 
‘case-related’ (when referring to the Vitoria-Irun HSR line) or ‘context-related’ (those with a 
broader scope) in order to prioritize the analysis. 
 
Discourse analysis 
The discourse analysis of data was broadly based on the ten steps suggested by Hajer (2006, 
pp. 73–74): desk research; ‘helicopter interviews’; document analysis; interviews with key 
players; sites of argumentation; analyze for positioning effects; identification of key 
incidents; analysis of practices in particular cases of argumentation; interpretation; and 
second visit to key actors. Due to time constraints and the limited availability of 
interviewees, however, this last stage was not carried out. More specifically, the conducted 
analysis consisted of: 
1. A first reading of documents and a preliminary coding based on the actual content of 
data. Documents included interviews, newspaper articles, a selection of official 
documents, and a selection of parliamentary proceedings. 
Examples of codes: ‘marginalization’; ‘economic competitiveness’; ‘balanced development’. 
2. A preliminary definition of structuring discourses and story-lines based on the 
examination of the coded data. 
3. Confirmation and qualification of this definition through the merging of the first list of 
codes in new categories based on the identified discourses and story-lines and the 
interactions between them. When necessary, second-order codes were used to refer, for 
instance, to the emergence of a story-line or to its discursive practices. 
Examples of codes: ‘marginalization story-line’; ‘developmental discourse’; ‘developmental vs. 
antagonistic discourse’. 
4. Write-up of the basic discursive structures and dynamics. This allowed the refinement of 
the content of discourse and the identification of positioning effects (e.g. ‘contestation is 
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against progress’) and of key incidents in the discursive dynamics (e.g. the emergence of 
a story-line). 
5. Detailed analysis of particular instances of argumentative exchange. These were the 
debates in the Basque Parliament between 1998 and 2006 (a total of ten debates, nine in 
plenary sessions and one in a parliamentary committee). 
 
Analysis of episodic agency power 
1. Write-up of a first section on the standing conditions (means and resources) framing the 
exercise of power. 
2. Coding of those data that showed signs of influence in all newspaper articles and semi-
structured interviews. It was carried out according to specific periods and general issues. 
• Examples of codes: ‘1986-1989’; ‘1989-1994’; ‘developments in other nation-states’; ‘subnational 
issues’. 
3. Individual analysis of the different periods and issues identified. Development of a first 
narrative and identification of episodes (when a change in the characteristics of the high-
speed rail project or in the course of events occurred) through newspaper articles and 
official documents. The scope of the episodes was kept fairly wide to avoid a narrow 
focus in the analysis. 
• Examples of codes: ‘Ep. 2. Change to HSR and UIC track gauge’; ‘Ep. 5. Start of construction through 
tender of works’. 
4. Establishment of causal relationships through the analysis of interviews. The theoretical 
categories proposed in the analytical framework were used, but no further coding was 
carried out. 
 
Spatiality of policy-making 
1. Review and re-coding, when relevant to the spatiality of discourse production and of the 
exercise of power, of the data coded for the previous two analyses. The codes referred to 
either discursive structures (the different discourses and story-lines) or to the arenas 
through which discourse was produced and power exercised. 
Examples of codes: ‘space in social train story-line’; ‘nation-state power arenas’. 
288 
 
2. Analysis of the data coded in the previous phase. The analysis resulted in the 
identification of spaces of concern and of reliance, but no new codes were developed.  
3. Establishment of relationships between the spatial categories applied and both the 
production of discourse and the exercise of power. When necessary, non-coded data were 
accessed and coded. 
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Appendix D. Ethical considerations 
As a social sciences-based piece of research with a focus on the politics of transport 
infrastructure development, it included the conduction of interviews with actors related to 
varying degrees to this process and the use of materials produced by them. Since it involved 
living human participants and data derived from them, an important aspect of the research 
endeavour was to ensure that it was conducted ethically. This section details the steps taken 
for this purpose. 
Widely accepted ethical standards in research are the informed consent by the 
participants, the balancing of the risk to participants and the potential benefit to the wider 
community, and the right of participants to remain confidential (UCL, 2015). In general 
terms, participants were fully informed about the study and the use that would be made of 
the data obtained from the interviews, and the disclosure or otherwise of their identities was 
agreed with them. The risk to participants was moderate, yet in any case I endeavoured to 
help them make an informed decision about their participation. In addition, data was kept 
strictly confidential and undisclosed. Access to it was restricted to the researcher and was 
stored securely. Further details of the measures adopted with respect to participants and the 
risks and benefits involved in the research project are provided below. 
 
Measures concerning participants 
Since the documents used were or had been publicly available, the ethical questions with 
regard to participants concerned the interviewees. A total of 38 adults were interviewed, 
following the sampling procedure described in Appendix A, plus a number of informal 
conversations that were not used in the analysis were carried out. The interviewees were 
actors from state institutions, private sector and non-state political organizations, and 
experts. The research did not involve children or vulnerable adults such as individuals with 
mental health problems or with learning disabilities, the elderly, prisoners or young 
offenders. No payment or incentive was made to the research participants except a drink 
when the interview took place in a public place such as a cafe.  
When addressing potential and actual interviewees, an effort was made to fully inform 
them of the nature of the study and the use of the information obtained through the 
interviews. They were first approached through e-mail or, in those limited cases where their 
address was not available, phone. If the e-mail was not replied, it was followed up with a 
phone call. When contacting potential participants, I introduced myself, explained the 
purposes of my research project and the interview, detailed the main characteristics of the 
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latter and the use that would be made of the data obtained from it, including the possibility of 
keeping it anonymous, and mentioned the dates when the interview could be held. In case of 
a positive response, the specific time and place of the interview was decided by the 
participant within the dates indicated. As mentioned in Appendix A, before the start of each 
interview I reminded the interviewee of the information provided in my initial contact and, 
on the basis of this, they verbally decided both whether the interview would be audio-
recorded or not and whether their contribution would be kept anonymous or not. I verbally 
agreed and complied with their decisions. 
In this respect, of the 38 individuals that participated in the 36 conducted interviews, 
four chose to remain anonymous. In these four cases I made every effort to guarantee that 
they could not be identified and that the data they provided could not be traced back to them. 
Accordingly, in the list of interviews (see Appendix B) these participants are named as 
‘Anonymous’ and their roles within their organizations are kept sufficiently undefined. In 
addition, when they were cited or quoted in the thesis, particular attention was given to 
guaranteeing that their anonymity was not compromised by the presentation of data obtained 
from their interviews. 
 
Risks and benefits to the researcher and the researched 
In the first place, the research did not pose particular risks to the researcher. However, basic 
precautions were taken when carrying out the research fieldwork, particularly in remote 
locations or at night (e.g. carrying a switched-on mobile phone). Secondly, the topic under 
study was expected to be sensitive due to the conflicts that surrounded the selected policy 
process in particular towards the end of the past decade, when numerous relevant actors were 
threatened and the Basque terrorist group ETA murdered one of them. Nevertheless, 
generally the response of potential participants was positive and they were keen to share 
their experiences and opinions. The improvement of the situation when the fieldwork started 
– ETA announced the end of its armed activity in October 2011 – appears to have 
contributed to this. In any case, the voluntary nature of the interview and the possibility of 
making their contribution anonymous were emphasized by the researcher both when first 
contacting them and before starting each interview. Apart from the contribution to studies on 
transport infrastructure development and politics, the research outputs may also provide a 
comprehensive and detailed narrative of a case to participants who have often been involved 
in it only partially. Thus, they may promote a reflexive understanding of the policy process 
studied and of the roles of the actors that participated in it. 
